Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State By Adugodi Police Station & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 49; [2024] 1 S.C.R. 623
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dipankar Datta
- Decided
- 22 Jan 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 335/2024
- Sections
- 12, 420, 173(8), 34, 173, 173(2), 482, 239, 415, 468, 471
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:23 am. Original source ↗
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* Author [2024] 1 S.C.R. 623 : 2024 INSC 49 Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr.
v.
State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 335 of 2024)
22 January 2024 [Surya Kant* and Dipankar Datta, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The crux of respondent No. 2’s allegations is that the appellants purportedly forged his signature on the passport application submitted to obtain the minor child’s passport. Whether the actions of the appellants prima facie constitute the offence of cheating u/s. 420 IPC; Whether there has been a prima facie case made out for forgery u/ss. 468 and 471 IPC; Whether there has been a violation of s.12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967; Whether in the absence of any new evidence found to substantiate the conclusions drawn by the investigating officer in the supplementary report, a Judicial Magistrate was compelled to take cognizance, as such a report lacked investigative rigour and failed to satisfy the requisites of s.173(8) Cr.P.C.
Headnotes Penal Code, 1860 – Cheating and Forgery – Appellants’ prayer to discharge them u/ss. 420, 468, 471, 120-B, 201 r/w. s.34 of IPC was dismissed by the High Court – Propriety:
Held: In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant-wife seems to have breached the notion of mutual marital trust and unauthorizedly projected respondent no. 2’s consent in obtaining the passport for their minor child – It, however, remains a question as to how such an act can be labelled as ‘deceitful’ – The motivations prompting either of the appellants to procure a passport for the minor child were not rooted in deceit – Furthermore, the grant of passport to the minor child did not confer any benefit upon the appellan-wife, nor did it result in any loss or damage to respondent no. 2 – In the same vein, appellant no. 2, being the father of the appellant-wife and assisting in securing the passport for the child, derived no direct or indirect benefit from this action – This grant can be best characterised as the minor 624 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports child’s acquisition of property – Since the gain by the minor child is not at the cost of any loss, damage or injury to respondent no. 2, both the fundamental elements of ‘deceit’ and ‘damage or injury’, requisite for constituting the offence of cheating are conspicuously absent in this factual scenario – As far as forgery is concerned, the offences of ‘forgery’ and ‘cheating’ intersect and converge, as the act of forgery is committed with the intent to deceive or cheat an individual – The determination of whether the appellants prepared a false document, by forging respondent no. 2’s signature, however, cannot be even prima facie ascertained at this juncture – Considering the primary ingredient of dishonest intention itself could not be established against the appellants, the offence of forgery too, has no legs to stand – The elementary ingredients of ‘cheating’ and ‘forgery’ are conspicuously missing – Thus, the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the appellants is nothing but an abuse of the process of law – The impugned judgments of the High Court and the trial Court are set aside. [Paras 16, 18, 20, 23, 34, 39] Passport Act, 1967 – s. 12(b) – Whether there was a violation of s.12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967:
Held: Section 12(b) categorically states that, whoever knowingly furnishes any false information or suppresses any material information, with a view to obtaining a passport or travel document under this Act or without lawful authority, alters or attempts to alter or causes to alter the entries made in a passport or travel document – As discernible from the language of the provision, what must be established is that the accused knowingly furnished false information or suppressed material information with the intent of obtaining a passport or travel document – In the instant case, it is crucial to consider that the State FSL report explicitly stated that the alleged forgery of respondent No. 2’s signatures on the passport application was inconclusive – Moreover, the cognizance of such like offence can be taken only at the instance of the Prescribed Authority – No complaint to that effect has been disclosed against the Appellants – The Court cannot proceed on the basis of conjectures and surmises.[Paras 35, 36] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 173 (8) – Respondent no. 2 invoked s.173(8) Cr.P.C. and sought further investigation of the offences u/ss. 468 and 471 IPC in the concerned FIR – Trial Magistrate allowed respondent no. 2’s prayer for further [2024] 1 S.C.R. 625Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr. investigation – Pursuant thereto, the investigating agency filed a supplementary charge-sheet against the appellants – Propriety:
Held: It is a matter of record that in the course of ‘further investigation’, no new material was unearthed by the investigating agency – Instead, the supplementary charge-sheet relies upon the Truth Lab report dated 15.07.2013, obtained by respondent no. 2, which was already available when the original chargesheet was filed – The term ‘further investigation’ stipulated in s.173(8) Cr.P.C. obligates the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station to ‘obtain further evidence, oral or documentary’, and only then forward a supplementary report regarding such evidence, in the prescribed form – The provision for submitting a supplementary report infers that fresh oral or documentary evidence should be obtained rather than re-evaluating or reassessing the material already collected and considered by the investigating agency while submitting the initial police report, known as the chargesheet u/s. 173(2) Cr.P.C. – In the absence of any new evidence found to substantiate the conclusions drawn by the investigating officer in the supplementary report, a Judicial Magistrate is not compelled to take cognizance, as such a report lacks investigative rigour and fails to satisfy the requisites of s.173(8) Cr.P.C. – The investigating agency acted mechanically, in purported compliance with the Trial Magistrate’s order. [Paras 26 and 27] Penal Code, 1860 – Cheating – Components of:
Held: It is paramount that in order to attract the provisions of s.420 IPC, the prosecution has to not only prove that the accused has cheated someone but also that by doing so, he has dishonestly induced the person who is cheated to deliver property – There are, thus, three components of this offence, i.e., (i) the deception of any person, (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person, and (iii) mens rea or dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement – There is no gainsaid that for the offence of cheating, fraudulent and dishonest intention must exist from the inception when the promise or representation was made. [Para 11] Penal Code, 1860 – Forgery – Components of:
Held: There are two primary components that need to be fulfilled in order to establish the offence of ‘forgery’, namely: (i) that the 626 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports accused has fabricated an instrument; and (ii) it was done with the intention that the forged document would be used for the purpose of cheating – Simply put, the offence of forgery requires the preparation of a false document with the dishonest intention of causing damage or injury. [Para 22] Case Law Cited Krishna Chawla v. State of UP [2021] 2 SCR 550:
(2021) 5 SCC 435; Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation [2011] 8 SCR 1: (2011) 5 SCC 708; Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali and others [2012] 13 SCR 1005:
(2013) 5 SCC 762; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another [1978] 2 SCR 621: (1978) 1 SCC 248; K.S.
Puttaswamy v. Union of India [2018] 8 SCR 1: (2019)
1 SCC 1 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, 6th Edition, Vol.1, pg.903 – referred to.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Passport Act, 1967.
List of Keywords Cheating; Components of cheating; Fraudulent intentions; Dishonest intentions; Deceit; Damage; Injury; Forgery; Components of forgery; Procedural irregularities; Abuse of the process of law; Further investigation; Supplementary charge-sheet; Fresh oral or documentary evidence.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.335 of 2024.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.02.2021 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLRP No.692 of 2018.
Appearances for Parties Ranbir Singh Yadav, Mohammed Sharookh, Prateek Yadav, Ms. Anzu K. Varkey, Ms. Mahesh Sharma, Ms. Chembugari Abheeshna, Advs. for the Appellants.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 627Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr. Narendra Hodda, Sr. Adv., Sanchit Garga, R. D. Singh, Ms. Mithu Jain, Kunal Rana, Pranshu Kaushal, Advs. for the Respondents. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Surya Kant, J.
Leave granted.
2. The Appellants assail the judgment dated 18.02.2021, passed by the High Court of Karnataka, at Bengaluru (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), whereby their Criminal Revision Petition challenging the order dated 15.03.2018 of the VI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru (hereinafter, ‘Trial Magistrate’) has been dismissed. Consequently, the Appellants’ prayer to discharge them in connection with FIR No. 141/2010 under Sections 420, 468, 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, ‘IPC’) registered at P.S. Adugodi, Bengaluru has been concurrently turned down.
A. FACTS
3. The brief facts that are relevant to the present proceedings are set out as follows:
3.1. The Appellant No. 1 – wife, and Respondent No. 2 – husband, got married in Bengaluru on 02.08.2007. At the time of their marriage, Respondent No. 2 was engaged in a software business, located in New Castle Upon Tyne, the United Kingdom. During this period, Respondent No. 2 statedly assured the Appellant – wife that post marriage they would reside together in London. It is the Appellants’ case that Respondent No. 2 initially refused to take the Appellant – wife with him, but after considerable persuasion, she managed to accompany Respondent No. 2 to London. However, soon after, Respondent No. 2 allegedly abandoned her and forcefully confined her to the residence of her sister-in-law. At the same time, Respondent No. 2 returned to India.
3.2. Appellant No. 2, who is the father of the Appellant – wife, had to intervene in the aforesaid circumstances and facilitate the latter’s return to India. Subsequently, on 02.06.2008, the Appellant 628 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports – wife gave birth to a male child. The Appellants allege that Respondent No. 2 and his family members did not provide any financial assistance to the Appellant – wife and the minor child. In January, 2009, the Appellant – wife sought to obtain a passport for the minor child based allegedly upon Respondent No. 2’s instructions. Respondent No. 2 also assured them that he had arranged their stay in the United Kingdom. Shortly thereafter, the minor child’s passport was issued, and Respondent No. 2 obtained a sponsorship letter from his brother-in-law, Dr. M.K. Shariff, which was duly forwarded to the United Kingdom High Commission. The sponsorship letter stated that Dr. M.K. Shariff would accommodate the Appellant – wife and the minor child during their visit to the United Kingdom and specifically mentioned the minor child’s passport number.
3.3. However, as per the allegations of the Appellants, the duration of marriage with Respondent No. 2 was fraught with physical and mental torture solely on account of Respondent No. 2’s relentless financial demands. More pertinently, Respondent No. 2, during his visit to India towards the end of 2009, subjected the Appellant – wife to coercion and torture. These acts of intimidation prompted the Appellant – wife to file a complaint against Respondent No. 2 and his family members on 07.04.2010 before the Basavangudi Women Police Station, Bengaluru. The complaint was registered as Crime No. 68 / 2010, under Sections 346, 498A and 506, read with Section 34 IPC. Additionally, the complaint alleges that Respondent No. 2, on the pretext of arranging for their travel to the United Kingdom, took away the minor child’s passport and jewellery items belonging to the Appellant – wife.
3.4. Having learnt of the complaint filed by his wife, Respondent No. 2 also lodged a complaint of his own on 13.05.2010 before the Adugodi Police Station, alleging that the Appellants had forged his signatures on the minor child’s passport application and submitted the same to the Regional Passport Office, Bengaluru, at the time when Respondent No. 2 was in the United Kingdom. This complaint was registered as FIR No. 141/2010 under Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with Section 34 IPC (hereinafter, ‘Concerned FIR’).
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 629Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v . State b y A d u g o d i Police Station & A n r .
3.5. Following the investigation conducted in the Concerned FIR, the investigating agency proceeded to file a chargesheet, implicating the Appellants and one Mr. Aksar Ahmed Sheriff, who is a travel agent, for procuring the minor child’s passport using forged documents. Notably, the charges for offences under Sections 468 and 471 IPC were dropped. Consequently, a case numbered CC No. 23545 / 2011 commenced before the Trial Magistrate only for the offences punishable under Section 420 read with Section 34 IPC.
3.6. The Appellants sought quashing of the aforementioned chargesheet vide Criminal Petition No. 3600 / 2012, invoking the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘CrPC’), but their petition was dismissed vide order dated 22.04.2014. However, liberty was granted to the Appellants to approach the Trial Magistrate and seek their discharge from the case CC No. 23545/2011.
3.7. The Appellants consequently moved an application under Section 239 CrPC, seeking discharge in CC No. 23545 / 2011. In the meantime, Respondent No. 2 also invoked Section 173(8) CrPC and sought further investigation of the offences under Sections 468 and 471 IPC in the Concerned FIR. The Trial Magistrate on 24.06.2015, vide separate orders, allowed Respondent No. 2’s prayer for further investigation and directed him, being the de facto complainant, to furnish necessary evidence before the investigating officer, if so required. On the other hand, the Trial Magistrate dismissed the Appellants’ discharge application on the ground that the question as to whether an offence under Section 420 IPC was made out or not would be decided during the course of trial.
3.8. Pursuant to the abovementioned order of the Trial Magistrate, the investigating agency filed a supplementary chargesheet against the Appellants on 25.07.2017, adding offences under Sections 468, 471, 420, 120-B and 201 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967. At this juncture, it is imperative to highlight that the concerned Passport Officer was also implicated as Accused No. 4, for allegedly providing false information regarding the availability of the original passport of the minor child and being complicit with the Appellants in its 630 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports destruction. The supplementary chargesheet also referred to a report provided by the State Forensic Laboratory, Madiwala, Bengaluru, dated 27.02.2016 (hereinafter, ‘State FSL’), which categorically states as follows:
“Opinion on questioned photocopied signatures marked as Q1 to Q4 is not expressed since, the questioned photocopied signatures are showing bad line quality of strokes.”
3.9. In addition to the State FSL Report, the supplementary chargesheet also mentioned a report dated 15.07.2013 purportedly obtained by Respondent No. 2 from a private agency, known as, ‘Truth Lab’. This report opined that the signatures on the passport application did not signify a close resemblance with the specimens of Respondent No. 2’s signatures.
3.10. Subsequent to these developments, when the case CC No. 23545 / 2011 was taken up for hearing before charge, it was urged on behalf of the Appellants that there were no grounds to frame charges. However, the Trial Magistrate repelled this contention by order dated 15.03.2018 and declined to discharge them.
3.11. The Appellants preferred to challenge the Trial Magistrate’s order vide Criminal Revision Petition No. 692 / 2018, but as noticed at the outset, the High Court dismissed the same via the impugned order dated 18.02.2021, primarily on the ground that there were specific allegations against the Appellants which required a full-fledged trial.
3.12. The aggrieved Appellants are now before this Court.
B. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
4. Mr. Ranbir Singh Yadav, Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, argued that Respondent No. 2’s complaint pertaining to the forgery of the passport application was merely a counterblast to the Appellant – wife’s complaint alleging cruelty against him. He contended that Respondent No. 2 had expressly consented to obtaining the minor child’s passport and after the issuance of passport, had even sent the sponsorship letter authored by his brother-in-law, Dr. M.K. Shariff, for the relocation of the Appellant – wife and the [2024] 1 S.C.R. 631Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v . State b y A d u g o d i Police Station & A n r . minor child to London. It was argued that this sponsorship letter is vital since it had been obtained at the instance of Respondent No. 2 and it specifically mentioned the passport number of the minor child, thereby implying consent of Respondent No. 2.
5. Mr. Yadav further contended that the opinion rendered by the State FSL was inconclusive as to the alleged forgery, and no additional material whatsoever had been recovered by the investigating agency between filing the original chargesheet and the supplementary chargesheet. Mr. Yadav also highlighted the reliance placed by both the High Court and the Trial Magistrate on the opinion of a handwriting expert obtained by Respondent No. 2 through a private agency – known as the Truth Lab. He vehemently urged that the State FSL Report should have been given utmost weightage in comparison to a paid opinion so as to uphold the fairness and impartiality of the investigation. Mr. Yadav contended that no prima facie case had been made out against the Appellants. Citing the decision of this Court in Krishna Chawla v. State of UP,1 he emphasised upon the duty of the Trial Magistrate to nip frivolous prosecution in the bud before it reaches the trial stage by discharging the accused in fit cases.
6. Contrarily, Mr. Narender Hooda, Learned Senior Counsel representing Respondent No. 2, strongly refuted the allegations levelled by the Appellants. He strenuously urged that Respondent No. 2 was not present in India during the period from 13.07.2008 to 17.11.2009, when the alleged passport application with his forged signatures was submitted, to procure the minor child’s passport. He further argued that the Trial Magistrate has unequivocally observed that the Passport Officer (Accused No. 4), who deliberately withheld the original passport application, was an accomplice in the offence of the destruction of evidence. Additionally, Mr. Hooda objected to discarding the Truth Lab report at the stage of deciding the discharge application on the premise that the report of the State FSL was ambiguous and that the veracity of the private lab report could be ascertained only at the time of trial.
7. In addition to the full insight of the controversy, as highlighted by the learned counsel for the parties, we have also meticulously perused the chargesheets and other documents brought on record by them. 1 (2021) 5 SCC 435, para 23.
632 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
C. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
8. The foremost question that falls for consideration before us is whether a prima facie case, to subject the Appellants to the agony of trial, has been made out. In furtherance of this question, the following issues emerge for our further consideration:
(i) Whether the actions of the Appellants prima facie constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC?
(ii) Whether there has been a prima facie case made out for forgery under Sections 468 and 471 IPC?
(iii) Whether there has been a violation of Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967?
D. ANALYSIS
9. In the present case, charges have been brought against the Appellants for offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471, 120-B, 201, read with Section 34 IPC, and Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967. In this context, it is paramount to delve into the ingredients of ‘forgery’ and ‘cheating’ required to be prima facie established against the Appellants, at the very threshold. We are conscious of the fact that such an evaluation would have to proceed on the premise that the material gathered by the investigating agency is not to be discarded or disbelieved at this stage.
The offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC:
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