Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 28; [2024] 1 S.C.R. 374
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
- Decided
- 10 Jan 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 8185/2009
- Sections
- 16, 5, 54, 55, 55(1)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
* Author [2024] 1 S.C.R. 374 : 2024 INSC 28 Alagammal and Ors.
v.
Ganesan and Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 8185 of 2009)
10 January 2024 [Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah*, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the Agreement between the seller and the buyer discloses a fixed time-frame for making payment in full by the buyer that is, in terms of the recitals in the agreement for sale executed by the seller in favour of the buyer.
Headnotes Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Specific performance of contract – Time, if essence of contract – Seller and the buyer entered into registered agreement to sell property on 22.11.1990 for a consideration of Rs.21,000/- - Advance payment of Rs. 3000/received by the seller and the transaction was to be completed within six months – However, on 05.11.1997, seller executed a Sale Deed with regard to the property in question with the third person for a consideration of Rs.22,000/- - Thereafter, issuance of notice by the buyer to the seller calling upon the seller to execute the agreement – Subsequently, suit for specific performance of the Agreement, damages and for recovery of money with interest filed by the buyer against the seller – Dismissal of the suit – Appeal thereagainst allowed by the First Appellate Court, and upheld by the High Court – Correctness:
Held: Within six months there existed the onus of paying the entire balance amount by the buyer to the seller – From the payment of Rs.7,000/- out of Rs.21,000/-, as indicated in the notice sent by the buyer, it is clear that the buyer had not complied with their obligation under the Agreement within the six-month period and neither they offered to pay the remaining/balance amount before the expiry of the six-month period – Seller having accepted payment of Rs.1,000/on 21.04.1997, after seller had executed a Sale Deed in favour of the third party, coupled with the fact that the forensic expert found [2024] 1 S.C.R. 375Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr. the two thumb-impressions purportedly acknowledging payment after the expiry of the time fixed not matching the fingerprints of seller is clearly indicative that time having not been extended, no enforceable right accrued to the buyer for getting relief under the 1963 Act – If the seller had accepted money from buyer after the expiry of the time-limit, which itself has not been conclusively proved during trial or even at the first or second appellate stages, the remedy available to the buyer was to seek recovery of money paid along with damages or interest to compensate such loss but suit for specific performance to execute the Sale Deed would not be available – Furthermore, though the third party was arrayed as a defendant in the suit, yet no relief seeking cancellation of his Sale Deed was sought for – Even if the case of later payments by the buyer to the seller is accepted, the same being at great intervals and there being no willingness shown by them to pay the remaining amount or getting the sale deed ascribed on necessary stamp paper and giving notice to the seller to execute the sale deed, it cannot be said that judged on the anvil of the conduct of parties, especially the seller, time would not remain the essence of the contract – Judgment of the High Court as also the First Appellate Court set aside and that of the trial court is restored. [Paras 24-26, 28-30] Case Law Cited K.S. Vidyanadam v Vairavan, [1997] 1 SCR 993 :
(1997) 3 SCC 1; Godhra Electricity Company Limited v State of Gujarat, [1975] 2 SCR 42 : (1975) 1 SCC 199 – referred to.
Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Secret Hotels Limited (formerly Med Hotels Limited), [2014] UKSC 16 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Sir Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 7th Edition - refered to.
List of Acts Specific Relief Act, 1963 List of Keywords Agreement for sale; Specific Relief; Specific performance; Time, 376 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports essence of contract; Consideration amount; Advance payment; Sale Deed; Legal notice; Suit for specific performance; Stamp papers; Forensic expert; Thumb-impressions; Fingerprints; Enforceable right; Remedy; Recovery of money; Damages; Interest; Compensate; Willingness; Conduct of parties.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8185 of 2009. From the Judgment and Order dated 28.04.2009 of the High Court of Madras in SA No.1127 of 2008.
Appearances for Parties V. Prabhakar, Ms. E.R. Sumathy, Ms. Jyothi Parashar, N. J.Ramchandar, Advs. for the Appellants.
P. V. Yogeswaran, Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Y. Lokesh, V. Kandha Prabhu, V. Sibi Kargil, Ms. Maitri Goal, Ms. Sonali Patra, Sachin Kumar Verma, Ms. Divya, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The present appeal is directed against the Final Judgment dated 28.04.2009 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) passed by the Madurai Bench, Madras High Court (hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”) dismissing a Second Appeal [S.A. (MD) No.1127 of 2008] filed by the appellants/original defendants.
BRIEF FACTS:
3. The appellants no.1, 2 and 3 entered into a registered Agreement of Sale (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement”) with the respondents on 22.11.1990 to sell the suit property for a consideration of Rs.21,000/-, against which Rs.3000/- had been received in advance. Further, six months’ time was fixed for completion of the transaction. The appellants No.1, 2 & 3, in the meantime, had executed a Sale Deed with regard to the property in question with appellant no.7 on 05.11.1997 for a consideration of Rs.22,000/-. On 18.11.1997, the [2024] 1 S.C.R. 377Alagammal and Ors. v . G a n e s a n a n d A n r . respondents sent a Notice to the appellants calling upon them to execute the Agreement. This led to the respondents filing of Original Suit No.165 of 1998 before the Munsif, District Court, Dindigul against the appellants for specific performance of the Agreement, damages and for recovery of money with interest. The suit stood dismissed by the Principal District Munsif Judge, Dindigul by order dated 10.09.2000. An appeal bearing A.S. No.258 of 2008 filed by the respondents was allowed by the First Appellate Court, and the same has been upheld by the High Court by the Impugned Judgment dated 28.04.2009.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that as per the Agreement, the balance consideration amount of Rs. 18,000/- was to be paid within six months which was admittedly not done. He submitted that the so-called subsequent payments on 16.12.1990 of Rs.1,000/-; on 15.04.1991 of Rs.3,000/-, and; on 17.09.1991 of Rs.2,500/- though were not actually paid to the appellants and even without admitting the same and accepting it for the sake of argument, the same is incorrect as the fingerprint expert has found the thumbimpression of the appellant no.1 as not matching the admitted actual sample thumb-impression of the appellant no.1. and, thus, the very basis of holding that time was not the essence of the agreement gets washed away. It was submitted that the Agreement stipulated that if there was default on the part of the respondents, the advance paid would be forfeited, and the entitlement to obtain the Sale Deed and get possession free from all encumbrances would also end.
5. It was submitted that once the fingerprint has been disapproved of by an expert and such report has been brought before the First Appellate Court, the claim based on such a document on which forgery has been committed itself renders the whole transaction inadmissible in law on the well-settled principle that the respondents did not come before the Court with clean hands as the entire claim was based on a forged document.
6. It was submitted that the claim of the respondents to have paid Rs.3,000/- on 18.09.1992; Rs.1,800/- on 24.07.1996; Rs.1,300/- on 25.07.1996 and Rs.1,000/- on 29.07.1996 i.e., a total of Rs.20,425/- 378 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports and ultimately Rs.1,000/- on 21.04.1997 i.e., an excess of Rs. 425/over the amount indicated in the Agreement, was false.
7. Learned counsel submitted that the endorsement(s) made not having been proved, it cannot be assumed that the respondents were ready and willing, or that they had, in fact, paid the excess amount.
8. It was contended that the Legal Notice sent on behalf of the respondents dated 18.11.1997 was clearly to get over the fatal lapses on their part and to give life to a dead cause i.e., revive the Agreement, which already stood incapable of being executed through Court due to efflux of time. On this issue, the contention was that readiness and willingness must be pleaded and proved which has not been done as is clear from the averments made in the plaint filed by the respondents. Thus, it was submitted that the trial court and even the First Appellate Court not recording any finding on the aspect of the readiness and willingness on the part of the respondents, the High Court’s observation in the Impugned Judgement on readiness and willingness of the respondents is without basis.
9. Learned counsel submitted that readiness and willingness has to be specifically pleaded and proved as per Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “1963 Act”) and there cannot be any question of drawing inference. Thus, he submitted that the respondents were obliged to obtain stamp-paper and draw up the Sale Deed, of which there is no indication in the plaint. It was urged that this establishes that there was no readiness and willingness to comply with their obligations in terms of the Agreement.
10. Learned counsel submitted that the thumb-impression(s) in the endorsement(s) have neither matched nor been found to be identical as per the fingerprint expert’s report which has been referred to in the judgment of the First Appellate Court.
11. Learned counsel submitted that as per the judgment rendered by the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the High Court, the last payment made and endorsed on 17.09.1991 has been accepted and thus three years from such date would be 16.09.1994 but the suit was instituted only on 23.03.1998, which is clearly barred by limitation.
12. It was submitted that the Trial Court had found that the endorsements were silent regarding extension of time, which finding has not been disturbed either by the First Appellate Court or the High Court and [2024] 1 S.C.R. 379Alagammal and Ors. v. Ganesan and Anr. looking at the issue from such angle, six months’ time under the Agreement would expire on 21.05.1991 and a three-year limitation would end on 22.05.1994. On this, learned counsel submitted that the contention of the respondents that the limitation would start from the judgment rendered in Original Suit No.551 of 1992 dated 24.07.1996, filed by appellant no.1 for seeking possession and eviction of her husband and mother-in-law from the suit property, is not the correct legal perspective, as mere absence of possession would not have defeated the passing of title from the appellants in favour of the respondents by the execution of a Sale Deed. The object of the Agreement was only for conveying the title of the property in question.
13. Learned counsel submitted that neither Original Suit No.551 of 1992 nor the judgment rendered therein have been mentioned by the respondents in Original Suit No.165 of 1998 for computing the cause of action for filing suit in the year 1998 with regard to the Agreement, which was entered into in 1990. Further, it was urged that it was incumbent upon the respondents to have obtained the Sale Deed and possession through Court as set forth in the Default Clause in the Agreement and thus, the Legal Notice dated 18.11.1997 by the respondents would not extend the time as it had expired much before and such unilateral issuance of notice would not get over the legal bar of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”).
14. Learned counsel summed up arguments by contending that in any view of the matter, prior to filing of the suit, the property in question had already been sold under registered Sale Deed to the appellant no.7 and the suit for specific performance was required to be dismissed as the Sale Deed to appellant no.7 has not been challenged.
15. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v Vairavan, (1997) 3 SCC 1, at Paragraphs 10, 11 and 13 for the proposition that Courts in India have consistently held that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect, and the period of limitation prescribed by the Act for filing a suit was 3 years.
16. It was contended that in the aforesaid judgment, the terms of the agreement therein were identical to the instant Agreement, inasmuch as there was no reference to any tenant in the building and it was 380 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports stated that within six months, the plaintiff should purchase the stamp-papers and pay the balance consideration upon which the defendants shall execute the Sale Deed either in his name or the name(s) proposed by him before the Sub-Registrar. It was restated that there was no prior letter/notice from the plaintiffs (respondents) to the defendants (appellants) calling upon them to get the Sale Deed executed till the issuance of the Legal Notice dated 18.11.1997 i.e., after a gap of 6 ½ years, identical to the facts in K.S. Vidyanadam (supra).
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:
17. In opposition to the appeal, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that on 23.03.1992, appellant no.1 had filed Original Suit No.551 of 1992 against her husband, mother-in-law, second wife of her husband and the son of the second wife, which was decreed. He submitted that appellants even after accepting Rs.425/- over and above the amount indicated in the Agreement and even after getting a decree for declaration and possession of the suit property in her favour on 24.07.1996, did not execute the Sale Deed due to which Legal Notice was sent to her on 18.11.1997. As no action was taken, the respondents were forced to file a suit on 23.03.1998 seeking specific performance.
18. Learned counsel submitted that the First Appellate Court had recorded that the Sale Deed executed by appellant no.1 in favour of appellant no.7 dated 05.11.1997 was not bonafide as the said sale was effected after getting an order for declaration and recovery of possession of the suit property in favour of appellant no.1 on 24.07.1996 in Original Suit No.551 of 1992.
19. Learned counsel submitted that the issue whether time is the essence of the contract i.e., the Agreement would depend also on the conduct of the parties and in the present case, when money was accepted by appellant no.1, much after the stipulated time, clearly the Agreement’s validity so as to culminate in sale could not be said to have been extinguished, as by accepting money later, the time indicated for completion of the transaction by execution of Sale Deed had been relaxed.
20. It was contended that the actual intention of the parties was not only to execute the Sale Deed but also handover the possession [2024] 1 S.C.R. 381Alagammal and Ors. v . G a n e s a n a n d A n r . which is an implied term of every sale of immovable property and thus only when on 24.07.1996, the appellant concerned became capable of handing over possession, limitation would start from such date as otherwise even if the Sale Deed was executed in favour of the respondents, it would have been of no real consequence in the absence of possession being capable of hand over.
21. Learned counsel contended that the stand taken by the appellants, that the proposed sale was only for transfer of title and not possession, cannot be accepted since the sale of immovable property is always for the transfer of possession from the seller to the buyer in terms of Section 5 read with Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the “TP Act”). Further, it was submitted that Section 55(f) of the TP Act contemplates duty of the seller to hand over possession of the property at the time of sale, and if the seller is not in possession of the property at the time of the agreement to sell or thereafter, it is a “material defect” in the property necessarily to be disclosed to the purchaser at the time of sale in accordance with Section 55(1)(a) of the TP Act. Thus, according to him, it is the obligation of the seller to hand over possession at the time of sale, as was stipulated in the Agreement.
22. On the question of whether time is of the essence in such a contract, it was contended that when a party is not in possession to hand over the same at the time of execution of an agreement for sale, then time would not be of the essence as the right to sue would accrue in favour of the person to whom the suit property is required to be sold only upon the vendor being in a position to hand over possession of the property to the buyer. It was further submitted that subsequent conduct of parties is also relevant for testing whether time is of the essence of the contract in question. It was submitted that in the present case, the acceptance of money much after the expiry of the six-month period by the appellant no.1 from the respondents leaves no doubt that time was not the essence and the time for performance of the Agreement would commence only after obtainment of physical possession by the appellants.
23. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in Godhra Electricity Company Limited v State of 382 [2024] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 199, the relevant paragraphs being 11 to 16; of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Secret Hotels2 Limited (formerly Med Hotels Limited), [2014] UKSC 16 dated 05.03.2014, the relevant being paragraph 33 1, and; The Interpretation of Contracts, 7 th Edition by Sir Kim Lewison, the relevant being paragraph 3.189.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.