Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (Hsiidc) and Another
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 951; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 463
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 10 Dec 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 13348/2024
- Sections
- 28, 18, 4, 3, 54, 11, 4(1)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:24 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 463 : 2024 INSC 951 Banwari and Others v.
Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (HSIIDC) and Another (Civil Appeal No. 13348 of 2024)
10 December 2024 [B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent relying on Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai’s case and setting aside the order passed by the LAC holding that the application u/s.28-A can only be filed within a period of three months from any judgment of the Reference Court u/s.18, arising from the same acquisition but not from the date of judgment of this Court or the High Court. Headnotes† Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – ss.4, 18, 28-A – Enhancement of compensation – Appellants awarded compensation for the land acquired for Kundli Manesar Palwal Expressway – Reference u/s.18 by similarly circumstanced land-owners for enhancement of compensation and the same was dismissed – However, the High Court allowed the Regular First Appeal and enhanced the compensation in respect of the land covered by the same notification under which the appellants’ land also covered – Subsequently, the appellants did not file Reference but filed an application u/s.28-A within a period of three months from the order of the High Court – LAC held that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the order passed by the High Court and enhanced the compensation payable to the appellants as awarded to similarly circumstanced land-owners – Thereagainst, writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed by the High Court relying on Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai’s case and the order passed by the LAC was set aside holding that the application u/s.28-A can only be filed within a period of three months from any judgment of the Reference Court * Author 464 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports u/s.18, arising from the same acquisition but not from the date of judgment of this Court or the High Court – Correctness: Held: An earlier decision of a Bench of particular strength would be binding on the subsequent Benches of this Court having the same or lesser number of judges – A decision or judgment can be said to be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench – Limitation for moving the application u/s.28-A will begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which redetermination of the compensation is sought – Application of the appellants u/s.28-A is within a period of three months from the order passed by the High Court – Judgment rendered in Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai’s case would reveal that the said case did not take note of the earlier view taken by three judges of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others’s case – Judgment in Pradeep Kumari and Others case has been rendered after considering the relevant provisions of the Statute and the principles of interpretation – However, the judgment in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai’s case is a short judgment only referring to the text of s.28-A(1) – Statement of Objects and Reasons of s.28-A would reveal that the object underlying the enactment of the said provision is to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for same or similar quality of land – Said provision is for giving benefit to inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court u/s.18 – This is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once any of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court u/s.18 – Same benefit would be available to the other landholders u/s.28-A – s.28-A being a beneficent legislation, the principle of interpretation to be adopted is which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it – Thus, the judgment and order passed by the High Court is quashed and set aside, and the order of the LAC is upheld. [Paras 15, 16, 19, 21, 22-25] Per incuriam – Rule of per incuriam – Judgment, when per incuriam:
Held: Decision or judgment can be said to be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench. [Para 21] [2024] 12 S.C.R. 465Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.28-A – Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court – Invocation of the provisions of s.28-A(1) – Conditions to be satisfied – Stated – Explanation of Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others’s case. [Paras 11-14] Case Law Cited Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others, 1995 INSC 180 : [1995] 2 SCR 703 : (1995) 2 SCC 736 – relied on. Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2018 INSC 405 : [2018] 3 SCR 1019 : (2018) 16 SCC 445 – per incuriam.
National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others, 2017 INSC 1068 : [2017] 13 SCR 100 : (2017) 16 SCC 680 – referred to.
List of Acts Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
List of Keywords Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai’s case; Application u/s.28-A of the LA Act; Reference Court u/s.18 of the LA Act; Enhancement of compensation; Land acquired for Kundli Manesar Palwal Expressway; Similarly circumstanced land-owners; Per incuriam; Limitation for moving the application u/s.28-A of the LA Act; Redetermination of compensation; Beneficent legislation; Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others’s case. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13348 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2021 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 19814 of 2021 Appearances for Parties Piyush Sharma, Anuj Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the Appellants. Alok Sangwan, Sr. A.A.G., Samar Vijay Singh, Sumit Kumar Sharma, Rajat Sangwan, Ms. Sabarni Som, Fateh Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
466 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal challenges the judgment and order dated 25 th November 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 19814 of 2021 (O&M), whereby the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the District Revenue Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Jhajjar (hereinafter referred to as “LAC”) dated 15 th September 2020, came to be allowed.
3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as under:
3.1. By a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “1894 Act”) dated 17th November 2004, the land of the appellants admeasuring 8 Kanal 17 Marla of village Majri, Tehsil Bahadurgarh, District Jhajjar was acquired for Kundli Manesar Palwal Expressway. By an award dated 1 st March 2006, a compensation of Rs.12,50,000/- per acre was determined.
3.2. Aggrieved by the said award, similarly circumstanced landowners preferred a reference for enhancement of compensation before the learned Additional District Judge, Jhajjar under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. Vide order dated 17th January 2012, the said reference was dismissed.
3.3. The said land-owners preferred a Regular First Appeal (RFA) being No. 429 of 2013 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Vide judgment and order dated 2nd May 2016, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana allowed the said RFA and enhanced the compensation to Rs.19,91,300/- along with statutory benefits.
3.4. Immediately thereafter the appellants on 30 th June 2016 filed an application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act before the LAC, Jhajjar as reference was not filed by the appellants.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 467Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another
3.5. Vide order dated 15th September 2020, the LAC held that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the judgment and order of the High Court in RFA No. 429 of 2013 dated 2 nd May 2016 and enhanced the compensation payable to the appellants to Rs.19,91,300/- per acre along with statutory benefits as awarded by the High Court to the similarly circumstanced land-owners.
3.6. Being aggrieved thereby, respondent No.1 preferred a writ petition before the High Court. The High Court vide impugned judgment and order, relying on its earlier judgment in CWP No. 8456 of 2020 titled “Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Smt. Shanti and Others” decided on 6 th September 2021, allowed the writ petition and set aside the order dated 15 th September 2020 passed by the LAC. In its earlier judgment, the High Court has placed reliance on the judgments of this Court including the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat and Another,1 whereby this Court has held that the application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act can only be filed within a period of three months from any judgment of the Reference Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, arising from the same acquisition but not from the date of judgment of this Court or the High Court.
3.7. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellants have approached this Court.
4. We have heard Shri Piyush Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Shri Rajat Sangwan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the High Court has erred in relying on the judgment of this Court in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), inasmuch as the said judgment does not take into consideration the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India and Another v. Pradeep Kumari and Others.2 He, therefore, submits that the appeal be allowed.
1 2018 INSC 405 : [2018] 3 SCR 1019 : (2018) 16 SCC 445 2 1995 INSC 180 : [1995] 2 SCR 703 : (1995) 2 SCC 736 468 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the High Court has rightly relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra). He, therefore, submits that the appeal be dismissed.
7. This Court, speaking through a bench of three learned Judges, in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), has observed thus:
“3. It is clear from the opening words of the provision that the redetermination under Section 28-A is available only in respect of an “award” passed by the “court” under Part III of the Act, comprising Sections 18 to 28-A (both inclusive). The “Court” referred to in Section 28-A of the Act is the Court as defined under Section 3(d) to mean “… a Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction …”. Thus, the judgment of the appellate court is not within the purview of Section 28-A. It is also to be noted that the appellate courts under Section 54 are under Part VIII of the Act whereas the redetermination is only in respect of the award passed by the Reference Court under Part III of the Act. [See Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. LAO [Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. LAO (1996) 6 SCC 746] ]. In its recent judgment in Bharatsing v State of Maharashtra [Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 92 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 44], this Court has surveyed the decisions on this issue and reiterated the legal principle.
4. What the appellant seeks is redetermination of compensation under the Act in terms of the judgment in Ramsingbhai v. State of Gujarat [Ramsingbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2014 SCC OnLine Guj 5840 : 2015 AIR CC 1046] of the High Court passed under Section 54 of the Act. In view of the settled legal position which we have explained above, the appellant is not entitled to such a relief; his entitlement, if any, is only in terms of Section 28-A of the Act based on the award of the Reference Court.”
8. It can thus be seen that, this Court has held that as the appellant therein was seeking redetermination of compensation on the basis of the judgment of the High Court passed under Section 54 of the [2024] 12 S.C.R. 469Banwari and Others v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited(HSIIDC) and Another 1894 Act, he was not entitled to such a relief. It was held that the application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act had to be made within a period of three months from the date of the award passed by the Court under Part-III of the Act and the appellate courts are not within purview of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act.
9. It, however, appears that this Court in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), has not noticed an earlier judgment rendered by this Court in Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra).
10. In the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra), though the award of LAC therein was not challenged by Pradeep Kumari, the similarly circumstanced persons whose land was acquired had made references. In one of the references, an award was made on 21 st February 1987. Immediately within a period of three months, the said Pradeep Kumari filed an application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act before LAC for claiming the benefit of the said award. On the said application, the Collector made an order dated 14 th March 1988 awarding an additional amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Reference Court dated 21st February 1987. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of Collector, the Union of India filed a writ petition before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. Civil Appeals were filed before this Court, challenging the judgment of the High Court. The same were dismissed. Aggrieved still, Review Petitions were filed. This Court, speaking in a combination of three learned Judges, observed thus: “8. We may, at the outset, state that having regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, referred to earlier, the object underlying the enactment of Section 28-A is to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for same or similar quality of land arising on account of inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. This is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once any of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the Act. Section 28-A is, therefore, in the nature of a beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and 470 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act. In relation to beneficent legislation, the law is well-settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation the court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed keeping in view the object underlying the said provision.
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