Muskan Enterprises & Anr. v. The State of Punjab & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 1046; [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1273
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra
- Decided
- 18 Dec 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 5491/2024
- Sections
- 482, 138, 148, 148(1), 357(3), 389, 11, 114, 362, 143
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[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1273 : 2024 INSC 1046 Muskan Enterprises & Anr.
v.
The State of Punjab & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 5491 of 2024)
19 December 2024 [Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the subsequent petition u/s.482, Cr. PC on the ground that since the earlier petition had been withdrawn without liberty obtained to apply afresh, the subsequent petition was not maintainable. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-s.482 – Subsequent petition under – Maintainability – Order of conviction and sentence for offence punishable u/s.138 against appellants – In appeal, the sentence of the the appellants suspended and was granted bail however, directed to deposit 20% of the compensation amount – Appellants filed petition u/s.482, challenging the same – Petition dismissed as withdrawn since it was held in Surinder Singh Deswal’s case that the condition for deposit in terms of s.148, N.I. Act as mandatory – Subsequently, this Court in Jamboo Bhandari’s case held that deposit may not be ordered if the appellate court finds a case to be exceptional – Appellants applied afresh u/s.482 – High Court dismissed the subsequent petition since the earlier petition had been withdrawn without liberty obtained to apply afresh, the subsequent petition was not maintainable – Correctness: Held: High Court unjustified in dismissing the subsequent petition on the ground that the appellants had withdrawn the earlier petition without obtaining leave to file afresh and, thus, the petition under consideration was not maintainable – Principle of res judicata has no application in a criminal proceeding – Change of law can legitimately be regarded as a vital change in circumstance clothing the High Court with the power, competence and jurisdiction to *Author 1274 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports entertain the subsequent petition notwithstanding the fact that the earlier petition was withdrawn without obtaining any leave, subject to the satisfaction recorded by the High Court that the order prayed for in the subsequent petition ought to be made, inter alia, either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice – Constricted view taken by High Court to hold that the appellants were required to obtain the leave of the Judge who had dismissed the earlier petition prior to filing the subsequent petition is untenable and not warranted in law – Appellants applied a second time before the High Court only when the law on interpretation of s.148, N.I. Act was laid down somewhat differently in Jamboo Bhandari’s case and not on any other ground – It was not a review in disguise that the appellants attempted but their endeavour was to impress the High Court to have the law, currently governing the field, to be applied in their case – Subsequent petition was well-nigh maintainable – Impugned order of the High Court declining to entertain the subsequent petition u/s.482 of the appellants is unsustainable in law – Impugned order of the High Court and the Sessions Court’s order set aside – However, in the interest of justice, matter remitted to the Sessions Court to re-examine the issue of ordering deposit required to be made by the appellants in the light of the law laid down in Jamboo Bhandari’s case – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. [Paras 13, 19, 20-29] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.148(1) – Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction – “May” and “shall” in sub-section (1), (2), (3) and proviso to s.148 – Interpretation of:
Held: Text is to be read as set in the context – Legislature has used both the verbs ‘may’ and shall’ in sub-section (1) of s.148, but in different contexts, clearly suggestive of the legislative intent to mean what it said – Verb ‘may’ in sub-section (1), implies discretion, and, if intended to have its natural meaning, it would refer to the discretion left to the appellate court to determine as to whether such court should order any deposit to be made by the appellant or not pending hearing of the appeal against the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court – Jamboo Bhandari’s case lays down that deposit may not be ordered if the appellate court finds a case to [2024] 12 S.C.R. 1275Muskan E nterprises & Anr. v. The State of Punjab & Anr. be exceptional – On the contrary, the verb ‘shall’ used in the same sentence and distanced from the verb ‘may’ implies an obligation or duty that is referable to the quantum of deposit – Deposit in any case, must not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court – Once the appellate court is satisfied that a deposit is indeed called for, in an appropriate case, such court’s power is in no way fettered to call upon the appellant to deposit more than 20% of the awarded compensation, but in no case can it be less than 20% – While the proviso to sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of s.148 use ‘shall’ in the relevant context, sub-section (3) again reverts to ‘may’ and its proviso to ‘shall’ – Thus, ‘may’ would be read as ‘may’ and ‘shall’ as ‘shall’, wherever they are used in s. 148, because, the words mean what they say. [Paras 26-28] Interpretation of statutes – Construction of – Legislative intent, mandatory or directory in character – Use of the verbs ‘may’ and ‘shall’:
Held: User of the verbs ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in a statute not a sure index for determining whether such statute is mandatory or directory in character – Legislative intent to be gathered looking into other provisions of the enactment, which can throw light to guide one towards a proper determination – Although the legislature often uses ‘may’, ‘shall’ or ‘must’ interchangeably, ordinarily ‘may’, having an element of discretion, is directory whereas ‘shall’ and ‘must’ are used in the sense of a mandatory provision – It is the duty of the court to gather the real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the entire statute, the section and the phrase/expression under consideration – Provision appearing to be directory in form could be mandatory in substance – Substance, rather than the form, being relevant, ultimately it is a matter of construction of the statute that is decisive – Interpretation must depend on the text and the context – Interpretation which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual would be best – Enactment has to be looked at as a whole and it needs to be discovered what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word means and whether it is designed to fit into the scheme of the entire enactment – While no part of statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation, statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. [Paras 24, 25] 1276 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S. S. Deswal v. Virender Gandhi [2019] 8 SCR 746 : 2019 (11) SCC 341; Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors. (2023) 10 SCC 446; S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla [2007] 2 SCR 862 : (2007) 4 SCC 70; Devendra v. State of U.P. [2009] 7 SCR 872 : (2009) 7 SCC 495; Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P. [2023] 14 SCR 55 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1399; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. [1987] 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1987 SC 1023 – referred to.
List of Acts Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords Subsequent petition u/s.482, Cr.PC; Earlier petition withdrawn; Deposit 20% of compensation amount; Surinder Singh Deswal’s case; Condition for deposit in terms of s.148, N.I. Act; Jamboo Bhandari’s case; Principle of res judicata; Abuse of the process of court; Verb “may” and “shall”; Text to be read as set in context; Legislative intent; Quantum of deposit; Compensation; Mandatory or directory in character; Textual interpretation; Contextual interpretation; Enactment to be looked at as a whole.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
5491 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 18.05.2024 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No. 25041 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Ms. Shumaila Altaf, Harvinder Singh Mann, Sakib Altaf, Abhimanue Shrestha, Advs. for the Appellants.
Mohd Irshad, A.A.G., Karan Sharma, Dilpreet Singh Gandhi, Nishant Bishnoi, Ms. Srishti Prabhakar, R. C. Goutam, Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1277Muskan E nterprises & Anr. v. The State of Punjab & Anr. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The judgment and order dated 18th May, 2024, passed by a learned Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh 1 dismissing a petition2 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 3 preferred by the appellants is under assail in this appeal.
3. The basic facts are not in dispute.
4. Conviction for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 18814 had been recorded against the appellants by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Amloh, District Fatehgarh 5 vide judgment and order dated 15 th September, 2022. Consequently, the second appellant (the proprietor of the first appellant) was sentenced to 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment; also, under Section 357(3), Cr. PC. they were directed to pay compensation of Rs.74,00,000/- (double the cheque amount) to the complainant who was given the liberty to recover the same from the appellants.
5. The conviction and sentence, as aforesaid, were carried in appeal by the appellants before the Sessions Court, Fatehgarh Sahib. 6 While admitting the appeal by order dated 17th October, 2022, the Sessions Court suspended the sentence till disposal of the appeal. The second appellant was granted bail. Additionally, the Sessions Court directed the appellants to deposit 20% of the compensation amount awarded by the trial magistrate within a period of sixty days in the court below, being of the view that such a deposit (of 20%) was imperative. The complainant was given liberty to withdraw the 1 High Court
2 CRM-M-25041-2024
3 Cr. PC 4 N. I. Act 5 trial magistrate 6 Sessions Court 1278 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports deposit subject to furnishing an undertaking that the same would be returned, if the appellants succeeded in the appeal.
6. Imposition of such condition by the Sessions Court for deposit of 20% of the compensation awarded by the trial magistrate was questioned by the appellants before the High Court in a petition7 filed under Section 482, Cr. PC.
7. The said petition was considered by the High Court on 01 st May, 2023, i.e., at a point of time when the decision of this Court in Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S. S. Deswal vs Virender Gandhi 8 was governing the field on interpretation of Section 148 of the N.I. Act. The said decision held the condition for deposit in terms of Section 148, N.I. Act as mandatory.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants had argued for some time. However, having found that his arguments would yield no fruitful result since the High Court was bound by the ratio of the decision in Surinder Singh Deswal (supra), he made a statement that the appellants would withdraw the petition. Accordingly, an order was passed to the effect that the petition stands dismissed as withdrawn.
9. Close on the heels of dismissal of the said petition of the appellants, as withdrawn, came the decision of another coordinate bench of this Court in Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. and ors.9. Upon consideration of the law laid down in Surinder Singh Deswal (supra), the bench in Jamboo Bhandari (supra) proceeded to hold as follows: - “6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 of the NI Act. Hence, normally, Appellate Court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section
148. However, in a case where the Appellate Court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded.
7 CRM-M-21715-2023
8 [2019] 8 SCR 746 : 2019 (11) SCC 341
9 (2023) 10 SCC 446
[2024] 12 S.C.R. 1279Muskan E nterprises & Anr. v. The State of Punjab & Anr.
7. Therefore, when Appellate Court considers the prayer under Section 389 of the Cr. P.C. of an accused who has been convicted for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the Appellate Court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded.”
10. Having regard to such decision, the appellants applied afresh under Section 482, Cr. PC. It is this petition which has now been dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order. The sole ground assigned by the High Court is that since the earlier petition had been withdrawn without liberty obtained to apply afresh, the subsequent petition is not maintainable.
11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellants, the respondent no.2-complainant as well as the respondent no.1- State of Punjab.
12. The short question emerging for our decision is whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the subsequent petition under section 482, Cr. PC for the reason that it assigned.
13. Having considered the materials on record as well as the rival claims, we are of the considered view that the High Court was unjustified in dismissing the subsequent petition on the ground that the appellants had withdrawn the earlier petition without obtaining leave to file afresh and, therefore, the petition under consideration was not maintainable.
14. The procedural laws governing criminal proceedings and civil proceedings in our country are quite dissimilar, though the rule of audi alteram partem and a procedure that is both fair and reasonable to both/all parties for rendering justice are at the heart of both the Cr. PC and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.10 The principle of res judicata, traceable in Section 11 of the CPC, does neither apply to criminal proceedings nor is there any provision in the Cr. PC akin to Order XXIII Rule 1(3), CPC. While Section 114 of the CPC read
10 CPC
1280 [2024] 12 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports with Order XLVII thereof empowers the civil courts to exercise the power of review, Section 362, Cr. PC bars a review. A close reading of Sections 482, Cr. PC and 115, CPC would also reflect that the purposes sought to be achieved by exercising the high courts’ inherent powers, which the respective procedural laws save, are also at variance. Prudence and propriety in the decision-making process, thus, make it imperative for the high courts to not confuse the procedural laws governing criminal and civil proceedings.
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