The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 823; [2024] 10 S.C.R. 1876
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice C.T. Ravikumar, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia
- Decided
- 25 Oct 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2129/2014
- Sections
- 302, 34, 161, 157, 145, 374
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[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1876 : 2024 INSC 823 The State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Ramjan Khan & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2129 of 2014)
25 October 2024 [C.T. Ravikumar* and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was right in setting aside the conviction of the respondents-accused under Section 302, IPC read with Section 34, IPC.
Headnotes† Evidence – Dying declaration, allegedly made to a close relative – Reliance upon – When not proper – Respondents were convicted inter alia relying on the dying declaration allegedly made to the mother of the deceased (PW-8) – Conviction set aside by High Court – Correctness:
Held: Oral dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness – Dying declaration is not a strong piece of evidence and therefore, when it is verbal and that too, allegedly made to a close relative, it ought to be treated with care and caution – In the present case, the trial Court dealt with the same without due care and caution – Prosecution attempted to establish the existence of an oral dying declaration through the evidence of PW-8, the mother of the deceasedinformant – However, neither in the FIR nor in her statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., PW-8 stated about the oral dying declaration made to her by the deceased – Except her statement in the Court there is no evidence in that regard – High Court justified in taking note of the serious omissions in the oral testimony of PW-8 and discrediting it – Further, the eyewitnesses PW-2 and PW-17 did not support the case of the prosecution and also the omissions on part of PWs 5 and 9 (minor brothers of the deceased) amounted to material contradiction going into the core of the prosecution’s case – In view of the omissions and contradictions, the oral testimonies of the witnesses are not reliable – Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the respondents * Author [2024] 10 S.C.R. 1877The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors. beyond reasonable doubt – Respondents entitled to benefit of doubt, acquitted – Judgment of the High Court not interfered with. [Paras 17, 20, 27-30] Criminal Law – FIR:
Held: FIR is an important document but, not a substantial piece of evidence – Even though it is not an encyclopedia containing chronicle of all intricate and minute details, it could be used to corroborate its maker viz., the informant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under Section 145 of the Evidence Act to establish whether he is a trustworthy witness or not – Whether the omission(s) is one which seriously impeaches the credibility of the witness and is sufficient to reject the testimony of the informant would depend upon whether it is of an important fact and whether that fact was within the knowledge of the informant. [Paras 14, 15] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.374 – Appeals from convictions – Acquittal – Appeal against acquittal – Interference with, when – Discussed. [Paras 6, 7, 8] Case Law Cited Jai Karan & Ors. v. State of U.P. [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 995 : (2003) 12 SCC 655; Govindaraju v. State by Sivaramapuram PS [2012] 5 SCR 67 : (2012) 4 SCC 722; State of U.P. v. Dharmaraj and Anr. (2003) 9 SCC 39; Superintendent of Police, CBI & Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh [2003] 3 SCR 485 : (2003) 6 SCC 175; State of UP v. Naresh & Ors. [2011] 4 SCR 1176 : (2011) 4 SCC 324; Lalitha Kumari v. Government of UP & Ors. [2013] 14 SCR 713 : (2014) 2 SCC 1; Amish Devgan v. UOI & Ors. [2020] 14 SCR 198 : (2021) 1 SCC 1; Dharma Rama Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra [1973] 3 SCR 92 : (1973) 1 SCC 537; Anil Phukan v. State of Assam [1993] 2 SCR 389 : (1993) 3 SCC 282; Chandu Bhai Shana Bhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1982 SC 1022 – referred to. List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence Act, 1872.
List of Keywords Dying declaration made allegedly to a close relative; Ocular evidence; Benefit of doubt; Verbal/Oral dying declaration; Dying 1878 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports declaration not a strong piece of evidence; Eyewitnesses; Material contradiction; Omissions and contradictions; Guilt not proved beyond reasonable doubt; FIR not a substantial piece of evidence; FIR not encyclopedia; Appeal against acquittal.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2129 of 2014 From the Judgment and Order dated 31.01.2013 of the High Court of M.P at Gwalior in CRLA No. 602 of 1998 Appearances for Parties Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Pashupathi Nath Razdan, Ms. Maitreyee Jagat Joshi, Ms. Soumya Priyadarshinee, Ankit Ambasta, Amit Srivastava, Amlaan Kumar, Astik Gupta, Ms. Akanksha Tomar, Ms. Priyanka, Advs. for the Appellant.
Lokesh Kumar Choudhary, Devmani Bansal, Ajay Kumar Rai, Shubham Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment C.T. Ravikumar, J.
1. This appeal is against the judgment of acquittal dated 31.01.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 1998 in reversal of the judgment of conviction recorded against the appellants therein viz., the respondents herein, by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Sironj in Sessions Trial No. 320 of 1996 dated 28.10.1998.
2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant State and learned counsel for the respondents, the convicts who were acquitted by the High Court vide the impugned judgment.
3. The case of the prosecution, in succinct, was as under: - ‘On 01.10.1996, at about 1.00 pm, the respondents herein viz., Ramjan Khan, Musaf Khan @ Musab Khan and Habib Khan, by cutting/beating with sickle, axe and stick caused death of Naseem [2024] 10 S.C.R. 1879The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors. Khan, near the village well of Karaikheda and thereby committed the crime punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34, of the Indian Penal Code (for short the ‘IPC’).’
4. As mentioned above, the respondents herein were tried by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Sironj. The prosecution had examined 19 witnesses including Haseen Khan (PW-5) and Farid Khan (PW- 9), who are the real brothers of deceased Naseem Khan and eye witnesses. Documentary evidence including the postmortem report prepared by Dr. S.S. Thakur (PW-1) were tendered by the prosecution. On the side of the defence two witnesses were examined.
5. The trial Court relied on the oral testimonies of PW-5 and PW-9, the minor brothers of the deceased besides the testimony of PW-8, the mother of the deceased who happened to be the informant and the further found that the ocular evidence got corroboration from the medical evidence, to enter conviction on the appellants for having committed murder of Naseem Khan. Consequently, the respondents herein were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 35,000/-. The respondents herein, the convicts preferred appeal jointly, against the judgment of conviction for the offence punishable under Section 302, IPC read with Section 34, IPC and the life sentence imposed therefor, the High Court acquitted them of the offences with which they were charged and allowed the appeal in the impugned judgment of acquittal.
6. Before dealing with the rival contentions raised before us, we think it only appropriate to refer to some of the relevant decisions of this Court laying law in regard to appeal against acquittal. It is true that the judgment of acquittal was passed after setting aside the judgment of conviction passed against the respondents herein by the trial Court.
7. In the decision in Jai Karan & Ors. v. State of U.P.1 this Court held that where the trial Court and the High Court had concurrently found the accused guilty, the Supreme Court would not scrutinize the evidence once again, unless there has been a total miscarriage of justice. We may hasten to add here that this Court may have to re-appreciate evidence in cases where a prima facie perverse appreciation of evidence is brought out, even in such cases. We shall also not be understood to have held that merely because the 1 [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 995 : (2003) 12 SCC 655 1880 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports trial Court and the High Court have rendered divergent findings, this Court should invariably scrutinize the evidence once again and in that regard this Court should entertain an appeal. In an appeal, against conviction in murder case under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the ‘Cr.P.C.’), a proper analysis of the evidence and accepting or rejecting, the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court must reflect in the judgment of the High Court. In other words, the disposal of the appeal under Section 374, Cr.P.C., shall not be by cryptic or non-reasoned order. In the decision in Govindaraju v. State by Sivaramapuram PS, 2 this Court held that a very vital distinction has to be kept in mind while dealing with appeal under Section 374, Cr.P.C., that interference would be justifiable only when distinction is kept between perversity in appreciation of evidence and mere possibility of another view. Furthermore, it was held therein that it would not be appropriate for the High Court to merely record that the judgment of the trial Court was perverse without specifically dealing with the facets of perversity relating to the issues of law and/ or appreciation of evidence, as otherwise such observation of the High Court would not be sustainable in law.
8. Having taken note of the position settled thus we may add that when the High Court acquitted the convict(s) in the appeal filed under Section 374, Cr.P.C., in reversal of conviction, by granting the benefit of doubt after a proper appreciation of evidence interference is permissible and justifiable only if it is infected with perversity in troth, the prosecution was not successful in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In the decision in State of U.P. v. Dharmaraj and Anr.,3 which involved a challenge against a judgment of acquittal in a murder case by the High Court, this Court held that when on facts the view taken by the High Court was a reasonably possible view, though not the only view that could be taken, interference with acquittal would be uncalled for.
9. Bearing in mind the aforesaid decisions and the fact that the trial Court and the High Court are at issue on the question whether the respondents are guilty in the case on hand, we will proceed to consider the captioned appeal. Obviously, the trial Court relied on 2 [2012] 5 SCR 67 : (2012) 4 SCC 722
3 (2003) 9 SCC 39
[2024] 10 S.C.R. 1881The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan & Ors. the oral testimonies of PWs 5, 8 and 9 whereas in the appeal the High Court found the oral evidence of PWs 5, 8 and 9 as unreliable.
10. Before dealing with the oral testimonies of the minor brothers of the deceased (PWs 5 and 9), we will deal with the oral evidence of PW-8, the mother of the deceased. She is the informant at whose instance FIR No.78/96 was registered against the respondents herein. Though she was believed by the trial Court, on re-appreciation the High Court found her unreliable owing to the material improvements and omissions made while being examined as PW-8. It was brought out while being cross-examined that she had not deposed at all about a dying declaration made to her by the deceased son. Before analysing her evidence further, it is not inappropriate to refer to a few decisions having bearing on her testimony.
11. FIR is not an encyclopedia disclosing all facts and details relating the entire prosecution case. (See the decisions in Superintendent of Police, CBI & Ors. v. Tapan Kumar Singh;4 State of UP v. Naresh & Ors.;5 Lalitha Kumari v. Government of UP & Ors., 6 and Amish Devgan v. UOI & Ors.7 ).
12. It is true that the aforementioned decisions would undoubtedly reveal the position that an FIR is not meant to be a detailed document containing chronicle of all intricate and minute details.
13. Even after, referring to the decisions mentioned above, we think it equally relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in Dharma Rama Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra.8 It was held therein thus: - "The first information report, it may be pointed out, is never treated as a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used for corroborating or contradicting its maker when he appears in court as a witness.”
14. There can be no doubt with respect to the position that the prime object of FIR, from the point of view of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion and from the point of the investigating authorities 4 [2003] 3 SCR 485 : (2003) 6 SCC 175 5 [2011] 4 SCR 1176 : (2011) 4 SCC 324 6 [2013] 14 SCR 713 : (2014) 2 SCC 1 7 [2020] 14 SCR 198 : (2021) 1 SCC 1 8 [1973] 3 SCR 92 : (1973) 1 SCC 537 1882 [2024] 10 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports is to obtain information about the alleged activity so as to enable to take suitable steps to trace and book the guilty. Thus, it can be said that FIR is an important document, though not a substantial piece of evidence, and may be put in evidence to support or contradict the evidence of its maker viz., the informant. Whether the omission(s) is one which seriously impeaches the credibility of the witness and is sufficient to reject the testimony of the informant would depend upon the question whether it is of an important fact and whether that fact was within the knowledge of the informant, going by the case of prosecution unraveled through the witness concerned.
15. Thus, the position with respect to FIR is clear from the decisions referred supra that even though it is not meant to be an encyclopedia containing chronicle of all intricate and minute details, it could be used to corroborate its maker under Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict its maker viz., the informant under Section 145 of the Evidence Act to establish whether he is a trustworthy witness or not.
16. Realising and recognizing the aforesaid position with respect to FIR we will proceed to consider whether the disinclination on the part of the High Court to rely on, rather, treating the evidence of the informant – PW8 as unreliable is justifiable and sustainable in law.
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