Gujarat Composite Limited v. A Infrastructure Limited & Ors.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 470; [2023] 5 S.C.R. 103
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dinesh Maheshwari, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Justice None of the Other Agreements Contained Any Arbitration Clause
- Decided
- 1 May 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 3259/2023
- Sections
- 8, 21, 11, 7, 34, 5, 24, 34(2)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H
GUJARAT COMPOSITE LIMITED
v.
A INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3259 of 2023)
MAY 01, 2023
[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND SUDHANSHU DHULIA, JJ.] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.8 – Arbitrability of the dispute in question – Held: Except the principal licence agreement, none of the other agreements contained any arbitration clause, even if they related to the same property and also involved the appellant and the respondent No.1 – Even if the original licence agreement is said to be the genesis of the contractual relations of the appellant and the respondent No.1, that does not ipso facto lead to the availability of the arbitration agreement in relation to the dispute in question emanating from the tripartite agreement and which cannot be determined without reference to the said tripartite agreement and without involving all the parties thereto – Thus, no dispute resolution process, including arbitration, could be undertaken in relation to the subject-matter of the suit without reference to the terms of tripartite agreement and without involving the bank-respondent No.2 – This is apart from the fact that the other elements of dispute pertaining to the subsequent purchasers too cannot be resolved in any forum without reference to the tripartite agreement and its amended clause, which did not provide for arbitration – Thus, there is no doubt about non-existence of arbitration agreement in relation to the dispute in question – Substantive reliefs claimed in the suits fall outside the arbitration clause in the original licence agreement – Therefore, the view taken by the Commercial Court and the High Court in declining the prayer of the appellant for reference to arbitration u/s.8 cannot be faulted – Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Except the principal agreement dated 07.04.2005, none of the other agreements contained any arbitration clause, even if they related to the same property and [2023] 5 S.C.R. 103 A B C D E F G H 104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.
also involved the appellant and the respondent No. 1. The later transactions involved other parties too like the tripartite agreement dated 06.07.2006 whereby the respondent No. 2 bank sanctioned loan to the respondent No. 1 and then, supplemental to the said tripartite agreement for dealing with the deposit of title deeds. Similarly, the other deeds of conveyance dated 23.01.2015 involve the appellant and the other defendants. The submissions made by the appellant with reference to the amendment of Section 8 of the Act of 1996 and the later decisions of this Court in interpretation of the amended Section 8 do not inure to the benefit of the appellant. This is for the simple reason that no such conjunction can be provided to the original licence agreement dated 07.04.2005 and the tripartite agreement involving the Bank dated 06.07.2006 and 23.01.2008, whereby the arbitration clause could be held applicable to the tripartite agreement too. This is apart from the fact that in the frame of the suit and various other reliefs claimed, involving subsequent purchasers too and the allegations of fraud, the dispute cannot be said to be arbitrable at all. The present one cannot be said to be a case involving any “doubt” about non-existence of arbitration agreement in relation to the dispute in question. [Paras 17, 17.1][137-F-G; 138-A-C] 1.2 There being no doubt about non-existence of arbitration agreement in relation to the entire subject-matter of the suit, and when the substantive reliefs claimed in the suits fall outside the arbitration clause in the original licence agreement, the view taken by the High Court does not appear to be suffering from any infirmity or against any principle laid down by this Court. Even if by reference to remote pedigree, the original licence agreement is said to be the genesis of the contractual relations of the appellant and the respondent No. 1, that does not ipso facto lead to the availability of the arbitration agreement in relation to the dispute in question, which emanates from the tripartite agreement and which cannot be determined without reference to the said tripartite agreement and without involving all the parties thereto. In other words, no dispute resolution process, including arbitration, could be undertaken in relation to the subject-matter of the suit without reference to the terms of tripartite agreement and without involving the bank- respondent No.2. This is apart A B C D E F G H from the fact that the other elements of dispute pertaining to the subsequent purchasers too cannot be resolved in any forum without reference to the tripartite agreement and its amended clause, which did not provide for arbitration. Thus, the ancestry of the tripartite agreement, in the facts of the present case, does not lead to the result desired by the appellant. Therefore, even on the principles enunciated in Vidya Drolia, the prayer of the present appellant for reference to arbitration under Section 8 cannot be granted. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case and in the nature of transactions as also the nature of reliefs claimed in the suit, the view taken by the Commercial Court and the High Court in declining the prayer of the appellant for reference to arbitration cannot be faulted. [Paras 17.2, 18, 18.1 and 20][138-D-H; 140-B-C] Vidya Drolia and Ors. v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1; Ameet Lalchand Shah and Ors. v.
Rishabh Enterprises and Anr. (2018) 15 SCC 678 :
[2018] 6 SCR 1001; ONGC Ltd. v. Discovery Enterprises (2022) 8 SCC 42; Intercontinental Hotels v. Waterline Hotels (2022) 7 SCC 662 – distinguished.
Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya & Anr.
(2003) 5 SCC 531 : [2003] 3 SCR 558; S. N. Prasad v.
Monnet Finance Ltd. and Ors. (2011) 1 SCC 320 :
[2010] 13 SCR 207; Deutsche Bank Home Finance Ltd.
v. Taduri Sridhar and Anr. (2011) 11 SCC 375 : [2011] 5 SCR 674; Himangi Enterprises v. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia (2017) 10 SCC 706 : [2017] 10 SCR 139 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [2003] 3 SCR 558 referred to Para 5.2 [2018] 6 SCR 1001 distinguished Para 6.2 [2010] 13 SCR 207 referred to Para 7.5 [2011] 5 SCR 674 distinguished Para 7.5 [2017] 10 SCR 139 referred to Para 12 GUJARAT COMPOSITE LIMITED v. A INFRASTRUCTURE
LIMITED & ORS.
A B C D E F G H 106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3259 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 23.04.2018 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in FA No. 588 of 2018.
With Civil Appeal No. 3260 of 2023.
Nikhil Goel, Aniruddha Deshmukh, Adhitya Koshy Roy, Ms. Naveen Goel, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ramesh Singh, Sr. Adv., Biju Mattam, Rahul Singh, N D Kaushik, Satish Kumar, Avishkar Singhvi, Rohan Sharma, Pradhuman Gohil, Mrs. Taruna Singh Gohil, Ms. Ranu Purohit, Alapati Sahithya Krishna, Dushyant Parashar, Bhaskar, Manu Parashar, Dinesh Pandey, Harshvardhan Singh Rathore, Muthuvel Palani M., Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred against the common judgment and order dated 23.04.2018 passed by the High Court of Gujarat whereby, the High Court has dismissed First Appeal Nos. 588 of 2018 and 587 of 2018 filed by the appellant against the order passed by the Commercial Court, Ahmedabad dismissing the applications under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 in Commercial Civil Suit Nos. 90 of 2017 and 91 of 2017 respectively. Both these appeals, involving common questions concerning arbitrability of the dispute, have been heard together and are being taken up for disposal by this common judgment.
3. It would be apposite to take note of the factual and background aspects to the extent relevant for the points arising for determination in the present appeals. Given the commonalities of the factual chronology, it would be proper to accord primacy to facts of the lead matter i.e., the appeal arising from SLP (C) No. 16932 of 2018 [relating to First Appeal No. 588 of 2018 in the High Court, arising from the order passed in Commercial Civil Suit No. 90 of 2017], apart from noticing a few facts that may be of relevance in the cognate appeal.
1 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘Act of 1996’ or simply ‘the Act’. A B C D E F G H
3.1. On 07.04.2005, the appellant herein entered into two licence agreements with respondent No. 1 and the sister concern of respondent No. 12 (against whom the cognate appeal is filed). The first agreement with respondent No. 1 was for licensing the operation of two manufacturing units of the appellant, being A.C. Sheet and Cement Grinding, with the licensing fee per quarter set at Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh) for the combined use of land and building as well as factory machinery and equipment. The second agreement with the sister concern of respondent No. 1 was for licensing the operation of another manufacturing unit of the appellant, being A.C. Pressure Pipe, with the cumulative licensing fee per quarter set at Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh). Both agreements were of the same nature and were executed for a term of 7 years (84 months). The relevant clauses of the agreement entered into between the appellant and respondent No. 1 could be usefully reproduced as under: - “3. The duration of the Licence for manufacture will be for a period of 84 months, extendable to a further period of 84 months on mutual consent from the date on which the LICENSEE takes over production and manufacturing facilities after completion of the necessary inspection and the compilation of inventories as stipulated herein. The said takeover would be fully and duly evidenced by acknowledgement of both the parties in writing, and will constitute a pan of this Licence Agreement.
*** *** ***
8. LICENSEE shall pay quarterly licence fee of Rs.1,00,000 (Rupees One lakh only) per quarter towards the use of land and building including office building and Rs.4,00,000 (Rupees Four lakhs only) per quarter towards the use of factory machinery & equipments. The Licence fee shall, be paid within 21 days of end of the quarter.
*** *** ***
12. LICENSEE shall not be entitled to mortgage, assign, licence or sublet the said Unit. However, LICENSEE shall be at liberty to mortgage/ charge, Raw Material stock, Finished Goods book debts and equipment brought in and belonging to LICENSEE under this arrangement which shall be kept separately identified and insured. *** *** *** 2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘sister concern’.
GUJARAT COMPOSITE LIMITED v. A INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ORS. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] A B C D E F G H 108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.
15. The LICENSOR will be entitled to a Bonus, in addition to licence fee payable under Clause 8, in consideration of the use of its manufacturing facilities, licence, brand goodwill etc, as worked out below:
i. 14% of the profit earned will be the retained profit in this arrangement and balance 86% shall be distributable as under: a) The Bonus payable by LICENSEE to LICENSOR under this Clause would be 43% of the divisible profit minus the licence fee payable as per Clause 8 above. In the event the amount of Bonus works out to be negative, then LICENSOR shall be liable to reimburse this amount to LICENSEE on quarter to quarter basis.
b) The retained profit shall always belongs to the LICENSEE during the continuation or upon determination of the licence period.
c) The computation of the Profit & Loss and its distribution shall be done quarterly.
ii. Profit for this purpose means operating profits/losses earned during the quarter, after deducting interest on working capital and depreciation on the assets added by LICENSEE, but before charging the licence fee specified in Clause 8. The operating profit shall be worked out on the basis of Accepted Accounting principles.
*** *** ***
17. The LICENSEE at its absolute discretion may advance some amount to the LICENSOR on the terms/conditions/security as may be mutually agreed to facilitate smooth operation of this agreement.
*** *** ***
32. Disputes if any, arising out of this Agreement shall be referred to arbitration of a Sole Arbitrator if mutually agreed, failing which Arbitrator will be appointed as per provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The venue of Arbitration will be as decided mutually but preferably at Delhi.”
A B C D E F G H
3.2. On the same date i.e., 07.04.2005, a supplementary agreement was also executed between the appellant-licensor, respondent-licensee, and the sister concern as confirming party. As per the terms of this agreement, appellant requested respondent No. 1 for some financial assistance to arrive at a settlement with its creditors, employees as well as statutory authorities for discharging their dues. The respondent No. 1, therefore, agreed to advance a sum of Rs. 5,30,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crore Thirty Lakh) to the appellant with interest at 10% p.a. and as consideration for the financial assistance rendered, it was agreed that respondent No. 1 would be permitted to create a mortgage on the three licensed manufacturing units in order to secure the ad hoc advance. This advance was recoverable in ten quarterly instalments commencing from the 90th day of payment of the ad hoc advance out of the licence fee and bonus under clauses 8 and 15 of the main agreement. A few relevant clauses of the supplementary agreement dated 07.04.2005 could also be usefully reproduced as under: - “NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants set forth herein, and also in the main License Agreement dated 7th April 2005 and for other good and valuable considerations, the parties hereto hereby agrees as follows:
1. The LICENSOR requested the LICENSEE for some financial assistance to arrive at an amicable settlement with the creditors; employees and statutory authorities for discharging of their dues.
2. The LICENSEE, in consideration of facilitating the smooth operation of the main agreement dated 7th April 2005 between LICENSOR and CONFIRMING PARTY and main agreement dated 7th April 2005 between LICENSOR and LICENSEE including smooth operation of A. C. Pipes, A. C. Sheets and Cement Units, have agreed to advance a sum of Rs. 5,30,00,000 (Rupees Five Crores Thirty Lakhs only) to the LICENSOR fetching interest at 10% per annum to be calculated at monthly rests after receipt of the approval of LICENSOR’S secured creditors as per Clause 4 of the main agreement and upon creation of mortgage on A.C. Sheet, A. C. Pipe and Cement manufacturing Unit including building, plant, and machineries in favour of LICENSEE for securing the above adhoc advance. LICENSOR shall use the said (illegible) for entering into a settlement with its secured creditors by making a down payment towards their dues GUJARAT COMPOSITE LIMITED v. A INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ORS. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] A B C D E F G H 110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.
and for payment of balance in an agreed manner and for obtaining their consent to the above agreement and to pay and discharge various other pressing liabilities of LICENSOR including payment of dues of workers, statutory liabilities etc. This advance along with interest thereon shall be recoverable in Ten. (10) quarterly instalments, commencing from the 90th day of the payment of adhoc advance amount, out of the licence fee payable as per Clause 8 and Bonus as per Clause 15 of the main Agreement.”
3.3. Subsequently, clauses 11 and 15 of the original licence agreement, (pertaining to repurchase of assets and entitlement of licensor to bonus) were amended by means of execution of an amendment agreement dated 25.06.2005 between appellant and respondent No. 1. The amended clauses read as under: - “Clause- 11: LICENSOR will allow LICENSEE to make necessary modification/ addition/ changes in the machinery, building or any other fixed assets for smooth operation of the plant. Minor expenses to the extent of Rs.25000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) may be debited to P&L Account and the expenses in excess of specified amount will be capitalized and may be funded by both the parties in the following ratio.
i) Licensor : 43% ii) Licensee : 57% Such expenses to be decided mutually and duly minuted.
Depreciation on these additions to the fixed assets shall be calculated at the rates specified in the Companies Act as per Straight Line Method. Upon determination of the license period the LICENSOR would be under obligation to buy these assets at the Written Down Value.
b) Clause No.15 : The LICENSOR will be entitled to a Bonus, in addition to license fee payable under Clause-8, in consideration of the use of its manufacturing facilities, license, brand goodwill etc. as worked out below.
i) The Bonus payable by LICENSEE to LICENSOR under this Clause would be 43% of the profit. The Bonus so payable shall be reduced by the amount of License fee payable as per Clause- 8 of the Agreement. However, in the event of loss, the LICENSOR A B C D E F G H shall be liable to reimburse 43% of the total loss to LICENSEE on a quarter-to-quarter basis.
ii) Computation of the Profit & Loss and its distribution shall be provisionally based on the annual audited accounts.
iii) Profit/Losses for this purpose means profits/losses earned, after deducting interest on working capital and depreciation on the assets added by the LICENSEE but before changing the license fee specified in Clause No. 8. The profit/loss shall be worked out on the basis of accepted accounting principles.”
3.4. Thereafter, on 06.07.2006, a tripartite agreement was executed by and amongst the appellant, respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 (Bank of Baroda3) upon sanctioning of a loan to the tune of Rs. 500 lakh to respondent No. 1. The appellant agreed to create first charge on fixed assets, which was to be released only with the consent of respondent No. 1. However, it was also stipulated that if payment of corporate loan was made directly by the appellant to the bank, the first charge could be released without the consent of respondent No. 1. The relevant clauses of the tripartite agreement dated 06.07.2006 could be usefully reproduced as follows: - “WHEREAS Bank of Baroda has sanctioned Corporate loan of Rs.500 lacs to M/s. A Infrastructure Limited on the terms & conditions stipulated in the sanction letter and to secure this above loan in addition to other conditions and corporate guarantee also provided by M/s. Gujarat Composite Limited.
Further M/s. Gujarat Composite Limited has agreed to create first charge on the fixed assets as stipulated in the sanctioned letter in favour of Bank of Baroda.
Further M/s. Gujarat Composite Limited, has agreed that first charges will be released by Bank of Baroda only with the consent of M/s. A Infrastructure Limited even after repayment of the said loan. Bank of Baroda further agreed to release the first charge only with the consent of M/s. A Infrastructure Limited. However in case M/s. Gujarat Composite Ltd. will make payment of this corporate loan of Rs.500 lacs directly to Bank of Baroda. Bank of Baroda will release the first charges without the consent of M/ s. A Infrastructure Limited”
3 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the bank’.
GUJARAT COMPOSITE LIMITED v. A INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ORS. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] A B C D E F G H 112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.
3.5. An amendment was introduced to the aforementioned tripartite agreement on 23.01.2008, so as to restrict the transfer of title deeds of the land of appellant during the term of licence agreements. The amended condition reads as follows: - “Further M/ s. Gujarat Composite Limited, has agreed that First Charge will be released by Bank of Baroda only with the consent of M/s. A Infrastructure Limited even after repayment of the said loan. Bank of Baroda further agreed to release the First Charge only with the consent of M/s. A Infrastructure Limited. However, in case M/s. Gujarat Composite Ltd. will make payment of dues against this corporate loan of Rs.500 lacs directly to Bank of Baroda, Bank of Baroda will release the First Charge without the consent of M/s. A Infrastructure Limited. But M/s Gujarat Composite agrees that the title Deeds of the land will not be transferred to any other party during the currency of Licence Agreements executed between M/s. A Infrastructure Limited and M/s. Gujarat Composite Ltd. “
3.6. The dispute in the present matter arose after respondent No. 1, by means of representation dated 22.02.2012, invoked clause 3 of the original licence agreement and called upon the appellant to extend the term of the licence agreement by a further period of 84 months. This extension was sought because appellant was unable to pay certain dues owed to respondent No. 1 and sought time to arrange for payment. In response to this representation, the appellant, through letter dated 29.02.2012, denied the proposal of respondent No. 1 to extend the term of licence agreement as also the projected outstanding dues. Later, on 06.04.2012, which was the date of completion of tenure of the original licence agreement, respondent No. 1 did not hand over possession and instead, declared its intention to continue with possession. Between April 2012 and March 2015, according to the appellant, certain attempts were made to resolve the dispute, but to no avail. It is also a part of the case of respondent No. 1 that certain parcels of land were transferred to respondent Nos. 3 to 5 in January 2015.
3.7. Then, on 07.04.2015, the appellant issued notice to respondent No. 1 claiming recovery of possession of the manufacturing units as well as certain monetary dues. In the notice, the appellant stated that the licence had expired by efflux of time without any extension, hence possession by respondent No. 1 was illegal. Further, the appellant claimed A B C D E F G H that there was a huge outstanding payable by respondent No. 1. In the reply dated 20.04.2015, respondent No. 1 disputed these claims and asserted that the appellants had not cared to pay back its legitimately claimed amounts. Yet again, between 26.08.2015 to 17.11.2016, attempts were made to resolve the dispute but there was no positive outcome. Seeing that the attempts to resolve the dispute had failed, on 28.02.2017, the appellant served a notice on respondent No. 1 under Section 21 of the Act of 1996 invoking the provision for arbitration contained in the licence agreement (clause 32). Respondent No. 1 replied to this notice on 27.03.2017, contesting the arbitrability of the dispute since it was inextricably interconnected with other related transactions and unresolved issues arising therefrom. It was asserted that as the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was derived from the agreement, adjudication of the alleged dispute would go beyond the scope of the said agreement.
3.8. In this backdrop of events, the appellant preferred a composite arbitration petition before the Gujarat High Court on 26.04.2017 being IAAP No. 63 of 2017 against respondent No. 1 and its sister concern. On the other hand, respondent No. 1-A Infrastructure Limited-filed a commercial civil suit bearing No. 90 of 2017 before the Commercial Court at Ahmedabad on 27.04.2017 with the following defendants:
1. Gujarat Composite Limited
2. Bank of Baroda
3. Real Home Corporation - a partnership firm
4. M/s. Raj Corporation (Confirming Party) - partnership firm
5. RJD Buildcon Ltd.
3.8.1. In the said suit, the respondent No. 1 (the plaintiff) made the prayers for multiple reliefs in the following terms: - “33) The Plaintiff therefore prays that:
(A) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the defendant No.1 to pay to the Plaintiff herein a sum of Rs.32,66 crores with interest @ 14% per annum from the date of suit till realization herein under this decree and any further orders to be passed by this Hon’ble Court;
(B) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to hold and declare that the Deeds of Conveyance dated 23rd January, 2015 registered GUJARAT COMPOSITE LIMITED v. A INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ORS. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] A B C D E F G H 114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.
vide registration no. 742 and 750 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.3 and 5, as null and void;
(C) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to permanently restrain the defendant Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5 or their agent, executors, or administrators from disturbing or obstructing the plaintiffs occupation possession of the suit property till the discharged; (D) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the defendant No.2 Bank not to release original title papers and other relevant documents in favour of defendant Nos.1, 3 and/or 4;
(E) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to hold and declare that the Conveyance Deed dated 23rd January, 2015 entered into between the defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 to 5 as null and void;
(F) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the defendant No. 2 to take over all the current assets of the plaintiff pertaining to or in connection with the operation of A.C. Sheet and Cement. Manufacturing unit under license agreement at their book value and make payment to the plaintiff for the current assets available at the time of handing over of the possession, if required.”
3.9. An application was preferred by the appellant under Section 8 of the Act of 1996 in the said commercial civil suit bearing No. 90 of 2017 for reference of the dispute to arbitration. In the written statement of the appellant, objection was also raised against the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court, given the arbitration clause in the licence agreement. Respondent No. 1 filed a reply to the application and the appellant filed an affidavit in rejoinder to the aforesaid reply on 03.07.2017.
3.10. In relation to the said application moved by the appellant in terms of Section 8 of the Act of 1996, another material factor may also be noticed. Two memos (pursis), came to be filed before the Commercial Court on 06.12.2017. In one of the memos, the respondent Nos. 3 to 5 (subsequent purchasers of the property in question) purportedly stated that they were not having any objection if the dispute concerning them was resolved by arbitration proceedings. The appellant, by another memo of the even date, suggested that the tripartite amended agreement was with reference to the licence agreement and it was agreed that till the time of the defendant No. 1 (appellant) making payment of a sum of Rs. A B C D E F G H 5 crore to the plaintiff, the title deeds of the immovable property would remain with the bank. The appellant suggested that with a view that the dispute between the parties should be resolved by arbitration proceedings, keeping all contentions open, they would be depositing the said amount of Rs. 5 crore in the Court and that in this manner ‘the dispute with defendant No. 2 would be ended’ and then, the bank who was handed over the title deed, would deposit the same in the Court and the Court would be pleased to place the same in sealed cover till the dispute of the other parties was not resolved by arbitration proceedings.
3.11. Before adverting to the order passed by the Commercial Court on the prayer of the appellant for reference to arbitration in terms of Section 8 of the Act of 1996, we may complete the narration concerning the parallel proceedings in terms of Section 11 of the Act of 1996, even while deviating a little from the chronology. The said IAAP No. 63 of 2017 was withdrawn on 07.07.2017, as it was a composite petition against both respondent No. 1 and its sister concern with liberty to file fresh petitions. Thereafter, two separate IAAPs being IAAP No. 90 of 2017 and 89 of 2017 were filed by the appellant but, the proceedings therein ultimately culminated in the common order dated 15.12.2017. The High Court dismissed those applications in view of the fact that the prayer of the appellant in terms of Section 8 of the Act had been rejected by the Commercial Court on 13.12.2017 but, with liberty to the appellant to file afresh under Section 11 of the Act after decision on the challenge to the order so passed by the Commercial Court. Be that as it may, this aspect is not as such relevant for the present purpose and could be left at that.
4. The Commercial Court at Ahmedabad, in the order dated 13.12.2017, rejected the application of the appellant under Section 8 of the Act of 1996. It was held that there was no arbitration clause in the tripartite agreement and no reference had been made to the original or supplementary licence agreement to give effect or consider the arbitration clause as a part and parcel of the tripartite agreement. While referring to clause 32 of the Licence Agreement dated 07.04.2005, the Court observed that it was explicitly clear that the arbitration clause was applicable to the appellant and respondent No. 1, specifically in reference to the original licence agreement and supplementary licence agreement but the same could not be extended to apply to subsequent transactions and agreements with different parties.
GUJARAT COMPOSITE LIMITED v. A INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ORS. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] A B C D E F G H 116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.
4.1. In consonance with the aforementioned observations, the Commercial Court also held that there must be a valid arbitration agreement in order to invoke the powers of the Court to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act of 1996. It was further observed that persons who are not parties to the arbitration agreement cannot be referred to arbitration, as the binding effect would only apply to the parties thereto, i.e., the appellant and respondent No. 1. Hence, if the dispute was between parties and non-parties to the arbitration agreement, appointment of arbitrator could only be made with respect to the parties. The relevant parts of the order passed by Commercial Court could be usefully reproduced as under: - “15….As such, no arbitration clause seems to have been inserted nor any reference has been made as to the License Agreement or Supplementary License Agreement executed between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 so as to give effect and to consider as a part and parcel of the tripartite agreement executed between the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2.
16. Even perusing item No. 32 of the Licence Agreement dated 07/04/2005 executed between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 wherein it has been expressly agreed upon between the parties thereto that dispute, if any, arising out of this Agreement shall be referred to arbitration…..Thus, it is explicitly clear that the arbitration clause is binding to the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 only and that too pertaining to the Licence Agreement/ Supplementary Licence Agreement and cannot be given effect and extended and made applicable to the subsequent transactions and/or agreements so executed between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 with the strangers.
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT:
17. Now the question arises is as to what is an “arbitration agreement” and/or “a valid arbitration agreement”? To meet with the aforesaid issue, the provisions of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act requires to have a glance wherein the arbitration agreement means an agreement between the parties to submit to arbitration of or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a definite legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
A B C D E F G H
18. It is further provided that the arbitration agreement must be in writing and signed by the parties and also in exchange of statement – defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other party.
19. Thus, considering the facts of the case on hand while applying the provisions of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act, the powers of the Court to refer the parties to arbitration are subject to fulfilment of the required conditions i.e. there should be an arbitration agreement and if the Court finds that no valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties, then to invoke the powers under Section 8 and the issue thereof does not arise.
20. Hence, on the aforesaid account and as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, the clause of arbitration so inserted is between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 as inserted in the Licence Agreement and the same cannot be applied to the subsequent transactions and with the persons who are not the parties to the arbitration agreement who cannot be compelled to or referred to arbitration. Hence, in view of the aforesaid, the arbitration clause, the binding effect applies to the plaintiff and defendant No.1 only and cannot be extended to the rest, admittedly who are not the parties to the arbitration agreement.
21. Thus, the sum and substance of the aforesaid discussion is that the reference to the arbitration is possible only if there is a valid arbitration agreement between the parties, but if the dispute is between the parties to an arbitration with the other parties as also non-parties to the arbitration agreement, a reference to the arbitration or even the appointment of the arbitrator can only be made with respect to only the parties to the arbitration agreement and not the non-parties.”
4.2. In terms of the requirements of Section 8 of the Act of 1996 the Commercial Court held that the matter could be referred to arbitration only if it were a part of the subject-matter of the agreement. The reliefs sought by the plaintiff involved its challenge to the conveyance deeds as violative of the undertaking submitted before the Industrial Tribunal as also the fact that the transaction was entered into during the operation of stay granted by the High Court4. Thus, this would not fall within the 4 We have not elaborated on the other litigations wherein the said orders were passed, for being not entirely necessary in relation to the core question involved in the matter. GUJARAT COMPOSITE LIMITED v. A INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ORS. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] A B C D E F G H 118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.
scope of adjudication. The Commercial Court further held that the issue of mortgage was not arbitrable. In essence, the considerations of the Commercial Court had been that the relief sought by the plaintiff related to several other transactions which did not provide for arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. It was observed that the challenge to the conveyance deed and also the relief sought against the bank to not release documents in favour of appellant would only be capable of adjudication by the Courts and could not be resolved by arbitrator.
4.3. Another ancillary observation had been that the conduct of respondent Nos. 3 to 5 would indicate collusion with the appellant during pendency of litigation. Thus, in substance, it was held that the issues in question were not connected with the licence agreement and that there was no valid arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the rest of the defendants apart from defendant No. 1 (appellant). The Commercial Court further clarified that a partial reference to arbitration would not be possible because the cause of action could not be split into separate parts.
5. In appeal, the decision of the Commercial Court was upheld by the High Court, after extensively taking note of the material aspects of the pleadings in plaint and the rival submissions as also the principles enunciated in the cited decisions, with the finding that it would not be proper to bifurcate the disputes in terms of arbitrable and non-arbitrable disputes.
5.1. As regards the suit in respect of a matter which falls partly within and partly outside the arbitration agreement, and also involves non-parties as well as parties, it was held that Section 8 of the Act of 1996 would not be attracted, in reference to several decisions of this Court. The High Court observed that the licence agreements were only executed between the appellant and respondent No. 1 and respondent Nos. 2 to 5 were not party to the agreement. There was a tripartite agreement between the appellant, respondent No. 1 and the bank, however, it was an admitted position that no arbitration agreement existed in that regard. Further, the tripartite agreement was an independent agreement for mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It was further observed by the High Court, as had also been observed by the Commercial Court, that the appellant had breached the injunction granted by the High Court as well as the undertaking before the Industrial Tribunal by selling some of the properties to respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Referring to the plaint A B C D E F G H averments, the High Court took note of the reliefs sought by respondent No. 1 and the parties against whom reliefs were sought as also the pleadings with respect to cause of action in the following words: - “[8.5] In the present case as observed herein above there are license agreements containing the arbitration clause, executed between the plaintiff and the original defendant No.1 on one hand. Admittedly, the original defendant Nos.2 to 5 are not party to the arbitration agreement. There is a tripartite agreement between the original plaintiff, original defendant No.1 and the original defendant No.2 (Bank of Baroda) under which the plaintiff and the original defendant No.2 have prayed the reliefs. It is an admitted position that in the tripartite agreement between the original plaintiff, original defendant No.1 and the original defendant No.2 (Bank of Baroda), there does not exist any arbitration agreement. Under the tripartite agreement the original defendant No.1 has placed the title deeds and the said tripartite agreement as such can be said to be an independent agreement and under the said tripartite agreement there is a mortgage by deposit of title deeds in respect of immovables and hypothecation of movables. It appears that the said tripartite agreement was executed while sanctioning a corporate loan of Rs.500 lakh in favour of the original plaintiff and the charge and mortgage has been created in favour of Bank of Baroda – original defendant No.2. It appears that during the pendency and subsistence of the aforesaid mortgage and as alleged by the original plaintiff surreptitiously and in breach of the injunction granted by this Court as well as the undertaking before the Industrial Tribunal, the original defendant No.1 has sold some of the properties (mortgaged properties) in favour of original defendant Nos.3 to 5. In light of the above broad facts and averments in the plaint, pleadings on the cause of action and the reliefs sought are required to be considered.
[8.6] In the plaint in Commercial Civil Suit No.90/2017, the plaintiff has sought the relief against the following defendants:
1. Gujarat Composite Limited
2. Bank of Baroda
3. Real Home Corporation - a partnership firm GUJARAT COMPOSITE LIMITED v. A INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED & ORS. [DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.] A B C D E F G H 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.
4. M/s. Raj Corporation (Confirming Party) - partnership firm
5. RJD Buildcon Ltd.
The suit is filed for recovery of legitimate dues, cancellation of sale deed and for permanent injunction. In the suit the plaintiff has prayed for the following reliefs.
“(A) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the defendant No.1 to pay to the Plaintiff herein a sum of Rs.32.66 Crores with interest @ 14% per annum from the date of suit till realization herein under this decree and any further orders to be passed by this Hon’ble Court;
(B) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to hold and declare that the Deeds of Conveyance dated 23rd January, 2015 registered vide registration no. 742 and 750 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.3 and 5, as null and void;
(C) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to permanently restrain the defendant Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5 or their agent, executors, or administrators from disturbing or obstructing the plaintiffs occupation possession of the suit property till the plaintiff claim made in para (a) and (b) above is fully discharged;
(D) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the defendant No. 2 Bank not to release original title papers and other relevant documents in favour of defendant Nos.1, 3 and/or 4;
(E) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to hold and declare that the Conveyance Deed dated 23rd January, 2015 entered into between the defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 to 5 as null and void;
(F) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct the defendant No. 2 to take over all the current assets of the plaintiff pertaining to or in connection with the operation of A.C. Sheet and Cement Manufacturing unit under license agreement at their book value and make payment to the plaintiff for the current assets available at the time of handing over of the possession, if required.” [8.7] Necessary pleadings in the plaint with respect to cause of action are as under:
A B C D E F G H
1. The cause of action has arisen when the defendant No. 1, behind the back of the plaintiff, entered into Conveyance Deed with defendant no. 3 and defendant No. 5.
2. Even the original title deeds and other documents partially pertaining to the suit property are in the custody of defendant No. 2 Bank and by suppressing the fact that the plaintiff has absolute right over the suit property qua possession, the defendant No. 1 has entered into Conveyance Deed with defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 5 stating that suit property is free from any encumbrance and/or mortgage.
3. That the cause of action for filing the suit has arisen because the defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 5 made an application to mutate the entry in the revenue record in regard to the Deed of Conveyance. As the plaintiff is legitimately in possession of the suit property by virtue of license agreement, supplementary agreement, tripartite and amended tripartite agreement, it vehemently opposed the said entry and ultimately the authority concerned rejected the application of the defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 5 for mutation of entry in regard to Conveyance Deed. Thus the mutation entry with regard to mortgage of the suit property with defendant No. 2 Bank still exists and the defendant No. 2 Bank has not removed/revoked the said mortgage.
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