Siju Kurian v. State of Karnataka
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 378; [2023] 4 S.C.R. 397
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice Aravind Kumar Penal Code, Justice 1860: Ss. 302, Justice 201
- Decided
- 17 Apr 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 64/2021
- Sections
- 27, 378, 313, 8, 25, 2(1), 302, 106
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H
SIJU KURIAN
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 64 of 2021)
APRIL 17, 2023
[SURYA KANT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860: ss. 302, 201, 404 and 419 – Circumstantial Evidence – Reliance upon – Prosecution case that the accusedlabourer in the farmhouse of the victim, murdered the victim by hitting him with iron rod and then hid the dead body in a pit located in the garden – Other articles also concealed – Accused stole the articles in the farm house and sold them as also sold the land to make undue monetary gain – Acquittal by the trial court on the ground that prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt – However, the High Court convicted and sentenced the accused for the offence punishable u/ss. 302, 201, 404 and 419 – On appeal, held: Death of the victim being homicidal stands proved by the post mortem report – Prime witnesses as also other prosecution witnesses testified that accused last seen in the company of the victim – Recovery of dead body as also articles of the deceased on basis of the voluntary statement of accused, and was also proved through the prosecution witnesses – Articles sold by the accused were recovered on the strength of the voluntary statement of the accused – Plea that confession statement is to be discarded in its entirety cannot be accepted – Also it cannot be said that the statement was not being voluntary or it was recorded improperly – Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is based on sound appreciation of evidence and proper application of law – No material irregularity in the judgment of the High Court – On reappreciation of entire evidence by the High Court in proper perspective, it was rightly held that the accused alone committed the murder of the victim and there being no other possible view which could be considered as missing in the link of chain of circumstances – Thus, the order passed by the High Court upheld – Evidence Act 1872 – ss. 8, 25 and 27.
[2023] 4 S.C.R. 397 A B C D E F G H 398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
Evidence Act, 1827: s 27 – How much of information received from accused may be proved – Held: Section 27 permits the derivative use of custodial statement in the ordinary course of events – There is no automatic presumption that the custodial statements have been extracted through compulsion – In pursuance to a voluntary statement made by the accused, a fact must be discovered which was in the exclusive knowledge of the accused alone – In such circumstances, that part of the voluntary statement which leads to the discovery of a new fact which was only in the knowledge of the accused would become admissible u/s.27 – Such statement should have been voluntarily made and the facts stated therein should not have been in the knowhow of others.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 378 – Appeal against acquittal – Powers of appellate court – General principles – Stated. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 It would be open for the High Court to re-apprise the evidence and conclusions drawn by the trial court and in the case of the judgment of the trial court being perverse that is contrary to the evidence on record, then in such circumstances the High Court would be justified in interfering with the findings of the trial court and/or reversing the finding of the trial court. The appellate court may reverse the order of acquittal in the exercise of its powers and there is no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction having placed on the High Court in exercise of its power as an appellate court. No distinction can be drawn as regards the power of the High Court in dealing with an appeal, between an appeal from an order of acquittal and an appeal from a conviction. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not place any fetter on exercise of the power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. [Para 13][411-F; 412-B-D]
1.2. The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the State to prove the circumstances which points to the guilt of the accused alone for having committed the offence as summarized by the High Court cannot be found fault with. [Para 15][413-H; 414-A] A B C D E F G H
1.3. The death of the victim being homicide stands proved by virtue of the Post Mortem report. The said report would indicate the death would have occurred 45-60 days prior to the post-mortem examination. PW-22, doctor opined that the victim had died due to brain hemorrhage that occurred because of commuted fracture on the forehead. The irresistible conclusion drawn by the High Court, death of the victim was homicidal cannot be found fault with. [Para 16][414-B, D-E]
1.4. The submission for the accused that it is not possible to state conclusively as to what had exactly happened, due to lack of eye-witnesses and therefore the possibility of the deceased having fallen and suffered an injury cannot be ruled out is an argument which cannot be accepted and finding recorded by the High Court deserves to be affirmed. [Para 16.1][414-E-F]
1.5. The fact that accused was last seen in the company of the deceased is testified by PW-10 and PW-14. Apart from two prime witnesses, PW-5, PW-7, PW-9, PW10, PW-11 and PW-15 also clearly and in unequivocal terms deposed that accused was last seen in the house of the deceased after his death. Even if one witness amongst these is to be believed as to what has been deposed is the truth, necessarily the onus is on the accused to provide a satisfactory explanation either in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. or from the admissions elicited from these witnesses, the circumstances in which he was in the company of deceased. When PW-10 and PW-14 have clearly stated that they had seen the accused in the company of the deceased, and there being no satisfactory explanation offered by the accused to the contrary, it has to be necessarily held that accused had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him. When PW-10 and PW-14 have in clear terms deposed to have last seen the accused with the deceased, necessarily accused must offer an explanation as to how and when he started living separately and there being no explanation offered necessarily in the chain of circumstances, the last seen theory propounded by the prosecution to drive home the guilt of the accused requires to be accepted. [Para 16.5 and 16.6][416-G-H; 417-A; 418-B-C] SIJU KURIAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA A B C D E F G H 400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
1.6. The prosecution relied upon is the recovery of dead body at the instance of the accused, based on voluntary statement, which statement has been disowned by the accused and the same not having been proved by the prosecution according to the accused. The said statement of the accused has been marked as Ex.P-2 through PW-25. The said statement was recorded in the presence of PW-1, CW-3 and interpreter – PW-10. [Para 17][418- D-E]
1.7. Section 27 permits the derivative use of custodial statement in the ordinary course of events. There is no automatic presumption that the custodial statements have been extracted through compulsion. A fact discovered is an information supplied by the accused in his disclosure statement is a relevant fact and that is only admissible in evidence if something new is discovered or recovered at the instance of the accused which was not within the knowledge of the police before recording the disclosure statement of the accused. The statement of an accused recorded while being in police custody can be split into its components and can be separated from the admissible portions. Such of those components or portions which were the immediate cause of the discovery would be the legal evidence and the rest can be rejected The submission by the accused that the confession statement is to be discarded in its entirety cannot be accepted for reasons more than one. Firstly, the conduct of the accused would also be a relevant fact as indicated in Section 8. [Para 18][419-A-D]
1.8. It is a trite law that in pursuance to a voluntary statement made by the accused, a fact must be discovered which was in the exclusive knowledge of the accused alone. In such circumstances, that part of the voluntary statement which leads to the discovery of a new fact which was only in the knowledge of the accused would become admissible under Section 27. Such statement should have been voluntarily made and the facts stated therein should not have been in the knowhow of others. When the deposition of PW-10 is perused it would leave no manner of doubt that statement of the accused having been recorded being voluntary and when the statement is being recorded in the language not known to the accused, the assistance of interpreter A B C D E F G H if taken by the police cannot be found fault with. The ultimate test of the said statement made by the accused having been noted down as told by the accused or not would be of paramount consideration. If the answer is in the affirmative then necessarily said statement will have to be held as passing the test of law as otherwise not. Merely because the translation was made from Malayalam to Tamil and written down in Kannada would not suggest that such statement be held to be either not being voluntary or the said statement having been recorded improperly. Merely because PW-10 did not know how to read and write Malayalam does not ipso facto make the contents of the statement to be disbelieved. On the other hand, he states that he is from Kerala and he knows how to speak Malayalam. What was required to be performed by him was to pose the question as stated by the witness to the accused and the answers given to such questions are to be stated to the police for being recorded as stated by the accused. In fact, there is not even a suggestion made to PW-10 about the contents of the statement being incorrect. [Para 19][420- B-H; 421-A]
1.9. It is no doubt true that confession of PW-25 in its entirety is not admissible in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. However, in the teeth of Section 8 read with Section 27 of the Evidence Act, that part of the confession which led to the recovery of the dead body of the victim would become admissible, apart from other articles of the deceased recovered at the instance of the accused has been identified by several witnesses independently. This has also persuaded the High Court to accept the statement recorded under Ex.P-2 as being admissible which cannot be construed as highly improbable. Certain articles were recovered on the strength of confession statement made by the accused and in order to prove such recovery the witnesses have been examined by the prosecution and this has also persuaded the Court to accept the findings of the High Court. [Para 20][422- G-H; 423-A-B]
1.10. The other surrounding circumstances which prove the accused being guilty of the offence beyond reasonable doubt are the recovery of the articles belonging to the deceased and sold by the accused which were recovered on the strength of the SIJU KURIAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA A B C D E F G H 402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
voluntary statement of accused. PW-5 clearly stated as to how the accused intended to sell the immoveable property belonging to the deceased. PW 5 has clearly deposed as to how the accused was apprehended by the police when he was attempting to sell the property of the deceased. That apart the statements made by the accused that deceased had gone to Kerala or the deceased had suffered a paralytic stroke or deceased had proceeded to America and expired there are all incorrect and conflicting statements as has been deposed by PW-5. The conclusion arrived at by the High Court is based on sound appreciation of evidence and proper application of law. On account of evidence available on record having been ignored and there being patent perversity in appreciation of evidence by the Sessions Judge it resulted in interference by the High Court. No material irregularity has crept in the judgment of the High Court calling for interference. On re-appreciation of entire evidence by the High Court in proper perspective it has resulted in arriving at a right conclusion viz. that accused alone committed the murder of the deceased and there being no other possible view which could be considered as missing in the link of chain of circumstances, the appeal is devoid of merits. The judgment passed by the High Court is upheld. [Paras 21-23][428-G-H; 429-A-B, C-E] Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Sheo Swarup v.
King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227; Naresh Chandra Das v. Emperor AIR 1942 (Cal) 593; Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 1 SCC 530; Anvar P.V.
v. P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1; State of Karnataka v. Suvarnamma (2015) 1 SCC 323 : [2014] 10 SCR 778; Pattu Rajan v State of Tamil Nadu (2019) 4 SCC 771 : [2019] 5 SCR 535; State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 501; A.N. Venkatesh & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714; Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2010 SC 589 :
[2009] 14 SCR 1 – referred to.
A B C D E F G H Chandrappa and Others v. State of Karnataka (2007)
4 SCC 415 : [2007] 2 SCR 630; Murugesan v. State through the Inspector of Police (2012) 10 SCC 383 :
[2012] 13 SCR 1; Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1976 SC 483 : [1976] 1 SCR 715 – relied on.
Case Law Reference [1985] 1 SCR 88 referred to Para 8.2 [2007] 2 SCR 630 relied on Para 8.2, 14 [2012] 13 SCR 1 relied on Para 8.2, 12 (1980) 1 SCC 530 referred to Para 8.2 (2014) 10 SCC 473 referred to Para 8.2 (2020) 7 SCC 1 referred to Para 8.2, 9 [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 501 referred to Para 9, 16.5 (2005) 7 SCC 714 referred to Para 9, 18 [2014] 10 SCR 778 referred to Para 9, 22 [2019] 5 SCR 535 referred to Para 9, 22 [2009] 14 SCR 1 referred to Para 9 [1976] 1 SCR 715 relied on Para 18 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
64 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.03.2020 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 335 of 2014. Renjith B. Marar, Zulfiker Ali P. S., Ms. Lakshmi Sree P., Ms. Lebina Baby, Advs. for the Appellant.
V. N. Raghupathy, Adv. for the Respondent.
SIJU KURIAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA A B C D E F G H 404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1. This appeal under Section 2(1)(a) of the Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal AppellateJurisdiction) Act, 1970 by the sole accused in Sessions Case No.96 of 2012 on the file of the Fast Track Court, Sagar Taluk,arises from a judgment rendered by the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Appeal No.335 of 2014 filed by the State of Karnataka against the judgment of the Fast Track Court reversing the order of acquittal and convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’), 201 of IPC, 404 of IPC and 419 of IPC and sentencing him to simple imprisonment for life and also sentencing to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 years/2years for the respective offences which has been ordered to run concurrently and also fine.
2. Brief facts of the case as putforth by the prosecution are: accused was working as a labourer in the farmhouse of Mr. Jose Kafan (deceased) in Kerodi village of Sagar Taluk (Karnataka State) and on 02.12.2011 between 6:00 am to 6:30 am, said accused had entered the room of the deceased through the eastern side of the farmhouse while he was sleeping there and murdered him by hitting with iron rod on his face, upon his left eyebrow and on his left chin with force, then stole the articles in the farmhouse and sold the same and also sold the land of said farmhouse to others to make undue monetary gain. In order to conceal the act and with a deliberate intention to destroy the evidence, the accused then hid the dead body in a pit meant for storing ash manure in the garden land located at a short distance from the farmhouse in the western side of the farmhouse. The iron rod used for committing the murder, waist belt of the deceased person, his pant, shirt were also concealed below the upper crust of soil in the gardenafter which, he had sold theequipmentsstolen from the farmhouseto Sunil Kumar (CW-18) for consideration and likewise he had sold other items toMr. Denis C Thomas(CW20). It was alleged that said amount released by way of sale was dishonestly misappropriated by the accused. It is further alleged by the prosecution that accused impersonating himself as the son of the deceased person had also attempted to sell the land of the deceased to others and to substantiate his false claims had also handed over the documents of the farmhouse of the deceased to CW-15 Mr. Lizo and thereafter he had absconded.
A B C D E F G H
3. Mr. Sajid, son of the deceased lodged a missing complaint and in the backdrop of information regarding the accused,inquiry was conducted and accused confessed to the crime and showed where the dead body was concealed in the presence of witnesses. Hence, the prosecution alleged in this manner accused had murdered the father of the complainant, sold the belongings of the deceased and handed over the documents of the land owned by the deceased, proclaiming himself to be the son of the deceased and had made attempts to sell the land illegally to others. On completion of investigation the charge-sheet came to be filed against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 201, 404 and 419 of IPC for committing a cognizable offence. Charge came to be framed against the accused and same having been deniedresulted in trial being held and in order to drive home the guilt of the accused prosecution got examined 25 witnesses as PW-1 to PW-25 and got exhibited material evidence as per Ex.P-1 to P-51 and the material objects as MO1 to MO47. On conclusion of prosecution evidence, the statement of the accused person under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, came to be recorded and accused pleaded not being guilty and also reiterated his stand of being innocent.Learned Sessions Judge after having heard the arguments on both the sides formulated six points/ issues of determination. The learned Trial Judge acquitted the accused by arriving at a conclusion that prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, by judgment dated 08.08.2013. State being aggrieved by the same filed Criminal Appeal No.-335 of 2014 assailing the said order of acquittal contending inter alia that Sessions Judge had failed to appreciate the evidence and/or there is erroneous appreciation of evidence and as such the accused had to be convicted.It was also contended that though recoveries of the articles, namely, material object was at the instance of the accused and the testimony of the witnesses clearly supported the case of the prosecution, yet learned Sessions Judge had erroneously disbelieved the case of the prosecution. It was also canvassed that on account of non-consideration of the evidence of the doctor PW-22 in proper perspective it had resulted in an erroneous order of acquittal being passed by Sessions Court. On these amongst other grounds as urged in the appeal memorandum the State sought for reversal of the Order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. After considering the arguments advanced by the respective learned advocates appearing for the prosecution as well as the accused the High Court reversed the finding recorded by the Trial Court and convicted the accused for the SIJU KURIAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
offence punishable under Sections 302, 201, 404 and 419 of IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment as already noticed herein supra.Hence this appeal.
4. We have heard the arguments of Shri. Renjith B.Mararlearned counsel appearing for the appellant along with Mr. Zulfiker Ali P.S, Ms. Lakshmi Sree P., Ms. Lebina Baby, Advocates for the appellant/ accused and Shri V.N.Raghupathy, learned standing counsel appearing for the State.
5. It is the contention of Shri Renjith B. Marar,learned counsel appearing for the appellant that there is no direct evidence attributable to the role of the accused and High Court has based the order of conviction on circumstantial evidence.He has contended that prosecution has not been able to establish the chain of events on the basis of circumstantial evidence, all leading to the one and only conclusion namely the guilt of the accused. He would submit that convictionhas been based solely on the basis of confessional statement alleged to have been given by the appellant to the police in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The said evidence is not reliable and ought not to have been accepted since it was written in the Kannada Language which was not known to the accused. He contended that according to the prosecution accused had given a confessional statement at the police station in Malayalam in the presence of PW-10 who translated the same to Kannada and undisputedly PW-10 did not know how to write and read Kannada but was only able to speak Kannada language and as such the translated version of appellant’s alleged confession to the police could not be acceptable evidence. There being no evidence available on record as to the person who had got it typed on a computer and who had taken the printout of the same was itself sufficient to disbelieve the said statement and there was no explanation forthcoming from prosecution. On these aspects as rightly pointed out by the Trial Court,the High Court ought not to have interfered with the well-reasoned order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.
6. He also drew the attention of this Court to the evidenceof PW- 10 by contending that he is a close friend of other prosecution witnesses and his evidence ought not to have been considered. He would contend that confessional statement of the accused was in a printed format and this was not typed in the presence of the accused at the police station and even according to the prosecution it was told by PW-10, written A B C D E F G H down by the police and undisputedly the statement which was written down was not produced and as such evidence of PW-10 could not have been relied upon by the High Court to convict the accused.
7. He would further contend that complainant PW-4 who is the son of the deceased had stated that his father had left home in Kerala lastly on 29.11.2011 and he had called his father once on 28.12.2011 to invite him to a family function which had been agreed but deceased did not visit Kerala. He would contend that according to the prosecution the deceased was murdered by the accused on 02.12.2011 as stated in the alleged confession statement and as per the post-mortem report, death had occurred 45 to 60 days prior to days of exhumation on 21.01.2012 and as such the story of the prosecution as attributed to the accused is not believable and on account of the same it caused a serious doubt and the lacuna that has crept in prosecution case has remained unexplained, which was fatal to the prosecution story.
8. He would further contend that prosecution has mainly relied upon 3 witnessesnamely PW-1 (mahazar witness), PW-2 (inquest witness) and PW-10 (the person who translated the revelations of accused) to prove the recovery of material objects (MO’s) allegedly stolen by the accused from the farmhouse of the deceased.By taking us to the deposition of these witnesses he would contend that they are close friends residing in neighbourhood and all these three witnesses had witnessed the recoveries and attested the seizure measure and inquest report and as such they have to be treated as stock witnesses brought in at the instance of the prosecution and same ought to have been discarded as not being trustworthy. He would also contend that story of the prosecution is that accused was an employee in the farmhouse of the deceased which had not been proved. He would submit that prosecution had failed to prove the chain of circumstances including the last seen theory. He would contend that very fact of accused having denied all the allegations put against him when he was examined under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) including the recovery of the dead body and other material objects at his instance was sufficient to accept the stand of the accused by arriving at a conclusion that prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
8.1 He would contend that the case of the accused was that when he was brought to the spot by the police there were already some people SIJU KURIAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
standing exactly at the spot where the dead body was exhumed and accused had not pointed out the spot to the police and the spot was known to the police even before the arrest of the accused. Hence, High Court ought not to have put the burden to disprove the prosecution case. He would contend that the two employees who were working in the farmhouse of the deceased were missing and there was no explanation whatsoever forthcoming from the prosecution in this regard and this cast a serious doubt with regard to the alleged act of the deceased. He would contend that the CDR of the accused’s mobile was not secured and produced by way of evidence by prosecution which was fatal to the prosecution case.
8.2 He would contend that the alleged confessional statement Ex. P-2 is to be segregated into two parts: namely recovery of dead body and articles and in which statement was undisputedly before the police and as such inadmissible. He would also elaborate the submissions by contending that when the findings of the trial court cannot be held as perverse or not possible to be arrived at, necessarily the benefit should be extended to the accused as held by catena of Judgments of this Court and as such he has prayed for affirming the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court which has since been reversed by the High Court. He would contend that on suspicion, conviction cannot be sustained and the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and by relying upon the following judgments he prays for allowing of the appeal and restoring the judgment passed by the Trial Court:
(i) Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra(1984)
4 SCC 116,
(ii) Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227,
(iii) Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4
SCC 415,
(iv) Murugesan v. State through the Inspector of Police (2012)
10 SCC 383,
(v) Naresh Chandra Das v. EmperorAIR 1942 (Cal) 593,
(vi) Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra (1980) 1 SCC 530, A B C D E F G H
(vii) Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer(2014) 10 SCC 473,
(viii) Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal
(2020) 7 SCC 1.
Per contra Shri V. N. Raghupathy, learned standing counsel appearing by the State would support the judgment passed by the High Court. He would submit that when learned Sessions Judge had failed to look into the evidence available before it or had erroneously appreciated the available evidence it had resulted in appellate court exercising its jurisdiction to reverse the said findings for which the reasonings have been assigned while recording the findings. He would submit that on reappreciation of the evidence the appellatecourt has formed an opinion that there had been non-appreciation of available material on record and has discussed the same threadbare.
9. He would submit that material witnesses namely the witnesses to the seizure mahazar PW-3, PW-9, PW-11 had remained unshaken and there being no explanation forthcoming in the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.,the High Court has rightly noticed that this material evidence had been ignored by the Trial Court and on account of said uncontroverted evidence available on record it has proceeded to accept the same and convict the accused which finding does not suffer from the vice of error. He would draw the attention of the court to the evidence of PW-5 who is the friend of the accused who has spoken about the rubble tapping machines being sold to Mr. Babu (PW-11) namely brother in law-Mr. Lijo(PW-5) under the agreement prepared by the advocate PW-15. He would contend that said witness has also spoken about Ex.P-15 under which MO23 to 32 had been seized which are said to have been given by the accused, thus supporting the case of the prosecution and by contending that the High Court has on re-appreciation of evidence had rightly formed an opinion that the Trial Court had ignored the material evidence and as such prays for sustaining the judgment of the High Court which had reversed the finding of the Trial Court whereby the accused had been acquitted. In support of his submissions he has relied upon the following judgments:
(i) State of Rajasthan v Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254
(ii) A.N. Venkatesh & Ors. v State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC SIJU KURIAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
(iii) State of Karnataka v Suvarnamma (2015) 1 SCC 323
(iv) Pattu Rajan v State of Tamil Nadu (2019) 4 SCC 771.
(v) Arjun Panditrao Kotkar v Kailash (2020) 7 SCC 1.
10. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and after bestowing our careful and anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at the bar, we are of the considered view that the following points could arise for our consideration:
(a) Whether the judgment of the High Court reversing the finding of the Trial Court is to be set aside on the basis of there being two possible views and the one taken by Trial Court being a possible view?
(b) Whether the judgment of the High Court is erroneous and the findings recorded by the Trial Court has been erroneously reversed by High Court while re-appreciating the said evidence?
Or
(c) Whether the High Court has appreciated the evidence in proper manner or the High Court had failed to consider the evidence in proper perspective?
DISCUSSION AND FINDING
11. As the points formulated hereinabove are interlinked and findings being recorded are likely to overlap with each other, we have considered the above points conjointly and answered hereinbelow:
RE: POINTS 1 TO 3
12. One of the main contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is to the effect that High Court ought not to have interdicted with the judgment of the acquittal passed by the Trial Court and only in the event of judgment of the trial court was riddledwith perversity and the view taken by the Trial Court was not a possible view, same could have been reversed by relying upon the judgment of this Court in case of Murugesan V. State through the inspector of police1 whereunder it came to be held as follows:
“33. The expressions “erroneous”, “wrong” and “possible” are defined in Oxford English Dictionary in the following terms:
1(2012) 10 SCC 383
A B C D E F G H “erroneous.— wrong; incorrect.
wrong.—(1) not correct or true, mistaken.
(2) unjust, dishonest, or immoral.
possible.—(1) capable of existing, happening, or being achieved.
(2) that may exist or happen, but that is not certain or probable.”
34. It will be necessary for us to emphasize that a possible view denotes an opinion which can exist or be formed irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of such an opinion. A view taken by a court lower in the hierarchical structure may be termed as erroneous or wrong by a superior court upon a mere disagreement. But such a conclusion of the higher court would not take the view rendered by the subordinate court outside the arena of a possible view. The correctness or otherwise of any conclusion reached by a court has to be tested on the basis of what the superior judicial authority perceives to be the correct conclusion. A possible view, on the other hand, denotes a conclusion which can reasonably be arrived at regardless of the fact where it is agreed upon or not by the higher court. The fundamental distinction between the two situations have to be kept in mind. So long as the view taken by the trial court can be reasonably formed, regardless of whether the High Court agrees with the same or not, the view taken by the trial court cannot be interdicted and that of the High Court supplanted over and above the view of the trial court.”
13. It need not be restated that it would be open for the High Court to re-apprise the evidence and conclusions drawn by the Trial Court and in the case of the judgment of the trial court being perverse that is contrary to the evidence on record, then in such circumstances the High Court would be justified in interfering with the findings of the Trial Court and/or reversing the finding of the Trial Court. In Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh2 it has been held by this Court as under:
“14. We have considered the arguments advanced and heard the matter at great length. It is true, as contended by Mr. Rao, that interference in an appeal against an acquittal recorded by the trial court should be rare and in exceptional circumstances. It is,
2 AIR 2010 SC 589
SIJU KURIAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.] A B C D E F G H 412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 4 S.C.R.
however, well settled by now that it is open to the High Court to reappraise the evidence and conclusions drawn by the trial court but only in a case when the judgment of the trial court is stated to be perverse. The word “perverse” in terms as understood in law has been defined to mean “against the weight of evidence”. We have to see accordingly as to whether the judgment of the trial court which has been found perverse by the High Court was in fact so.
The Appellate court may reverse the order of acquittal in the exercise of its powers and there is no indication in the Code of any limitation or restriction having placed on the High Court in exercise of its power as an Appellate court. No distinction can be drawn as regards the power of the High Court in dealing with an appeal, between an appeal from an order of acquittal and an appeal from a conviction. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not place any fetter on exercise of the power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed.
In the case of Sheo Swarup v King Emperor3, it has been held by the Privy Council as under:
But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as:
1) The views/opinion of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses;
2) The presumption of innocence infavour of the accused; 3) The right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and 4) The slowness of an appellatecourt in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
14. This Court has time and again reiterated the powers of the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeal against an order of acquittal
3 AIR 1934 PC 227
A B C D E F G H and laid down the general principles in the matter of Chandrappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka4 to the following effect: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the Appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An Appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an Appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an Appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an Appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An Appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
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