Prakash Aggarwal v. Ganesh Benzoplast Limited and Another
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 464; [2023] 3 S.C.R. 844
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice There Is An Inordinate Delay in Lodging the Complaint – Further, Justice At Its Face Value, Justice 406, Justice 420, Justice 120b, Justice Ipc Is Dismissed –
- Decided
- 28 Apr 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1308/2023
- Sections
- 34, 15, 403, 200, 420, 406
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A B C D E F G H 844 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
PRAKASH AGGARWAL
v.
GANESH BENZOPLAST LIMITED AND ANOTHER
(Criminal Appeal No. 1308 of 2023)
APRIL 28, 2023
[B. R. GAVAI AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.] Administration of Justice – Abuse of process of law – Held: Respondent No.1-complainant has attempted to turn a purely contractual dispute between the parties into a criminal case – Not only that, there is an inordinate delay in lodging the complaint – Further, the complaint even taken at its face value, does not disclose that any of the ingredients of the offence complained of have been made out – Thus, the present complaint is nothing else but an abuse of process of law – Complaint filed before the trial court u/ss.403, 406, 420, 120B, IPC is dismissed – Impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and trial court are quashed and set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.120-B, 403, 406, 420 r/w s.34 – Security Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 – s.15-HA – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34.
Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: A perusal of the entire complaint would reveal that the only allegation is that accused No.1 Company had sold the shares to itself when the market price of the shares had fallen. The averments are totally contrary to the terms agreed between the parties in the Inter-Corporate Deposit Agreement (ICDA) as well as in the Letter of Pledge (LoP). The ICDA as well as the LoP specifically authorizes the accused persons/appellants to sell the shares either to themselves or their group of companies. Accused No.1 Company had already invoked the arbitration clause on 14th August 2001. In the arbitration proceedings, a specific stand was taken by the complainant/respondent No.1 that accused No.1 Company should have invoked the pledge at the stage of the first default, i.e. in May 2000. However, the accused persons/appellants waited till August-September, 2001 to sell the pledged shares which had in the meanwhile depreciated in value. [2023] 3 S.C.R. 844 A B C D E F G H Another allegation made before the arbitration proceedings was that accused No.1 Company had manipulated the price of the shares. Thus, though the complainant/respondent No.1 was aware about the sale of shares as early in the year 2001, he did nothing till the year 2006 when, according to it, it had applied to BSE and NSE for details. Even after the year 2006, the complainant/ respondent No.1 waited till the year 2011 to lodge the complaint. Though, it is sought to be urged by the complainant/respondent No.1 before this Court that it came to know about the fraudulent act of the accused persons/appellants in the year 2009, which gave a cause of action to it to file the complaint, there is no averment to that effect in the complaint. Insofar as the other contention that the shares were sold at a lesser price than the market price is concerned, there is no averment in the complaint in that regard. In any case, the transactions have been made through the BSE and NSE. As such, the contention in that regard is without substance. In any case, a specific finding has been given by the Arbitrator in that regard. The said arbitral award is under challenge in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The complainant/respondent No.1 has attempted to turn a purely contractual dispute between the parties into a criminal case. Not only that, there is an inordinate delay in lodging the complaint. Though the complainant/respondent No.1 was aware about the sale of the shares in the year 2001, it did not do anything except filing an application before the Arbitrator. According to the complainant/respondent No.1, it received the information from the BSE and NSE in the year 2006, which fortified its suspicion about the fraud being played. Even thereafter, for a period of 5 years, it was silent and filed the complaint only in the year 2011. The complaint, taken at its face value, does not disclose that any of the ingredients of the offence complained of have been made out. The present complaint is nothing else but an abuse of process of law. The impugned judgment passed by the High Court and the order passed by the trial court are quashed and set aside. The complaint filed before the trial court under Section 403, 406, 420 and 120B of the IPC is dismissed. [Paras 16, 17, 20-24][853- E, G-H; 854-A-B; 855-D-H; 856-A-B, C-E] PRAKASH AGGARWAL v. GANESH BENZOPLAST LIMITED
AND ANOTHER
A B C D E F G H 846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1308 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2021 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in CRLWP No. 349 of 2020.
With Criminal Appeal Nos. 1309 and 1310-1311 of 2023.
Shyam Divan, Vijay Aggarwal, Sr. Advs., Ankur Chawla, Aamir Khan, Vaibhav Malhotra, Shivam Tandon, Ms. Aruna Gupta, Vijay Juneja, Ms. Sanam, Advs. for the Appellant.
Abhishek M Singhvi, Mrs. Anjana Prakash, Sr. Advs., Ms. Iti Sharma, Puneet Sharma, Anshay Dhatwalia, Aditya Joshi, Ashwani Kumar, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Bharat Bagla, Ms. Shreya Saxena, Ms. Yamini Singh, Sourav Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B. R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeals challenge the judgment and order dated 26th April 2021, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, thereby dismissing Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 348, 349 and 357 of 2020 filed by the appellants herein seeking quashing of the order dated 22nd March 2017 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Railway Mobile Court, Andheri, Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as the “trial court”), thereby issuing summons to them. The High Court allowed Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 127, 128, 129 and 130 of 2020 filed by the complainant/ respondent No.1 herein, thereby, upholding the order dated 22nd March 2017.
3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeals are as under:
3.1. Ganesh Benzoplast Ltd., the original complainant and respondent No. 1 herein, availed two Inter Corporate Deposit (hereinafter referred to as “ICD”) facilities, dated 14th February 2000 and 7th March 2000, from Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd – accused No. 1. The said ICD were for Rs. 50,00,000/-, each to be repaid by 15th May A B C D E F G H 2000 and 5th June 2000. As per the ICD, security cover of 200% of the ICD amount was to be maintained. Accordingly, the complainant/ respondent No.1 executed a Letter of Pledge (for short, “LoP”) in favour of accused No.1 Company, pledging 15,00,000 of its equity shares as security, with each share valued at Rs. 16/-, thereby amounting to Rs. 2,40,00,000/-.
3.2. Prakash Aggarwal, Meera Goyal and Suresh Chand Goyal, appellants herein, who were Directors of accused No. 1 Company, were responsible for the management of its day to day affairs. They were arraigned as accused Nos. 2 to 4 in the original complaint.
3.3. On 3rd May 2000, accused No.1 Company issued a notice to the complainant/respondent No.1 asking it to pledge additional shares as the value of the pledged shares had decreased to Rs. 1,24,50,000/- on account of depression in the financial market, thereby, resulting in a shortfall of Rs. 75,50,000/- from the agreed security cover i.e. 200% of the ICD amount.
3.4. Due to financial hardship, the complainant/respondent No.1 was not in a position to repay the ICD amount on 5th June 2000, i.e. the due date, and therefore, it informed accused No.1 Company that it could sell the pledged shares to realize the due amount, and remit the excess amount to the complainant/respondent No.1. Thereafter, accused No.1 Company assured the complainant/respondent No.1 that, as and when the shares were sold, the balance amount, if any, would be remitted to it.
3.5. On 25th August 2000, the complainant/respondent No.1 repaid the first ICD and the loan account was closed.
3.6. It is pertinent to note that the interest that was being charged on ICD was being regularly recovered by accused No. 1 Company uptill 6th August 2001. In the meanwhile, the complainant/respondent No.1 was in constant communication with the accused No.1 Company, seeking the details of the sale of shares. However, these requests were rebuffed, with accused No.1 Company asking the complainant/respondent No.1 not to confuse the issue of sale of shares with the issue of interest on
ICD.
3.7. On 2nd August 2001, accused No.1 Company issued another notice to the complainant/respondent No.1, demanding the repayment of the ICD of Rs. 50,00,000/- as the value of the pledged shares had fallen to Rs. 44,25,000/-, failing which the pledged shares would be sold. PRAKASH AGGARWAL v. GANESH BENZOPLAST LIMITED AND ANOTHER [B. R. GAVAI, J.] A B C D E F G H 848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
3.8. Subsequently, on 14th August 2001, complainant/respondent No.1 proposed to repay Rs. 25,00,000/- initially in five equal monthly installments, with the first installment to be paid on or before 25th August 2001. However, on the same day, accused No.1 Company invoked the arbitration clause in the ICD agreement and appointed a Sole Arbitrator, claiming the outstanding amount due from the complainant/respondent No.1.
3.9. During the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, accused No.1 Company sold the 15,00,000 pledged shares for an amount of Rs.24,67,631/- to one Doogar and Associates Ltd., which was later renamed as Morgan Ventures Ltd. in the year 2004. Importantly, accused Nos. 2 to 4 were also Directors in this transferee Company.
3.10. The complainant/respondent No.1, on 11th February 2011, filed a criminal complaint being CC No. 56/SW/2011 against accused Nos.1 to 4, alleging fraud, cheating and criminal breach of trust, before the trial court. Vide order dated 11th September 2012, the Magistrate issued process against all the accused for offences punishable under Sections 403, 406, 420 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”).
3.11. The aforesaid order was challenged by filing a Criminal Revision Application No. 1276 of 2012 before the Court of Session for Greater Bombay at Bombay. Vide order dated 16th January 2016, the said criminal revision application was allowed, and the matter was remanded to the trial court, who was directed to re-record verification under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973.
3.12. In the meantime, on 9th December 2015, an arbitral award was passed in favour of accused No.1 Company and the complainant/ respondent No.1 was held liable to pay the claim amount of Rs.34,59,218/- with interest at the rate of 36% per annum.
3.13. Pursuant to the remand order dated 16th January 2016, the trial court, vide order dated 22nd March 2017, issued process under Sections 406, 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC read with Section 15- HA of the Security Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (for short, “SEBI Act”) against accused Nos. 1 to 4.
3.14. Aggrieved by the same, the accused filed Criminal Revision Application being No.128 of 2017 before the Court of Sessions, Dindoshi, Mumbai. Vide order dated 2nd December 2019, the said revision A B C D E F G H application was partly allowed. Insofar as the process issued against accused No.1 Company, it was completely quashed and set aside, whereas, the issuance of process against accused Nos. 2 to 4 was set aside only under Section 420 of the IPC and Section 15-HA of the SEBI Act. However, issuance of process against accused Nos. 2 to 4 for the offences punishable under Section 406 read with Section 34 of the IPC stood confirmed.
3.15. Challenging the aforesaid order, criminal writ petitions were filed both by the complainant/respondent No.1 and accused Nos. 2 to 4/ appellants herein. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment dated 26th April 2021, allowed the criminal writ petitions filed by the complainant/ respondent No.1 and dismissed the criminal writ petitions filed by accused Nos. 2 to 4, thereby affirming the order of the trial court and confirming the issuance of process against them under Sections 406 and 420 read with Section 34 of IPC. The charges under Section 15-HA of the SEBI Act were dropped at the instance of the complainant/respondent No.1, who averred before the High Court that he would not pursue the application under the same.
3.16. Hence, the present appeals.
4. We have heard Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel and Shri Vaibhav Malhotra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused Nos. 2 to 4-appellants, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Mrs. Anjana Prakash, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant/ respondent No.1 and Shri Siddharth Dharmadhikari, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent No.2-State.
5. Shri Divan submitted that the complaint, even taken at its face value, does not disclose that ingredients of any offence have been made out. He submits that, along with the Inter-Corporate Deposit Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “ICDA”), the complainant/respondent No.1 had pledged the shares in question. As per the LoP, the accused No.1 Company was entitled to invoke the pledge at any time in the event of default or otherwise. In the LoP, the authority was also given to sell and dispose of the said securities. He further submits that, as per the LoP itself, the accused No.1 Company could have sold the shares to themselves.
6. Shri Divan further submits that, with regard to the very same dispute, the arbitration proceedings were conducted between the parties. PRAKASH AGGARWAL v. GANESH BENZOPLAST LIMITED AND ANOTHER [B. R. GAVAI, J.] A B C D E F G H 850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
The complainant/respondent No.1 has participated in the said arbitration proceedings and an arbitral award is also passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. He submits that the same is challenged by the complainant/ respondent No.1 by a proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Arbitration Act”). He further submits that it could clearly be seen that the dispute between the parties, if any, is purely of civil nature and continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to nothing else but an abuse of process of law.
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