Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (Nct of Delhi
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 311; [2023] 3 S.C.R. 697
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, Justice Dipankar Datta Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Justice 1985 – S.37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, Justice If Entitled to Bail – Held: Recovery of Ganja Was Made From the Behest, Justice As Well As the Confessional Statement of the Appellant – in Addition
- Decided
- 28 Mar 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 943/2023
- Sections
- 37, 436A, 439, 482, 120B, 37(1), 36(1), 309, 20, 43, 436
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:26 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H MOHD MUSLIM @ HUSSAIN v.
STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 943 of 2023)
MARCH 28, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND DIPANKAR DATTA, JJ.] Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.37 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.436A – Appellant accused of committing offences punishable under NDPS Act has been in custody since 2015, if entitled to bail – Held: Recovery of ganja was made from the four co-accused – Appellant was arrested at the behest, and on the statement of one of the co-accused – Prosecution relied on that statement, as well as the confessional statement of the appellant – In addition, it also relied on the bank statements of one of the co-accused who allegedly disclosed that money used to be transferred to the appellant – As against this, the prosecution has not recovered anything else from the appellant – The allegation that he is a mastermind is not backed by any evidence of extensive dealing with narcotics, which would reasonably have surfaced – Further, two co-accused persons have been enlarged on bail – Appellant has been in custody for over 7 years and 4 months – Progress of the trial has been at a snail’s pace wherein 30 witnesses have been examined, and 34 more have to be examined – Grant of bail on ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by s.37, given the imperative of s.436A which is applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too – Thus, on facts, appellant enlarged on bail subject to such conditions as the trial court may impose – Bail.
Bail – Offences under Special Acts – Duty of Courts – Discussed.
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.37 – Special conditions under – Interpretation of.
Words and Phrases – ‘Not guilty’ – Discussed – Bail.
[2023] 3 S.C.R. 697 A B C D E F G H 698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The recovery of ganja was made on 28.09.2015, from the four co-accused, including ‘NE’. The present appellant was arrested at the behest, and on the statement of this ‘NE’. The prosecution has relied on that statement, as well as the confessional statement of the present appellant; in addition, it has relied on the bank statements of ‘VS’ @ ‘B’, who allegedly disclosed that money used to be transferred to the appellant. As against this, the prosecution has not recovered anything else from the appellant; its allegation that he is a mastermind, is not backed by any evidence of extensive dealing with narcotics, which would reasonably have surfaced. The prosecution has not shown involvement of the appellant, in any other case. Furthermore, he was apparently 23 years of age, at the time of his arrest. It is an undisputed fact that two co-accused persons (who also, were not present at the time of raid and from whom no contraband was recovered) - the accused (‘VS’ @ ‘B’) who allegedly transferred money to the appellant’s account as payment for the ganja, and the accused (‘NY’ @ ‘TP’) from whom the original insurance papers and registration certificate of the car from which contraband was seized, was recovered - have both been enlarged on bail. The appellant has been in custody for over 7 years and 4 months. The progress of the trial has been at a snail’s pace: 30 witnesses have been examined, whereas 34 more have to be examined. [Para 17][709-E; 710-A-D] 1.2 The conditions which courts have to be cognizant of are that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty of such offence” and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. What is meant by “not guilty” when all the evidence is not before the court? It can only be a prima facie determination. That places the court’s discretion within a very narrow margin. Given the mandate of the general law on bails (Sections 436, 437 and 439, CrPC) which classify offences based on their gravity, and instruct that certain serious crimes have to be dealt with differently while considering bail applications, the additional condition that the court should be satisfied that the accused (who is in law presumed to be innocent) is not guilty, has to be interpreted reasonably. Further the A B C D E F G H classification of offences under Special Acts (NDPS Act, etc.), which apply over and above the ordinary bail conditions required to be assessed by courts, require that the court records its satisfaction that the accused might not be guilty of the offence and that upon release, they are not likely to commit any offence. These two conditions have the effect of overshadowing other conditions. In cases where bail is sought, the court assesses the material on record such as the nature of the offence, likelihood of the accused co-operating with the investigation, not fleeing from justice: even in serious offences like murder, kidnapping, rape, etc. On the other hand, the court in these cases under such special Acts, have to address itself principally on two facts: likely guilt of the accused and the likelihood of them not committing any offence upon release. This court has generally upheld such conditions on the ground that liberty of such citizens have to - in cases when accused of offences enacted under special laws – be balanced against the public interest. A plain and literal interpretation of the conditions under Section 37 (i.e., that Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty and would not commit any offence) would effectively exclude grant of bail altogether, resulting in punitive detention and unsanctioned preventive detention as well. Therefore, the only manner in which such special conditions as enacted under Section 37 can be considered within constitutional parameters is where the court is reasonably satisfied on a prima facie look at the material on record (whenever the bail application is made) that the accused is not guilty. Any other interpretation, would result in complete denial of the bail to a person accused of offences such as those enacted under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The standard to be considered therefore, is one, where the court would look at the material in a broad manner, and reasonably see whether the accused’s guilt may be proved. The satisfaction which courts are expected to record, i.e., that the accused may not be guilty, is only prima facie, based on a reasonable reading, which does not call for meticulous examination of the materials collected during investigation. Grant of bail on ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by Section 37 of the Act, given the imperative of Section 436A which is applicable to offences under the NDPS Act too. In the facts of this case, the appellant deserves to be MOHD MUSLIM @ HUSSAIN v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
A B C D E F G H 700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
enlarged on bail. The appellant is directed to be enlarged on bail, subject to such conditions as the trial court may impose. [Paras 18-20, 24][710-E-G; 711-A-H; 713-A] Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 :
[1994] 2 SCR 375 – followed.
Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 731 : [1994] Supp. 4 SCR 386; Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India (1996) 2 SCC 616 : [1996] 2 SCR 1123; Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2022) 10 SCC 51; Union of India v.
K. A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713 : [2021] 2 SCR 443;
Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary v. Union of India 2022 SCC Online SC 929:[2022] 6 SCR 382 – relied on.
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 81 : [1979] 3 SCR 1276; Kadra Pahadiya & Ors. v. State of Bihar (1981) 3 SCC 671;
Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 : [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 325; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kajad (2001) 7 SCC 673 : [2001] Supp. 2 SCR 617; Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 2 SCC 281 : [2008] 17 SCR 369; A Convict Prisoner v. State 1993 Cri LJ 3242 – referred to.
National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI- 2021/ Exe cu ti v e _ n c r b_ Su mm a r y -20 2 1 . p d f ; Do n a l d Clemmer, The Prison Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, ‘Donald Clemmer’s Concept of Prisonisation’, available at: https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wp- content/ uploads/2020/12/Sobecki_sklad.pdf (accessed on 23rd March 2023) – referred to.
A B C D E F G H Case Law Reference [1979] 3 SCR 1276 referred to Para 2 [1991] 3 Suppl. SCR 325 referred to Para 3 [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 617 referred to Para 11 [1994] 4 Suppl. SCR 386 relied on Para 12 [2008] 17 SCR 369 referred to Para 13 [1994] 2 SCR 375 followed Para 13 [1996] 2 SCR 1123 relied on Para 13 [2021] 2 SCR 443 relied on Para 14 [2022] 6 SCR 382 relied on Para 15 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
943 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.09.2022 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in BA No. 2675 of 2022.
Ms. Tanya Agarwal, Mrs. Shubhangi Tuli, Advs. for the Appellant. Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Ms. Nachiketa Joshi, Digvijay Dam, Sachin Sharma, Rajan Kr. Chourasia, Ms. Shruti Agarwal, Ms. Janhvi Prakash, Kartik Dey, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. Special leave granted. With consent of counsel for parties, the appeal was heard finally.
2. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar1 this court had declared that the right to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just” it was held that:
1 [1979] 3 SCR 1276 : (1980) 1 SCC 81 MOHD MUSLIM @ HUSSAIN v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
A B C D E F G H 702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.”
3. These observations have resonated, time and again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors. v. State of Bihar2 and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak3; in the latter the court reemphasized the right to speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged trial, has no option:
“The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not given one, may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his right to speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.”
4. These issues have pivotal meaning to the facts of this case. The appellant complains that his application for bail ought not to have been rejected by the High Court, in the present case, considering that he
2 (1981) 3 SCC 671
3 [1991] Supp. 3 SCR 325: (1992) 1 SCC 225 A B C D E F G H has suffered incarceration for over 7 years and the criminal trial has hardly reached the half-way mark. The appellant is accused of committing offences punishable under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereafter ‘NDPS Act’). His application under Section 439 read with Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereafter ‘CrPC’), seeking grant of regular bail, before the Delhi High Court, was denied by the impugned judgment4. Some other facts important to the decision in this case, are that at the time of his arrest, the appellant was 23 years. He was not found in possession of the narcotic drug; other co-accused were.
5. The prosecution alleges that on 28.09.2015, based on secret information received by the police, a raid was conducted, leading to arrest of four accused persons - Nitesh Ekka, Sanjay Chauhan, Sharif Khan, and Virender Shakiyar/Sakyabar @ Deepak, who were alleged to be in possession of 180 kilograms of ganja. During investigation, the accused Nitesh Ekka was taken to Chhattisgarh for identification of coaccused persons. At his instance, the present appellant Mohd. Muslim was arrested on the intervening night of 03/04.10.2015. Pursuant to further investigation, three other co-accused (Virender Singh @ Beerey, Shantilal Tigga @ Guddu, and Nepal Yadav @ Tony Pahalwan) were also arrested. It is the prosecution’s case that Virender Singh @ Beerey would purchase ganja and make transfers to the bank accounts belonging to Mohd. Muslim, Shantilal Tigga @ Guddu and Nitesh Ekka, and their friends and families, before further supplying the ganja to Nepal Yadav @ Tony Pahalwan. On 29.02.2016, the chargesheet was filed under Sections 20/ 25/ 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 120B IPC, and on 05.07.2016 the charges were framed against the appellant and other coaccused. As per pleadings, two supplemental chargesheets were also filed on 01.08.2016 and 08.11.2017.
6. The appellant’s bail application was rejected by the district court5 based on the gravity of the offences alleged, severity of punishment, and the appellant’s alleged role. It was noted that he had been in regular contact with the other co-accused to commit the crime, and that material witnesses were yet to be examined.
4 Order dated 08.09.2022 in Bail Application No. 2675/2022. 5 Order dated 08.06.2022 in FIR No. 148/2015, passed by the ASJ & Special Judge (NDPS), South East District, Saket Court, New Delhi.
MOHD MUSLIM @ HUSSAIN v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] A B C D E F G H 704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 3 S.C.R.
7. Aggrieved, the present appellant approached the High Court. The impugned judgment records that the present accused was prima facie in regular contact with other co-accused as indicated by the call records, and that the main accused Virender Singh @ Beerey had transferred money from his bank account to the appellant’s bank account, several times. One of the witnesses, during trial, had also allegedly mentioned that Rs. 50,000 was received from the present appellant. It was held that there was a prima facie case against him, and no grounds to rely on the exceptions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act; therefore, application for regular bail was refused, with a direction to the trial court to expedite the trial and conclude it within six months. Aggrieved, the appellant is now before this court, renewing his plea for grant of regular bail.
8. Ms. Tanya Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, urged that the period of long incarceration suffered, entitled the appellant to grant of bail. Further, 34 more witnesses were yet to be examined, with little or no progress to the trial since the High Court’s direction to expedite the trial. It was also pointed out that main accused Virender Singh @ Beerey and another co-accused Nepal Yadav, had both already been granted bail by the High Court6. Counsel urged bail on the ground of parity.
9. Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing for the State, strongly opposed grant of bail, citing Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was urged that the appellant was actively involved in the commission of the offence – with call records and bank transactions implicating him with the main accused Virender Singh @ Beerey. The ASG submitted that such cases are deeply concerning, as the accused persons are said to be involved in a drug peddling network. The public interest of protection against sale and use of illegal drugs, outweighed the concerns regarding individual liberty of the accused, and justified continued custody of the appellant. Provisions like Section 37 of the NDPS Act have been upheld by this court, as necessary to ensure public order and to prevent recurrence of serious crimes like drug dealing. The learned ASG also submitted that the role of the appellant, though he is a co-accused is prominent, as he appears to be the mastermind behind the supply and delivery of narcotic substances from Chhattisgarh. 6 Order dated 10.12.2018 in Bail Application No. 2188/2018, and order dated 26.07.2018 in Bail Application No. 944/2018, respectively.
A B C D E F G H Analysis and Conclusions
10. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as follows:
“Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless—
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force, or granting of bail.”
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