M/S Alpine Housing Development Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. Ashok S Dhariwal and Others
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 57; [2023] 1 S.C.R. 991
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice M.R. Shah, Justice C.T. Ravikumar Arbitration & Conciliation Act, Justice 1996 Case, Justice So S.34(2)(A) Pre-Amendment Shall Be Applicable – in S.34(2)(A) Pre-Amendment, Justice An Arbitral Award Could Be Set Aside By the Court If the Party Making
- Decided
- 19 Jan 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 73/2023
- Sections
- 34(2), 34, 48(1), 48, 48(2), 56, 5
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H M/S ALPINE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
PVT. LTD.
v.
ASHOK S DHARIWAL AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 73 of 2023)
JANUARY 19, 2023
[M. R. SHAH AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.] Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(2)(a) – Prior and post 2019 Amendment – Whether the applicant can be permitted to adduce evidence to support the ground relating to Public Policy in an application filed u/s. 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 – Held: In the instant case, the arbitration proceedings commenced and even the award was declared prior to the amendment of s.34(2)(a) by Act 33/2019, so s.34(2)(a) pre-amendment shall be applicable – In s.34(2)(a) pre-amendment, an arbitral award could be set aside by the Court if the party making application “furnishes proof” – An application for setting aside the arbitral award will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was before the arbitrator, however, if there are matters not containing such records and the relevant determination to the issues arising u/s. 34(2)(a), they may be brought to the notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both the parties’ the cross-examination of the persons swearing in to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary as the truth will emerge on the reading of the affidavits filed by both the parties – Respondent permitted to file affidavits/ additional evidence in the proceedings u/s.34 of the Arbitration Act.
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 : s. 34(2)(b) – When an award passed could be set aside on the ground of its being in conflict with the “Public Policy of India” – Scope – The ground that arbitral award is in conflict with the Public Policy of India, the said ground could be available only after passing of the award – Therefore, the same can be permitted to be agitated in an application u/s 34 and the person shall not have to wait till the execution is filed – The defence that the arbitral award is in conflict with the Public Policy of India itself can be a ground to set aside the award in view of section 34(2)(b) of the Act.
[2023] 1 S.C.R. 991 A B C D E F G H 992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1. The arbitration proceedings commenced and even the award was declared prior to the amendment of Section 34(2)(a) by Act 33/2019, Section 34(2)(a) pre-amendment shall be applicable. Prior to the amendment of section 34(2)(a), an arbitral award could be set aside by the Court if the party making an application “furnishes proof” and the grounds set out in section 34(2)(a) and section 34(2)(b) are satisfied. However, subsequent to the amendment of section 34(2)(a), the words “furnishes proof” have been substituted by the words “establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal”. In that view of the matter, it is held that in case of arbitration proceedings commenced and concluded prior to the amendment of section 34(2)(a) by Act 33/2019, pre-amendment of section 34(2)(a) shall be applicable. [Para 6][1000-F-H]
2. The scope and ambit of section 34(2)(a) pre-amendment would be that applications under sections 34 of the Act are summary proceedings; an award can be set aside only on the grounds set out in section 34(2)(a) and section 34(2) (b); speedy resolution of the arbitral disputes has been the reason for enactment of 1996 Act and continues to be a reason for adding amendments to the said Act to strengthen the aforesaid object; therefore in the proceedings under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the issues are not required to be framed, otherwise if the issues are to be framed and oral evidence is taken in a summary proceedings, the said object will be defeated; an application for setting aside the arbitral award will not ordinarily require anything beyond the record that was before the arbitrator, however, if there are matters not containing such records and the relevant determination to the issues arising under section 34(2)(a), they may be brought to the notice of the Court by way of affidavits filed by both the parties’ the cross-examination of the persons swearing in to the affidavits should not be allowed unless absolutely necessary as the truth will emerge on the reading of the affidavits filed by both the parties. Therefore, in an exceptional case being made out and if it is brought to the court on the matters not containing the record of the arbitrator that certain things are relevant to the determination of the issues arising under section A B C D E F G H 34(2)(a), then the party who has assailed the award on the grounds set out in section 34(2)(a) can be permitted to file affidavit in the form of evidence. However, the same shall be allowed unless absolutely necessary. [Para 8][1005-H; 1006-A-E]
3. It is required to be noted that even for establishing that the arbitral award is in conflict with Public Policy of India, in a given case, the evidence may have to be led and by leading evidence, the person who is challenging the award on that ground can establish and prove that the arbitral award is in conflict with Public Policy of India and/or the subject matter of dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force. However, at the same time, from the record before the arbitrator, if the same can be established and proved that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force or the arbitral award is in conflict with the Public Policy of India, in that case, the person may not be permitted to file the affidavit by way of evidence/additional evidence. [Para 9][1006G-H; 1007-A-B]
4. It is required to be noted that so far as one of the grounds set out in section 34(2)(b), namely, that the arbitral award is in conflict with the Public Policy of India, the said ground could be available only after passing of the award. Therefore, the same can be permitted to be agitated in an application under section 34 of the Act and the person shall not have to wait till the execution is filed. The defence that the arbitral award is in conflict with the Public Policy of India itself can be a ground to set aside the award in view of section 34(2)(b) of the Act.[Para 10] [1007-C-D] Fiza Developers and Inter-Trade Private Limited v.
AMCI (India) Private Limited & Another, (2009) 17 SCC 796 : [2009] 12 SCR 1; Canara Nidhi Limited v. M.
Shashikala (2019) 9 SCC 462 : [2019] 15 SCR 637;
Emkay Global Financial Services Limited v. Girdhar Sondhi, (2018) 9 SCC 49 : [2018] 10 SCR 937 referred to.
Case Law Reference [2009] 12 SCR 1 referred to Para 2.2, [2019] 15 SCR 637 referred to Para 7(iii)
M/S ALPINE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PVT. LTD. v. ASHOK S. DHARIWAL A B C D E F G H 994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
[2018] 10 SCR 937 referred to Para 7(iii)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.73 of 2023.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.09.2021 of the High Court of Judicature of Karnataka at Bangalore in W.P. No.50799 of 2019(GM/
CPC).
Krishnan Venugopal, Sr. Adv., Ms. Shobha Gupta, Ms. Sanskriti Gupta, Krishnan Agarwal, M. C. Dhingra, Advs. for the Appellant. Balaji Srinivasan, Ms. Lakshmi Rao, Ms. Aakriti Priya, Abdul Saleem, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 1.9.2021 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Petition No. 50799/2019, by which the High Court has allowed the said writ petition and while quashing and setting aside the order passed by the learned Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, has permitted the respondents – original writ petitioners to adduce evidence in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), the original respondent before the High Court and in whose favour the award has been passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal has preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as under:
That against the award passed by the learned arbitrators dated 12.03.1998, an application under Section 34 of the Act being Arbitration Case No. 38/1998 has been filed by the respondents. That the respondents filed an interim application being IA No. 4 in section 34 application to adduce additional evidence. At this stage, it is required to be noted that as such the award passed by the learned arbitrators was an ex-parte award and no evidence was led by the respondents herein, who subsequently assailed the award by way of section 34 application. The appellant herein filed objections to the said interim application seeking permission to adduce evidence on the ground that the same was not A B C D E F G H maintainable in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996. The grounds on which the respondents submitted an application to permit them to adduce evidence shall be dealt with and considered hereinafter.
2.1 The Court dealing with interim application being IA No. 4 in section 34 application rejected the said interim application and refused to permit the respondents to adduce evidence by observing that if such a permission is granted, it would defeat the object and purpose of early disposal of arbitration proceedings and it would delay further hearing of section 34 application. For that purpose, reliance was placed on the provisions of Section 34(2)(a) of the Act, as amended in the year 2019, by which expression “furnish proof” in section 34(2)(a) came to be substituted with the expression “establish on the basis of record of arbitral tribunal”. Therefore, the Court dealing with section 34 application opined that the said amendment intended to limit the scope of judicial review under Section 34 of the Act only in exceptional circumstances enumerated under Section 34(2)(a) of the Act on the basis of the record available and even if the grounds urged relate to section 34(2)(b) of the Act, the applicants cannot have a right to produce additional evidence. The order passed by the Court dealing with Section 34 application which rejected the interim application being IA No. 4 preferred by the respondents permitting them to adduce additional evidence/evidence was the subject matter of writ petition before the High Court.
2.2 Before the High Court, it was conceded on behalf of the appellant herein – original respondent before the High Court, so recorded in paragraph 8 of the impugned judgment, that the provisions of Section 34 (2)(a) of the Act, as it stood prior to Act 33 of 2019 would apply, namely, pre-amendment to section 34(2)(a) of the Act shall be applicable. That thereafter, by the impugned judgment and order, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Fiza Developers and Inter-Trade Private Limited v. AMCI (India) Private Limited & Another, reported in (2009) 17 SCC 796, the High Court has allowed the said writ petition and set aside the order passed by the court below and has allowed the application preferred by the respondents herein permitting them to adduce evidence in the proceedings under section 34 of the Act. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court permitting him respondents to adduce evidence/additional evidence in the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act is the subject matter of present appeal before this Court. M/S ALPINE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PVT. LTD. v. ASHOK S. DHARIWAL [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
3. Shri Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellant and Shri Balaji Srinivasan, learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondents – original writ petitioners.
3.1 Shri Krishnan Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed a very serious error in permitting the respondents to adduce evidence in an application under section 34 of the Act. It is submitted that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court permitting the respondents to adduce additional evidence in an application under section 34 of the Act is against the object and purpose of the amending section 34(2)(a), amended vide Act No. 33/2019. It is submitted that if in an application under section 34 of the Act, the applicant who is aggrieved by the award passed by the arbitral tribunal is permitted to adduce evidence, it would defeat the object and purpose of amending section 34(2)(a) of the Act by which the expression “furnishes proof” has been substituted with the expression “establish on the basis of record of the arbitral tribunal”. It is submitted that the object and purpose of amending section 34(2)(a) of the Act is to decide and dispose of the arbitration proceedings at the earliest and to avoid delay.
3.2 It is further submitted by Shri Krishnan Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that though it was conceded before the High Court by the counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that section 34 of the Act prior to amendment amending section 34(2)(a) shall be applicable, the said concession is not binding as the same would be against the law and any concession contrary to law shall not be binding. It is submitted that therefore according to him the provisions of section 34(2)(a) post amendment shall be applicable by which in the proceedings under section 34 of the Act, the applicant is not required to furnish proof on the grounds set out in section 34 (2)(a) to set aside the award and the court dealing with section 34 application has to decide the same only on exceptional circumstances enumerated under section 34(2)(a) of the Act on the basis of the record available. It is submitted that therefore the applicants cannot have a right to produce additional evidence/evidence.
3.3 It is further submitted that even otherwise and assuming that the provisions applicable prior to amendment (Act 33 of 2019) are A B C D E F G H applicable, in that case also, as the respondents – original applicants have assailed the award on the grounds enumerated under section 34(2)
(b) of the Act, the expression “furnish proof” in section 34(2)(a) cannot apply to section 34(2)(b). It is submitted that the award passed by the arbitral tribunal can be assailed either on the grounds enumerated under section 34(2)(a) or under section 34(2)(b). It is submitted that the grounds enumerated under section 34(2)(a) and section 34(2)(b) are separate grounds/clauses. It is submitted that therefore “furnish proof” in section 34(2)(a) of the Act cannot apply to section 34(2)(b) because if the Parliament intended so, Section 34(2) would have applied the proof requirement to all seven grounds, without any need for separate clauses
(a) and (b). It is submitted that the effect of “the court finds that” in section 34(2)(b) is that the court can on its own decide based on the arbitral award that the dispute was not arbitrable or that award conflicts with public policy. It is submitted that therefore, the disjunctive “or” between clauses (a) and (b) of section 34(2) cannot be read as the conjunctive “and”.
3.4 It is further submitted that the ratio of this Court in the case of Fiza Developers(supra) was for framing of issues which is not required in section 34(2) proceedings. It is submitted that in the case of Emkay Global Financial Services Limited v. Girdhar Sondhi, reported in (2018) 9 SCC 49, this Court has explained the decision in the case of Fiza Developers (supra) and has expressly held that only section 34(2)
(a) contemplates furnishing proof. It is submitted that the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Canara Nidhi Limited v. M. Shashikala, reported in (2019) 9 SCC 462 has approved the interpretation of section 34(2)(a) in Emkay Global (supra). 3.5 It is further submitted that in the case of Gemini Bay Transcription Private Limited v. Integrated Sales Service Limited, reported in (2022) 1 SCC 753, this Court has treated 2019 amendment to section 34(2)(a) as clarificatory, while considering section 48(1) which are broadly in pari materia with section 34(2)(a) and 34(2)(b) as they stood prior to the 2019 amendment. It is submitted that this Court in the aforesaid decision in paragraphs 39 & 40 held that grounds under unamended section 48 including conflict with public policy in section 48(2) are to be established only on basis of “record of arbitral tribunal” in the interest of speedy enforcement of foreign award.
M/S ALPINE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PVT. LTD. v. ASHOK S. DHARIWAL [M. R. SHAH, J.] A B C D E F G H 998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
3.6 It is submitted that as such there is no legal bar to the Parliament to provide two different procedures for two different sets of grounds in a proceeding or even having two different procedures for the same relief. It is submitted that the Parliament intended that grounds in section 34(2)
(b) must be established on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal. It is submitted that even assuming proof is required under section 34(2) (b), it does not apply to a case of alleged conflict of an award with statute. Being a pure question of law, it can be considered on the findings/ directions recorded in the award.
3.7 It is further submitted that even otherwise on merits also, general rule is that unless exceptional circumstances are made out, no additional evidence is permissible. It is submitted that the present case does not fall within the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” as held by this Court in the case of Canara Nidhi (supra). It is submitted that the directions in the award that the parties shall apply for statutory permissions is the legally correct decree to pass in a suit for specific performance. Therefore, the award cannot be said to be in conflict with “public policy of Indian law.”
3.8 It is submitted that the respondents’ contention that the award is frustrated because corporation refused permission for clubbing of khatas which is the basis for award to be executed does not fall within the conflict with public policy ground under section 34(2)(b) because it is the award and not its execution that must conflict with the public policy of India. It is submitted that apart from the fact that the respondents contention is premised on his having accepted the award, the corporation’s alleged refusal is admittedly a subsequent event after the award. It is submitted that it is the executing court that would determine that the decree is inexecutable due to change in circumstances. It is submitted that the evidence can be led during execution. It is submitted that the respondents are bound to suffer the consequence of their wilful failure to participate in the arbitration proceedings before the arbitral tribunal, despite attending them after the rejection of their objection to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It is submitted that therefore the respondents cannot be allowed to lead evidence by taking advantage of their own wrong.
3.9 It is further urged by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that if this Court is inclined to allow the respondents to lead evidence, in that case, (a) the appellant may be permitted to lead A B C D E F G H evidence including the permission for clubbing khatas where there are nalas and the corporation’s later endorsement dated 28.6.2004 agreeing to consider clubbing of khatas concealed by the respondents, and (b) the questions of law regarding whether the corporation’s refusal falls under section 34(2)(b) may kindly be left open.
4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri Balaji Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is submitted that in the present case initially the respondents challenged the arbitration proceedings/constitution of the arbitral tribunal and therefore did not participate in the arbitration proceedings. It is submitted that thereafter the arbitral tribunal proceeded with the hearing ex-parte. It is submitted that therefore as such no evidence was adduced or led by the respondents before the arbitral tribunal.
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