Jabir & Ors v. The State of Uttarakhand
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 48; [2023] 1 S.C.R. 969
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha Penal Code, Justice 1860 – Ss.302, Justice 364, Justice 201 – the Prosecution Case Was That the Victim ‘h’, Justice Aged About 7 Years, Justice Went Missing On 8.10.1999 – On 10.10.1999, Justice He Had Seen ‘h’ Standing Along With A-1
- Decided
- 17 Jan 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 972/2013
- Sections
- 156(3), 302, 364, 201, 307, 156
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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A B C D E F G H
JABIR & ORS.
v.
THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND
(Criminal Appeal No. 972 of 2013)
JANUARY 17, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 364, 201 – The prosecution case was that the victim ‘H’, aged about 7 years, went missing on 8.10.1999 – On 10.10.1999, his dead body was found in the sugarcane field of ‘Y’ in Village – The victim’s father (PW-1) filed an application u/s. 156(3) Cr.P.C. on 19.11.1999 – FIR was recorded on 21.11.1999 – In the FIR, the informant alleged that he was told by PW-3 and PW-2 that they had seen A-3 taking deceased boy ‘H’ into her house on 08.10.1999 – PW-4 told him that on 09.10.1999 at about 6 AM, he had seen ‘H’ standing along with A-1 and A-2 on the road near Y’s sugarcane field – In the trial, the prosecution relied on the testimony of 12 witnesses – The trial court convicted the appellants u/s. 302 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment as well as 7 years u/s.364, IPC and imprisonment for 5 years u/s. 201, IPC – The High court affirmed the trial court’s findings – On appeal, held: The prosecution was not able to prove its case as there were serious flaws in the testimonies of two sets of witnesses (PWs 2 & 3 and PW- 4 & 5) who deposed to seeing the deceased with A-3 and the first two accused, on 08.10.1999 and 09.10.1999, respectively – PW-1’s conduct, in not stating anything during inquest proceedings, despite being informed about seeing the boy in the company of A-3 on 08.10.1999, and later, on the early morning of 09.10.1999, by PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4, undermines the prosecution story – In the present case, save the “last seen” theory; there is no other circumstance or evidence – The time gap between when the deceased was seen in the company of the accused and the probable time of his death, based on the post mortem report, is not narrow – Therefore, solely relying on the “last seen” circumstance to convict the accused-appellants is unjustified.
Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The conviction is solely based on the testimonies of two sets of witnesses, PW-4 and PW-5. PW-5 is a cousin of PW- [2023] 1 S.C.R. 969 A B C D E F G H 970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
1, and his behaviour in not interceding upon seeing the 7-yearold crying boy in the company of the accused, away from his house and despite knowing about the previous enmity between the parties, is unnatural. The police statement of PW-5 was recorded more than two months after the start of investigation, and the application under Section 156(3) CrPC does not mention that he had witnessed the boy with the accused despite the witness’s statement that he informed PW-1 about what he saw. [Para 18][977-F-G; 978-B]
2. PW-4’s testimony that he saw the deceased in the company of first two appellants is unreliable, as him being a resident of Akbarpur, went out to answer the call of nature at 6 AM to another village as Y’s field was located at village Narayanpur and returned home immediately, then, there is no explanation how he knew that the accused were standing at a specific spot. Besides this, it is unnatural and improbable that one as close a neighbour of PW-1 living 8-10 paces away would not be aware that the boy went missing on 8.10.1999. [Para 19][978-E-G]
3. There is no explanation why PW-1, despite being told by PW-2 and PW-3 that they had seen A-3 taking victim ‘H’ in her house holding his hand, did not mention the involvement of A-3 in the inquest proceedings. PW-7, who is witness to inquest, deposed about the presence of PW-1 to PW-5 during the inquest renders suspect the deposition of PW-2 and weakens the testimony of PW-5, who claims to have left the village on 09-10- 1999 and returned only on 12-10-1999. [Para 20][979-E-G]
4. In circumstantial evidence cases, to sustain conviction, the panchsheel principles laid down in Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra must be fulfilled. However, in present case, prosecution is not able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. There are serious flaws in the testimonies of two sets of witnesses (PW-2, PW-3 & PW-4, PW-5) who deposed to seeing the deceased with A-3 and the first two accused (A-1 and A-2), on 08.10.1999 and 09.10.1999, respectively. There are flaws in their testimonies regarding their presence at the place and time and with respect to the knowledge of PW-1. PW-1’s conduct, in not stating anything during inquest proceedings, despite being A B C D E F G H informed about seeing the boy in the company of A-3 on 08.10.1999, and later, on the early morning of 09.10.1999, by PW- 2, PW-3 and PW-4, undermines the prosecution story. The conduct of PW-4 and PW-5 in not taking any steps to ensure the safety of the child despite knowing the previous enmity or grudge on the part of the accused is unnatural. [Paras 21-22][980-C; 987- C-F] Sarad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88– relied on.
6. The “last seen” doctrine has limited application, wherein the time lag between the time the deceased was seen last with the accused and the time of murder, is narrow; furthermore, the court should not convict an accused only on that basis. In the present case, save the “last seen” theory, there is no other circumstance or evidence. The time gap between when the deceased was seen in the company of the accused on 09-10-1999 and the probable time of his death based on the post mortem report is not narrow. Given this fact, and the serious inconsistencies in the depositions of the witnesses, and the fact that the FIR was lodged almost 6 weeks after the incident, the sole reliance on the “last seen” circumstance to convict the accused-appellants is not justified. [Paras 23, 25][981-H; 982-A; 984-D-E] Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab (2005) 12 SCC 438;
Rambraksh @ Jalim v. State of Chhattisgarh [2016] 2 SCR 599; Nizam & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan [2015] 10 SCR 786 – relied on.
Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] 1 SCR 1091; Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat (1997) 7 SCC 1 – referred to.
Case Law Reference [1952] 1 SCR 1091 referred to Para 12, 21 [1985] 1 SCR 88 relied on Para 12, 21 (2005) 12 SCC 438 relied on Para 23 [2016] 2 SCR 599 relied on Para 24 [2015] 10 SCR 786 relied on Para 24 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.972 of 2013.
JABIR & ORS. v. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND A B C D E F G H 972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
1 By judgment and order dated 05.10.2012 in Crl. No. 358/2004 From the Judgment and Order dated 05.10.2012 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.358 of 2004. J. C. Gupta, Sr. Adv., Vikrant Singh Bais, Yogesh Tiwari, Advs. for the Appellants.
Vikas Negi, Sudarshan Singh Rawat, Sunny Sachin Rawat, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. The appellants were convicted under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter “IPC”) and sentenced to life imprisonment as well as 7 years under Section 364, IPC and imprisonment for 5 years under Section 201, IPC. Their conviction and sentence was upheld by the Uttarakhand High Court.1
2. Haseen, aged about 7 years, was the son of Bisarat, (PW-1), a resident of Village age Akbarpur. He went missing on 08.10.1999. On 10.10.1999, at about 16:30, the dead body of Haseen was found in the sugarcane field of Yaqub in Village Narayanpur, situated at a distance from Akbarpur, Haseen’s village. Information was sent to the Police Station Manglor. Inquest proceedings were held by ASI Dalchand, PW-
6. The post-mortem was conducted on 11.10.1999 by Dr. A.K. Jain (PW-9). According to his statement, death had occurred about two days before the post-mortem examination.
3. PW-1, Bisarat moved an application under Section 156(3) Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “Cr. PC”) on 19.11.1999. Based on the order of the magistrate concerned, the first information report (FIR) was recorded on 21.11.1999. In the FIR, the informant alleged that his son Haseen was missing since 3 PM on 08.10.1999 and that despite search, he could not be found. He went to PS Manglor on 10.10.1999 on the day dead Haseen’s body was found. He also narrated about the post-mortem examination on 11.10.1999. PW-1 stated that he was busy in making inquiries. He was told by Sayeed Ahmad (PW-3) and Murad Ali (PW-2) that they had seen A-3 Husn Jahan taking deceased boy Haseen into her house on 08.10.1999 at about 3.30 PM. Suleman (PW- 4) told him that on 09.10.1999 at about 6 AM he had seen Haseen standing along with A-1 Jabir and A-2 Jakir on the road near Yaqub’s sugarcane filed. He (PW-1) immediately went to PS Manglor to lodge the report on A B C D E F G H the morning of 12.10.1999, but his report was not recorded. He then met S.P., Haridwar on the same day, but police did not interrogate him or his witnesses nor take any action against the accused persons. Based on these allegations, the police investigated the incident, and during the course of those proceedings, arrested the accused- appellants.
4. After investigations were completed, the police, in their final report, alleged that the appellants were guilty of the offences. Charges were framed against them, by the court. The prosecution, to establish its allegations, relied on the testimony of 12 witnesses. The defence did not examine any witness. Based on the materials placed before it, the trial court convicted the appellants, who then appealed to the High Court. The impugned judgment affirmed the trial court’s findings. Appellants’ contentions
5. It is argued, on behalf of the appellants, that the conviction and sentence imposed in this case, is unsustainable. It was argued that no reason was given why the FIR was lodged almost five weeks after the deceased boy went missing and after his body was found on 10.10.1999. The complainant stated that on 12.10.1999, he was told by the witnesses that on 8.10.1999, the third appellant, A-3 Husn Jahan, was seen taking the child inside her house, and on 9.10.1999 at 6 AM, the child was seen along with accused Jabir and Jakir. The application under section 156(3) Cr. P.C. was moved on 19.11.1999, i.e., after more than one month. In the mean-time no application was sent to any officer. There is no explanation for a delay of more than a month.
6. It was urged that there is discrepancy in the testimonies of various witnesses, particularly that of PW-1 (father of the deceased) and the others, particularly PW-4 and PW-5, as to whether the suspicion of the accused’s involvement was, in fact, reported within a couple of days after the boy’s body was found. Counsel especially highlighted that the police witnesses did not support the version of PW-1 that he had voiced suspicions contemporaneously. Further, it was submitted that the testimonies of witnesses were that the accused’s role was not known to PW-1 and others on 10.10.1999, but this was not reflected in the inquest report.
7. Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution witnesses are untrustworthy since they appear to have been added as after thoughts. It was submitted that the appellants’ consistent case was that they were named much after the incident, on account of enmity with the deceased JABIR & ORS. v. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.] A B C D E F G H 974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
father’s family. It was pointed out that in the testimony of the first IO, (PW-8) that PW-2 did not mention about the role and involvement of A- 3 and that she was with the deceased on 8th October, 1999. Further, that witness (PW-8) also testified that the villagers had initially suspected Saleem and Mansoor, and not the present accused.
8. Learned counsel highlighted that P-4 and PW-5 are wholly unreliable witnesses. In fact, the police statement of PW-4 was recorded much after the incident in December, 1999. This witness, as indeed PW- 5, were introduced to somehow implicate the first two appellants (A-1 and A-2) since there was no other witness who supported the prosecution with respect to their alleged involvement or presence. The idea of introducing them was to link them with the deceased. It was submitted that PW-4’s testimony was unreliable, because he recorded his police statement after two months, and as per his admission, though he had seen the deceased in the first two appellants’ company and informed PW-1 about this as early as on 12.10.1999. Likewise, PW-5 deposed having informed PW-1 on 12.10.1999 about witnessing the boy in the company of the first two appellants on (09.10.1999). No explanation was given by the prosecution why he was examined so late. Furthermore, the deceased’s father, PW-1, did not mention having been told about the involvement of the first two appellants by PW-5 in his written complaint.
9. It is argued that the “last seen” theory is, on the face of it, an after- thought and concocted in as much as PW7 Mansab stated before the court that PW2 Murad Ali, Sayeed Ahmad PW3, and PW4 Suleman, who all were closely related to the deceased child, were present at the time of inquest proceedings held on 10.10.1999, yet they for the reasons best known to them kept silent for 2 days and for the first time informed Bisarat PW1, only on 12.10.1999. Yet, that witness PW-1 did not mention these facts in his written version.
10. It was contended that all prosecution witnesses were of the same family, as complainant Bisarat PW1 is the nephew of Murad Ali PW2; Sayeed Ahmad (PW-3) is son of Sharif, PW-1’s cousin, and PW4 Suleman as well as PW5 Munfaid too belonged to PW-1’s family. It was urged that there was reason for the witnesses to cook up a false story against the appellants because in the year 1996, Munfaid, father of the appellants had lodged an FIR against Murad Ali (PW-2), Phurkan and Shamshad under Section 307, 452, 504, 506 IPC and they were prosecuted. This clearly established their motive to falsely implicate the appellants.
A B C D E F G H
2 1952 (1) SCR 1091
3 1985 (1) SCR 88
4 1997 (7) SCC 156
JABIR & ORS. v. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND [S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]
11. Counsel highlighted that according to Mansab’s (PW-7) deposition (who was a witness to establish the Inquest Report) Munfaid, Sayeed, and Murad Ali were also present at the time of inquest. It is unimaginable that had they seen the deceased in the company of accused persons, they would not disclose the same even after seeing the dead body of their kith and kin. This incongruity went to the root of their credibility, falsifying the prosecution version.
12. Learned counsel relied on Hanumant vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh,2 Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra,3 and Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia vs. State of Gujarat4 to contend that in circumstantial evidence-based cases, each incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances proved must form a chain of events from which the irresistible conclusion of the accused’s guilt can be safely drawn; no other hypothesis is possible. It was submitted that this court has cautioned that in a case depending upon circumstantial evidence, there is a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly, and such a completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped, and the other circumstances cannot, in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. Counsel also stated that this court has to be watchful and avoid the danger of allowing the suspicion to take the place of legal proof for sometimes, unconsciously it may happen to be a short step between moral certainty and legal proof. It has been indicated by this court that there is a long mental distance between “may be true” and “must be true” and the same divides conjectures from sure conclusions. It was contended that in the present case, the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt, every circumstance, and the courts below erred in treating suspicion as proof, leading to the appellants’ conviction.
State/Prosecution’s contentions
13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the state argued that this court should not disturb the concurrent findings of the trial court and A B C D E F G H 976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 1 S.C.R.
the High Court. He first dealt with the issue of delayed lodging of the FIR and relied on the trial court’s reasoning, as well as the testimony of PW-1. He argued that when the deceased went missing, there was nothing unnatural on the part of PW-1, his father, in not reporting the absence immediately and instead searching for him. It was only when he was informed that the dead body was found, that he approached the police; the post mortem corroborated that the boy died due to shock on account of injuries caused due to violence and injuries caused on his person. Learned counsel submitted that all the eyewitnesses who deposed to having seen A-1 to A-3, clearly stated that they had seen the boy in the company of the said appellants. Therefore, the last seen theory was correctly applied. Furthermore, PW-1 in fact, sought to complain to the police, but without avail. Eventually, he approached the magistrate under Section 156 (3) Cr. PC, which was allowed.
14. It was also submitted that the cumulative effect of the depositions of PW- 4 and PW-5 was that the deceased boy was seen last, in the company of the first two accused, early morning near the place where his body was discovered subsequently. Given that the report of this was made immediately after discovery of the body, on 10.10.1999, the informant could not be faulted for not taking prompt action. The inquest, which was held the next day, also concluded that death occurred under suspicious circumstances, having regard to the nature of injuries on the deceased’s body.
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