Indrakunwar v. The State of Chhattisgarh
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 934; [2023] 14 S.C.R. 959
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Sanjay Karol Headnotes Issue for Consideration: Whether, Justice In Explaining the Purported Incriminating Circumstance Against Her, Justice The Convict-Appellant Ought to Have Disclosed, Justice Over and Above Denial of Any Relationship With the Deceased Child
- Decided
- 19 Oct 2023
- Case number
- CONTEMPT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 1730/2012
- Sections
- 313, 3, 302, 301(1958), 497
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:27 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 14 S.C.R. 959 : 2023 INSC 934
CASE DETAILS
INDRAKUNWAR
v.
THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
(Criminal Appeal No. 1730 of 2012)
OCTOBER 19, 2023
[ABHAY S. OKA AND SANJAY KAROL, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: Whether, in explaining the purported incriminating circumstance against her, the convict-appellant ought to have disclosed, over and above denial of any relationship with the deceased child, the specifics of her miscarriage and its aftermath; particularly when the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of establishing such relationship between the deceased and the convict -appellant. Constitution of India – Right to Privacy – Personal life of a woman accused of committing a crime – Failure of Prosecution to discharge its duty:
Held: The essence of a woman’s fundamental right to equality and privacy, regarding private matters of bodily and psychological integrity is the ability to make autonomous decisions about her own body and reproductive choices – It is entirely within the realm of privacy of a woman to decide whether or not to bear a child or abort her pregnancy (within the framework of law) – In the instant case, the guilt has been placed on appellant-convict without any solid foundation thereto since no relationship of any nature whatsoever could be established between her and the deceased child discovered in the dabri – The conclusion drawn is simply on the basis that the convict-appellant was a woman living alone and had been pregnant (as admitted in the statement u/s. 313 CrPC) – This, in the Court’s view, was in itself suspect since she had been ‘deserted’ by her husband – Her statement, nowhere reflects an answer to a question concerning the particulars of the child that she was admittedly carrying but denied that the deceased was not the one recovered from the dabri – Although there is a requirement by law 960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
to disclose the aspects required to adjudicate in a criminal matter, such duty cannot unreasonably and unwarrantedly step over the fundamental right of privacy. [Paras 27, 36] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 313 – Principles as evolved over period of time for statements u/s. 313 Cr.PC.:
Held: 1. The object, evident from the Section 313 Cr.PC. itself, is to enable the accused to themselves explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against them; 2. The intent is to establish a dialogue between the Court and the accused – This process benefits the accused and aids the Court in arriving at the final verdict; 3. The process enshrined is not a matter of procedural formality but is based on the cardinal principle of natural justice, i.e., audi alteram partem; 4. The ultimate test when concerned with the compliance of the Section is to enquire and ensure whether the accused got the opportunity to say his piece; 5. In such a statement, the accused may or may not admit involvement or any incriminating circumstance or may even offer an alternative version of events or interpretation – The accused may not be put to prejudice by any omission or inadequate questioning; 6. The right to remain silent or any answer to a question which may be false shall not be used to his detriment, being the sole reason; 7. This statement cannot form the sole basis of conviction and is neither a substantive nor a substitute piece of evidence – It does not discharge but reduces the prosecution’s burden of leading evidence to prove its case – They are to be used to examine the veracity of the prosecution’s case; 8. This statement is to be read as a whole – One part cannot be read in isolation; 9. Such a statement, as not on oath, does not qualify as a piece of evidence u/s. 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; however, the inculpatory aspect as may be borne from the statement may be used to lend credence to the case of the prosecution; 10. The circumstances not put to the accused while rendering his statement under the Section are to be excluded from consideration as no opportunity has been afforded to him to explain them; 11. The Court is obligated to put, in the form of questions, all incriminating circumstances to the accused so as to give him an opportunity to articulate his defence – The defence so articulated must be carefully scrutinized and considered; 12. Non-compliance with the Section may cause prejudice to the accused and may impede the process of arriving at a fair decision. [Para 34] Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 – Prosecution case that the convictappellant had relations with a co-villager as a result of which she conceived a child – She, upon giving birth, allegedly killed this child and threw the corpse into a dabri (small water body- pond) – The High Court upheld the conviction u/s. 302 IPC and the order of sentence passed by the trial Court – Propriety:
Held: It is established that negative inferences cannot be drawn for a question or incriminating circumstance not put to an accused while making a statement u/s. 313 Cr.P.C – Her statement, nowhere reflects an answer to a question concerning the particulars of the child that she was admittedly carrying but denied that the deceased was not the one recovered from the dabri – It is a matter of record that none of the witnesses has seen the convictappellant throwing the deceased child into the dabri; as hitherto observed, no conclusive proof, of any nature, of relationship had been put forth by the prosecution; no evidence has been led to cast doubt upon the version of the convict – The statement of the doctor is silent on the death of the deceased having occurred prior to or after birth, although in examination in chief, the doctor has deposed that the death of the deceased child was homicidal in nature; however, in the cross-examination, it is admitted that such fact does not form part of the record, thereby calling into question the conclusion itself as it is a vital piece of information that has been omitted – Therefore, the conviction recorded against the convict-appellant to be entirely based on mere presumption, with the actual evidence on record failing to establish the prosecution case much less beyond reasonable doubt. [Paras 36, 41, 43]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018) 16 SCC 368 : [2018] 4 SCR 955; S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal (2010) 5 SCC 600 : [2010] 5 SCR 322; K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1: [2017] 10 SCR 569 – relied on.
Geeta Devi v. State of U.P 2022 SCC OnLine 57; Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018) 7 SCC 192 : [2018] 3 SCR 770; Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn. (2009) 9 SCC 1 : [2009] 13 SCR 989; X v. The Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors 2022 SCC OnLine SC 905; XYZ v. The State of Gujarat INDRAKUNWAR v. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
& Ors. Criminal Appeal No. /2023 (@ Slp (Crl.) Dy. No. 33790/2023) – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1730 of 2012.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.04.2010 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 605 of 2005.
Appearances:
Surya Narayan Singh, Sr. Adv., Naresh Kumar, Shantanu Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Gautam Narayan, Ms. Asmita Singh, Harshit Goel, Ms. Akriti Arya, Siddhant Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KAROL J.,
1. The questions arising for consideration in the present appeal are: 1) To what extent does the right to privacy shield the matters concerning the personal life of a woman accused of committing a crime, particularly when the prosecution has failed to discharge its duty?
2) To what extent are the rights or duties of the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in a statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure1?
2. This appeal at the instance of the convict-appellant impugned a judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh passed in Criminal Appeal No.605 of 2005 dated 20th April 2010, whereby the judgment of conviction under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 18602 and order of sentence 1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’ 2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’ dated 4th July 2005 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Baikunthpur, District Koriya (Chhattisgarh) in Sessions Trial No. 525 of 2004 was upheld.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
3. Eschewing unnecessary details, the facts of the case put forward by the prosecution are:
3.1 The convict-appellant had relations with a co-villager, namely, Baiga Gond, as a result of which she conceived a child. She, upon giving birth, allegedly killed this child and threw the corpse into a dabri (small water body- pond).
3.2 An FIR (First Information Report) dated 14th September 2004, the very day on which the alleged corpse of the newborn child of the convict-appellant was found, stood registered. After due investigation, the chargesheet was filed on 13th October 2004, and eventually, the accused was charged with committing an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.
4. The Trial Court, having recorded the statements of various witnesses, observed that the case is the one resting upon circumstantial evidence. 4.1 The prosecution declared five of the eight witnesses examined hostile, including Jai Mangal Singh - PW1, at whose instance the FIR was registered.
4.2 The other witnesses,for instance, Sumitra – PW4, is recorded to be “guessing” about the convict-appellant being pregnant; Kuwarobai – PW8refused that she ever saw the convict-appellant pregnant as also that she would use a ‘chadar’ to hide her pregnancy.
4.3 Yet, referring to the statements of PW1, Suraj Kumar Singh – PW2, Rambaran Singh – PW3, PW4, Ram Jhalako – PW5, Birhulia – PW6, Rambai – PW7, A.R. Manikpuri (Head Constable) – PW9 to establish the presence of the body of the deceased child in ‘Suraj ki dabri’ the statement under Section 313 CrPCof the convict-appellant along with the statement of Dr. Divya Rani Tigga – PW11 regarding the signs of recent delivery on the person of the convict-appellant found the following circumstances to have been proved: - INDRAKUNWAR v. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [SANJAY KAROL, J.] 964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
a) The accused was living in the village alone as her husband deserted her. Also that, she was pregnant.
b) In the dabri (small pond), the body of a newborn baby was found on 14th September 2004, and a few days before that, i.e., 2-3 days, the accused had delivered a child.
c) The accused did not state anything nor tell anyone about the delivery.
4.4 Given the above, the Trial Court found the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
5. The High Court, in the judgment impugned before us, taking note of the testimony of PW11, who deposed that she had, upon examination, found the convict-appellant to have delivered a child and that the deceased had suffered injuries, convicted the accused. However, the doctor admits that the death of the child being prior to or after the birth remains unmentioned. The same was noted to be of no consequence as the injuries recorded on the body of the deceased child established the death to be homicidal in nature. In conclusion, the High Court held that the conviction under Section 302 IPC was warranted.
6. It is observed that the Courts below, in holding the accused guilty, primarily relied on the testimonies of eight independent witnesses, the testimony of the doctor PW11, and the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
OUR VIEW
7. Awarding the punishment of life imprisonment requires due appreciation of evidence and cannot be awarded mechanically and in a perfunctory manner. The law requires that the High Court, must, only after re-appreciation of evidence confirm or overturn the findings of fact returned by the Trial Court. Recently, this Court in Geeta Devi v. State of U.P.3 has succinctly dealt with this issue.
3 2022 SCC OnLine 57 (2-Judge Bench)
8. The judgment under challenge, which we are constrained to observe, makes only general and sketchy observations, unlike the appreciation of evidence as is required by law, in respect of testimonies of the witnesses and other evidence. This approach cannot be appreciated, especially when the conviction rendered is for a serious offence, that is, Section 302 IPC. In Geeta Devi (supra), the Court found it fit to remand the matter to the High Court for consideration afresh, but in the present case, such course will not be prudent given that this appeal dates back to the year 2010. Hence, we proceed to examine the evidence on record.
9. The testimony of Jai Mangal Singh – PW1, who was Sarpanch at the time of the incident, also reveals that he was informed by a villager about the dead body of a newborn child found in the pond but did not know to whom it belonged to. Also, he had no knowledge about the pregnancy of the accused. He did not know when and by whom the child was thrown. In his cross-examination, he stated that there were houses belonging to other people near the dabri where the dead body was found. Significantly, we find none of them stands examined, testifying to the presence of the accused near the pond, nor does this witness testify to such an effect.
10. Suraj Kumar Singh - PW2, who saw the dead body of a child in his dabri, admits the place to be open from all sides, having access by all. He further deposes that he did not see any woman, much less the accused, throw the child.
11. Rambaran Singh -PW3, who was informed by PW2 of the dead body of a child lying in the dabri, admits having no knowledge as to whom the child belonged to. His testimony reveals the reason for suspicion and doubting the accused, for she being the only one without a husband.
12. Smt. Sumitra - PW4, in her testimony, only discloses the factum of the accused being pregnant. The testimonies of PW5 and PW6 are also to similar effect.
13. Similarly, though, Smt. Rambai - PW7 denies any knowledge of the accused being pregnant but only adds that the accused’s body looked as though she had just delivered a child. However, the latter part is denied by PW8.
INDRAKUNWAR v. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH [SANJAY KAROL, J.] 966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
14. The testimony of the Investigating Officer - PW10 is only to the effect of spot verification and conduct of procedural formalities.
15. PW11 is the Medical Officer who examined the child’s dead body and the accused person. She gave her opinion that the child was delivered prematurely, i.e., prior to 9 months. She also stated that the child died within 45 to 50 hours of the medical examination, and its death was homicidal in nature. On examination, she found the accused to be physically weak. She admitted not to have mentioned as to whether the child had died before or after birth. She did not even mention if the child belonged to the accused person.
16. Thus, none of these witnesses could prove, much less beyonda reasonable doubt, the prosecution case of the accused having thrown the child in the dabri after delivery or having caused the death.
17. In her defense, the convict-appellant categorically denied the accusation of having killed any child, much less the child in question. She states that Baiga Gond, who had fathered the child she was carrying, in an endeavor to get rid of the child, forcibly tried to have her take some medicine. He pushed her into ‘Suraj ki dabri’ on her refusal, leading to her miscarriage. The further defence set up by her was that she had not killed the child and was being falsely implicated.
18. A perusal of the statement of the convict-appellant gives rise to the question as to whether she had admitted her guilt? Whether upon such a statement, the onus on the prosecution stood shifted? Whether it could be said that the convict-appellant was obliged to disclose her pregnancy, if so, and what became of such child that she was allegedly carrying?
19. Further, what must be considered is whether the convict-appellant has no right of privacy of not disclosing the prosecution or the Court as to what happened to her child which she was carrying in her womb, particularly when the prosecution failed to discharge the initial burden and onus of establishing the deceased, in any manner to be related to the accused?
20. Is not, inherent in a lady the right of confidentiality and privacy in matters concerning her personal life, of not disclosing any circumstances, as may be required by law?
LAW ON PRIVACY
21. In searching for answers to the questions above, it is pertinent for us to intervene when structures of injustice and persecution deeply entrenched in patriarchy are destructive of constitutional freedom.4 The right to privacy is the underpinning of human dignity and is fundamental to the realization of human rights.
22. Right to Privacy is regarded as one of the most crucial human rights in the contemporary day. In many different countries and civilizations, privacy is cherished. It is also protected by numerous international and regional human rights treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many more.
23. The importance of this right was underscored by U.S. Supreme Court as far as the year 19585 by quoting William Pitt, Earl of Chatham: “The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake, the wind may blow through it, the storms may enter; the rain may enter but the King of England cannot enter, all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.”
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