M/S Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited v. Amit Chand Mitra & Anr.
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 854; [2023] 14 S.C.R. 28
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Aniruddha Bose, Justice Relating to Purpose for Which A Lease Is Granted
- Decided
- 25 Sept 2023
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6149/2023
- Sections
- 107, 106, 49, 53A, 17, 105
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:28 am. Original source ↗
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[2023] 14 S.C.R. 28 : 2023 INSC 854
CASE DETAILS
M/S PAUL RUBBER INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED v.
AMIT CHAND MITRA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 6149 of 2023)
SEPTEMBER 25, 2023
[ANIRUDDHA BOSE AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]
HEADNOTES
Issue for consideration: To what extent the Court can take cognizance of a clause, relating to purpose for which a lease is granted, contained in an unregistered deed of lease for immovable property stipulating its duration for a period of five years.
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – ss.106, 107 – Unregistered lease deed for a period of five years – Inadmissibility – Purpose of lease – If for ‘manufacturing purpose’ – Burden to prove – Tenancy of “month to month” character:
Held: The subject agreement had a duration of five years with a provision for renewal for a further period of five years – Hence, under the first part of s.107, for the said lease agreement to be admissible, registration of the same would have been necessary – That is the mandate of s.107 and ss.17 and 49, 1908 Act – The Court cannot admit it in evidence – This is a prohibition for the Court to implement and even if the Trial Court has taken it in evidence, the same cannot confer legitimacy to that document for being taken as evidence at the appellate stage – The parties cannot by implied consent confer upon such document its admissibility – Further, the lease was for use by the predecessor of the appellants “for the purpose of his business and/or factory” – The property was described in the schedule to be estimated 16 cottahs of land “with a factory shed/godown space” – Such description would not be sufficient to establish that the same was for manufacturing purpose – In the absence of a registered instrument, the courts are not precluded from determining the factum of tenancy from other evidence on record as well as the purpose of tenancy – In this case, factum of creation of tenancy has been established – But the purpose of tenancy, so as to attract the six months’ notice period u/s.106 cannot be established by such evidence as in such a situation, registration of the deed would have been mandatory – Burden of proving that the lease was for manufacturing purpose lies on the party who claims it to be so – Onus was on the appellant-defendant to establish that manufacturing activity was being carried on from the demised premises – A mere statement by DW-1 or the purpose of lease as specified in the lease agreement would not be sufficient to demonstrate the purpose of lease to be for manufacturing – This could be proved by explaining what kind of work was being carried on in the factory shed however, in such a situation also, the registration of the deed would have been necessary – In absence of such registration, tenancy would have been of “month to month” character – High Court did not err in dismissing the appellant’s appeal – Lease – Registration Act, 1908 – ss.17, 49. [Paras 10, 11 and 14] Registration Act, 1908 – ss.17, 49 – Nature and character of possession – “collateral purpose” – Plea of the appellant relying upon Sevoke Properties Ltd. v. West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (2020) 11 SCC 782 that for establishing nature and purpose of possession, even an unregistered document could be looked into as that would come within the ambit of collateral purpose: Held: Sevoke Properties is not an authority for the proposition that nature and character of the possession in an unregistered lease deed could always constitute collateral purpose so that the Court could examine the deed for that reason – The purpose for which lease is granted forms an integral part of the lease deed in this case and this very issue forms one of the main disputes – The expression “collateral purpose” has been employed in proviso to s.49 to imply that content of such a document can be used for purpose other than for which it has been executed or entered into by the parties or for a purpose remote to the main transaction – Nature and character of possession contained in a flawed document (being unregistered) in terms s.107, 1882 Act and ss.17 and 49, Registration Act can form collateral purpose when the “nature and character of possession” is not the main term of the lease and does not constitute the main dispute for adjudication by the Court – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.107. [Para 12] M/S PAUL RUBBER INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. v. AMIT
CHAND MITRA
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Sevoke Properties Ltd. -vs- West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (2020) 11 SCC 782 – distinguished.
Anthony -vs- K.C. Ittoop & Sons and Others (2000) 6 SCC 394: [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 645; Shri Janki Devi Bhagat Trust, Agra -vs- Ram Swarup Jain (Dead) by Lrs. (1995) 5 SCC 314; and Satish Chand Makhan and Others -vs- Govardhan Das Byas and Others (1984) 1 SCC 369: [1984] 1 SCR 621; G. Mackertich -vs- Steuart and Co. Ltd. (1971) 3 SCC 39; Shivaji Balaram Haibatti -vs Avinash Maruthi Pawar (2018) 11 SCC 652: [2017] 12 SCR 344; K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited -vs- Development Consultant Limited (2008) 8 SCC 564: [2008] 8 SCR 290; Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. -vs- Ramkrishna Dalmia and Others (1973) 1 SCC 7: [1973] 2 SCR 257 – relied on.
Rai Chand Jain -vs- Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla (1991) 1 SCC 422: [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 91; Park Street Properties Private Limited -vs- Dipak Kumar Singh and Another (2016) 9 SCC 268 – referred to.
Messrs Shree Nursing Timber Works and Messrs. Shree Nursing Electric Stores -vs- Sm. Amala Bala Dassi [1973 CWN 522 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.6149 of 2023. From the Judgment and Order dated 20.07.2022 of the High Court at Calcutta in FA No.36 of 2021.
Appearances:
Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Anshula Lavaiya, Santosh Kumar, Abhijit Sarkar, Rupak Ghosh, Dhruv K. Dave, Shakti Kanta Pattanaik, Advs. for the Appellant.
Paramjit Singh Patwalia, Nikhil Nayyar, Sr. Advs., Vikram Hegde, Debmalya Ganguli, Anupam Dasadhikari, Ms. Vandana Tiwari, Ms. Simran Singh, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Advs. for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
Leave granted.
2. The main point which we have to address in this appeal is as to what extent the Court can take cognizance of a clause relating to purpose for which a lease is granted contained in an unregistered deed of lease for immovable property stipulating its duration for a period of five years. In the judgment under appeal, opinion of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is that such deed cannot be received as evidence of any transaction affecting the property over which the lease is executed. On 27.03.2003, a document captioned “Tenancy Agreement” was executed by and between one Sabita Mitra (the landlady, since deceased), now represented before us by her legal heirs being the two respondents and an incorporated company, Paul Rubber Industries Private Limited. The latter is the appellant in this proceeding. In this judgment, we shall refer to the landlady and her legal representatives as the respondents interchangeably and the appellant Paul Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. shall be described as defendant. The property in question comprises of approximately 16 cottahs (one cottah is equivalent to approximately 720 sq. ft.) of land situated at Radha Madhab Dutta Garden Lane, within the city of Kolkata. The tenure of the agreement, as stipulated therein was for a period of five years with provision for renewal for further five years. There is stipulation for further renewal for such period and on such terms and conditions as might have been agreed upon by the parties. This is contained in clause 2 of the agreement. But no such renewal was effected. First five years of the tenancy stood completed on 31.10.2007, and a letter was sent by the landlady on 07.11.2007 seeking enhancement of rent. It does not appear that the defendant had paid rent thereafter. It had, however, raised a plea that such rent used to be collected on behalf of the landlady on due date, but this was stopped after October 2007. Thereafter, on 06.03.2008, the landlady served a notice requiring the defendant to vacate the subject-premises with effect from 31.03.2008. In this letter of 06.03.2008, M/S PAUL RUBBER INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. v. AMIT
CHAND MITRA
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
the defendant was addressed as monthly tenant. Default in payment of monthly rent was highlighted in this letter. It was also specified therein that the landlady needed the said premises for her own use and occupation and for business purpose of her family members. This letter is being projected by the respondents as notice for fifteen days, as per stipulation of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (herein after “1882 Act”).
3. The tenant had not delivered vacant possession as a result of which the suit, which gives rise to the present appeal, was instituted by the landlady on 04.09.2008 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division at Sealdah, having jurisdiction over the suit property. The original plaintiff (i.e. the landlady) claimed, inter-alia, recovery of possession as also decree for mesne profit. Various defences were set up by the defendant in its written statement. One of them was that since it was an agreement for lease under which it was inducted as a tenant and the same was unregistered, the suit was not maintainable. Another plea of the defendant was that the subject property stood vested in the State under the thika tenancy law. This is a special type of tenancy prevalent in the Kolkata region involving multiple-tier of tenancy and ownership structure. The defendant claimed to have filed certain returns before the Thika Controller. This issue was not raised before the High Court and is not in lis before us also. The defendant in the written statement, denied expiry of tenancy on 31.01.2007.As regards default in payment of rent, we have already referred to the defendant’s stand. Altogether, five issues were framed by the Trial Court. The first two issues framed by the Trial Court related to maintainability of the suit in the form it was framed and subsistence of cause of action. These two issues had not been pressed during trial and the Trial Court found that the suit was maintainable. The other three issues related to the question as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to the reliefs claimed or not.
4. The defendant, in its written statement, referred to the said agreement of 27.3.2003.In paragraphs 6,8 and 10 of the written statement, main defence of the defendant was disclosed. Plea was also taken denying default and vesting of the property in the State under the thika tenancy law. Before us, arguments have been advanced mainly on legal position of the unregistered agreement and the consequences thereof. Rest of the written statement contained broad denial of the plaintiff’s claims. We quote below the said three paragraphs of the written statement:- “6. As a matter of fact, the plaintiff by representating herself to be the Owner/Landlady of the suit premises inducted the defendant therein as a lessee as would be evident from the Agreement dated 27.3.2003. The plaintiff has not sought any leave from this Learned Court to rely upon the said Agreement neither a copy of which has been filed. However this defendant craves leave of this Ld. Court to rely upon the said Agreement at the time of hearing.
The aforesaid Agreement on the face of it was an Agreement of Lease not registered under the statute and accordingly the suit is not maintainable.
8. It is denied that the tenancy if at all, expired on 31.01.2007 as the defendant was assured of a renewal by the plaintiff and the defendant was willing to renew the same which was known to the plaintiff.
10. The notice of the plaintiff served upon the defendant is defective. Admittedly the defendant was a Lessee under the plaintiff on the strength of the aforesaid Agreement and on expiry of the initial period of five years was subject to a renewal. The plaintiff never denied the fact of renewal to the defendant and is therefore put to the strictest proof thereof.”
Main argument before the Trial Court centred around legality of the notice. The defendant’s case was that the premises was let out for manufacturing purpose and in terms of Section 106 of the 1882 Act, a clear six months’ notice was required to be given. The Trial Court on analysis of evidence found that the suit property was not let out for agricultural or manufacturing purpose.
5. The Trial Court held:- “I have no hesitation to hold that the tenancy of the defendant was month by month governed under the T.P. Act and after expiry of terms of the lease, the said tenancy was not extended by the parties with mutual consent as per provision of the agreement dated 27.03.03. It is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant is also a defaulter and he did not pay the rent of the suit premises from October, 2007. Such contention of the plaintiff is also admitted by the plaintiff that the rent, municipal charges and maintenance charges of the suit premises were not paid by M/S PAUL RUBBER INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. v. AMIT CHAND MITRA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.] 34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
the defendant from October, 2007 but pleaded that the plaintiff never sent her representative to the defendant for collection of rent which was the usual practice. From Ext. 7 which is the notice issued upon the defendant, it appears that a 15 days clear notice was duly served upon the defendant by the plaintiff asking him to quit and vacate the suit premises on and from 31.03.08. It is further appears from the case record hat during the trial, the defendant has filed a return before the reasonable office of Thika Controller for determination of right title interest under the Thika Tenancy Act along with others which was registered as Misc. Case 79 & 80 of 2007. From Ext. 8 filed by the plaintiff, it appears that upon hearing the parties, the Ld. Thika Controller was pleased to hold that the plaintiff is the recorded owner of the suit premises.
So, from the overall discussion, evidence and materials on record, I am of view that the suit premises was let out to the defendant for other purposes other than agricultural or manufacturing purposes and such tenancy of the defendant deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by 15 days notice and after expiry of the term of the lease i.e. on 31.10.07, a clear 15 days notice was served upon the defendant requesting him to quit and vacate the suit premises and hand over the peaceful possession of the same to the plaintiff. As such, the plaintiff is entitled to get relief as prayed for. Hence, the above issues are also decided in favour of the plaintiff.”
(quoted verbatim from the paperbook)
6. The Trial Court found that the tenancy of the defendant was month by month governed under the 1882 Act and after the expiry of the lease, the said tenancy was not renewed by the parties on mutual consent as per the terms and provisions of the agreement dated 27.03.2003.On the question of Thika tenancy, the Trial Court recorded that the Thika Controller had already held that the plaintiff was the owner of the suit premises.
7. The appeal of the defendant was examined by the Division Bench of the High Court and on considering a large body of authorities, the High Court found no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. The appeal was dismissed.It was the view of the High Court that the agreement being unregistered, the same could not be looked into for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties and for its duration. On the question as to whether the purpose of the lease was “manufacturing” or not, the High Court held that it was for the appellant to establish that factor. The appellant not having adduced any evidence in that regard, the High Court drew adverse inference on that count and the Trial Court judgment was not interfered with.
8. For the purpose of adjudicating the present appeal, we need to look into the provisions of Sections 105, 106 and 107 of the 1882 Act and the provisions of Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter “1908 Act”). The said provisions of the 1882 Act stipulate:- “105. Lease defined.—A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.
Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined.—The transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.
[106. Duration of certain leases in absence of written contract or local usage.—(1) In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months’ notice; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days’ notice.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the period mentioned in sub-section (1) shall commence from the date of receipt of notice.
(3) A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period M/S PAUL RUBBER INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. v. AMIT CHAND MITRA [ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.] 36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.
specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section.
(4) Every notice under sub-section (1) must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the person giving it, and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property.]
107. Leases how made.—A lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument.
[All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession.
[Where a lease of immoveable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee:] Provided that the State Government may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immoveable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.]”
Sections 17 and 49 of the 1908 Act read:- “17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.— (1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely:—
(a) instruments of gift of immovable property;
(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property;
(c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any such right, title or interest; and
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