State of Punjab v. Kewal Krishan
- Citation
- 2023 INSC 583; [2023] 10 S.C.R. 1
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Manoj Misra Penal Code, Justice The Sole Witness of the Last Seen Circumstance, Justice In His Deposition in Court
- Decided
- 21 Jun 2023
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2128/2014
- Sections
- 302, 106, 313
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A B C D E F G H
STATE OF PUNJAB
v.
KEWAL KRISHAN
(Criminal Appeal No. 2128 of 2014)
JUNE 21, 2023
[B. V. NAGARATHNA AND MANOJ MISRA, JJ.] Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 – Acquittal confirmed – Prosecution case that the deceased was last seen alive in his own house in the company of the accused at about 7.00 p.m. on 10.12.1998 – PW-6, nephew of the deceased discovered body of deceased on 12.12.1998 – FIR was registered – Name of the accused did not surface on the record till 25.12.1998 – PW-2, the sole witness of the last seen circumstance, in his deposition in court, stated that he had expressed his suspicion in respect of accused’s involvement to the police on 13.12.1998 – It was also alleged that accused made an extra-judicial confession before PW-3 – Accused made a disclosure to the police regarding knife used in the crime, which led to its recovery – Trial Court convicted and sentenced the respondent u/s. 302 – However, the High Court acquitted him – On appeal, held: The High Court opined that if PW-2 was aware of the last seen circumstance and had made such a disclosure, there was no reason for the police not to act against the accused till 25.12.1998 – Therefore, the statement of PW-2 in respect of imparting knowledge of the last seen circumstance appeared doubtful and it appeared that the witness was set up to create link evidence – The alleged date and time when the deceased was last seen alive was at quite a distance from the date and time when the deceased was found dead – There was no evidence as to when the accused left the house and that no one else could have entered the house in the interregnum, other intervening circumstances including hand of some third person in the crime was not ruled out by the prosecution evidence – Recovery of the knife was denied by the accused and there was no serologist report to connect it with the crime – Insofar as the evidence of extra judicial confession made by the accused is concerned, there was no evidence to demonstrate that the accused had any prior relations with PW-3 or that the accused hoped for, or sought, any help from PW-3 and, therefore, made the confession to him – Notably, [2023] 10 S.C.R. 1 : 2023 INSC 583 A B C D E F G H 2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
the accused denied making any such confession – The incriminating circumstances were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and otherwise also the circumstance of last seen was inconclusive, the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of conviction recorded by the Trial Court.
Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Held: It is trite law that to convict an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the incriminating circumstances on which it proposes to rely; the circumstance(s) relied upon must be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards accused’s guilt and must form a chain so far complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability it is the accused and no one else who had committed the crime and they (it) must exclude all other hypothesis inconsistent with his guilt and consistent with his innocence. Evidence Act, 1872 – s. 106 – Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt – It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused.
State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352; State of M.P.
v. Paltan Mallah (2005) 3 SCC 169 : [2005] 1 SCR 710; Basheera Begam v. Mohd. Ibrahim (2020) 11 SCC 174 : [2020] 3 SCR 562; Shivaji Chintappa Patil v.
State of Maharashtra (2021) 5 SCC 626 – relied on.
Case Law Reference [2005] 1 SCR 710 relied on Para 14 [2020] 3 SCR 562 relied on Para 15 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2128 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.05.2012 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No. 372 of 2002. Mohit Siwach, Karan Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
A B C D E F G H The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:
JUDGMENT
1. Counsel for the appellant is present. None has appeared for the respondent. The office has submitted a report that notice has been served on the sole respondent, yet no one has entered appearance on his behalf.
2. We have heard Mr. Mohit Siwach, learned counsel for the appellant.
3. This appeal assails the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana (for short the High Court) dated 01.05.2012 rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 372 of 2002, whereby the judgment and order of the trial Court convicting and sentencing the respondent (Kewal Krishan) under Section 302, IPC has been set aside and the appellant (respondent herein) has been acquitted of the charges for which he was tried.
4. The prosecution case rests on evidence in respect of following circumstances:
(a) The deceased was last seen alive in his own house in the company of the accused at about 7.00 p.m. on 10.12.1998 by PW-2.
(b) Dead body of the deceased with multiple injuries was found in his house by PW-6, nephew of the deceased, on 12.12.1998 at around 1.00 pm.
(c) Autopsy conducted on 12.12.1998, at about 4.15 pm, reflected that death of the deceased could have occurred within two days, as a result of shock and haemorrhage, due to ante mortem incised wounds.
(d) Accused made an extra-judicial confession before P.W-3 on 25.12.1998 and was thereafter handed over to the police on the same day.
(e) Accused made a disclosure to the police on 25.12.1998 with regard to the place where he hid the knife used in the crime, which led to the recovery of a Khanjar (knife) (Ex.P-1).
(f) The autopsy surgeon opined that the incised wounds found on deceased’s body could have been caused by use of that Khanjar.
STATE OF PUNJAB v. KEWAL KRISHAN A B C D E F G H 4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R.
5. The trial Court found those circumstances proved and forming a chain so complete as to conclusively indicate that it was the accused and no one else who committed the murder and thus convicted and sentenced the accused accordingly.
6. Aggrieved by his conviction, the accused went in appeal to the High Court.
7. The High Court noticed that the accused in his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence and had claimed that he was arrested on 12.12.1998 itself on false implication. Thereafter, the High Court, on a careful analysis of the evidence, more particularly the statement made by PW-2 that on 13.12.1998 he had disclosed to the police about the involvement of the accused, doubted the date of arrest of the appellant (i.e., 25.12.1998), as set up by the prosecution, and opined that the statement of PW-2 probabilizes the claim of the accused that he was arrested on 12.12.1998 itself. The High Court found PW-2’s evidence of last seen not convincing and reliable inasmuch as if on 13.12.1998 PW-2 had informed the police about his suspicion in respect of the involvement of the accused, the police would have arrested the accused forthwith and not waited till 25.12.1998. But the record indicated that the name of the accused came to light for the first time on 25.12.1998. In these circumstances, the High Court found PW-2 unreliable, as being a witness who was set up later. Otherwise also, the High Court found that last seen circumstance did not conclusively point towards the guilt of the accused by excluding all hypotheses consistent with his innocence, inasmuch as there was a huge time gap between the date and time when the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused and discovery of deceased’s dead body. Further, the High Court took note of the circumstance that the autopsy conducted on 12.12.1998 at 4.15 pm indicated occurence of rigor mortis on lower limbs, which suggested that death could have occurred within 30 hours of the autopsy, thereby throwing open the possibility of death occurring much later than at 7.00 pm on 10.11.1998, when the deceased was allegedly seen in the company of the accused. Taking note of the above and bearing in mind that the accused did not reside with the deceased and no evidence was led that except the accused no one else could have entered the house of the deceased in the interregnum, the last seen circumstance was found inconclusive.
A B C D E F G H
8. In respect of the circumstance of recovery of the knife, the High Court, firstly, doubted the date of arrest, as noticed above, and, secondly, noticed that there was no serologist report to ascertain whether the knife was stained with human blood as to connect it with the crime.
9. The High Court also discarded the extra judicial confession on the ground that there was no cogent explanation set out in the prosecution evidence to demonstrate as to why the accused would make a confession to P.W.3, particularly, when the accused had no significant relationship with PW-3 and PW-3 could not have helped him. The extra judicial confession was also doubted on the ground that the date of arrest of the accused (i.e., 25.12.1998) appeared doubtful, inasmuch as there was a high probability of the accused being arrested earlier i.e., 12.12.1998, as claimed by him, because from the statement of PW-2 it appeared that the police was informed by him on 13.12.1998 itself in respect of his suspicion regarding the involvement of the accused.
10. After a thorough analysis of the evidence as highlighted above, the High Court found that, firstly, the incriminating circumstances were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and, secondly, they did not constitute a chain so complete as to conclusively indicate that it was the accused and no one else who, in all human probability, committed the crime. Consequently, the High Court set aside the order of the trial Court and acquitted the accused of the charge.
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