Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1114; [2025] 9 S.C.R. 982
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 12 Sept 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 4004/2025
- Sections
- 34, 15(2), 9, 438, 420, 438CR, 498, 204(1), 437, 376, 20, 20(7)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 9 S.C.R. 982 : 2025 INSC 1114 Anna Waman Bhalerao v.
State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No. 4004 of 2025)
12 September 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the anticipatory bail applications of the appellants; issue of inordinate delay by Courts in deciding the bail and anticipatory bail applications. Headnotes† Directions by Supreme Court – Bail/Anticipatory bail applications – Time-bound disposal of – Constitution of India – Arts.14, 21:
Held: 1.1 High Courts to ensure that applications for bail and anticipatory bail pending before them or before the subordinate courts under their jurisdiction are disposed of expeditiously, preferably within two months from the date of filing, except in cases where delay is attributable to the parties themselves – Suitable mechanisms and procedures be devised by High Courts to avoid accumulation of pending bail/anticipatory bail applications and ensure that the liberty of citizens is not left in abeyance. [Para 18] 1.2 High Courts shall issue necessary administrative directions to subordinate courts to prioritise matters involving personal liberty and to avoid indefinite adjournments. [Para 18] 1.3 Investigating agencies are also expected to conclude investigations in long pending cases with promptitude so that neither the complainant nor the accused suffers prejudice on account of undue delay. [Para 18] 1.4 A copy of this judgment be circulated to all High Courts for immediate compliance and prompt administrative action. [Para 18.1] Anticipatory bail – Rejection of, when justified – FIR pertaining to the events of 1996-98 was filed in 2019 alleging that the * Author [2025] 9 S.C.R. 983Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra appellants (Circle Officer and Talathi in the Revenue Department at the relevant time) in their official capacity, certified the mutation entries on the basis of forged documents, thereby facilitating the illegal transfer of ownership of the immovable property – Appellants filed anticipatory bail applications before Sessions Court, eventually rejected – Before the High Court, the anticipatory bail applications remained pending from 2019 wherein interim protection was granted from time to time, however, the same were finally rejected by the impugned judgment in 2025 – Justification:
Held: Impugned judgment rejecting the anticipatory bail applications, affirmed – Although there was a long delay in the initiation of proceedings, the gravity of the allegations, the alleged abuse of official position, and the prima facie findings of the High Court that custodial interrogation is necessary cannot be diluted merely on the ground of delay – Even in a case based largely on documentary evidence, custodial interrogation may be essential to trace the chain of transactions, ascertain complicity, and prevent further suppression or tampering of records – Moreover, the appellants, despite enjoying interim protection for nearly six years, did not extend due cooperation to the investigation – Impugned judgement not interfered with. [Paras 14, 19] Constitution of India – Arts.14, 21 – Prolonged delay in disposal of bail/anticipatory bail applications, denial of justice – Anticipatory bail applications filed by the appellants before High Court in 2019 remained pending and were finally rejected by the impugned judgment in 2025:
Held: Inordinate delay in the disposal of the appellants’ applications for anticipatory bail by the High Court, deprecated – Applications affecting personal liberty particularly bail and anticipatory bail ought not to be kept pending indefinitely for years – The grant or refusal of bail, anticipatory or otherwise, is ordinarily a straightforward exercise, turning on the facts of each case – Therefore, there is no justification for deferring decision-making – In matters concerning liberty, bail courts must be sensitive and ensure that constitutional ethos is upheld – Prolonged delay in disposal not only frustrates the object of Code of Criminal Procedure, but also amounts to a denial of justice, contrary to the constitutional ethos in Arts.14 and 21. [Paras 15, 17] 984 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited Siddaram Satlingappa Mehtre v. State of Maharashtra [2010] 15 SCR 201 : (2011) 1 SCC 694; Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India [2017] 12 SCR 358 : (2018) 11 SCC 1; Rajesh Seth v. State of Chhattisgarh, SLP (Crl) 1247/2022; Sanjay v. The State (NCT of Delhi) & Another, SLP (Crl.) No. 5675 of 2022; Rajanti Devi v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1595; Satendra Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr. (2022) 10 SCC 51; Sumit Subhaschandra Gangwal & Another v. the State of Maharashtra & Another, SLP (Crl.) No. 3561/2023; Kavish Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, SLP (Crl.) No. 16025/2023 with SLP (Crl.) No. 16047/2023; Mahatab Ali v. State of West Bengal & Anr., SLP (Criminal) Diary No. 60183/2024; Ashok Balwant Patil v. Mohan Madhukar Patil & Ors. Etc., SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 1540/2024; Amol Vitthal Vahile v. The State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 545/2024; Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani [2024] 9 SCR 257 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2453 – referred to.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Maharashtra Land Revenue Code; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords Bail applications; Anticipatory bail applications; Bail applications not to be kept pending indefinitely; Inordinate/prolonged delay in disposal of bail applications/anticipatory bail applications; Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India; Expeditious disposal of bail and anticipatory bail applications; Custodial interrogation essential; Personal liberty; Anticipatory bail rejected; Long delay in initiation of proceedings, Alleged abuse of official position; Mutation entries certified; Mutation entries cancelled; Forged documents, Illegal transfer of ownership of immovable property.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 4004 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 04.07.2025 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in ABA No. 1790 of 2019 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 985Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra With Criminal Appeal No. 4005 of 2025 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ardhendhumauli Kumar Prasad, Sr. Adv., Shantanu Phanse, Kaustubh Patil, Ms. Preet Phanse, Ms. Vidhi Pankaj Thaker, Prastut Mahesh Dalvi.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted in both the SLPs.
2. Both these criminal appeals arise from a common judgment dated 04.07.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay1 in Anticipatory Bail Application Nos.1790 of 2019 and 1844 of 2019, whereby the appellants’ applications seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with F.I.R. No. 30/2019, came to be dismissed.
3. Based on a complaint lodged by one Vikas Narsingh Vartak, FIR No. 30/2019 was registered on 26.01.2019 at Arnala Sagari Police Station, District Palghar, Maharashtra against Mahesh Yashwant Bhoir and others, for offences punishable under Sections 420, 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 474 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 2 .
3.1. In the complaint, it was alleged that the complainant’s father, Narsingh Govind Vartak died on 29.01.1978. Out of his five brothers, four had died, and one Harihar Govind Vartak was still alive. It was further alleged that the land bearing Survey No. 29, Hissa No. 1 (Old) and Survey No. 233, Hissa No.1(A) (New), admeasuring 1.46 hectares situated at Village Agashi, was jointly owned by Narsingh Govind Vartak, Hari Govind Vartak, Mahadev Govind Vartak, Parshuram Govind Vartak, 1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2 For short, “IPC”
986 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Raghunandan Govind Vartak, Harihar Govind Vartak, along with Purushottam Manohardas Shah, Amrutlal Manohardas Shah, and Kantilal Manohardas Shah, and their names stood recorded in the revenue records.
3.2. On 13.05.1996, a Power of Attorney was purportedly executed in favour of Vijay Anant Patil (A2) by Narsingh Govind Vartak, and his brothers, and another Power of Attorney was executed in favour of Rajesh Kamat (A3) by the Shahs. On the strength of these Powers of Attorney, on 18.05.1996, a sale deed was executed by A2 and A3 in favour of Mahesh Yashwant Bhoir (A1) for a consideration of Rs.8 lakhs. Mutation Entry Nos. 15177 and 15180 were recorded in 1996 on the basis of this sale deed.
3.3. At the relevant point of time, the present appellants were serving as Circle Officer and Talathi respectively in the Revenue Department of the State of Maharashtra. Subsequently, a revision application was filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bhiwandi seeking cancellation of the said mutation entries, and by order dated 30.09.1998, Mutation Entry Nos. 15177 and 15180 were accordingly cancelled.
4. The appellants were not initially named in the FIR. They were later arraigned as Accused Nos. 5 and 6 on allegations that, in their official capacity, they had certified the said mutation entries on the basis of forged documents, thereby facilitating the illegal transfer of ownership of the immovable property. Apprehending arrest, they preferred Anticipatory Bail Application Nos.561 and 562 of 2019 before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Vasai3 . By order dated 06.06.2019, the Sessions Court granted interim protection to them. However, upon hearing both sides, the Sessions Court, by order dated 21.06.2019, rejected their applications. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the High Court by filing Anticipatory Bail Application Nos. 1790 and 1844 of 2019, in which, interim protection was granted from time to time. Finally, by the impugned judgment dated 04.07.2025, the High Court rejected the anticipatory bail applications, but granted interim protection for a period of four week, which expired on 01.08.2025. Thereafter, the appellants have preferred the present appeals before this Court.
3 For short, “the Sessions Court”
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 987Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
5. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the appellants were originally not named in the subject F.I.R and there is a prima facie case for grant of anticipatory bail in their favour. On 16.08.2019 and 22.08.2019, the High Court granted interim protection, which was periodically extended and lastly continued by the impugned order dated 04.07.2025 for a further period of four weeks, expiring on 01.08.2025.
5.1. It was contended that the appellants, who were serving as Circle Officer and Talathi respectively at the relevant time and have since retired, acted purely in their official capacity while certifying mutation entries on the basis of a registered sale deed presented before them. They had no role in the creation or execution of the alleged forged powers of attorney or sale deed, nor any direct link with the subsequent transfer in favour of A1. There is also no allegation of personal gain, dishonest intention, or conspiracy. The only act attributed to them is certification of mutation entries on the strength of facially valid documents.
5.2. It was urged that in the absence of material to show knowledge of forgery, dishonest inducement, or collusion, the essential ingredients of the offences under Sections 420, 463, 467, 468, and 471 IPC are not attracted. Mere administrative endorsement, without fraudulent intent, cannot amount to cheating or forgery. The appellants neither created nor used forged documents, nor induced any person to part with property. At best, the allegations, even if taken at face value, may constitute a procedural lapse in discharge of official duties, which does not give rise to criminal liability.
5.3. Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the very mutation entries in question (Nos. 15177 and 15180) had been cancelled by the Sub-Divisional Officer as far back as 30.09.1998. Once annulled by a competent authority, those entries stood nullified ab initio, leaving no continuing illegality or consequence. Thus, no enduring wrongful gain or loss can be attributed to the appellants.
5.4. It was further submitted that the FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay of over 20 years from the alleged incident of 1996. The complainant, being aware of the cancellation in 988 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 1998, remained silent for two decades. Such extraordinary delay gravely prejudices the appellants’ right to a fair investigation and defence, particularly as the allegations relate to administrative acts performed in official capacity long ago. The delay undermines the credibility of the prosecution’s case.
5.5. It was also urged that the entire case rests on documentary evidence already in existence. Custodial interrogation of the appellants, retired government officers with no criminal antecedents, is neither necessary nor justified. Furthermore, they are willing to cooperate with the investigation and furnish all documents as required.
5.6. In support, reliance was placed on Siddaram Satlingappa Mehtre v. State of Maharashtra4 , wherein this Court emphasised that anticipatory bail is intended to protect personal liberty where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused will neither abscond nor misuse the concession of bail.
5.7. Accordingly, it was contended that the appellants have been falsely implicated, that no offence is made out on the basis of the FIR or the material on record, and that custodial arrest would serve no purpose. Without considering these factors, the High Court erred in rejecting the applications for anticipatory bail. Therefore, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside and the appeals be allowed.
6. We have heard the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and perused the record.
7. It appears that the original owners of the subject property, namely the Shahs and the Vartaks, had expired between 1969 and 1990. Nevertheless, powers of attorney were purportedly executed in the names of the deceased persons, on the basis of which a sale deed dated 18.05.1996 came to be executed in favour of Mahesh Yashwant Bhoir (A1). Relying on the said sale deed, the mutation entries were certified by the appellants (A5 and A6).
8. The FIR pertains to events of 1996-98 and the allegation against the appellants is that, on the strength of forged and fabricated documents,
4 (2011) 1 SCC 694
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 989Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra fraudulent entries were made in the mutation register, facilitating the illegal transfer of ownership. Initially, their names did not find place in the FIR, however, they were subsequently, arraigned as A5 and A5. At the relevant point of time, the appellants were serving as Circle Officer and Talathi, and they retired from service in 2013 and 2019 respectively. The FIR itself was lodged after a delay of more than 20 years from the alleged incident, and no departmental proceedings were initiated against the appellants either during their service or after retirement. It is not in dispute that their anticipatory bail applications remained pending before the High Court from 2019, and were finally dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 04.07.2025, though they continued to enjoy interim protection until 01.08.2025. It is also undisputed that the mutation entries certified by the appellants had already been cancelled by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 30.09.1998.
9. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellants is that the prosecution is vitiated by extraordinary and unexplained delay. The complainant, having knowledge of the cancellation as early as 1998, remained silent for two decades. By the time, FIR No. 30 of 2019 was lodged on 26.01.2019, the mutation entries stood annulled, leaving no subsisting illegality or wrongful gain. It was urged that the only role attributed to the appellants is certification of mutation entries in their official capacity, based on documents that appeared facially valid. They had no involvement in the creation or execution of the alleged forged powers of attorney or sale deed, nor did they derive any personal benefit or act in collusion with the co-accused. The appellants retired with unblemished records, and there are no criminal antecedents against them.
10. It was the contention of the State before the High Court that A1 was the direct beneficiary of the fraudulent transaction founded upon forged powers of attorney. The appellants (A5 and A6), instead of adhering to their statutory obligations under Section 15(2) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, certified the mutation entries thereby facilitating the transfer of immovable property. It was further alleged that despite enjoying interim protection since 2019, the appellants failed to cooperate with the investigation and prolonged the proceedings.
11. We find that the High Court rightly noted that the alleged powers of attorney were executed in 1996 long after the death of the original 990 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports owners and that the sale deed dated 18.05.1996 executed on the strength of such documents, is prima facie vitiated, with A1 appearing to be the direct beneficiary of such a transaction. The High Court further observed that the appellants, while serving in the Revenue Department, ignored their statutory duties and facilitated the mutation in favour of A1, and hence, their conduct cannot be brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse.
12. We are conscious of the fact that whether the appellants shared any criminal intent or abetted the acts of A1 is a matter for trial, and any conclusive finding at this stage would be inappropriate. However, while considering anticipatory bail, this Court must balance the liberty of individuals against the legitimate requirements of investigation.
13. The plea that the mutation entries were cancelled in 1998, though noted, does not efface the appellants’ alleged role in certifying those entries in the first place – a matter that must be adjudicated at trial.
14. Although there has been a long delay in the initiation of proceedings, the gravity of the allegations, the alleged abuse of official position, and the prima facie findings of the High Court that custodial interrogation is necessary, cannot be diluted merely on the ground of delay. Even in a case based largely on documentary evidence, custodial interrogation may be essential to trace the chain of transactions, ascertain complicity, and prevent further suppression or tampering of records. Moreover, the appellants, despite enjoying interim protection for nearly six years, did not extend due cooperation to the investigation. In these circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the judgement under challenge.
15. Apart from the relief of anticipatory bail, a significant issue that arises for consideration herein is the inordinate delay in the disposal of the appellants’ applications for anticipatory bail by the High Court. The record discloses that the applications remained pending for several years without any final adjudication, although interim protection was extended to the appellants from time to time, including even after the dismissal of the applications, until 01.08.2025. It is true that the appellants themselves did not suffer prejudice, having continued to enjoy interim protection. Nevertheless, this Court has consistently underscored, in a long line of decisions, that applications affecting personal liberty – particularly bail and anticipatory bail – ought not to be kept pending indefinitely. The grant or refusal of bail, anticipatory [2025] 9 S.C.R. 991Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra or otherwise, is ordinarily a straightforward exercise, turning on the facts of each case. There is, therefore, no justification for deferring decision-making and allowing a sword of Damocles to hang over the applicant’s head. In matters concerning liberty, bail courts must be sensitive and ensure that constitutional ethos is upheld. While docket explosion remains a chronic challenge, cases involving personal liberty deserve precedence.
16. In this context, we may refer to the following decisions of this Court. In Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India5 , Justice R. F. Nariman while adverting to the Magna Carta in the context of pre-arrest bail, observed as under:
“15. The provision for bail goes back to Magna Carta itself. Clause 39, which was, at that time, written in Latin, is translated as follows:
“No free man shall be seized or imprisoned or stripped of his rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.”
It is well known that Magna Carta, which was wrung out of King John by the Barons on 15-6-1215, was annulled by Pope Innocent III in August of that very year. King John died one year later, leaving the throne to his 9 year old son, Henry III. It is in the reign of this pious King and his son, Edward I, that Magna Carta was recognised by kingly authority. In fact, by the Statutes of Westminster of 1275, King Edward I repeated the injunction contained in Clause 39 of Magna Carta. However, when it came to the reign of the Stuarts, who believed that they were kings on earth as a matter of divine right, a struggle ensued between Parliament and King Charles I. This led to another great milestone in the history of England called the Petition of Right of 1628. Moved by the hostility to the Duke of Buckingham, the House of Commons
5 (2018) 11 SCC 1
992 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports denied King Charles I the means to conduct military operations abroad. The King was unwilling to give up his military ambition and resorted to the expedient of a forced loan to finance it. A number of those subject to the imposition declined to pay, and some were imprisoned; among them were those who became famous as “the Five Knights”. Each of them sought a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release. One of the Knights, Sir Thomas Darnel, gave up the fight, but the other four fought on. The King’s Bench, headed by the Chief Justice, made an order sending the Knights back to prison. The Chief Justice’s order was, in fact, a provisional refusal of bail. Parliament being displeased with this, invoked Magna Carta and the Statutes of Westminster, and thus it came about that the Petition of Right was presented and adopted by the Lords and a reluctant King. Charles I reluctantly accepted this Petition of Right stating, “let right be done as is desired by the petition”. Among other things, the petition had prayed that no free man should be imprisoned or detained, except by authority of law.
16. In Bushell’s case [Bushell’s case, 1670 Vaughan 135 : 124 ER 1006] , decided in 1670, Sir John Vaughan, C.J. was able to state that : (ER p. 1007)
“The writ of habeas corpus is now the most usual remedy by which a man is restored again to his liberty, if he have been against law deprived of it.” Despite this statement of the law, one Jenkes was arrested and imprisoned for inciting persons to riot in a speech, asking that King Charles II be petitioned to call a new Parliament. Jenkes went from pillar to post in order to be admitted to bail. The Lord Chief Justice sent him to the Lord Chancellor, who, in turn, sent him to the Lord Treasurer, who sent him to the King himself, who, “immediately commanded that the laws should have their due course”. (See Jenke’s case [Jenke’s case, (1676) 6 How St Tr 1189] , How St Tr at pp. 1207 & 1208). It is cases like these that led to the next great milestone of English history, namely, the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679. [2025] 9 S.C.R. 993Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra This Act recited that many of the King’s subjects have been long detained in prison in cases where, by law, they should have been set free on bail. The Act provided for a habeas corpus procedure which plugged legal loopholes and even made the King’s Bench Judges subject to penalties for non-compliance.
17. The next great milestone in English history is the Bill of Rights, 1689, which was accepted by the only Dutch monarch that England ever had, King William III, who reigned jointly with his wife Queen Mary II. It is in this document that the expression “excessive bail ought not to be required…” first appears in Chapter 2 Clause 10.
18. What is important to learn from this history is that Clause 39 of the Magna Carta was subsequently extended to pre-trial imprisonment, so that persons could be enlarged on bail to secure their attendance for the ensuing trial. It may only be added that one century after the Bill of Rights, the US Constitution borrowed the language of the Bill of Rights when the principle of habeas corpus found its way into Article 1 Section 9 of the US Constitution, followed by the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution which expressly states that, “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”. We may only add that the Eighth Amendment has been read into Article 21 by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. State [Rajesh Kumar v. State, (2011) 13 SCC 706 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 836] at paras 60 and 61.”
16.1. In Rajesh Seth v State of Chhattisgarh 6, the petitioner filed an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C seeking anticipatory bail, along with an I.A. seeking ex-parte ad-interim protection. On 17.01.2022, while admitting the application, the High Court directed it to be listed for final hearing ‘in due course’. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached this court contending that till date, the matter had neither been listed for hearing nor any order passed on the plea for interim protection during 6 SLP (Crl) 1247/2022 994 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the pendency of the anticipatory bail application. This Court observed as under:
“When a person is before the Court and that too in a matter involving personal liberty, least what is expected is for such a person to be given the result one way or the other, based on the merit of his case and not push him to a position of uncertainty or be condemned without being heard, when it matters.
When an application for anticipatory bail was listed before the learned Single Judge, which was also accompanied by an application for ad-interim relief, the learned Judge should have decided the same one way or the other, so far as the ad-interim prayer or should have taken up for consideration after giving some reasonable time to the State. Even if admitted, the learned Judge should have listed the same for final disposal on a specific date, keeping in view the nature of relief sought in the matter. Not giving any specific date, particularly in a matter relating to anticipatory bail, is not a procedure which can be countenanced. We are of the considered view that this type of indefinite adjournment in a matter relating to anticipatory bail, that too after admitting it, is detrimental to the valuable right of a person.”
16.2. In Sanjay v. The State (NCT of Delhi) & another 7, the application for bail was filed on 24.05.2022, but was posted to 31.08.2022 without granting any interim protection. Taking note of this circumstance, this Court held as under: “We are of the considered view that in a matter involving personal liberty, the Court is expected to pass orders in one way or other taking into account the merits of the matter at the earliest.”
…..
7 SLP (Crl.) No. 5675 of 2022 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 995Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra “At any rate, posting an application for anticipatory bail after a couple of months cannot be appreciated.”
16.3. In Rajanti Devi v. Union of India8 , this Court noted that the Patna High Court had heard the anticipatory bail application and reserved judgment on 07.04.2022. However, the judgment came to be delivered only on 04.04.2023. Thus, the matter remained pending for nearly one year after the conclusion of arguments. This Court expressed strong displeasure that an anticipatory bail petition could be kept pending for such an inordinate period and underscored the importance of the expeditious disposal of bail and anticipatory bail applications. The following paragraphs are apposite in this regard: “5. Though, we are very much alive about the magnitude of the bail applications being filed and heard by the Courts at all levels, we cannot be oblivious to the delay which takes place in the disposal of the Bail applications. This Court, time and again, has expressed great concern about the delay taking place in the disposal of the bail applications and has issued guidelines from time to time.
7. In a recent decision in the case of Satendra Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr., (2022) 10 SCC 51, this Court has directed to dispose of the bail applications in two weeks.
The said direction read as under: - “100.11. Bail applications ought to be disposed of within a period of two weeks except if the provisions mandate otherwise, with the exception being an intervening application. Applications for anticipatory bail are expected to be disposed of within a period of six weeks with the exception of any intervening application.”
8. Despite the aforestated guidelines/directions having been issued by this Court from time to time, 8 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1595 996 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports it appears that the cases like the present one, keep on happening and the bail applications are not being heard expeditiously and if heard, are not being decided within the stipulated time period.
9. In view of the above, it is directed that all the courts shall scrupulously follow the directions/ guidelines issued by this Court in the aforestated decisions.”
16.4. In Sumit Subhaschandra Gangwal & another v. the State of Maharashtra & another 9, this Court while dealing with the issue relating to the inordinate delay in passing the order, observed as follows:
“6. ...This Court has consistently right from the case of Niranjan Singh and Another v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Others, (1980) 2 SCC 559, held that detailed elaboration of evidence has to be avoided at the stage of grant/rejection of bail/anticipatory bail. We do not appreciate such a lengthy elaboration of evidence at this stage.
7. Another factor that needs to be noted is that though the order was reserved on 25.01.2023, the learned Single Judge of the High Court has pronounced the order on 01.03.2023 i.e. after a period of one month and one week.
8. It is always said that in the matters pertaining to the liberty of citizens, the Court should act promptly. In our view, such an inordinate delay in passing an order pertaining to liberty of a citizen is not in tune with the constitutional mandate.”
16.5. In Kavish Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh10, this Court had occasion to consider the interim order passed by a Single Judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court on an application for anticipatory bail filed by the petitioner – accused in respect of offences under sections 420, 467, 468, 409, 471 and 34 9 SLP (Crl.) No. 3561/2023 10 SLP (Crl.) no. 16025/2023 with SLP (Crl.) No. 16047/2023 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 997Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra IPC. By the said order, while the matter was taken up for consideration and the case diary was also called for, instead of fixing a specific date for further hearing, the Court directed that the case be listed “in its chronological order”. The operative observation in the order reads as follows:
“1. This Court held and reiterated that decisions on anticipatory bail applications / bail applications, are concerned with the liberty and therefore, shall be taken up and disposed of, expeditiously. On 21.02.2022 in SLP (Crl) No.1247/2022, a Bench of three Judges of this Court reiterated the same view. Virtually, this Court deprecated the practice of admitting the bail applications and thereafter deferring decisions on it unduly. The case on hand reveals recurrence of such a situation despite the repeated pronouncements of this Court on very issue. In the case on hand, the petitioner who is accused No.1 in F.I.R. No.218/2023 of Police Station Vidhan Sabha, Raipur, Chhattisgarh registered under Section 420 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Later, Sections 467, 468, 409 and 471, IPC were also added.
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