Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1061; [2025] 9 S.C.R. 258
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sanjay Kumar, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
- Decided
- 1 Sept 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 3813/2025
- Sections
- 223, 376(2), 464, 376, 6, 4, 164, 313, 216, 215, 218, 34
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 9 S.C.R. 258 : 2025 INSC 1061 Sushil Kumar Tiwari v.
Hare Ram Sah & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3813 of 2025)
01 September 2025 [Sanjay Kumar and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Allegation against the respondent nos.1 and 2 that they raped a minor girl. It is admitted that they never committed the acts together and always acted separately. In light of the controversy involved in the instant case, the two question arise for consideration: i) whether the High Court fell in a grave error in acquitting the respondent nos.1 and 2 by holding that the prosecution failed to discharge its evidentiary burden as the evidence led by the prosecution was full of inconsistencies and contradictions; ii) whether the High Court erred in its finding that the trial was carried out in violation of s.223 Cr.PC and non-adherence to the same had caused prejudice to the respondent nos.1 and 2, thereby leading to miscarriage of justice. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – s.376(2) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss.4 and 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.223 – Prosecution case that respondent nos.1 and 2 raped a minor girl, though separately – Girl became pregnant – Upon questioning, she disclosed names of the respondent nos.1 and 2 – Trial Court convicted respondent nos.1 and 2 u/s.376(2) of IPC and ss.4 and 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 – However, the High court held that the prosecution did not succeed in proving the case against the respondent nos.1 and 2 – The High Court outlined a few specific issues in the case i.e. victim’s age, date and time of incident, proof of pregnancy and abortion, and delay in lodging the FIR – Correctness:
Held: 1. In the instant case, a fairly consistent and creditworthy case of the prosecution has been discarded on what could only be termed as misapplication of procedure – No culprit should manage * Author [2025] 9 S.C.R. 259Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors. an acquittal on basis of unreasonable doubts – The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside being unsustainable – The view taken by the Trial Court was correct and there is no infirmity in the same – The judgment of the Trial Court stands restored, both on conviction and sentence. [Paras 36, 37, 38]
2. It cannot be denied that there are slight variations in the age of the victim at the relevant point of time, as discernible from the oral and documentary evidence – However, it cannot be said that age was not proved during the trial – The oral testimonies of PW-3, PW-5 and PW6 are consistent inter-se as well as with the Transfer Certificate issued by the government school – The age of the victim appears to be within the range of 12-13 years at the relevant point of time – Also, age was not challenged during the cross-examination of any witnesses – As long as the age conclusively appears to be under 18 years, the special protections carved out in favour of children cannot be diluted by insisting upon a rigid determination of the age – As regards the issue regarding date and time of the incident, the main witness pertaining to the commission of the offence is the victim herself, examined as PW-2 – She has expressed the entire chain in a consistent manner and her version is also consistent with other PWs – She has deposed that the offence took place in the days following the festival of Holi and the same is corroborated by the medical report dated 01.07.2016, which indicates that she was 3-4 months pregnant as on 01.07.2016 – The medical report corroborates the time frame stated by the victim – The testimony of the victim is fairly consistent and there is no reasonable ground to doubt the same – As far as proof of pregnancy and abortion is concerned, the medical report dated 01.07.2016 categorically indicated that at the time of ultrasound, the victim was 15 weeks pregnant – Further, the Trial Court has noted that the letter dated 28.07.2016 bearing Letter No. 60/BSLSA/AccT/2472 issued by the Bihar State Legal Services Authority indicated that the victim’s father had sought permission for her abortion – That abortion was conducted after the constitution of medical board by the Executive Chairman, BSLSA, Patna High Court, a fact which has not been disputed – There is ample documentary and oral evidence to prove these elements and the High Court has overlooked relevant evidence in arriving at its finding – As regards the delay in lodging the FIR, the incident came to light only after the ultrasound conducted on 01.07.2016 and the FIR was lodged on the very next day – Before the discovery of offence, the delay of 3-4 months 260 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports was a consequence of the intimidation made by the respondent nos.1 and 2, which prevented the victim from opening up before her parents – So, the victim could be faulted in any manner on account of delay. [Paras 17, 19, 20, 21] Penal Code, 1860 – s.376(2) – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss.4 and 6 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.223 – Trial Court convicted respondent nos.1 and 2 u/s.376(2) of IPC and ss.4 and 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 for raping a minor girl – Respondents never committed the acts together and always acted separately – The High Court emphasized the non-compliance of s.223 Cr.PC:
Held: The victim and the respondent nos.1 and 2 were residing in the same village, the house of respondent no.2 was situated one house away from that of the victim, respondent no.1 was running a coaching center adjacent to his house and in the same vicinity, and both the respondents threatened the victim of similar consequences if she dared to disclose their acts to anyone – Evidently, the nature of acts committed by the respondent nos.1 and 2 herein and subsequent intimidation to keep the victim silent were of a similar design – Further, there was a certain proximity of time and place as the incidents were committed within a continuous time-frame and at different places in the same village – However, it is also admitted that they never committed the acts together and always acted separately – Therefore, there is no direct evidence of commission of offences in the same transaction, however, an inference may be drawn – For, even if the conclusion of the High Court, that the joint trial was conducted in violation of s.223 Cr.PC, is accepted, the respondent nos.1 and 2 would still have to further show that the joint trial had caused prejudice to them and had occasioned a failure of justice – Mere irregular conduct of a joint or separate trial does not vitiate the trial as a whole and the proof of failure of justice is sine qua non for holding the trial as invalid – In the High Court’s reasoning, there is no finding of actual prejudice or failure of justice as a result of the joint trial, as necessitated by law – Mere non-compliance of the procedure contemplated u/s.223 does not ipso facto render the trial as invalid, and the same cannot form the basis of returning a finding of prejudice and failure of justice – The said conclusion must emanate from the facts of the case, after a thorough examination of the facts and evidence on record. [Paras 31, 34] [2025] 9 S.C.R. 261Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors. Evidence – Standard of reasonable doubt:
Held: One of the foremost principles of appreciation of evidence is that natural variations, errors and inconsistencies are not to be elevated to the standard of a reasonable doubt or to hold that the prosecution has failed – There is nothing like perfect evidence in a Court and in fact, perfection is often suggestive of tutoring and manufacturing of evidence – The availability of evidence as well as the quality of evidence are not open to judgment on any predetermined parameters – For, these aspects not only depend upon the quality of investigation but also upon the societal circumstances prevalent in the area of crime – They also depend upon the level of awareness, not only of the persons involved in the case but also of the members of the locality who often appear as witnesses – Therefore, the Courts must be alive to the state of affairs on the ground and in that backdrop, it must examine whether the inconsistencies and gaps have been properly explained or not – If so, such inconsistencies and gaps may not affect the case of the prosecution – However, if the prosecution fails to explain the inconsistencies in its case, an adverse inference may be drawn against it. [Para 22] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.464 – Whether mere discovery of an error, irregularity or omission in the framing of charge ipso facto render the decision of the Court as invalid: Held: Mere discovery of an error, irregularity or omission in the framing of charge does not ipso facto render the decision of the Court as invalid – In fact, even a case of non-framing of charge is not liable to be discarded on that ground alone – In order to vitiate the decision, what is necessary is the failure of justice as a result of such error or omission or irregularity – Thus, the quintessential issue that requires an answer is whether the defect in the framing of charge in the instant matter has occasioned a failure of justice for the respondent nos.1 and 2. [Para 26] Case Law Cited Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab and Another, 2021 INSC 642 : [2021] 13 SCR 566 – relied on.
Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana [2011] 8 SCR 774 : (2011) 7 SCC 130 – held inapplicable.
Soundarajan v. State (Represented by the Inspector of Police, Vigilance Anti-Corruption, Dindigul) [2023] 4 SCR 133 : (2023) 16 262 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports SCC 141; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao and Another [1964] 3 SCR 297 : AIR 1963 SC 1850 – referred to.
List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015.
List of Keywords Rape; Minor girl; Framing of charge; Irregularity; Evidence; Standard of reasonable doubt; Natural variations; Perfect evidence; Quality of evidence; Section 223 of CrPC; Non-compliance of s.223 Cr.PC; Victim’s age; Date and time of incident; Proof of pregnancy; Abortion; Delay in lodging the FIR.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3813 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 26.09.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in CRADB No. 1124 of 2019 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Daksha Kumar, Ms. Tanishq Mehta, Aftab Ali Khan, Ms. Ankita Baluni, Deepak Kumar, Ms. Sonakshi Monga.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Talib Mustafa, Ms. Raksha Agrawal, Lzafeer Ahmad B. F., Manish Kumar, Shashwat Pratyush.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Satish Chandra Sharma, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The struggle for sensitivity towards offences against women, children and other marginalized groups passes through various phases of [2025] 9 S.C.R. 263Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors. evolution. Whereas, the end goal is most desirable, the journey is not always a pleasant one. At times, the victims find themselves pitched against a system full of insensitive stakeholders and at other times, the victims find themselves in conflict with the procedural intricacies of the laws in place. Despite the importance of procedural sanctity, it is always a matter of utter failure for the system as a whole when a culprit, that too of a heinous sexual offence, manages to walk free by entangling the victim in misapplication of procedural rules, without the knowledge of the victim and without any control of the victim. The present case presents one such illustration from a place called Piro, District Bhojpur, Bihar.
3. In 2016, a few months after the festival of Holi, the victim - the appellant’s daughter – started feeling unwell. Upon finding that her health was constantly deteriorating, the appellant’s wife took their daughter to her native place in Ballia, Uttar Pradesh for treatment. There, she was taken to Zila Mahila Chikitsalaya on 01.07.2016 and upon examination, the victim was found to be 3 months pregnant. Upon questioning, she disclosed that she was raped by the respondents, namely, Hare Ram Sah and Manish Tiwari about 3-4 months ago, sometime after the festival of Holi. On the strength of this disclosure, the appellant lodged a complaint at PS Piro, District Bhojpur, Bihar on 02.07.2016, which culminated into FIR/Criminal Case No. 209/2016. Investigation commenced and chargesheet was filed in the concerned Court.
4. After trial, Learned Additional District & Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, POCSO Act, Bhojpur at Ara found the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 guilty for the commission of offences under Sections 376(2) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 1 , and Sections 4 & 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 2 . For the commission of the offence under Section 376 IPC, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo rigorous life imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 50,000/- each. In default of payment of fine, additional sentence of imprisonment for one year was imposed. For the commission of the offence under Section 6 of POCSO Act, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo rigorous life 1 Hereinafter referred as “IPC”
2 Hereinafter referred as “POCSO Act”
264 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 25,000/- each. In default of payment of fine, additional sentence of imprisonment for one year was imposed. For the commission of the offence under Section 4 of POCSO Act, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 7 years along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each. In default of payment of fine, additional sentence of imprisonment for three months was imposed. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
5. In appeal, the High Court examined the entire evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the prosecution did not succeed in proving the case against the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In doing so, the High Court primarily found the following infirmities in the prosecution case:
i. The date and time of the alleged incident were not proved; ii. The determination of age of the victim was not carried out; iii. No proof of abortion of the victim was placed on record; iv. The charge was not framed properly as it recorded the date as 02.07.2016, whereas the incident was reported on 01.07.2016 and offence was committed 3-4 months prior to its reporting; v. The Trial Court committed an error in conducting the joint trial of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, despite the case not falling within the conditions stipulated in Section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 3 for conducting joint trial. The High Court observed that the trial was bad in law, as the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were accused of committing different offences committed at different points of time, and the joinder of trial had caused grave prejudice to them and led to miscarriage of justice.
6. The High Court emphasized that in addition to the procedural infirmities that resulted from the non-compliance of Section 223 Cr.P.C., there were major inconsistencies in the deposition of prosecution witnesses. However, it clarified that the conviction was not set aside solely due to procedural lapses. The relevant para reads thus:
3 Hereinafter referred as “Cr.P.C.”
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 265Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors. “42. As per the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the two pronged test satisfies this case that the joint trial conducted has prejudiced the defence of the accused and has successfully proven to cause a miscarriage of justice. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the case on various grounds. The conviction of the present appellants is not being set aside on the mere ground that the procedure of Section 223 of the Code has not been adhered to but there are numerous laches on the part of the prosecution in proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Trial Court has also failed to consider the fact that Section 223 was applicable in this matter, but the same has not been considered in this case and the appellants have been tried jointly, causing prejudice to the appellants, despite which, the learned Trial Court has recorded the impugned judgment of conviction and the order of sentence. As such, the same are required to be quashed and set aside.”
THE CHALLENGE
7. Taking exception to the impugned judgment, Learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant submits that the High Court fell in a grave error in concluding that prejudice was caused to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 due to non-compliance of Section 223 Cr.P.C. He submits that the ground qua non-compliance of Section 223 was never taken by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the High Court examined the same on its own. To buttress the submission, it is submitted that even if Section 223 was not complied, it did not cause any prejudice to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and they had sufficient opportunity to participate and defend themselves during the trial.
8. It is further submitted that the age of the victim was established to be under 18 years without any doubt, on the strength of the school transfer certificate, statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the medical report dated 01.07.2016. It is further submitted that there was no reason to doubt the testimony of the victim and in a case of this nature, the testimony of the victim could form the 266 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports sole basis of conviction. It is further submitted that the aspects of pregnancy and abortion were duly proved in the case on the basis of the medical reports and abortion papers.
9. It is further submitted that there was no enmity between the victim and the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and thus, there was no motive to implicate the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is further submitted that even if the High Court had found any procedural irregularity, it ought to have remanded the matter back for fresh adjudication instead of acquitting the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. To buttress, it is submitted that the impugned decision completely disregarded the rights of the victim.
10. Per contra, the respondents advanced submissions in support of the impugned decision. On their behalf, it is submitted that the investigation was carried out in a completely casual and negligent manner and the same cause prejudice to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The submissions draw attention to the aspects of age determination, absence of proof of pregnancy and abortion, lack of investigation qua the date, time and place of the incidents, etc. It is further submitted that the charges framed by the Trial Court were defective and the entire trial was conducted on the basis of defective charges, thereby disentitling the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from a fair participation.
11. It is further submitted that the Trial Court conducted a joint trial of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in utter violation of Section 223 Cr.P.C. and without fulfilment of the conditions contemplated thereunder. It is further submitted that even at the stage of Section 313 Cr.P.C., the incriminating evidence was not put properly to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and consequently, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were prevented from explaining the evidence against them in a proper manner. Further, it is submitted that the version of the prosecution witnesses, especially that of the victim, was not consistent and the Trial Court committed an error in placing reliance upon their testimonies. It is further submitted that the defence witnesses presented a valid defence and the same out to have been considered.
12. Both the parties have filed written submissions and compilation of judgments in support of their case. We have considered the same. [2025] 9 S.C.R. 267Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors.
DISCUSSION
13. We have carefully considered the contentions advanced by the parties, impugned judgment, judgment of the Trial Court and the decisions relied upon by the parties. In light of the controversy involved in the matter, the following two issues arise for our consideration: i. Whether the High Court fell in a grave error in acquitting the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by holding that the prosecution failed to discharge its evidentiary burden as the evidence led by the prosecution was full of inconsistencies and contradictions? ii. Whether the High Court erred in its finding that the trial was carried out in violation of Section 223 Cr.P.C. and non-adherence to the same had caused prejudice to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, thereby leading to miscarriage of justice?
14. We may first consider the issue regarding inconsistencies and contradictions in the prosecution evidence, which would require some degree of examination of the evidence on record. At the outset, it needs to be noted that the High Court has outlined a few specific issues in the case i.e. victim’s age, date and time of the incident, proof of pregnancy and abortion, and delay in lodging the FIR.
15. Before appreciation of evidence led on these aspects, we may first traverse through the testimony of the victim, examined before the Trial Court as PW-2, in order to understand the precise allegations. After the discovery of pregnancy, PW-2 deposed that the incident took place in 2016, a few days after the festival of Holi. She deposed that one afternoon, her mother and father were not at home and she was sleeping alone in the house. Respondent No. 2 Manish Tiwari entered the house and raped her, and before leaving, he threatened her saying that should she tell anyone about it, she would be killed. Two or three days after this incident, the victim went near Shivala in the evening hours to look for her brother Himanshu. On the way, she passed respondent No. 1 Hare Ram Sah’s room and inquired if he had seen her brother. The said respondent pointed towards an inner room (used as coaching center) and suggested to the victim that her brother had gone in that direction. She went to check inside the room and found no one there. At the same time, Hare Ram Sah came from behind and grabbed her. She deposed that he took her inside and raped her. He also threatened her by 268 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports saying that should she tell anyone about it, she would be killed. The victim further deposed that she got scared and told no one about it. The story does not end here. She further deposed that after this incident, for two-three successive months, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 took turns and raped her multiple times. Thereafter, she fell sick and started experiencing stomach pain and vomiting. She informed her mother and her mother firstly took her to a doctor in Ara. Despite administration of medicines, her health did not improve. Thereafter, the victim was taken to her maternal uncle’s house in Ballia, Uttar Pradesh, where an ultrasound was conducted and the pregnancy was discovered. It is noteworthy that the statement of the victim recorded by the police, statement recorded by the concerned Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and the deposition recorded in the Court, are fairly consistent. There appears to be no variance insofar as the material aspects of the offence are concerned.
16. As regards the first issue concerning the age of the victim, it is quite understandable that for an offence under the POCSO Act, the victim must be aged under 18 years. In order to prove so, the prosecution has relied upon both oral and documentary evidence. The oral testimony of the mother of the victim, examined before the Trial Court as PW- 3, reveals that the victim was 12 years old at the time of incident. Further, the statement of victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C. also bears an endorsement regarding her age. The concerned ACJM, examined as PW-4, has recorded her age as 13 years. The father of the victim, examined as PW-5, has deposed that the victim’s age at the time of incident was 12 years. Insofar as the documentary evidence is concerned, the Transfer Certificate (Annexure P-10) issued by the government school attended by the victim records her date of birth as 03.10.2004, thereby meaning that during the concerned time-frame of the year 2016, the victim was around 12 years old. The medical report dated 01.07.2016 (Annexure P-1) is also relevant on this aspect. The said medical report pertains to the ultrasound examination of the victim and records her age as 15 years.
17. It cannot be denied that there are slight variations in the age of the victim at the relevant point of time, as discernible from the oral and documentary evidence. However, we do not find ourselves in agreement with the High Court that the age was not proved during trial. The oral testimonies of PW-3, PW-5 and PW-6 are consistent inter-se as well as with the Transfer Certificate issued by the [2025] 9 S.C.R. 269Sushil Kumar Tiwari v. Hare Ram Sah & Ors. government school. The age of the victim appears to be within the range of 12-13 years at the relevant point of time. The medical report records the age as 15 years. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the age of the victim was not challenged during cross-examination of any of the witnesses mentioned above. Their testimonies, on the point of age, have largely remained unrebutted, thereby meaning that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had no claim that she was not a minor at the relevant point. We do not mean to say in cases involving POCSO Act or Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015, the determination of age is not required. Most certainly, the determination of minority is essential to extend the protection of these legislations, however, as long as the age conclusively appears to be under 18 years, the special protections carved out in favour of children cannot be diluted by insisting upon a rigid determination of the age, that too when it was not even questioned at the right time. In the present case, even if it is believed that the age of the victim was not determined to the hilt, the Trial Court had concluded that the victim was aged between 12 to 15 years at the relevant point of time and thus, was a minor. Thus, it could not be stated that the Trial Court had not determined the minority of the victim. It was done and, in our opinion, rightly so, on the basis of the unrebutted oral and documentary evidence.
18. Interestingly, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 neither claimed that the victim was not a minor at any point of time nor led any evidence to that effect. We find that the High Court has erred in raising a doubt where none existed, even inter-se the parties to the case. We are also of the opinion that once the minority of the victim was beyond doubt, the special protection of POCSO Act ought not to have been diluted by raising a fictious doubt regarding the precise age of the victim. For, the Courts must remain alive to the socio-economic circumstances of the victims, especially those who are based in remoter regions of the country. In rural regions, discrepancies in the educational and identification documents are not unknown and, in such circumstances, the Courts must be sensitive to the ground realities of the society, so as to ensure that the intent of the law is not suppressed and protections created by the legislature reach the intended persons in their right spirit.
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