The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1122; [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1016
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 16 Sept 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6990/2014
- Sections
- 2, 18, 23, 14(1), 24, 21, 36, 14, 22
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1016 : 2025 INSC 1122 The State of Haryana v.
Jai Singh and Others (Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014)
16 September 2025 [B.R. Gavai,* CJI, Prashant Kumar Mishra and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The issue pertains to assail the correctness of the Judgment and Order passed by the Full Bench of High Court wherein the writ petition preferred by the proprietors/landowners, (Respondents herein), challenging the amendments carried out in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, as inserted by the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 was partly allowed.
Headnotes† Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 – sub-clause (6) to s.2(g) – East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation And Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 – Constitution of India – Art.31-A – The State of Haryana inserted sub-clause
(6) to s.2(g) of the 1961 Act along with an Explanation to the said sub-clause – In the said sub-clause, it was laid down that lands reserved for the common purposes of a village u/s.18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948, the management and control whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat u/s.23-A of the aforesaid Act – Aggrieved by the aforementioned amendment, the respondent-landowners who held land in various villages and had contributed a share of their holdings to form a common pool of land called ‘shamilat deh’, which was meant exclusively for the common purposes of the village inhabitants, filed Writ Petitions before the High Court – After various rounds of litigation, a Full Bench of the High Court by way of the impugned judgment and final order, examined the legality of sub-clause (6) of s.2(g) of the 1961 Act as inserted by the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and partly allowed the writ petitions preferred by the respondent-landowners – Appellant-State filed * Author [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1017The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others appeal against the same before the Supreme Court – Vide judgment and order dated 07.04.2022, this Court allowed the civil appeal – Review petition filed – Allowed – The judgment and order of this Court dated 07.04.2022 in Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is restored to the file: Held: No error in the impugned judgment and final order of the Full Bench of the High Court to the extent that it holds that the lands which have not been earmarked for any specific purpose do not vest in the Gram Panchayat or the State – It is settled that the land which remains unutilized after utilizing the land for the common purposes so provided under the consolidation scheme vests with the proprietors and not with the Gram Panchayat – The unutilized land i.e., the bachat land, left after utilizing the land earmarked for the common purposes, has to be redistributed amongst the proprietors according to the share in which they had contributed the land belonging to them for common purposes – The Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment and final order in the alternative held that, a consistent view has been taken in more than 100 judgments by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and applying the doctrine of stare decisis, such a view cannot be upset – The doctrine of stare decisis lays importance on stability and predictability in the legal system and mandates that a view consistently upheld by courts over a long period must be followed, unless it is manifestly erroneous, unjust or mischievous – No error in the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in applying the doctrine of stare decisis to the facts of the present case inasmuch as it followed the law which was consistently applied in more than 100 judgments. [Paras 53, 56, 59, 62] Case Law Cited Bhagat Ram and Others v. State of Punjab and Others [1967] 2 SCR 165 : 1966 SCC OnLine SC 264 – followed.
Ranjit Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others [1965] 1 SCR 82 : 1964 SCC OnLine SC 182 – held inapplicable.
Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay [1975] 1 SCR 1 : (1974) 2 SCC 402; Waman Rao v. Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 1 : AIR 1981 SC 271 – relied on. Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Another [1967] 2 SCR 143 : 1966 SCC OnLine SC 192; State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, 1998 SCC OnLine SC 8; Sarat Chandra Mishra and Others. v. State of 1018 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Orissa and Others [2006] 1 SCR 116 : (2006) 1 SCC 638; Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai [2005] 2 SCR 927 : (2005) 4 SCC 772; Gajraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others [2001] 3 SCR 344 : (2001) 5 SCC 762; K.T. Plantation Private Limited and Another v. State of Karnataka [2011] 13 SCR 636 : (2011) 9 SCC 1; State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh, Civil Appeal Nos. 5709-5714 of 2001 – referred to.
Suraj Bhan and Others v. State of Haryana and Another, CWP No. 314 of 2001; Jai Singh and Others v. State of Haryana, CWP No. 5877 of 1992 – referred to.
List of Acts Constitution of India; Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation And Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948.
List of Keywords Doctrine of stare decisis; Shamilat deh; Consolidation scheme; Unutilized land; Bachat land; Redistribution of land; Land earmarked for the common purposes; Stability and predictability in the legal system; Amendment to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961; Insertion of sub-clause (6) to s.2(g) to the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961; Common pool of land; Review.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 From the Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2003 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana At Chandigarh in CWP No. 5877 of 1992 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
B.K. Satija, A.A.G., Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv., Samar Vijay Singh, Gautam Sharma, Ms. Sabarni Som, Fateh Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Manoj Swarup, Rameshwar Singh Malik, Narender Hooda, Sr. Advs., Ankit Swarup, Mrs. Anubha Agarwal, Neelmani Pant, Rishi Bhargava, Yash Singhal, Hamad Tariq, Jitesh Malik, Ms. Anisha [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1019The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others Dahiya, Jatin Hooda, Tarjit Singh Chhikara, Abhaya Nath Das, N D Kaushik, Satish Kumar, Pardeep Gupta, Parinav Gupta, Mrs. Mansi Gupta, Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Dr. Surender Singh Hooda, Ravindra Bana, Rajesh Kumar, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor, Shrey Kapoor, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Ashok Kumar Singh, Tejaswi Kumar Pradhan, Manoranjan Paikaray, Aniket Gupta, A. Venayagam Balan, Gaurav Pal.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment
INDEX
I. BACKGROUND Paras 1 to 3 II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES Paras 4 to 23 III. CONSIDERATION Paras 24 to 62
(a) Consideration of the Constitution Bench Judgments of this Court in Ranjit Singh, Ajit Singh and Bhagat Ram Para 24 to 53
(b) Consideration of the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in impugned judgment and final order referring its earlier judgment in Gurjant Singh and several other judgments Para 54 to 57
(c) Applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis to the facts of the present case.
Para 58 to 62 IV. CONCLUSIONS Para 63 to 64 B.R. Gavai, CJI
I. BACKGROUND
1. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and final order passed by a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh 1 1 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’.
1020 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports in Civil Writ Petition No. 5877 of 1992 wherein the High Court partly allowed the writ petition preferred by the proprietors/landowners, (Respondents herein), challenging the amendments carried out in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 2 , as inserted by the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992, published on 11th February 1992 after the assent of the President of India.
2. The facts which give rise to the present proceedings are as follows: 2.1 The State of Haryana, by way of Government Gazette Notification dated 11th February 1992 inserted sub-clause (6) to Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act along with an Explanation to the said sub-clause, which received the assent of the President on 14 th January 1992. Sub-clause (6) to Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act reads thus:
“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requiresxxx xxx xxx
(g) “shamilat deh” includesxxx xxx xxx
(6) lands reserved for the common purposes of a village under Section 18 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the management and control whereof vests in the Gram Panchayat under section 23-A of the aforesaid Act.
Explanation - Lands entered in the column of ownership of record of rights as “Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hassab Rasad”, “Jumla Malkan” or “Mushtarka Malkan” shall be shamilat deh within the meaning of this section.”
2.2 The respondent-landowners along with several other similarlysituated landowners who held land in various villages and had 2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘1961 Act’.
[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1021The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others contributed a share of their holdings to form a common pool of land called ‘shamilat deh’, which was meant exclusively for the common purposes of the village inhabitants, filed Writ Petitions before the High Court being aggrieved by the aforementioned amendment.
2.3 When the batch of Writ Petitions first came up before the High Court, upon considering the important questions of law involved in the matter, which were likely to arise in a large number of cases and affect a huge chunk of land, the Division Bench which was seized of the matter vide order dated 1 st June, 1993 directed the papers of the case to be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench of the High Court for determination of the vires of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992. Thereafter, a Full Bench of the High Court heard the matter at length and vide judgment dated 18 th January 1995, reported as Jai Singh and Others v. State of Haryana 3, allowed the writ petitions and struck down the amendments carried out by way of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992.
2.4 The State of Haryana4 , Appellant herein, challenged the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court before this Court vide Civil Appeal No. 5480 of 1995 titled as State of Haryana v. Jai Singh5. This Court by order dated 6 th August, 1998 held that certain essentials of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India had been overlooked and accordingly, the civil appeal came to be allowed and the matter was remanded to the High Court for reconsideration of the issues in light of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.
2.5 Accordingly, a Full Bench of the High Court by way of the impugned judgment and final order, examined the legality of sub-clause (6) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act as inserted by the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and partly allowed the writ petitions preferred by the respondent-landowners. The Full Bench of the High Court vide the impugned judgment and final order also 3 CWP No. 5877 of 1992.
4 Hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant-State’.
5 1998 SCC OnLine SC 8 1022 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports issued certain consequential directions with regard to certain mutation entries made by the Revenue Authorities.
2.6 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State filed a Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 before this Court. Vide judgment and order dated 7 th April 2022, this Court allowed the civil appeal in the following terms:
“128.Consequently, we hold that Act 9 of 1992, the amending Act is valid and does not suffer from any vice of constitutional infirmity. The entire land reserved for common purposes by applying pro rata cut had to be utilised by the Gram Panchayat for the present and future needs of the village community and that no part of the land can be re-partitioned amongst the proprietors.
129. With the aforesaid discussion and findings, the appeals filed by the State and Panchayats are allowed and those filed by the proprietors are dismissed.
Consequently, the writ petitions filed before the High Court shall also stand dismissed.”
2.7 Seeking review of the aforementioned judgment of this Court, one Karnail Singh, being Respondent No. 28 in the present proceedings, preferred Review Petition (C) No. 526 of 2023 before this Court.
2.8 After a thorough consideration of the issue at hand, this Court vide order dated 16th May 2024 allowed the Review Petition in the following terms:
“69. In the result, we pass the following order:
The Review Petition is allowed.
The judgment and order of this Court dated 7th April 2022 in Civil Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is restored to the file.
The appeal is directed to be listed for hearing peremptorily on 7 th August 2024 at Serial No.1”
2.9 After the review was allowed, we have heard the appeals afresh. [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1023The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
3. We have heard Shri Vinay Navare, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant-State as well as Shri Manoj Swarup, Shri Narender Hooda and Shri Rameshwar Singh Malik, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent-landowners.
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
4. Shri Navare appearing for the appellant-State submitted that the impugned judgment and final order of the High Court is selfcontradictory in nature. He submitted that despite holding that lands reserved for common purposes as per the consolidation scheme, whether utilized or not, would vest with the State or Gram Panchayat, the High Court directed cancellation of mutations made in favour of the appellant-state. He further submitted that in light of a categorical finding to the effect that the amended provisions were merely elucidations of the already existing provisions, the High Court ought not to have cancelled or set aside the mutations which were a necessary consequence of Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 which amended the 1961 Act.
5. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the liberty granted by the High Court to the State or Gram Panchayat to file an application for eviction or title suit for those lands which had been earmarked for common purposes, would run contrary to the very purpose and objective of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and would introduce the same mischief which the said Act sought to do away with. He, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment and final order being self-contradictory and erroneous to the above extent deserves to be set aside and/or modified.
6. Shri Navare further submitted that the lands contributed by the respondent-landowners on pro-rata basis during consolidation proceedings as carried out under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation And Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 19486 would fall within the definition of ‘shamilat deh’ under the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992. Such lands, he submitted, would vest in the State or Gram Panchayat, irrespective of whether they have been reserved for common purposes or not. He submitted that vesting of such lands in the State or Gram Panchayat is complete as soon as 6 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Consolidation Act of 1948’. 1024 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the consolidation scheme attains finality and once so vested, the proprietors lose all rights and interests. Shri Navare further submitted that once the land has been recorded as ‘shamilat deh’, there would be no need to prove as to whether it had been earmarked or used for common purposes.
7. Shri Navare submitted that since the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 did not exclude unutilized lands i.e. bachat lands, the said lands could not be given back to the respondent-landowners. He submitted that before the High Court, the only claim raised by the respondent-landowners was qua land reserved for the income of the Gram Panchayat as well as land which had been reserved for common purposes but had not been utilized. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that all such lands which had been reserved for common purposes vested with the Gram Panchayat and further that, the concomitant Rule 16(ii) of the Consolidation Rules would cover all such lands which had been taken over for common purposes as per the consolidation scheme under the Consolidation Act of 1948. Therefore, Shri Navare submitted, the High Court had erred in holding that bachat lands not reserved for common use would remain with the proprietors in proportion to their contribution.
8. Shri Navare further submitted that Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 did not alter or affect the rights of the respondent-landowners, as their ownership had already been extinguished under the Consolidation Act of 1948 and its concomitant Rules upon the finalization of the consolidation proceedings thereunder. He submitted that the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992, enacted as an agrarian reform to strengthen Gram Panchayat control, is merely clarificatory and does not divest proprietors of any ownership rights and therefore, it would not be hit by the rigours of Articles 31-A and 300A of the Constitution of India.
9. With regard to the decision of this Court in Bhagat Ram and Others v. State of Punjab and Others 7, Shri Navare submitted that the judgment supports the proprietors only to the extent that land cannot be reserved solely to generate income for the Gram Panchayat. However, he submitted that this Court deliberately refrained from ordering the return of land to proprietors to avoid disrupting the consolidation scheme under the Consolidation Act of 1948. He 7 1966 SCC OnLine SC 264 : [1967] 2 SCR 165 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1025The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others submitted that returning bachat land to the proprietors would cause fragmentation and reverse the landholding structure to a pre-1948 scenario, which the Act expressly prohibits. Therefore, he submitted, what the Supreme Court consciously avoided in Bhagat Ram (supra) could not have been directed by the High Court. To substantiate his contention, Shri Navare placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Sarat Chandra Mishra and Others. v. State of Orissa and Others 8, Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai9 and Gajraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others 10 to submit that a judgment cannot be read as a statute and it may be presumed that the same has been rendered in accordance with law.
10. In the result, Shri Navare submitted that the civil appeals deserve to be allowed and the High Court’s order ought to be set aside only to the extent that it directs the cancellation of mutations made in the appellant’s favour.
11. Per contra, Shri Manoj Swarup, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of some of the respondent-landowners submitted that the concerned land has been in their possession and under their cultivation from the very inception. As such, he submitted that, the respondent-landowners are the absolute owners of the land and they could not have been deprived of their proprietary rights without acquisition of the land through due process of law.
12. Shri Swarup submitted that the insertion of Clause 2(g)(6) with the Explanation in the 1961 Act, by way of the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992, arbitrarily expanded the definition of ‘shamilat deh’. He submitted that the land of the respondent-landowners was neither reserved under the provisions of Section 18 of the Consolidation Act of 1948 for utilization for common purposes nor used for common purposes, but remained under their cultivation making them the absolute owners of the land. He, therefore, submitted that the amendment amounts to compulsory acquisition without compensation, thereby violating Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.
13. He further submitted that the unutilized land i.e. bachat land ought to be revested with the respondent-landowners as such land does
8 (2006) 1 SCC 638
9 (2005) 4 SCC 772
10 (2001) 5 SCC 762
1026 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports not fall within the ambit of ‘shamilat deh’. He submitted that the management and control of the bachat land would also not vest with the Gram Panchayat under the provisions of Sections 18 and 23-A of the Consolidation Act of 1948 and Rule 16(ii) of the Concomitant Consolidation Rules. The learned Senior Counsel further clarified that before the High Court, the respondent-landowners had only joined issues with regard to unutilized lands, since after an exchange of affidavits, the appellant-State had taken a similar stance. He, therefore, submitted that since the land has neither been utilized nor reserved for any specific common purpose, it ought to revest with the proprietors. To bolster his submission, Shri Swarup placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhagat Ram (supra) which has been relied upon by the High Court in the impugned judgment and final order.
14. Even insofar as the direction of the High Court with regard to vesting of utilized or unutilized land with the Gram Panchayat is concerned, Shri Swarup submitted that it has been set aside by a judgment passed by a 5-Judge Bench of the High Court dated 22 nd July 2016 in Suraj Bhan and Others v. State of Haryana and Another in CWP No. 314 of 2001, which has otherwise upheld the judgment of the Full Bench impugned before us, in toto.
15. Shri Swarup, in the result, submitted that decision of the High Court be upheld and the civil appeals be dismissed with costs.
16. Shri Narender Hooda, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of some of the respondent-landowners submitted that though the right to property is no more a fundamental right, it is still a constitutional right. It is submitted that in view of the law laid down by this Court in the cases of Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Another 11 and Bhagat Ram (supra), the land cannot be acquired where the beneficiary is the State. He submits that where the reservation of land is for the purpose of generating revenue for the State, it constitutes taking away the land for the State and attracts protection granted under the second proviso to Article 31A of the Constitution mandating payment of compensation at market value. It is, therefore, submitted that the High Court has rightly considered this legal position and held that the lands which are not earmarked for a particular purpose would revest in the proprietors.
11 1966 SCC OnLine SC 192 : [1967] 2 SCR 143 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1027The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
17. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of K.T. Plantation Private Limited and Another v. State of Karnataka 12 has reaffirmed the legal position that even after the deletion of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution of India, the deprivation of a property of a citizen must conform to foundational constitutional requirements. He submits that the Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that the public purpose is a precondition for deprivation of a person from his property under Article 300-A and that the State has to justify both - the public purpose as well as compensation for such deprivation.
18. He submits that the Constitution Bench has further held that the statutes authorizing deprivation of property are amenable to judicial review, and must satisfy constitutional standards of non-arbitrariness, proportionality, and the rule of law.
19. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Constitution Bench held that though a full market value compensation may be no longer a constitutional mandate, the obligation to pay compensation - whether nominal, partial or otherwise - still exists. He further submitted that such a compensation has to be “just, fair and reasonable” within the meaning of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. Shri Hooda further submitted that this Court in the Constitution Bench Judgments in the cases of Ranjit Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others13, Ajit Singh (supra) and Bhagat Ram (supra) on an interpretation of the Consolidation Act of 1948, in unequivocal terms, held that the lands whose possession was never given in implementation of the Consolidation Scheme do not vest in the Gram Panchayat but continue to belong to the original proprietors. It has further been held that such lands which have not been earmarked for any specific purpose under the Scheme, which are commonly known as bachat lands, must revert to the proprietors. He submitted that the doctrine of stare decisis, when the aforesaid legal position has been in vogue for a long period, would not permit the same to be reversed.
12 (2011) 9 SCC 1
13 1964 SCC OnLine SC 182 : [1965] 1 SCR 82 1028 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
21. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Consolidation proceedings in the State of Haryana happened in and around 1960. It is submitted that, over the past 65 years, the possession of the bachat land remained undisturbed, despite earmarking, with the proprietors. He submitted that in some instances, the original proprietors remained in settled occupation. In many cases, bona fide transactions have taken place through registered sale deeds. In several other instances, statutory authorities have effected partitions between joint owners and/or vendees. It is submitted that these persons have invested labour, capital and generations of time on the footing that their possession was lawful and secure. He submitted that, disturbing such long-settled rights would be manifestly unjust. He, therefore, submits that it would be just and necessary in the interests of justice that even if such bachat lands are earmarked for some purposes but their possession has not been taken for long years, they need to be protected, and such lands need to be revested in the proprietors.
22. Shri Rameshwar Singh Malik, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of some of the other respondent-proprietors submitted that, the case of the respondent-proprietors is squarely covered by the decisions of this Court in the cases of Ajit Singh (supra), Bhagat Ram (supra) and State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh14.
23. In light of the same, he submitted that the civil appeals be dismissed and the States of Punjab and Haryana and the UT of Chandigarh be directed to re-partition the bachat land amongst the respondentproprietors in the same proportion in which they had contributed their land during the consolidation proceedings.
III. CONSIDERATIONS
(a) Consideration of the Constitution Bench Judgments of this Court in Ranjit Singh (supra), Ajit Singh (supra) and Bhagat Ram (supra)
24. For considering the controversy, a reference to three Constitution Bench Judgments of this Court would be necessary.
14 Civil Appeal Nos. 5709-5714 of 2001 [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1029The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others
25. The first one is in the case of Ranjit Singh (supra). In the said case, the Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned with the consolidation proceedings in which portions of land from those commonly owned by the appellants therein as proprietors, had been reserved for the village Panchayat and handed over to it for diverse purposes; whereas, other portions had been reserved either for nonproprietors or for the common purposes of the villages. In the said case, in the village Virk Kalan, 270 kanals and 13 marlas had been given to the village Panchayat for management and realization of income, even though the ownership was still shown in village papers as ‘shamilat deh’ in the names of the proprietors; 10 kanals and 3 marlas had been reserved for abadi to be distributed among persons entitled thereto, and 3 kanals and 7 marlas had been reserved for manure pits. Similarly, in village Sewana, certain lands were set apart for the village Panchayat for extension of the abadi and to enable grants of certain land to be made to each family of nonproprietors and certain lands had been reserved for a primary school and some more for a phirni. Similarly, in village Mehnd, land had been reserved for the village Panchayat, a school, tanning ground, hospital, cremation ground and for non-proprietors. The proprietors were not paid compensation for the lands and as such, taking away and allotment of the lands was the subject matter of challenge in those appeals in the said case.
26. The appeals before this Court were heard and closed for judgment on 27 th April 1964. The judgment had to be postponed till after the vacation. However, before the Court could reassemble after the vacation on 20th July 1964, the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 received the assent of the President i.e. on 20 th June, 1964. Vide the said Amendment, a new sub-clause (a) in clause (2) of Article 31-A was substituted retrospectively and added a proviso to clause (1). The appeals were set down to be mentioned on July 20/23, 1964, and counsel were asked if, in view of the amendment, they wished to say anything. However, neither of parties wished to argue. The appeals were thus decided on the old arguments, though it was clear to the Court that the amendment of Article 31-A, which had a far-reaching effect, and it must have affected one or other of the parties. The Constitution Bench upheld the judgment of the High Court which had held that the transfer of ‘shamilat deh’ owned by the proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purposes of management 1030 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and the conferral of proprietary rights on non-proprietors in respect of lands in abadi deh was not ultra vires of Article 31 inasmuch as, no compensation was payable.
27. It must be noted that the judgment of the High Court was rendered by interpreting Article 31-A as it existed prior to the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. This Court though called upon the parties to address the Court on the effect of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, no arguments were advanced. As such, in Ranjit Singh (supra), this Court did not have the occasion to consider the effect of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 by which the second proviso was added to Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ranjit Singh (supra) will not have a bearing on the present matter.
28. In the case of Ajit Singh (supra), again the challenge was to the scheme made under the provisions of the Consolidation Act of 1948. One of the grounds raised before the High Court as well as this Court was that the compensation must be paid to the appellant for the land reserved in the scheme for various purposes in accordance with the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) inserted by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.
29. It will be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs in Ajit Singh (supra):
“6. Coming now to the third point raised by Mr Iyenger, we may first mention that it was held by this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab [(1965) 1 SCR 82] that the Act was protected from challenge by Article 31-A. It is necessary to set out the relevant constitutional provisions. The relevant portion of Article 31-A reads as under:
“31-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for—
(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights……….
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1031The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 19 or Article 31:
Provided that * * * Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof.
(2)(b) the expression ‘rights’ in relation to an estate shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue.”
Relevant portions of Articles 19 and 31 may also be set out because the learned counsel have laid stress on the language employed therein.
“19. (1) All citizens shall have the right—
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
31. (1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
1032 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate.
(2-A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprives any person of his property.”
7. It would be noticed that Article 31-A(1)(a) mentions four categories; first acquisition by the State of an estate; second, acquisition by the State of rights in an estate; third, the extinguishment of rights in an estate, and, fourthly, the modification of rights in an estate. These four categories are mentioned separately and are different. In the first two categories the State “acquires” either an estate or rights in an estate. In other words, there is a transference of an estate or the rights in an estate to the State. When there is a transference of an estate to the State, it could be said that all the rights of the holder of the estate have been extinguished. But if the result in the case of the extinguishment is the transference of all the rights in an estate to the State, it would properly fall within the expression “acquisition by the State of an estate”. Similarly, in the case of an acquisition by the State of a [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1033The State of Haryana v. Jai Singh and Others right in an estate it could also be said that the rights of the owner have been modified since one of the rights of the owner has been acquired.
8. It seems to us that there is this essential difference between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand and “modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the extinguishment is not the State. For example, suppose the State is the landlord of an estate and there is a lease of that property, and a law provides for the extinguishment of leases held in an estate. In one sense it would be an extinguishment of the rights of a lessee, but it would properly fall under the category of acquisition by the State because the beneficiary of the extinguishment would be the State.
9. Coming now to the second proviso to Article 31-A, it would be noticed that only one category is mentioned in the proviso, the category being “acquisition by the State of an estate”. It means that the law must make a provision for the acquisition by the State of an estate. But what is the true meaning of the expression “acquisition by the State of an estate”. In the context of Article 31-A, the expression “acquisition by the State of an estate” in the second proviso to Article 31-A(1) must have the same meaning as it has in clause (1)(a) to Article 31-A. It is urged on behalf of the respondents before us that the expression “acquisition by the State of any estate” in Article 31-A(1)(a) has the same meaning as it has in Article 31(2-A). In other words, it is urged that the expression “acquisition by the State of any estate” means transfer of the ownership or right to possession of an estate to the State. Mr. Iyengar on the other hand urges that the expression “acquisition by the State” has a very wide meaning and it would bear the same meaning as was given by this Court in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [(1964) SCR 587] , Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674] Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. [(1955) 1 SCR 707] and 1034 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay [(1958) SCR 1122] . In these cases this Court had given a wide meaning to the word “acquisition”. In Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674] Mahajan, J., observed at p. 704 as follows:
“The word ‘acquisition’ has quite a wide concept, meaning the procuring of property or the taking of it permanently or temporarily. It does not necessarily imply the acquisition of legal title by the State in the property taken possession of.”
He further observed at p. 705:
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