Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. R1: State of Uttar Pradesh R2: Devi Singh
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 918; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 305
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
- Decided
- 31 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 347/2018
- Sections
- 35, 74
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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 305 : 2025 INSC 918 Suresh v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
R1: State of Uttar Pradesh R2: Devi Singh (Criminal Appeal No. 347 of 2018)
01 August 2025 [Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the Courts below erred in declaring the Respondent No.2 as a ‘juvenile’ under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, on the date of the incident.
Headnotes† Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 – r.12 – Procedure to be followed in determination of Age – FIR was filed against Respondent No.2 and his father u/ss.452 and 302, IPC – Respondent No.2 pleaded juvenility – Trial Court declared the Respondent No.2 to be a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the incident – Challenged by appellant – Order upheld by High Court – Interference with:
Held: r.12(3)(a) lays down the sequential list of certificates to be examined and the order thereof – In the present case, as no ‘matriculation or equivalent certificates’ were available u/r.12(3) (a)(i), thus u/r.12(3)(a)(ii), ‘date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended’ was attracted and the certificate issued by the first attended school was taken as conclusive proof of date of birth – However, the deposition of the School’s Headmaster to the effect that the birth-date was noted on an oral representation by Respondent No.2’s father, makes the said certificate unreliable – Other school certificates were issued following this and therefore, are not correct, in the face of conflicting public records and public documents as also the Medical Report which state to the contrary – Thus, the certificate issued by the first attended school could not have been taken as conclusive proof of date of birth of Respondent No.2, discarding Form (A) u/r.2 of * Author 306 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the Rules under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act 1947; the entry in the Voters’ List for the Legislative Assembly of the year 2012, and; the Medical Report – Respondent No.2 was not a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the incident – Declaration of Respondent No.2 as a ‘juvenile’ was improper – Impugned order of the High Court as well as the order of the Trial Court holding the Respondent No.2 to be a ‘juvenile’, set aside – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.35, 74. [Paras 23-26] Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.35, 74 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 – Certificate issued by the first attended school was taken as conclusive proof of date of birth of the Respondent No.2-accused and he was held a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the incident:
Held: The first attended school is not a Government School and thus, the records maintained by the said School would not be ‘public documents’ – Moreover, the Headmaster/Principal of such School cannot be said to be a ‘public servant’ for the purposes of the Evidence Act – Thus, neither the Headmaster/Principal of the first attended school nor its records would qualify as ‘public servant’ or ‘public record’ or ‘public document’ respectively. [Paras 21, 22] Case Law Cited Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan [2012] 5 SCR 237 : (2012) 5 SCC 201 – relied on.
Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1988) Supp. SCC 604 – referred to.
List of Acts Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection. of Children) Rules, 2007; Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; UP Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.
List of Keywords Juvenile; Juvenility; Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007; Determination of Age; Juvenility not established; First attended school; School transfer certificate; Birth-date entry; Birth-date noted as per an oral representation; Date of birth certificate; Equivalent certificates; Other school certificates; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 307Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. Conflicting public records and public documents; Conclusive proof of date of birth; Family Register; Entry in the Voters’ List for the Legislative Assembly; Gram Panchayat; Not a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the incident; Declaration as ‘juvenile’ improper; Public servant; Public record; Public documents; First attended school not a Government School; Headmaster/Principal of first attended school not a public servant; Relevancy of an entry in a public record; Certificate of the Municipal Corporation; Murder; House-trespass; Exhortation; Country-made pistol; Deceased shot; Matriculation certificate; Statutory document.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
347 of 2018 From the Judgment and Order dated 29.03.2016 of the High Court Of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLR No. 2144 of 2015 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Neema, Rajesh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Vishwa Pal Singh, Mukesh Kumar, Prateek Rai, Vikrant Rana, Prafulla, Anurag Pandey, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, Ms. Nivedita Nair, Shashikant Pralhad Chaudhari.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
The present appeal emanates from the Final Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’) in Criminal Revision No.2144/2015 dated 29.03.2016 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) [2016:AHC:50543], whereby the High Court dismissed the criminal revision petition filed by the Appellant and upheld the Order passed by the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Kairana, Muzaffarnagar (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) on 19.05.2015, declaring Respondent No.2 as a ‘juvenile’ under 308 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Juvenile Justice Act’) [as it then was].
BRIEF FACTS:
2. The Appellant alleges that, on 31.08.2011, while the Appellant, his father, mother and his brother/Rajesh Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rajesh’) had gone to their fields, his chacha (paternal uncle)/Lillu Singh and his son Devi Singh/Respondent No.2 forcibly entered his house at around 10 am. When restrained by his wife who was alone at the house, the Appellant alleges that the two persons – father and son i.e., Lillu Singh and Respondent No.2 – manhandled her. When the said incident was narrated to the Appellant and his brother by the Appellant’s parents who had reached the house during the incident, Rajesh went to the accused/father-son duo, to enquire about the same. In this interaction, it is alleged that his chacha and Respondent No.2 forcibly took Rajesh inside their house, where the chacha caught/held him, and Respondent No.2 took out a countrymade pistol and fired it on Rajesh with the intention to kill him. It is stated that pursuant to this, Rajesh suffered injuries and died en route to Kairana hospital.
3. Thereafter, the Appellant lodged a First Information Report being Crime Case No.385/2011 at Kairana Police Station, Muzaffarnagar against Lillu Singh and Respondent No.2 under Sections 452 1 and 302 2 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’).
4. This complaint proceeded to be converted into Sessions Trial No.123/2012 before the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kairana, Muzaffarnagar. With a plea that his date of birth was 18.04.1995, and as on the date of the incident, he was aged 16 years, 4 months and 13 days, Respondent No.2 filed a miscellaneous application numbered as Miscellaneous Case No.04/11/2015 before the Trial Court seeking to establish his juvenility, which was connected 1 ‘452. House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint.—Whoever commits house-trespass, having made preparation for causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any person, or for wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting any person in fear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.’ 2 ‘302. Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.’ [2025] 8 S.C.R. 309Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. with Sessions Trial No.123/2012. The Trial Court, on appreciating the evidence and material placed on record, vide Order dated 19.05.2015, confirmed that as on the date of the incident, the Respondent No.2 was 16 years, 4 months and 13 days old and thereby established his juvenility.
5. Aggrieved by the Order of the Trial Court, the Appellant preferred a criminal revision petition before the High Court, which was dismissed vide the Impugned Order. Consequently, the juvenility of the Respondent No. 2 stood confirmed by the High Court. THE APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
6. The Appellant’s submissions majorly revolved around pointing out how the Courts below erred in establishing and confirming the Respondent No.2’s juvenility based on a transfer certificate issued by the first school attended by Respondent No.2, i.e., Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon, to which he was directly admitted in Class V. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Courts’ reliance on this certificate issued by the school was incorrect, when a statutory document like the Family Register maintained under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 by the Gram Panchayat declared the age of the Respondent No.2 as 20, mentioning his year of birth as 1991. Further, the Voters’ List also, of the year 2012, mentioned Respondent No.2’s age as 22 years as on 01.01.2012. In this light, learned counsel urged that though there were school certificates which declared the date of birth of the Respondent No.2 as 18.04.1995, relying on the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate issued by the first school attended, these ought not to have been relied on, when there is evidence contradicting this claim, especially in light of the fact that the first school attended by the Respondent No.2 directly admitted him into Class V, recording his date of birth as 18.04.1995 – on the oral mention of his father, without enquiring/ looking into any proof for his date of birth being such.
7. In this light, learned counsel sought to buttress his argument on the basis of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’), which would make admissible a document if it states a relevant fact or fact in issue and if it is made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. It was submitted that Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted 310 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports both in civil and criminal proceedings. To support this argument, learned counsel for the Appellant placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604, which held:
‘15. … To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record, secondly; It must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under section 35 of the Act, but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded. …’
8. Importantly, learned counsel submitted that the age of the accused- Respondent No.2 was over 18 years even as per the medical evidence/report given by the Chief Medical Officer, on 01.12.2012, which stated that his age was 22 years, which meant that at the time of the incident, the accused was over 20 years of age, and thus, could not raise any claim of juvenility. To support this submission, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Om Prakash v State of Rajasthan, (2012) 5 SCC 201, wherein this Court held that in cases of serious offences like murder, rape, etcetera, an accused cannot be allowed to abuse the statutory protection afforded to him by attempting to prove himself as a minor when the documentary evidence to prove his minority gives rise to a reasonable doubt about his assertion of minority. This Court also held that under such circumstances, medical evidence based on scientific investigation will have to be given due weight and precedence over the evidence based on school administration records, which give rise to hypothesis and speculation about the age of the accused. It was prayed that the appeal be allowed.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.1-STATE:
9. Respondent No.1/State of Uttar Pradesh succinctly submitted that since Respondent No.2 neither produced a birth certificate nor a [2025] 8 S.C.R. 311Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. matriculation certificate, in such case, date of birth as mentioned in the transfer certificate cannot be made the basis for giving benefit of the Juvenile Justice Act to the accused-Respondent No.2, especially when the Appellant produced a Voters’ List, Family Register and Medical Report which shows that at the time of the incident, Respondent No.2 was a major. Thus, the State also prayed that the Orders of the courts below be interfered with and set aside, and the instant appeal be allowed.
SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.2:
10. The learned counsel for the Respondent No.2 canvassed three-fold arguments. Firstly, learned counsel contended that the Trial Court established the Respondent No.2’s juvenility based on the date(s) of birth consistently recorded in the transfer certificates of multiple schools attended by him. This date of birth, i.e., 18.04.1995, as recorded in the school transfer certificates of 4 schools where Respondent No.2 studied from Classes V th to IXth suggests that, as on the date of the incident, he was 16 years, 4 months, and 13 days old and, thus, entitled to the benefit conferred under the Juvenile Justice Act read with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’). Learned counsel contended that the officials of the schools which gave these school certificates were also examined, and the validity of these certificates was testified by these witnesses. In light of such evidence and testimonies placed, learned counsel contended that the Trial Court rightly established juvenility of Respondent No.2.
11. Secondly, learned counsel submitted that Rule 12 of the Rules provide that the Court determining the juvenility of an accused can seek evidence by obtaining a matriculation certificate, in absence whereof, a date of birth certificate from the school first attended, in absence whereof a birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority, and only in absence of these documents, a medical opinion declaring the age of the juvenile would be considered. Learned counsel submitted that in the present case, since matriculation certificate in respect of Respondent No.2 was not available, the school transfer certificate issued by the Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon, Shamli, Uttar Pradesh, which is a certificate of the first school attended, is exclusive proof that the date of birth of Respondent No.2 is 18.04.1995, and there is no need 312 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports to consider any other evidence such as certificate of the Municipal Corporation or Family Register or certificate of the Medical Board.
12. Thirdly, learned counsel submitted that Respondent No.2 has been released by the Juvenile Justice Board after completing the maximum punishment of three years prescribed by law. It was, accordingly, urged that the appeal be dismissed.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
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