Xxx v. The Union of India & Others
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 943; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1941
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Augustine George Masih
- Decided
- 7 Aug 2025
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 699/2025
- Sections
- 3(2), 3, 3(1), 77, 2
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1941 : 2025 INSC 943
XXX
v.
The Union of India & Others (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 699 of 2025)
07 August 2025 [Dipankar Datta* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as to whether the writ petition be entertained at all having regard to the conduct of the petitioner-High Court Judge; does the In-house Procedure have legal sanction; is an inquiry and the consequent report in terms of the Procedure (which could be unfavourable to the Judge under probe) a parallel and extraconstitutional mechanism; does paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure foul clauses (4) and (5) of Art.124 r/w. Arts.217 and 218 of the Constitution or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge of a High Court; did the CJI/the Committee constituted by the CJI act in terms of the Procedure or in deviation thereof; and is the requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the Prime Minister unconstitutional.
Headnotes† Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – “In-house Procedure” – Paras 5(b), 7(ii) – Constitutional validity – Restatement of Values of Judicial Life dated 31st October, 1997 – Incident of fire at a store-room in the bungalow premises allotted to the petitioner- High Court Judge – Burnt currency notes discovered, and his conduct fell for scrutiny – “In-house Procedure” devised by the Supreme Court set in motion – Responses sought from the petitioner – Thereafter, three-member Committee constituted by the Chief Justice of India – Committee recorded that misconduct found proved is serious enough to call for initiation of proceedings for removal of the petitioner from his office – In terms of the Procedure, the CJI forwarded the report of the Committee to the President and Prime Minister – Petitioner then filed writ petition being aggrieved by the Procedure to the extent it permits the Committee to opine as to whether the * Author 1942 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports misconduct calls for initiation of proceedings for removal; and that the Procedure permits the CJI to intimate the President and the Prime Minister that the misconduct warrants initiation of proceedings for removal and sought declaration that his removal was unconstitutional and ultra vires Art.124 and 218 and be quashed:
Held: Conduct of the petitioner does not inspire much confidence to entertain the writ petition – Petitioner did not object to the photographs/video footage being uploaded, he participated in the inquiry without demur – Procedure could be seen as having a legal sanction – It is fallacious to argue that the Procedure is a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism for removal of a Judge – Inhouse inquiry or its report forming part of the Procedure in itself does not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the constitutionally ordained Procedure – Thus, the in-house inquiry is not a removal mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional mechanism – Argument that para 5(b) contravenes the constitutional scheme for removal of Judges by taking recourse to Art.124 is unsustainable – No reason to hold that para 5(b) of the Procedure in any manner transgresses or is in conflict with any constitutional provision – Right from the constitution of the Committee till intimations were given to the President and the Prime Minister by the CJI-its neither been shown nor is it a fact proved that either the CJI constituted Committee or the CJI acted in any manner in deviation of the Procedure, except when the photographs/video footage were uploaded on the website of the Supreme Court – As regards the requirement of para 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the Prime Minister, no reason to hold paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure as infringing either any provision of the Constitution or the concept of separation of powers – Constitution of India – Art.14, 32, 121, 124, 211, 217, 218, 141 – Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. [Paras 100-125] Constitution of India – Art.32 – Maintainability/Entertainability of the writ petition considering conduct of petitioner-High Court Judge as distinguished from waiver of rights:
Held: Challenge to the constitutionality of paragraph 5(b) and 7(ii) of the Procedure has been raised in this writ petition only after the CJI had written to the President and the Prime Minister, while enclosing therewith copy of the Report of the Committee together [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1943XXX v. The Union of India & Others with the Petitioner’s response dated 6th May, 2025, as required by the Procedure – According to the petitioner, uploading of the photographs/video footage, caused him immense harm, not only did it lower his reputation, he was convicted in the public eye without even a preliminary inquiry – However, the conduct of the petitioner to acquiesce to such uploading, participate in the inquiry without demur, and to question such uploading only after the Committee submitted its report to the CJI recording that there was sufficient substance in the allegations, baffles this Court – Submission that such uploading has had the effect of vitiating the enquiry is untenable – Though uploading of incriminating evidence available against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a step which the Procedure requires and while such uploading may not be considered to be proper, it is indeed fait accompli – No benefit can be claimed because of such uploading of the incriminating evidence at this stage, once in a duly constituted inquiry findings have been recorded as regards the failures/omissions of the Petitioner to abide by the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life – If indeed any fault were found in the Procedure and questions were to be raised, the Petitioner ought not to have waited for completion of the fact-finding inquiry set in motion by the CJI – Conduct of the Petitioner, does not inspire much confidence to entertain the writ petition. [Paras 100, 105-107] Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – “In-house Procedure” – Paras 5(b), 7(ii) – Does the In-house Procedure have legal sanction – Whether an inquiry and the consequent report in terms of the Procedure (which could be unfavourable to the Judge under probe) a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism:
Held: Procedure could be seen as having a legal sanction – Procedure has its roots in the law declared by this Court u/Art.141 of the Constitution – ‘Law for the time being in force’ in subsection (2) of s.3 of the Protection Act would include law laid down by this Court and that the term ‘otherwise’ read in conjunction with ‘such action’, appearing in the said sub-section, is wide enough to encompass measures that the Procedure contemplates – It is not the law that once the Committee constituted by the CJI records in its report that the conduct of the Judge under probe warrants initiation of proceedings for his removal and the CJI, in turn, upon accepting such report furnishes the same together 1944 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports with his recommendation, if any, to the President and the Prime Minister, that would invariably in all cases result in initiation of proceedings u/Art.124(4) and (5) of the Constitution (for Supreme Court Judges) and Arts.217 and 218 read with Art.124 (for High Court Judges) and the inquiry under the Inquiry Act – Report or no report, recommendation or no recommendation, whatever is the case, the Parliament’s power to initiate proceedings for removal of a Judge for alleged misbehaviour or incapacity remains unfettered – Even though there could be a case where good grounds for initiation of proceedings do exist, the Parliament may in its wisdom elect not to go ahead to initiate proceedings for removal – Contrarily, even if it is reported by the Committee under the Procedure that there exists any of the two situations [para 5(a) or 5(c)] and the CJI, accepting such report, does not make any recommendation, nothing prevents the Parliament to initiate proceedings for removal if for reasons aliunde it considers necessary so to do – Notably, if the Parliament, despite strong indication of a Judge either having indulged in misbehaviour or suffering from incapacity, does not initiate any proceedings for removal, no proceeding in a judicial forum would perhaps lie for activating the Parliament to have such Judge removed from office – Power, competence, authority and jurisdiction of the Parliament to decide what is in the best interests of the nation is left untrammelled by the Procedure; hence, it is fallacious to argue that the Procedure is a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism for removal of a Judge – Yet again, the in-house inquiry or its report forming part of the Procedure in itself does not lead to removal of a Judge, unlike the constitutionally ordained Procedure – Thus, the in-house inquiry is not a removal mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional mechanism. [Paras 110-117] Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – “In-house Procedure” – Paras 5(b), 7(ii) – Paragraph 5(b) of the Procedure, if foul clauses (4) and (5) of Art.124 r/w. Art.217 and 218 of the Constitution or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge of a High Court:
Held: Submission that para 5(b) contravenes the constitutional scheme for removal of Judges by taking recourse to Art.124 is unsustainable – Procedure that has been laid down in the Procedure is fair and just which does not compromise judicial independence [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1945XXX v. The Union of India & Others either, a basic feature of our Constitution – Judge by his conduct of being fair and just is supposed to earn for himself as well as the judiciary the trust and respect of the members of the bar as well as the litigants and all other stakeholders – If a complaint of misconduct committed by a Judge is received and if at an inquiry conducted under the Procedure the allegations against such a Judge are found to have sufficient substance, he cannot claim any immunity-either by citing abrogation of his Fundamental Rights or breach of the constitutional scheme for removal of a Judge by initiating proceedings for impeachment-that his conduct is not open to be commented upon by the Committee or even by the CJI – No reason to hold that para 5(b) of the Procedure in any manner transgresses or is in conflict with any constitutional provision. [Paras 119, 120] Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure – Whether CJI/Committee acted in terms of the Procedure or in deviation thereof:
Held: Right from the constitution of the Committee till intimations were given to the President and the Prime Minister by the CJI, it has neither been shown nor is it a fact proved that either the CJI constituted Committee or the CJI acted in any manner in deviation of the Procedure, except when the photographs/video footage were uploaded on the website of the Supreme Court – Placing incriminating evidence available against a Judge under probe in the public domain is not a measure provided in the Procedure, either expressly or by implication – Inquiry under the Procedure is for the information and satisfaction of the CJI and the report of inquiry is confidential and, thus, such report cannot be made public – Entire process under the Procedure is confidential having ascertainment of truth as one of its objectives – Demands of being fair and transparent, in such cases, have to yield to the confidential nature of the process – Thus, uploading of the photographs/ video footage on the website of this Court cannot be viewed as a necessary requirement of the “In-house Procedure”, thus, approved – However, nothing really turns on the uploading of the photographs/video footage since the Petitioner, did not have any grievance in relation thereto which is obvious from his failure to question such uploading at an appropriate time thereby allowing a situation to grow where the Court is faced with a fait accompli. [Para 121] 1946 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure – Requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure obliging the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the Prime Minister – Constitutionality:
Held: CJI, as the leader of the judiciary, apart from his various other duties owes a duty to the people of the country to keep the justice delivery system pure, clean and unpolluted – It is unreasonable to even think that despite an incident of the present nature, the CJI would wait for the Parliament to take action – It is up to the Parliament whether or not to activate Art.124 – Left to him, the CJI upon being informed of a Judge’s remissness does have the authority-moral, ethical and legal-to take such necessary action as is warranted to keep institutional integrity intact – Keeping in view such concerns and the legal position of the President being the ultimate appointing authority of Judges and the Prime Minister being the head of the Council of Ministers, upon whose aid and advice the President acts under the Constitution, coupled with receipt of complaints from the office of the President, the provision in para 7(ii) of the Procedure requiring the CJI to write to the President and the Prime Minister along with the report of the Committee to be quite in order, legal and valid – Office of the CJI not to be regarded as a post office that the report should only be routed through the CJI without his observations – This Court is unaware like the Petitioner of what the CJI remarked while forwarding the Report of the Committee and the Petitioner’s response dated 6th May, 2025 to the President and the Prime Minister – However, if the CJI has reiterated the finding of the Committee as contained in the Report and recommended initiation of proceedings for removal of the Petitioner from office, such a recommendation cannot be impeached on any valid and legal ground – Notwithstanding that the recommendation of the CJI carries much weight, one has to realize that the intimation given by the CJI, under the Procedure, is for the eyes of the President and the Prime Minister alone and not anyone else – Thus, no reason to hold paragraph 7(ii) of the Procedure as infringing either any provision of the Constitution or the concept of separation of powers. [Paras 123-125] Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure” devised by the Supreme Court in its Full Court meeting dated 15th December, 1999 through administrative resolution to deal with complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting Judges, both of the High Courts and the Supreme Court – [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1947XXX v. The Union of India & Others Genesis and contents of the in-house Procedure – Discussed. [Paras 41-47] Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) vis-à-vis In-house Procedure – Applicability:
Held: Protection Act does not offend the constitutional scheme, and, being in addition to the extant provisions, does not affect the Supreme Court’s authority to take such action, as deemed fit, against a Judge of a High Court who is alleged to have indulged in misconduct in terms of the Procedure – To address the growing concern of incidents of misconduct, the Procedure has been craftily designed to discipline Judges internally for such misconduct that is sufficient to tarnish the dignity of his office as well as the institution to which he belongs – CJI’s discretion as to whether, where and when to act, mindful of the substance in the complaints received, would obviously be a regulated discretion; but, once the ball is set rolling by the CJI, it must end with his recommendation/advice to the President and the Prime Minister depending on what the Committee records as its findings – With the advancement in science and technology and all other spheres of work, it is quite possible to bring to the CJI’s notice how a particular Judge might have conducted himself inappropriately calling for strict action – Withdrawal of judicial work from a Judge is an extreme measure that the Procedure expressly permits – There are other measures too, which could be explored if Judges are found to deviate from the Code of Conduct – Given that the only formal mechanism for addressing judicial misbehaviour under the Constitution is impeachment by Parliament, it must be remembered that not all misbehaviour of Judges necessarily rise to the level of “proved misbehaviour” attracting Arts. 217 and 218 r/w. clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 124 – Constitution’s silence on cases that do not rise to the level of proven misbehaviour creates a significant structural vulnerability, which has since been addressed by the Procedure – Procedure acts as a check on Judges’ unbridled freedom of action and thereby seeks to prevent outcomes that could be harmful or unjust – Under the present set-up, impeaching the Procedure or any part thereof may itself be viewed as unreasonable and unjustified. [Paras 71-85] Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 – s.3(2) – In-house Procedure – Nature of inquiry:
1948 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Held: Inquiry that is part of the In-house Procedure is designed to be a fact-finding inquiry as distinguished from guilt-finding inquiry, thus, akin to a preliminary inquiry that precedes regular disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent employee – Once the CJI constitutes the Committee, it is required to hold an inquiry into the allegations contained in the complaint in the manner that the Procedure ordains – Committee does have some leeway to devise its own Procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice – Though the Committee is not required to extend opportunity of cross-examination of the persons who come before it for giving their versions or opportunity to the Judge under probe to be represented by a lawyer, the Judge must be called upon to appear and given opportunity to have his say recorded – After concluding the inquiry, Committee may conclude and report to the CJI as regards the substance in the allegations contained in the complaint – Given its very nature, the Committee by preparing its report and recording its findings, effectively assists the CJI in arriving at a conclusion as regards the proposed action in a given case based thereon – Instant case falls within the second situation where Committee has recorded an opinion that there is sufficient substance in the allegations contained in the letter of the CJI and the misconduct disclosed is so serious that it calls for initiation of proceedings for removal of the petitioner-High Court Judge – Thus, the nature of inquiry is preliminary, ad-hoc and not final as well as not violative of any principle of natural justice. [Paras 88-91, 94] Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 – Provisions relatable to removal of a Judge of a High Court from office – Process of impeachment of a Judge – Discussed. [Paras 28-40] Judiciary – Chief Justice of India – Role of the CJI – Explanation: Held: While the CJI is no doubt primus inter pares, first among equals and also does not exercise powers of superintendence over the High Courts and the Judges of the High Court, nonetheless, the CJI bears a significant moral responsibility as the foremost judicial officer to ensure that the judiciary of the country functions in a transparent, efficient and constitutionally appropriate manner – Although the CJI is the head of the institution, he too is not above the law which is supreme; hence, utmost care to be taken to ensure that any action of the CJI is not in deviation of the In-house Procedure which permits the in-house inquiry to be undertaken. [Paras 61, 69] [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1949XXX v. The Union of India & Others Case Law Cited C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee [1995] Supp. 3 SCR 319 : (1995) 5 SCC 457; Supreme Court Advocates-on- Record Assn. v. Union of India [2015] 13 SCR 1 : (2016) 5 SCC 1; Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India [1964] 1 SCR 190 : AIR 1964 SC 1854 – followed.
Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India [1991] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1991) 4 SCC 699 – distinguished and held inapplicable.
Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India [2003] Supp. 1 SCR 108 : (2003) 5 SCC 494 – relied on.
Sahara India v. SEBI [2012] 12 SCR 256 : (2012) 10 SCC 603; Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh [2014] 13 SCR 300 : (2015) 4 SCC 91; P.D. Dinakaran (1) v. Judges Inquiry Committee [2011] 10 SCR 1064 : (2011) 8 SCC 380; K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [1991] 3 SCR 189 : (1991) 3 SCC 655; D.C. Saxena (Dr) v. Hon’ble The Chief Justice of India [1996] Supp. 3 SCR 677 : (1996) 5 SCC 216; State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand [1997] Supp. 6 SCR 1 : (1998) 1 SCC 1; Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra [1996] Supp. 8 SCR 939 : (1997) 1 SCC 299; Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat [2013] 5 SCR 200 : (2013) 4 SCC 301 – referred to.
List of Acts Constitution of India; Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968; Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.
List of Keywords Proceedings for removal of a Judge; Impeachment; Fire at a storeroom; Burnt currency notes; Restatement of Values of Judicial Life dated 31st October, 1997; “In-house Procedure”; Procedure obliging the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the Prime Minister; Fact-finding exercise; Legal sanction; Fundamental Rights of the Judge of a High Court; No waiver of Fundamental Right; Judicial independence; Basic feature of Constitution; Misconduct committed by Judge; Photographs/ video footage uploaded on the website of Supreme Court; Fait accompli; Guilt-finding inquiry; Principles of natural justice; Internal 1950 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports mechanism; CJIs recommendation for initiation of proceedings of removal; Constitutional scheme; Separation of powers; Judicial misbehaviour; Primus inter pares; Committee constituted by CJI; Provisions relatable to removal of a Judge of a High Court from office; Process of impeachment of a Judge; Role of the Chief Justice of India.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 699 of 2025 Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner:
Kapil Sibal, Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi, Siddharth Luthra, Sidddharth Aggarwal, Jayant Mehta, Sr. Advs., Ms. Stuti Gujral, Ms. Manisha Singh, Vaibhav Niti, George Pothan Poothicote, Ms. Jyoti Singh, Anurag Jain, Keshav Sehgal, Vishwajeet Singh, Prakarsh Kumar, Tasnimul Hassan.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
Preface
1. A deeply anguished Judge of the Allahabad High Court1 has petitioned this Court for enforcement of his Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India by invoking his Fundamental Right to constitutional remedy guaranteed by Article 32 thereof.
2. Lest any observation made by us denies the petitioner a level playing field in any future proceedings that he might face, we would tread the path cautiously and refer to, very briefly, only the bare facts leading to presentation of this writ petition as well as deal with only such of the several contentions, as urged, to the extent the same are absolutely necessary for our decision.
1 Petitioner [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1951XXX v. The Union of India & Others facts
3. Petitioner finds himself in an unsavoury situation. While the Petitioner was a Judge of the Delhi High Court, there was an incident of fire at a store-room in the bungalow premises allotted to him. On the date of the incident, the Petitioner was away from home. In the process of dousing the fire, certain burnt currency notes were discovered in the store-room. Such discovery gave rise to suspicion that the Petitioner may not have followed the universally accepted values of judicial life including those included in the Restatement of Values of Judicial Life dated 31st October, 1997; consequently, his conduct fell for scrutiny. Without wasting time, the “In-house Procedure” devised by the Supreme Court in its Full Court meeting dated 15 th December, 1999 2 was set in motion. The Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court3 vide letter dated 21 st March, 2025 sought a response from the Petitioner. In his response dated 22 nd March, 2025, the Petitioner’s defence, inter alia, was that no cash was ever placed in the store-room by him or his family members and he strongly denounced the suggestion that the cash belonged to him or his family members. Petitioner also stated that the same must have been planted in the store-room to frame him. However, the Petitioner neither denied the incident of fire nor discovery of the burnt currency notes. Upon receipt of the response, the same was considered. Inter alia, on 22 nd March, 2025, a threemember Committee 4 was constituted by the Chief Justice of India 5 . A press release of even date named the members of the C ommittee, and also disclosed that the CJ, DHC was asked not to assign judicial work to the Petitioner. At or about the same time, presumably on the orders of the CJI, certain documents/photographs/video footage linked to the fire incident and discovery of currency notes had been placed in the public domain. On 24 th March, 2025, the Collegium of the Supreme Court recommended the Petitioner’s repatriation to his parent High Court. Immediately thereafter, the C ommittee set out to accomplish the task assigned to it. The fire ravaged store-room was inspected. Versions of several witnesses having some knowledge of 2 ProCedure
3 CJ, DHC
4 C ommittee
5 CJI
1952 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and/or relation with the incident of fire/discovery of burnt currency notes were recorded by the C ommittee. Petitioner was furnished the versions of the witnesses. Thereafter, he was afforded an opportunity to state his case. An inquiry report 6 dated 3 rd May, 2025 of the C ommittee followed. On the basis of appreciation of the materials collected in course of the inquiry, the C ommittee recorded in the rePort of having found sufficient substance in the allegations raised in the letter dated 22 nd March, 2025 of the CJI. It was recorded by the C ommittee that misconduct found proved is serious enough to call for initiation of proceedings for removal of the Petitioner from his office. Vide letter dated 4 th May, 2025, the CJI gave the Petitioner the option to resign or to seek voluntary retirement within 6 th May, 2025, failing which the competent authorities would be intimated to initiate action for removal. Petitioner responded on 6th May, 2025 seeking reconsideration of the letter dated 4 th May, 2025 and more time to submit a written representation upon thorough review of the rePort. At the same time, the Petitioner further expressed his inability to either resign or seek voluntary retirement in the event his prayers for grant of additional time and reconsideration were not allowed. According to the Petitioner, acceptance of such advice could imply acquiescence to a process and outcome that he considered fundamentally unjust. Petitioner also urged that strict confidentiality be maintained by all stakeholders. The prayers, apparently, were not granted and a further press release of 8 th May, 2025 came to be issued recording that in terms of the P roCedure, the CJI had written to the nation’s Hon’ble President and Hon’ble Prime Minister and forwarded the rePort of the C ommittee and the response of the Petitioner dated 6 th May, 2025. What exactly were the contents of the CJI’s letter is, however, unknown to the Petitioner as well as us.
4. In the prevailing circumstances, the Petitioner presented this writ petition on 17th July, 2025, claiming the following relief from the Court: a. Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring Paragraphs 5(b) and 7 of In-House Procedure dated 15.12.1999 to the extent that it enables the In-House Committee to inquire and comment on the existence of ‘serious misconduct warranting 6 rePort [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1953XXX v. The Union of India & Others removal’ and the Hon’ble CJI to intimate the same to the Hon’ble President and the Hon’ble Prime Minister for initiating proceedings for removal and other consequential action as being unconstitutional and ultra vires.
b. Issue an appropriate writ, order, or direction declaring the intimation by the Hon’ble CJI to the Hon’ble President and the Hon’ble Prime Minister (as referred to in the Press Release dated 08.05.2025) for initiation of action for removal as being unconstitutional and ultra vires art 124 and 218 and quash the same.
c. Issue an appropriate writ, order, or direction to quash and set aside the Final Report dated 03.05.2025 submitted by the Committee, and all consequential actions taken pursuant to the same.
d. Pass such other order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.
arguments for the Petitioner
5. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel, duly assisted by other senior counsel, advanced arguments at length in support of the writ petition. A brief note of submissions was also placed by Mr. Sibal before the Court, which duly captures the points of challenge and the contentions in support of the relief claimed.
6. Mr. Sibal commenced his arguments by submitting that “it is a matter of moment”.
7. According to Mr. Sibal, the Petitioner is aggrieved by the ProCedure to the extent it permits the Committee to opine as to whether the misconduct calls for initiation of proceedings for removal. He is also aggrieved because the ProCedure permits the CJI to intimate the President and the Prime Minister that the misconduct warrants initiation of proceedings for removal.
8. In course of his arguments, Mr. Sibal outlined what the Petitioner was not challenging. While fairly admitting that the P roCedure itself is a valid in-house mechanism contemplated for the purpose of discipline by self-regulation by the higher judiciary, Mr. Sibal laid challenge to paragraphs 5(b) and 7 (ii) thereof on the ground that these are ultra vires the Constitution violating Articles 124 and 218 thereof. It was 1954 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports also fairly admitted that even though the C ommittee’ s remit was to conduct a fact-finding exercise, the subsequent recommendation by the C ommittee regarding the necessity to initiate proceedings for removal of a Judge is unconstitutional.
9. Moving ahead, Mr. Sibal accepted that he did not see any wrong in the CJI in advising the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court not to allocate judicial work to the Judge under probe or the CJI’s authority to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the Prime Minister along with intimation of the advice to the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court not to allocate judicial work to the concerned Judge.
10. While, however, confining the constitutional challenge to the validity of paragraphs 5(b) and 7 (ii) of the ProCedure, Mr. Sibal contended that Articles 124 and 218 of the Constitution are the only provisions under which a Judge of a High Court may be removed. In exercise of the powers under Article 124(5), the Parliament has enacted the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 7 . He argued that the constitutional provisions read with the Inquiry Act constitute a complete and comprehensive code which occupies the field of the process for removal.
11. Continuing further, Mr. Sibal stressed that the tenure of a High Court Judge is protected by the Constitution, and such a Judge is subject to the Constitution and the Constitution alone. Even Parliament is not permitted to discuss the conduct of any Judge either of the Supreme Court or of the High Courts except when a motion for presenting an address is admitted. Hence, any procedure/process for removal, other than that provided for under Article 124, would be unconstitutional. As per the constitutional scheme, removal of a Judge from office is subject to the Judge being found guilty of proved misbehaviour or incapacity in an inquiry conducted under the Inquiry Act; however, the ProCedure to the extent it could trigger proceedings for removal, without being bound by the constitutional rigours, is liable to be held ultra vires.
12. Mr. Sibal further argued that the removal process, set in motion by the ProCedure with the Committee being empowered to make recommendation, lacks constitutional sanction or contemplation. As against the safeguards provided in the Inquiry Act, such as framing 7 Inquiry Act, hereafter [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1955XXX v. The Union of India & Others of charges, presentation of evidence in support of the charge(s), statement of defence, cross-examination of witnesses, strict proof, etc. – all of which are compliant with the overarching mandate of Article 14 – the ProCedure contemplates such procedure as may be appropriate in the facts of a case. The P roCedure does not obligate the Committee to follow the codified or defined rules of evidence and permits the Committee to adopt such procedure as necessary, potentially leading to holding a Judge guilty, not just of serious misconduct but also calling for his removal. Such process, based only on a preliminary or prima facie view, where the Judge is denied the procedural safeguards which are otherwise available in consonance with due process, is wholly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
13. The report of the C ommittee, Mr. Sibal further contended, could only be used by the CJI to take corrective measures within his domain. It cannot possibly interfere with the process envisaged under Article
124. Separation of powers that is in-built in the Constitution demands that the judicial institution remains clear of the constitutional process undertaken for removal.
14. Finally, Mr. Sibal sought to again impress upon us that the ProCedure to the extent it permits the CJI to trigger the initiation of removal process by the Parliament through his recommendation is bound to have its own impact. Though termed as a recommendation or advice, such recommendation/advice from a high constitutional functionary such as the CJI would clearly be far more than being merely persuasive and is bound to influence the decision making and evaluation process. It would act as a virtual death knell for a Judge, particularly based on a prima facie evaluation of the allegations. Such process would also circumvent the constitutionally prescribed mechanisms.
15. In any case, Mr. Sibal argued, uploading of the photographs/video footage on the website of the Supreme Court together with the rePort of the C ommittee has the effect of convicting the Petitioner even before the procedure under Article 124 has been initiated. Such being the state of affairs, the powers of the CJI cannot extend to making such a recommendation. Hence, paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the ProCedure need to be set aside not only being violative of the constitutional scheme for removal of Judges but also because 1956 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports they deprive the Petitioner of equal protection of the laws, thereby infringing his valuable right under Article 14 of the Constitution.
16. Having completed his address on the constitutional challenge, Mr. Sibal placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India 8 and Sahara India v. SEBI 9 , to contend that the allegations against the Petitioner and the correspondence exchanged by and between him and the CJI as well as the evidence (photographs/video footage), ought not to have been put in the public domain. By so doing, not only has the good reputation of the Petitioner as a Judge (which he built by years of dedicated work) been tarnished, the public perception based on viewing of such evidence led to an exercise which has held the Petitioner guilty even before an inquiry according to fair procedure could commence and he being afforded the opportunity to raise an effective defence. Highly critical of uploading of the photographs/video footage on the website of this Court, Mr. Sibal contended that the Petitioner’s precious right under Article 21 stood abrogated right from the inception.
17. Relying heavily on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Sub- Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India10 , Mr. Sibal argued that the powers of the CJI in case of removal of a High Court Judge stand restricted. It was pointed out that as the CJI has no disciplinary control over Judges of the High Courts, the procedure for removal is not akin to removal of a delinquent employee. The CJI, it was contended, cannot have an authoritative say or partake in the process, which is otherwise the preserve of the Parliament.
18. Referring to the decision in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee11 , Mr. Sibal urged that the observations made therein were only intended to fill the ‘yawning gap between proved misbehaviour and bad conduct inconsistent with the high office’. The ProCedure, however, reaches far and beyond filling the gap and, in fact, attempts to kick-start the process under Article 124(5), which is the sole prerogative of the Parliament.
8 (2003) 5 SCC 494
9 (2012) 10 SCC 603
10 (1991) 4 SCC 699
11 (1995) 5 SCC 457
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1957XXX v. The Union of India & Others
19. While concluding, Mr. Sibal prayed that paragraphs 5(b) and 7(ii) of the ProCedure be declared ultra vires. He also prayed for a declaration that none including the Parliament be influenced either by the rePort of the C ommittee or the recommendation/advice of the CJI.
20. We heard Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior counsel assisting Mr. Sibal, submit at the very end that the Petitioner ought to have been given an opportunity of personal hearing by the CJI before making his recommendation/tendering his advice to the President and the Prime Minister. To support such submission, he referred to a similar opportunity that was extended by the then CJI to a Judge of the Calcutta High Court who also went through the same ProCedure. Non-grant of such opportunity, according to him, breached principles of equality before law.
Proceedings before the court
21. Although the challenge read with the prayers in the writ petition relate to the constitutionality of the ProCedure and the legality of the inquiry conducted by the C ommittee together with its rePort, as part of the ProCedure , Mr. Sibal rightly did not argue the second point 12 and restricted his arguments on the point of constitutionality.
22. It is placed on record that the Petitioner not having objected to uploading of the photographs/video footage at the first available opportunity and having participated in the inquiry conducted by the C ommittee without raising any demur, we posed a query: why should we entertain the writ petition at such a belated stage, notwithstanding the challenge laid on the constitutional aspect, particularly when the inquiry had culminated in submission of the rePort by the Committee to the CJI who, in turn, had written to the President and the Prime Minister while forwarding the rePort together with the Petitioner’s response?
23. In answer thereto, Mr. Sibal submitted that since a constitutional challenge was being raised by the Petitioner and law being settled that there could be no waiver of a Fundamental Right, the Court may not decline interference and decide the writ petition based on the points argued by him.
12 we need not spell out the reasons therefor in the judgment 1958 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
24. During the course of hearing, we had also put it across to Mr. Sibal whether the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 13 would have any application in the instant case. Faced with the Protection Act, Mr. Sibal sought to counter it by submitting two points. First, that no law as is referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 3 - either the Constitution or any statutory enactment - confers such power on the Supreme Court; hence the Protection Act has no application. Secondly, since sub-section (2) of Section 3 includes Central Government/State Government, it would then mean that these authorities could also initiate proceedings for removal of a High Court Judge which would be wholly unconstitutional and could not have been the intention of the Parliament.
25. Upon hearing Mr. Sibal and Mr. Rohatgi, we did not consider it necessary to issue notice to the respondents and reserved judgment. Questions
26. Based on Mr. Sibal’s arguments as well as the facts on record, the following substantial questions of law arise for an answer: I. Should the writ petition be entertained at all having regard to the conduct of the Petitioner?
II. Does the ProCedure have legal sanction?
III. Is an inquiry and the consequent report in terms of the ProCedure (which could be unfavourable to the Judge under probe) a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism?
IV. Does paragraph 5(b) of the ProCedure foul clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read with Articles 217 and 218 # of the Constitution or abrogate any Fundamental Right of a Judge of a High Court? V. Did the CJI/the C ommittee constituted by the CJI act in terms of the ProCedure or in deviation thereof?
VI. Is the requirement of paragraph 7(ii) of the ProCedure obliging the CJI to forward the report of the Committee to the President and the Prime Minister unconstitutional?
13 Protection Act # Ed. Note: “foul clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read with Articles 217 and 218” instead of “foul Article 124 and Article 125 read with Articles 217 and 218” in terms of subsequent corrigendum. [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1959XXX v. The Union of India & Others analysis and findings with reasons
27. Appreciating the merits of the arguments advanced on behalf of the Petitioner and expressing our opinion ought to be preceded by an examination of the provisions in the Constitution relating to removal of a Judge of a High Court from office, the law in terms whereof inquiry has to be held, the genesis of the ProCedure, what this ProCedure is all about, the role of the CJI, the nature of inquiry the ProCedure contemplates, what impact does such inquiry have on a Judge of a High Court whose conduct is under probe, and other related issues including the aspect of applicability of the Protection Act. This would also necessarily require us to take note of the precedents in the field which find place in the compilation of judgments handed over by Mr. Sibal. In our view, such an exercise would significantly facilitate and aid answering the above questions effectively and thereby enable us to complete the task at hand appropriately.
constitutional Provisions and the inQuiry act
28. That a Judge of a High Court cannot be removed from office except on the ground of proved misbehaviour or proved incapacity admits of no doubt. The provisions relatable to removal of a Judge of a High Court from office are traceable to Articles 217 and 218 read with Article 124. Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read as follows:
124. Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court …
(4) A Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting has been presented to the President in the same session for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.
(5) Parliament may by law regulate the procedure for the presentation of an address and for the investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under clause (4). … 1960 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
29. Articles 217 (to the extent relevant) and 218 provide:
217. Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court
(1) Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and shall hold office, in the case of an additional or acting Judge, as provided in article 224, and in any other case, until he attains the age of sixty-two years:
Provided that—
(a) ***
(b) a Judge may be removed from his office by the President in the manner provided in clause (4) of article 124 for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court;
(c) ***
(2) ***
(3) ***
218. Application of certain provision relating to Supreme Court to High Courts The provisions of clauses (4) and (5) of article 124 shall apply in relation to a High Court as they apply in relation to the Supreme Court with the substitution of references to the High Court for references to the Supreme Court.
30. The law that is referred to in clause (5) of Article 124 is the Inquiry Act.
31. The Constitution itself does not prescribe the procedure for the presentation of an address and for investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge but leaves it for the Parliament to regulate the same by law. In exercise of such powers, as discussed above, the Parliament enacted the Inquiry Act. The Inquiry Act, inter alia, provides for constitution of a committee which is to conduct an investigation/inquiry into the allegation of misbehaviour or incapacity [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1961XXX v. The Union of India & Others levelled against the Judge. The procedure enumerated in the Inquiry Act is in consonance with the principles of natural justice in that, formal charges are framed, the Judge is provided with the supporting material for each charge, opportunity is extended to cross-examine witnesses as well as to present his defence. The committee has the same powers as that of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for summoning and enforcing the attendance of a person, examining a person on oath, requiring discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on oath, issuing a commission for examination of witnesses or documents, and for all such other matters as may be prescribed. It is imperative to note that if the Judge is not found guilty of any charge(s) by the committee, then the pending motion in the House or Houses of Parliament will not be proceeded with. Thus, it marks the end of the proceedings.
32. The process for impeachment of a Judge, however, is very rigid at all levels – starting with a motion in the House, followed by an investigation/inquiry conducted by a committee comprising of persons of high calibre, adherence to fair procedure, then the necessity of approval by a majority of the Houses and finally the approval by the President whereafter a Judge can be removed from office by impeachment.
33. These provisions apart, there are two other similarly worded articles in the Constitution which, though not directly related to removal of a Judge of a High Court, impose restrictions on discussions in the Parliament/State Legislatures with respect to the conduct of a Judge of a High Court. They are Articles 121 and 211.
34. Mr. Sibal is right in his contention that apart from proviso (b) of clause
(1) of Article 217 and Article 218 read with clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124, there is no other provision in the Constitution relating to removal of a Judge of a High Court from his office. He is also right in contending that Article 121 even bars the Parliament to discuss the conduct of a Judge of a High Court except in the stated situation. Similar is the restriction imposed by Article 211.
35. A reading of the Constituent Assembly debates does not reveal any discussion or debate on any proposed measure, other than removal by the Parliament in the manner constitutionally ordained, if the conduct of a Judge of a High Court amounts to misbehaviour but 1962 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports does not amount to such misbehaviour as would warrant the severest measure of removal § from office. The framers of the Constitution, in their wisdom, possibly might have thought that having regard to the status of a Judge, being a high constitutional functionary in whom the people would repose trust and faith for rendering justice, only such individuals possessing the highest standards of integrity and moral character, apart from legal acumen, would be considered for appointment to the judicial office; yet, should there be an exceptional situation calling for removal of a Judge from office and to ensure that the Constitution is not incomplete without an in-built mechanism for a disciplinary measure, provisions for removal (by impeachment) were incorporated. Indeed, it took Parliament long 18 (eighteen) years after the advent of the Constitution to enact the law wherefor it was empowered by clause (5) of Article 124. It is also noteworthy that the first process of removal of a Judge by impeachment did not see the light of the day till the early nineties of the last century, i.e., almost 4 (four) decades after the people proclaimed India as a sovereign democratic republic 14 . It does suggest that the framers of the Constitution were not amiss in thinking that an exceptional case for disciplining a Judge might seldom arise.
36. Nonetheless, times have changed and changed drastically. With the process of appointment becoming executive-centric, fissures in the system became apparent; aberrations of Judges started attracting notice. However, possibly because of the cumbersome process that a process for removal by impeachment involves, many a Judge could have escaped unscathed without such aberration being brought in the public domain.
37. There have, however, been certain reported instances since the eighties of the last century of Judges having indulged in (perceived) misbehaviour leading to some of them being disciplined internally by the Chief Justices of the concerned High Courts.
38. Till date, there have been only 4 (four) instances of motions for removal of a Supreme Court/High Court Judges being admitted by the Parliament and not a single instance of the motion being 14 on 26 th November, 1949 § Ed. Note: “warrant the severest measure of removal” instead of “warrant the extreme measure of removal” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1963XXX v. The Union of India & Others carried through (although one cannot ignore that a couple of Judges strategically resigned prior to culmination of the proceedings).
39. Be that as it may, the Constitution was and is silent with regard to any disciplinary measure, short of removal by impeachment, should there be an aberration or bad conduct by a Judge of a High Court as distinguished from misbehaviour in the discharge of his judicial duties or administrative/non-judicial/official duties.
40. It is worthy of note that six years before the turn of the last century, the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court was compelled to demit office on the ground of alleged misbehaviour as a sequel to exertion of pressure by the local Bar Council/Bar Associations. A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution presented by a practising advocate changed the legal landscape of the country. The decision on such writ petition, which laid down a precedent and which we propose to consider a little later, has rightly been commented in one of the subsequent decisions of this Court as having sowed the seeds for the ProCedure.
the Procedure - its genesis and contents
41. The P roCedure (commonly known as the “In-house Procedure”), which has been developed by the Full Court of the Supreme Court through an administrative resolution, serves as an internal mechanism to deal with complaints of misconduct or incapacity against sitting Judges, both of the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
42. Reading of paragraph 32 of the decision in Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ v. Registrar General, High Court of Madhya Pradesh15 provides useful guidance as to how the ProCedure came to be devised. It reads:
“32. In furtherance of the directions issued in C.
Ravichandran Iyer case, this Court constituted a committee comprising of three Judges of this Court, namely, Justices S.C. Agrawal, A.S. Anand (as he then was) and S.P.
Bharucha (as he then was), and the then two seniormost Chief Justices of the High Courts i.e. Justices P.S. Misra and D.P. Mohapatra (of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
15 (2015) 4 SCC 91
1964 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and the Allahabad High Court, respectively), to lay down the ‘In-House Procedure’, for taking suitable remedial action against Judges, who by their acts of omission or commission, do not follow the accepted values of judicial life, including the ideals expressed by the Supreme Court in the ‘Restatement of Values of Judicial Life’. The Committee submitted its report on 31-10-1997. The same was adopted with amendments, in a Full Court Meeting of the Supreme Court of India, on 15-12-1999. In the aforestated report, three sets of procedure for taking such suitable remedial action against Judges were laid down. The first, related to the Judges of the High Courts, the second, to the Chief Justices of the High Courts, and the third, to the Judges of the Supreme Court. …”.
43. At the outset, the ProCedure itself records complaints made against Judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court often being received either by the Chief Justices of the High Courts or the CJI. Such complaints, also made to the President of India, are generally forwarded to the CJI for being looked into. Considering the lack of any constitutional mechanism or otherwise based whereon measures could lawfully be taken when the CJI is seized of such complaints, the Full Court of the Supreme Court by its resolution dated 15 th December, 1999 adopted the ProCedure.
44. The process under the ProCedure begins when a written complaint containing verifiable and specific allegations is received by the CJI or the Chief Justice of a High Court. What actions are required to be taken thereunder if the complaint is found to be of a serious nature have been provided in paragraphs 1 to 3 of the ProCedure.
45. Should the matter merit a deeper probe, the CJI would constitute a Committee consisting of two Chief Justices of the High Courts (other than the High Court to which the Judge belongs) and one High Court Judge (paragraph 3), and the Committee so constituted has the liberty to devise its own procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice (paragraph 4). The inquiry, being in the nature of a fact-finding exercise, entitles the Judge under probe to appear and have his say recorded. Since it is not a formal judicial inquiry and given its fact-finding and non-punitive character, examination/crossexamination of witnesses and representation by lawyers are excluded. [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1965XXX v. The Union of India & Others
46. Upon receipt of the report of inquiry from the Committee, the CJI is empowered to take one of three possible courses of action, depending on the nature and gravity of the findings qua the allegations. Firstly, if the Committee concludes that the allegations are unfounded or lacking in substance, the CJI may choose to close the matter [paragraph 5(a) read with paragraph 6]. Secondly, if the inquiry reveals serious misconduct, the CJI may advise the Judge to resign his office or seek voluntary retirement [paragraph 7(i)]. If the concerned Judge elects not to do so, the CJI shall intimate the President and the Prime Minister that the allegations are serious enough to warrant initiation of proceedings for removal and hence, judicial work has been withdrawn [paragraph 5(b) read with para 7(ii)]. Thirdly, where the misconduct is established but it is not so serious as to warrant removal, the CJI may call the Judge concerned and advise him accordingly; the report of the Committee to be placed on record may also be directed [paragraph 5(c) read with paragraph 8].
47. Despite the decision in Additional District and Sessions Judge ‘X’ (supra) at paragraph 47 thereof having delineated the various steps in the ProCedure through which the proceedings must pass, we have given a brief overview for our own understanding. Precedents
48. Having noted the genesis and the contents of the ProCedure, we proceed to consider the precedents that have been cited which directly dealt with proceedings/initiation of proceedings for removal of a Judge of a High Court.
49. The decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sub- Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra) is, incidentally, the sheet anchor of Mr. Sibal’s arguments.
50. At the same time, other decisions of this Court having a material bearing for deciding the question of constitutionality of the ProCedure would also necessarily fall for consideration which we propose to consider in seriatim.
51. Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra) had to consider issues of some importance bearing on the construction of Articles 121 and 124 of the Constitution as well the provisions of the Inquiry Act. The occasion for the controversy raised in the proceedings, the 1966 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports issues arising for decision and the broad contentions raised by the parties are noted in paragraphs 3, 4 and 15, respectively, of the majority judgment authored by Hon’ble B. C. Ray, J. (as His Lordship then was). For the sake of completeness but, at the same time, to maintain brevity, we discern that the main issues arising for decision were (i) what is the legal position and status of a motion for the removal of a Judge under a law made pursuant to Article 124(5) of the Constitution? (ii) whether the Doctrine of Lapse would apply to such a motion upon the dissolution of the Lok Sabha? (iii) whether the matters arising out of or relating to a motion for removal of a Judge in either House of the Parliament are at all justiciable before courts of law? and (iv) whether the Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction as its decision and its writ might become infructuous (in view of the fact that in the ultimate analysis, the final arbiter whether at all any Address is to be presented rests exclusively with the Houses of Parliament and which are wholly outside the purview of the courts)?
52. One of the contentions was Contention F, reading as follows: “Contention F:— The process of removal by means of a motion for address to the President is a political remedy. But the fundamental right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights take within its sweep the right to access to a court comprising of Judges of sterling and unsullied reputation and integrity which is enforceable. This judicial remedy is independent of the constitutional remedy and that the court has jurisdiction to decide as to its own proper constitution. In exercise of this jurisdiction it should examine the grounds of the alleged misbehaviour and restrain the Judge from judicial functioning.”
53. While rejecting the said contention, this Court, inter alia, held thus: “111. The relief of a direction to restrain the Judge from discharging judicial functions cannot be granted. It is the entire Constitutional Scheme including the provisions relating to the process of removal of a Judge which are to be taken into account for the purpose of considering this aspect. It is difficult to accept that there can be any right in anyone running parallel with the Constitutional Scheme for this purpose contained in clauses (4) and (5) of Article [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1967XXX v. The Union of India & Others 124 read with Article 121. No authority can do what the Constitution by necessary implication forbids. Incidentally, this also throws light on the question of interim relief in such a matter having the result of restraining the Judge from functioning judicially on initiation of the process under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. The Constitutional Scheme appears to be that unless the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity is ‘proved’ in accordance with the provisions of the law enacted under Article 124(5) and a motion for presenting an address for removal of the Judge on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity is made, because of the restriction contained in Article 121, there cannot be a discussion about the Judge’s conduct even in the Parliament which has the substantive power of removal under Article 124(4). If the Constitutional Scheme therefore is that the Judge’s conduct cannot be discussed even in the Parliament which is given the substantive power of removal, till the alleged misconduct or incapacity is ‘proved’ in accordance with the law enacted for this purpose, then it is difficult to accept that any such discussion of the conduct of the Judge or any evaluation or inferences as to its merit is permissible according to law elsewhere except during investigation before the Inquiry Committee constituted under the statute for this purpose. The indication, therefore, is that interim direction of this kind during the stage of inquiry into the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity is not contemplated it being alien to our Constitutional Scheme.” (emphasis laid by Mr. Sibal)
54. Having read what Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (supra) ruled while not accepting Contention F, we proceed to take note of the next relevant decision, i.e., C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra).
55. Hon’ble K. Ramaswamy, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench in C. Ravichandran Iyer (supra), after referring to previous decisions, reaffirmed the importance of the CJI as the head of the institution, when a matter questioning the integrity of a Judge arises, in paragraphs 35 and 36 of the decision. In very clear words, His Lordship suggested an in-house procedure to be followed by the Chief Justices of the High Courts or the CJI, when they are seized 1968 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of a complaint related to a Judge’s conduct. The CJI, upon receipt of information from the Chief Justice of a High Court could take such action as “deemed necessary or warranted”. Although, the concerned Judge in this case had demitted office before the judgment was delivered, this Court held that its statements were to be treated as a precedent. Relevant passages from the decision read as follows: “35. It is true that this Court has neither administrative control over the High Court nor power on the judicial side to enquire into the misbehaviour of a Chief Justice or Judge of a High Court. When the Bar of the High Court concerned reasonably and honestly doubts the conduct of the Chief Justice of that Court, necessarily the only authority under the Constitution that could be tapped is the Chief Justice of India, who in common parlance is known as the head of the judiciary of the country. It is of importance to emphasise here that impeachment is meant to be a drastic remedy and needs to be used in serious cases. But there must exist some other means to ensure that Judges do not abuse the trust the society has in them. It seems to us that self-regulation by the judiciary is the only method which can be tried and adopted. … ***
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.