Devendra Kumar v. The State (Nct of Delhi) & Anr.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1009; [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1095
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 20 Aug 2025
- Case number
- SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 12373/2025
- Sections
- 156(3), 195, 186, 341, 195(1), 340, 133, 106, 190(1), 2, 204, 3
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1095 : 2025 INSC 1009 Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 12373 of 2025)
20 August 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration High Court affirmed the order passed by the CMM directing registration of the FIR against the petitioner for offences punishable u/ss.186 and 341, Penal Code, 1860. Whether the CMM erred in involving the police in a complaint lodged by a Civil Judge for the offence punishable u/ss.186 and 341 of the I.P.C; whether the CMM erred in asking the police to investigate the complaint u/s.156(3) of the Cr.P.C instead of taking cognizance upon the complaint and issuing process to the petitioner; scope of s.195, CrPC.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.195 – Scope – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.186, 341 – Petitioner-SHO allegedly misbehaved with/detained the Respondent no.2-Process Server when he visited the police station and insisted for receipt of summons – Respondent no.2 brought alleged misconduct on part of the petitioner to the notice of the District & Sessions Judge in the form of voluntary obstruction said to have been caused in the discharge of his public functions, who in turn assigned the complaint to the Administrative Civil Judge who then lodged a private complaint in the court of the CMM – However, the CMM instead of taking cognizance upon the said complaint and issuing process to the petitioner, directed registration of FIR u/ss.186, 341, IPC – Order challenged by the petitioner before Sessions Judge, rejected – High Court affirmed the order passed by the CMM – Challenge to:
Held: 1.1 The word ‘obstruction’ in s.186 of the I.P.C is not confined to physical obstruction only – Threats of violence made in such a way as to prevent the public servant from carrying out his duty might easily amount to an obstruction of the public servant – The * Author 1096 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports expression ‘obstruction’ used in s.186 of the I.P.C. is not confined to physical obstruction – It need not necessarily be an act of use of criminal force – The act need not be a violent one – It is enough if the act complained of results in preventing a public servant in discharge of his lawful duties – Any act of causing impediment by unlawfully preventing public servant in discharge of his functions would be enough to attract s.186 of the I.P.C. [Paras 24, 29] 1.2 Petitioner’s acts prima facie, amount to obstructing the public servant in the discharge of their public function – Therefore, the complaint itself, does not suffer from any legal infirmity – However, the CMM should have straightaway taken cognizance upon the complaint and issued process to the petitioner – Asking the police to investigate the complaint u/s.156(3) of the Cr.P.C. was a very serious error committed by the CMM – There was no need to involve the police in a complaint lodged by a Civil Judge for the offence punishable u/ss.186 and 341 of the I.P.C. [Paras 30, 12] 1.3 s.195 of the Cr.P.C. does not bar the trial of an accused for a distinct offence disclosed by the same set of facts and is not so stated therein – s.195 also does not provide further that if in the course of the commission of that offence, other distinct offences are committed, the court concerned is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well – However, having said so, if the perusal of the first information report makes it clear that the offence u/s.186 of the I.P.C. is closely interconnected with another distinct offence(s), which in this case is s.341 of the I.P.C. and it cannot be split up, then in such circumstances, the bar of s.195 of the Cr.P.C. will apply to such other distinct offence also. [Para 36] 1.4 s.195(1)(a)(i), Cr.P.C. bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable u/ss.172 to 188 respectively of the I.P.C., unless there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned or his administrative superior, for voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharge of his public functions – Without a complaint from the said persons, the court would lack competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. [Para 59] 1.5 If in truth and substance, an offence falls in the category of s.195(1)(a)(i), it is not open to the court to undertake the exercise of splitting them up and proceeding further against the accused for the other distinct offences disclosed in the same set of facts – However, it also cannot be laid down as a straitjacket formula that the Court, under all circumstances, cannot undertake the exercise [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1097Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
of splitting up – It would depend upon the facts of each case, the nature of allegations and the materials on record. [Para 59] 1.6 Severance of distinct offences is not permissible when it would effectively circumvent the protection afforded by s.195(1)(a)(i) of the Cr.P.C., which requires a complaint by a public servant for certain offences against public justice – This means that if the core of the offence falls under the purview of s.195(1)(a)(i), it cannot be prosecuted by simply filing a general complaint for a different, but related, offence – The focus should be on whether the facts, in substance, constitute an offence requiring a public servant’s complaint. [Para 59] 1.7 In the aforesaid context, the courts must apply twin tests – First, the courts must ascertain having regard to the nature of the allegations made in the complaint/FIR and other materials on record whether the other distinct offences not covered by s.195(1)(a)(i) have been invoked only with a view to evade the mandatory bar of s.195 of the Cr.P.C. and secondly, whether the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence for which a complaint of the court or a public servant is required. [Para 59] 1.8 Where an accused is alleged to have committed some offences which are separate and distinct from those contained in s.195, s.195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein – However, the courts should ascertain whether such offences form an integral part and are so intrinsically connected so as to amount to offences committed as a part of the same transaction, in which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of s.195 of the Cr.P.C – This would all depend on the facts of each case. [Para 59] 1.9 ss.195(1)(b)(i)(ii) & (iii) and 340 of the Cr.P.C. respectively do not control or circumscribe the power of the police to investigate, under the Criminal Procedure Code – Once investigation is completed then the embargo in s.195 would come into play and the Court would not be competent to take cognizance – However, that Court could then file a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR and the material collected during investigation, provided the procedure laid down in s.340 of the Cr.P.C. is followed. [Para 59] 1.10 It is left open to the petitioner to raise the contention as regards the bar of s.195 of the Cr.P.C. before the trial court if at all, at the end of the investigation, chargesheet is filed for the offences enumerated in the FIR. [Para 60] 1098 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 195(1)(a)(i) – Bar under – Object and intent behind, stated. [Para 43] Word and Phrases - ‘obstruction’ – Penal Code, 1860 – s.186 vis-à-vis Customs Act, 1962 – s.133 - “whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions” used in s.186; expression “if any person intentionally obstructs any officer of customs” used in s.133 of the Customs Act, 1962:
Held: The expression ‘intentionally’ used in s.133 of the Customs Act and the expression ‘voluntarily’ used in s.186 of I.P.C. connote the same meaning – The expression ‘obstruction’ used in s.186 of the I.P.C. is not confined to physical obstruction – It need not necessarily be an act of use of criminal force – The act need not be a violent one – It is enough if the act complained of results in preventing a public servant in discharge of his lawful duties – Any act of causing impediment by unlawfully preventing public servant in discharge of his functions would be enough to attract s.186 of the I.P.C. [Para 29] Case Law Cited Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr. [2005] 2 SCR 708 : AIR 2005 SC 2119 – followed.
Umashankar Yadav and Another v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1066; Santosh Kumar Jain v. The State [1951] 1 SCR 303 : (1951) 1 SCC 190; Collector of Customs and Central Excise v. Paradip Port Trust [1990] 3 SCR 705 : (1990) 4 SCC 250; State of U.P. v. Suresh Chandra Srivastava & Ors. [1984] 3 SCR 738 : AIR 1984 SC 1108; State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy & Anr. [1981] 2 SCR 695 : AIR 1981 SC 1417; Basir-ul-huq and Others v. State of West Bengal [1953] 1 SCR 836 : (1953) 1 SCC 637; Durgacharan Naik and Others v. State of Orissa [1966] 3 SCR 636 : AIR 1966 SC 1775; Govind Mehta v. The State of Bihar [1971] Supp. 1 SCR 777 : AIR 1971 SC 1708; Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. The State of Gujarat [1971] Supp. 1 SCR 834 : AIR 1971 SC 1935; Surjit Singh & Ors v. Balbir Singh [1996] 3 SCR 70 : (1996) 3 SCC 533; State of Punjab v. Raj Singh & Anr. [1998] 1 SCR 223 : (1998) 2 SCC 391; K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy & Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 352; M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana & Anr. [1999] Supp. 4 SCR 160 : AIR 2000 SC 168; Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr. [1998] 1 SCR 492 : (1998) 2 SCC [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1099Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
493; Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 812 : AIR 1962 SC 1206; State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [1998] 1 SCR 223 : AIR 1998 SC 768; M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka [2003] Supp. 3 SCR 973 : AIR 2004 SC 555; Saloni Arora v. State of NCT of Delhi [2017] 1 SCR 397 : Criminal Appeal No. 64 of 2017 – referred to.
Nishi Kanta Pal v. Emperor, AIR 1917 Calcutta 180; State v. Babulal Gaurishanker Misar, AIR 1957 Bombay 10; Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1962 A.C. 528; Phudki v. State, AIR 1955 All. 104; Janki Prasad Tibrewal v. The State of Bihar, 1975 Crl. L.J. 575 (Patna); Diljam Sahu v. Emperor, AIR 1937 Patna 633; Emperor v. Sideman Abba AIR 1935 Bom. 24 – referred to. Jaswant Singh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 Lahore 139 – referred to. List of Acts Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Customs Act, 1962.
List of Keywords Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Obstruction; Obstruction in the discharge of public functions; Obstructing the public servant in the discharge of their public function; Obstruction of the public servant; Voluntarily obstructing the public servant from discharge of his public functions; Voluntary obstruction caused in the discharge of public functions; Section 186, Penal Code, 1860; Private complaint; Written complaint by the public servant; Distinct offences; Severance of distinct offences; Physical obstruction; Use of criminal force; Unlawfully preventing public servant in discharge of his functions; Process Server; Duty to serve warrants; Misbehaved; Detained; Made to stand raising hands; Misconduct; Public servant; Public function; Order of police investigation; Complaint; Threats of violence; Written complaint; Preventing a public servant in discharge of his lawful duties; Contempt of lawful authority.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 12373 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2024 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in WPCRL No. 2047 of 2013 1100 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner:
Nikilesh Ramachandran, SC Sagar, Shubham Seth, Ms. Ananya V Mehra, Ms. Soumya Saisa Das.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the following parts: - INDEX* A. BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX ............................................................. 2 B. IMPUGNED ORDER ....................................................................... 8
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER ................... 10
D. ANALYSIS ...................................................................................... 11 i. Section 186 of the I.P.C. .......................................................... 15 ii. Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. ........................................................ 23 E. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 47
1. This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Delhi dated 12 th September 2024 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 2047 of 2013 and connected Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 18861 of 2013 by which the writ petition along with the connected application came to be rejected, thereby affirming the order dated 28.11.2018 passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate directing registration of the FIR against the petitioner-herein for the offence punishable under Sections 186 and 341 respectively of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “I.P.C”).
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1101Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
A. BRIEF FACTUAL MATRIX
2. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent no. 2 herein at the relevant point of time was serving as a Process Server, Nazarat Branch, Shahdara. He was assigned the duty to serve warrants and, in this connection, he had to visit the Nand Giri police station on 03.10.2013. It is the case of the respondent no. 2 that few police officials, more particularly, the petitioner-herein misbehaved with him when he insisted for a receipt of the summons. According to him, he was detained in the police station till 4:30 PM. It is only after the arrival of the Head Constable that the warrants were accepted.
3. The respondent no. 2 brought the alleged misconduct on part of the petitioner to the notice of the District and Sessions Judge of Shahdara in the form of voluntary obstruction said to have been caused in the discharge of his public functions. The District and Sessions Judge assigned the complaint to the Administrative Civil Judge who in turn lodged a private complaint in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
4. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 28.11.2013 directed the registration of FIR under Sections 186 and 341 respectively of the I.P.C. The order passed by CMM, Shahdara, Delhi dated 28.11.2013 reads thus:
“The present complaint case was filed u/s. 195 Cr.P.C. by Ld. ACJ, Shahdara.
Allegations of Shri Ravi Dutt Sharma (Process Server)
are that one warrant issued by the court of Shri Sharad Gupta, Ld. MM and one summon issued by the court of Shri Arvind Kumar, Ld. AD) were assigned to him to be served to SHO PS Nand Nagri. On 3.10.2013 he reached PS Nand Nagri at about 12.30 P.M. One Ct Sanjay Kumar Sharma was present in the room of 5-8. The said constable received the processes but signed as HC Brahmjeet.
Process Server Ravi Dutt asked him not to do so. Upon this Ct. Sanjay cut the signatures made by him in the name of HC Brahmjeet and took the processes to the Reader of SHO who also refused to receive the processes. The process server went to duty officer who also refused to take the processes.
1102 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports The process server went to SHO Insp. Devender Kumar and told him all the facts. The said SHO kept the processes and abused the process server badly. SHO asked process server to stand there raising his hands and wait till the Havaldar/Head Constable comes. For about half an hour process server stood there, raising his hands as a punishment. He was also made to sit on the floor for about 3-4 hours as punishment. The process server begged SHO to allow him to go as he had to serve other processes also and told him that, he would come after serving other processes. The SHO, however, did not allow the process server to go. At about 4.30 p.m. one head constable come who took the processes and gave receipt.
From these allegations offence U/s. 106, 341 and 342 IPC are clearly made out. The conduct of the SHD PS Nand Nagri cannot be tolerated. This case carrot be taken lightly. Hence, U/s. 156(3) Cr.P.C., it is ordered that FIR be registered against SHO P.S. Nangi for the above said offence. The FIR be registered at PS Nand Negri itself as the offence took place within the premises of PS Nand Nagri itself. Investigation be conducted by Officer of the rank of ACP and under direct supervision of Addl. CP concerned. Copy of this order be sent to CCP and Addl. CP concerned for immediate compliance. Put up for status report on 14.12.2023.”
(Emphasis supplied)
5. The aforesaid order came to be challenged by the petitioner-herein in the court of the Sessions Judge, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi by filing Criminal Revision Application No. 174 of 2013. The revision application came to be rejected vide order dated 03.12.2013. The order reads thus:
“10. A perusal of the record reveals that the Process Server Mr. Ravi Dutt Sharma posted at Nazarat Branch, Karkardooma Court, Delhi has submitted his complaint dated 10/10/13, to Ld. District & Sessions Judge, Shahdara, Delhi. Ld. District & Sessions Judge, Shahdara had [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1103Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
made an endorsement dated 14/10/13 assigning the said complaint to Ld. Administrative Civil Judge, Shahdara to deal with the matter. Shri Neeraj Qaur, Ld. Administrative Civil Judge, Shahdara District. Karkardooma Court, Delhi, thereafter made a complaint dated 15/10/13 U/s 195 Cr.P.C to the Ld. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi enclosing, the original complaint made by the Process Server. In the said complaint he had observed that allegations made in the complaint prima facie constitute offences U/s 186 IPC and U/s 341 IPC.
11. Ld. CMM on receipt of the complaint had issued notice to the DCP for 29/10/13 vide order dated 17/10/13. On 29/10/13, ACP Seemapuri had appeared and sought adjournment for filing the report and the matter was adjourned for 13/11/13. On that day, further time was sought by ACP and matter was adjourned to 28/11/13.
On 28/11/13, report was filed on behalf of Addl. DCP vide letter No. 179/13 dated 27/11/l3 submitting that inquiry into the matter was got conducted by ACP Seemapuri wherein fault on the part of the Inspector Devender Kumar, SHO, PS Nand Nagri was established. In the impugned order, Ld. Trial Court has reproduced the contents of the complaint wherein allegations were made against the SHO concerned and the staff and after considering the complaint, Ld. Trial court had observed: that from the allegations made in the complaint offences U/s 186, 341 and 342 IPC are clearly made out. Therefore, Ld. Trial court has substantially compiled with the guidelines issued by Hon’ble High Court in authority: reported as Subhash Manchanda v State & Anr., 2013 II AD (Delhi) 277 and Subhkaran Luharuka and Shree Ram Mills Ltd. v State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) and Utility Premises Pvt Ltd. It Is pertinent to mention here that in the present case, the complainant is a Process Server posted at Karkardooma Court who had gone to PS Nand Nagri to serve the summons issued from the court of Shri Arvind Kumar, Ld. ADJ and warrants-issued from the court-of Shri Sharad Gupta, Ld. MM but he faced the difficulty in execution of 1104 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the process at police station. He has narrated the entire episode in his complaint which reflects that in VB Room, one person disclosed his identity as Ct. Sanjay Kumar, who received the processes and signed as HC Brhamjeet and on protest by the complainant, he struck off the signatures made by him and took the complainant to Reader of SHC and then to Duty Officer who both refused to receive the processes. He was thereafter, produced before the revisionist to whom facts were disclosed, whereupon he started misbehaving by remarking whatever has” been done by Ct. Sanjay, Reader and Duty Officer was correctly done and that he would, teach complainant how to do service; that complainant is below a Constable and he being fourth class employee was nobody to teach them work and made him to stand up for half an hour with hands up and was made to sit on floor for 3-4 hours as punishment. He also asked his staff to bring DD register and remarked that complainant should be confined (band karo) and then he would see as to what the Judge of complainant would do and that he (complainant) should make the revisionist talk on phone with the Judge then he would see as to what a Judge can do as Judge is also an officer so is revisionist. Despite request of complainant to let him go and come back after executing the court work, complainant was not allowed. Complainant has placed on record the photocopies of the process bearing the cuttings allegedly done by the Constable who had put the signatures of other Head Constable and subsequently the signatures were struck off. The original or copy of the process was not delivered to the Process Server but he was provided only photocopy, thereof. He was allegedly illtreated, wrongly confined, punished by making him stand hands-up and was also allegedly asked to sit on the floor for about 3-4 hours, He has made the complaint against the SHO concerned, the revisionist herein. Under the circumstances, he could not have been expected to have first approached the revisionist against whom he had the grievance and therefore the contention that he could not have made the complaint directly to the court has no merit.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1105Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
12. The contention raised by Ld. Counsel for the revisionist that the complaint U/s 195 Cr.P.C by Ld. ACJ to the court of Ld. CMM could only be filed subsequent to holding an inquiry U/s 340 Cr.P.C is not tenable because the question of holding an inquiry U/s 340 Cr.P.C would arise only when the offence referred to falls in clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 195 Cr.P.C which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding In that court or as the case may be in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in that Court. The complainant Process Server Ravi Dutt Sharma is a public servant and being employee in the court he was administratively subordinate to Ld. Administrative Civil Judge, who had made the complaint U/s 195 Cr.P.C and therefore in the complaint he had formed a view after considering the contents of the complaint that from the allegations made therein prima facie offence U/s 186 IRC and U/s 341 IPC are constituted and therefore there was no illegality in the complaint. The question of obtaining sanction against the offender being a police officer, is to be appreciated at the time of taking cognizance of offence or filing of chargesheet and contention in this regard is pre-mature at this juncture.
13. The impugned order has been passed by Ld. CMM, Shahdara and PS Nand Nagri falls in the territorial jurisdiction of District Shahdara, Delhi and therefore Ld. Trial Court was competent and had territorial jurisdiction to pass the impugned order.
14. The contention that Ld. Trial court has completely failed to appreciate the distinction between Chapters XV and XXVI has no merit. In authority reported as Baru Ram v State of Haryana 1990 Cr.L.J NOC 153, it was held that if cognizance of offence has not been taken by the Magistrate U/s 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C on receipt of complaint, he can direct investigation U/s 156(3) Cr.P.C after registration of the case. In authority reported as Minu Kumari & Anr v State of Bihar and Ors (2006) 4 Supreme Court Cases 359, It was held that the Magistrate is not bound to follow the procedure laid down in sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case U/s 190(1)(i)(a) Cr.P.C. 1106 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
15. It cannot be said that -the complaint made by Ld.
Administrative Civil Judge to Ld. CMM U/s 195 Cr.P.C accompanied with the complaint of Process Server is abuse of court process or of provisions of law. The contention that allegations made by the Process Server are improbable and absurd cannot be outrightly rejected or disbelieved rather the photocopies of the warrant and summons placed by him on record prima facie support his allegations.
The letter No. 179/13 dated 27/11/13 submitted by Mr.
Rajender Singh Sagar, Additional DCP, N/E District, Delhi also supports the complainant as it has been reported that in the inquiry conducted by ACP Seemapuri fault on the part of Inspector Devender Kumar SHO, PS Nand Nagri was established.
16. There is no doubt that a Magistrate cannot direct investigation to be conducted by an officer of a particular rank, However, in the present case the complainant had made the allegations against the SHO, PS Nand Nagri, (the revisionist herein) and therefore an order directing investigation to be conducted by an Officer of the rank of ACP cannot be said to be illegal because investigation by a superior officer alone can serve the purpose of inquiry or investigation.
17. In my considered view there appears no illegality, irregularity or impropriety in the Impugned order. The revision is therefore dismissed. Copy of order alongwith trial court record be sent to the Ld. Trial Court. Revision file be consigned to Record Room.”
(Emphasis supplied)
B. IMPUGNED ORDER
6. The aforesaid order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge came to be challenged before the High Court. The High Court declined to interfere and rejected the writ petition. The impugned order passed by the High Court reads thus:
“31. Prima facie; it is established that there was indeed an obstruction/delay caused by the Police Officials of [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1107Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
P.S. Nand Nagri in execution of the court duties of the Complainant in the service of the summon/warrants.
32. The first plea of the Petitioner that the Ld. CMM could not be specifically directed registration of FIR u/s 186/341/342 IPC, 1860 is not tenable for the simple reason that the observations are that these offences are prima facie made put, but it does not curtail the investigations to be confined only to these offences. The I.O. is obligated, to conduct investigations fair and the submit the final report on the offences if any, are established on the basis of the investigations.
33. The second ground taken is that direct registration of FIR in non-cognizable offences u/s 186 IPC, 1860 in the absence of any complaint by the Court, is in contravention of S.195 Cr.P.C. This argument is totally fallacious for the simple reason that firstly, the complainant/Process Server who is a public servant and as an employee of the court, is administratively subordinate to the Learned Administrative Civil Judge, who filed the complaint under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. to the Ld. CMM who in turn forwarded it by endorsing the prima facie commission of the offences and directing the investigations. Secondly, the alleged misconduct of the Petitioner, by no stretch of imagination, can be termed as acts in discharge of his official duties. Thirdly, the Complaint under S.195 Cr.P.C. is required for taking cognizance on the charge sheet; the issue of obtaining sanction is premature at this stage. Thus, the Ld.ASJ has rightly observed that there is no illegality in the complaint and the need for sanction against the accused, a police officer, should be addressed when taking cognizance or filing the chargesheet.
34. The Third challenge is to the directions by the Ld. CMM for the investigations to be conducted by officers of Rank of ACP. Considering that the complainant has made allegations against the SHO of PS Nand Nagri, it has been rightly ordered that the investigation be carried out by an officer of the rank of ACP. Such directions cannot 1108 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports be held illegal, as only an investigation conducted by a higher-ranking officer can effectively serve the purpose of a proper inquiry or investigation.
35. Fourth ground to challenge the Impugned Order was that a Preliminary Enquiry should have been conducted before directing registration of an FIR against a government servant. However, the holding of an inquiry u/s. 340 Cr.P.C. does not arise in the present case as the Ld. CMM had filed a complaint u/s. 195(1)(a)(i) Cr.P.C. along with the complaint of the respondent no. 2 for the offence under s. 186 IPC. The Ld. ASJ has rightly observed that the question of Preliminary enquiry under s. 340 Cr.P.C. would have arisen only when the offence referred falls within s. 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. and does not pertain to the offence under s.186 IPC.
36. The Fifth contention raised by the Petitioner that the Ld. ASJ has failed to discuss the Enquiry Report dated 25.11.2013 of ACP, is completely misplaced as the Ld.
ASJ has not only discussed and referred to the Inquiry report dated 25.11.2013 but has concluded that the same clearly establishes the fault of the Petitioner: The reliance of the Petitioner on this Report self-destructive as the same clearly highlights the misconduct of the Petitioner who used harsh words against the process server on being provoked.
37. In light of the foregoing discussion, it is held that there is no infirmity in the Order dated 28.11.2018 of the Ld. CMM, directing registration of the FIR against the concerned police officials which is upheld by the Ld. ASJ vide the Order dated 03.12.2013 and the same warrant no inference by this Court.
38. The Petition, along with pending application(s) if any, are hereby dismissed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. In such circumstances referred to above, the petitioner is here before this Court with the present petition.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1109Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
8. Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently submitted that even if the entire case put up in the FIR is believed to be true or accepted to be true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 186 of the I.P.C. could be said to be disclosed. In other words, the counsel contends that the whole of the complaint even if taken to be true does not reveal the commission of any offence by the petitioner-herein. He would submit that the contents of the complaint even if read together as true would not attract Section 186 of the I.P.C. far from Section 341 of the I.P.C. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, mere obstruction is not enough unless it is accompanied by use of some criminal force.
9. The learned counsel vehemently submitted that no order could have been passed in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. for the registration of an offence under Section 186 of the I.P.C. as the same is encompassed within Section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. and cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 186 of the I.P.C. can only be taken upon a complaint as defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C.
10. In such circumstances referred to above, it was prayed that there being merit in this petition, the same may be allowed and the First Information Report be quashed.
D. ANALYSIS
11. We could have disposed of the present petition by just observing that the petitioner may avail appropriate legal remedy before an appropriate forum in accordance with law if at all at the end of the investigation a chargesheet is filed. However, there is one issue which needs a little clarification at our end.
12. It is not in dispute that the Administrative Civil Judge upon instructions from the District and Sessions Judge, Shahdara lodged a private complaint in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi. This was in tune with the procedure prescribed under Section 195(1)(a) of the Cr.P.C. that it is either the public servant concerned or some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate, who would be allowed to file a complaint in writing. To the extent of filing a private complaint everything 1110 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports proceeded in accordance with law. However, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate should have straightaway taken cognizance upon the said complaint and issued process to the petitioner-herein. Asking the police to investigate the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. was a very serious error that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate could be said to have committed. What was the need to involve the police in a complaint lodged by a Civil Judge for the offence punishable under Sections 186 and 341 respectively of the I.P.C.?
13. If an accused person, in situations such as the present, obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public function, the accused person commits two offences. One offence committed by him is the alleged obstruction which comes within Section 186 I.P.C. and the other offence committed by him is the offence of having been guilty of undermining the authority of the court. In our view, therefore, if an accused is alleged to have committed an offence within Section 186, he would seem to have committed also an offence of contempt of court.
14. In the facts of the present case, the right thing to do for the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate should have been to take cognizance and issue process under Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. In the present case, there is no other serious offence or any offence figuring under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Cr.P.C. that perhaps would have required the assistance of the police. In the case in hand, the dignity of the court was at stake. There is lot of sanctity attached to a complaint lodged by none other than a civil judge. In a complaint lodged by a public servant, even verification of the contents of the complaint on oath is not required. In such circumstances, we do not approve of the order of police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C.
15. It would be argued that as the FIR was registered for non-cognizable offences; Section(s) 186 and 341 of the I.P.C., respectively, and even if Section 341 of the I.P.C. is to be treated as a distinct offence being not covered under Section 195 of the Cr.P.C., the police report if at all filed in future, insofar as the offence under Section 186 of the I.P.C. is concerned, may be treated as a “complaint” in view of the explanation to Section 2(d) of the Cr.P.C. Section 2(d) Cr.P.C. reads as follows:
“(d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1111Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.
Explanation.—A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant;”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. As per the explanation appended to the definition clause, a police report disclosing a non-cognizable offence (Sections 186 and 341 I.P.C. respectively in the present case) shall be deemed to be a complaint and the police offer shall be deemed to be the complainant. Even then, the legal embargo under Section 195 Cr.P.C., so far as Section 186 of the I.P.C. is concerned is not dispelled as the legal fiction deems the police officer and not the aggrieved public servant as the complainant. [See: Umashankar Yadav and Another v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1066]
17. The entire trial would have been over within a period of three months from the date of filing of the complaint in writing, had the CMM taken cognizance on the very first day and issued process under Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. Having not done so at the right time and in the right manner, it has been now twelve years that this litigation is still pending.
18. Look at the mess created by one and all over a period of twelve years. We are talking about upholding and maintaining the dignity of court. This entire prosecution for the alleged offence is to uphold the dignity of court. However, it has been twelve years but no one has been able to uphold the dignity of the court by proceeding in the right direction.
i. Section 186 of the I.P.C.
19. Before proceeding further to discuss as to whether mere obstruction itself would be enough or the act of obstruction is to be accompanied by use of some criminal force, it may be necessary to notice one particular allegation made against the petitioner herein in the complaint. In the complaint the allegations are:
1112 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “one warrant issued by the court of Shri Sharad Gupta, Ld. MM and one summons issued by the court of Shri Arvind Kumar, Ld. AD) were assigned to him to be served to SHO PS Nand Nagri. On 3.10.2013 he reached PS Nand Nagri at about 12.30 P.M. One Ct Sanjay Kumar Sharma was present in the room of 5-8. The said constable received the processes but signed as HC Brahmjeet. Process Server Ravi Dutt asked him not to do so. Upon this Ct. Sanjay cut the signatures made by him in the name of HC Brahmjeet and took the processes to the Reader of SHO who also refused to receive the processes. The process server went to duty officer who also refused to take the processes. The process server went to SHO Insp. Devender Kumar and told him all the facts. The said SHO kept the processes and abused the process server badly. SHO asked process server to stand there raising his hands and wait till the Havaldar/Head Constable comes. For about half an hour process server stood there, raising his hands as a punishment. He was also made to sit on the floor for about 3-4 hours as punishment. The process server begged SHO to allow him to go as he had to serve other processes also and told him that, he would come after serving other processes. The SHO, however, did not allow the process server to go. At about 4.30 p.m. one head constable come who took the processes and gave receipt.”
20. In Nishi Kanta Pal v. Emperor reported in AIR 1917 Calcutta 180, the accused who were not parties to a suit in which a public right of way was claimed, did not allow a Munsif, in whose Court the suit was pending, to pass in a boat through a ditch which was their private property, when the Munsif wanted to pass through it for the purpose of making a local inspection in connection with the suit. The Calcutta High Court held that the accused did not commit any offence under Section 186 of the I.P.C. The Court took the view that there was no right of way as such and to pass through it for the purpose of making a local inspection and therefore, the accused are right in obstructing the Munsif from passing through their lands.
21. In Jaswant Singh v. King Emperor reported in AIR 1925 Lahore 139, the Lahore High Court held that the use of the word voluntarily [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1113Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
in Section 186 of I.P.C. indicates that the Legislature contemplated the commission of some overt act of obstruction, and did not intend to render penal mere passive conduct. The Allahabad High Court in Phudki v. State reported in AIR 1955 All. 104, held that the word obstruction in Section 186 connotes some overt act in the nature of violence or show of violence. It cannot be said that a man obstructed another if that man runs away from arrest or if he does not actually submit to the arrest. The Patna High Court in Janki Prasad Tibrewal v. The State of Bihar reported in 1975 Crl. L.J. 575 (Patna) while construing the expression ‘obstruct’ used in Section 186 observed that the expression obstruct envisages actual resistance and obstacle in the way of public servant and it implies the use of criminal force. However, the Patna High Court in Diljam Sahu v. Emperor reported in AIR 1937 Patna 633 observed that sufficient indication that any attempt to effect attachment by a public servant having warrant of attachment would be resisted by force is quite enough to constitute obstruction within the meaning of Section 186 of the Act. Mere resistance of warrant of attachment by a public servant would be an offence punishable under Section 186 of I.P.C.
22. The Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Sideman Abba reported in AIR 1935 Bom. 24 also took the similar view that mere obstruction or prevention of discharge of duties may be enough to constitute an offence under Section 186 of the I.P.C. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court in State v. Babulal Gaurishanker Misar reported in AIR 1957 Bombay 10 held that to constitute ‘obstruction’ within Section 186 of the I.P.C., it is not necessary that there should be actual criminal force. It is sufficient if there is either a show of force or threat or any act preventing the execution of the process of the civil Court. It was held by the Court that if an accused obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public function (execution of a warrant of possession) he commits two offences. One offence committed by him is the alleged obstruction which comes within Section 186 and the other offence committed by him is the offence of having been guilty of undermining the authority of the Court.
23. “Obstructing” the police is not confined to physical obstruction. [See: Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1962 A.C. 528]
24. The word ‘obstruction’ in Section 186 of the I.P.C is not confined to physical obstruction only. Threats of violence made in such a way as 1114 [2025] 8 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports to prevent the public servant from carrying out his duty might easily amount to an obstruction of the public servant.
25. In Santosh Kumar Jain v. The State reported in 1951 SCC 190, the General Manager of the Jagdishpur Zamindary Co. who were the lessees of a sugar factory, was prosecuted for obstructing the District Magistrate and the Special Officer of Rationing, Patna, in the discharge of their official functions when they went to the factory on 06.12.1947 to remove, 5,000 maunds of sugar which had been seized out of the stock held by the Company pursuant to an order of the Government of Bihar dated 05.12.1947. The named officers went to the Factory on 06.12.1947 to carry out the order of the Government. The Officers were told by the accused General Manager that he would do everything possible to obstruct the removal of the sugar and accordingly it was found that the sugar godowns had been locked and the road leading to them blocked by heaps of coal, firewood and tins placed across, so as to make vehicular traffic impossible. As a result of such obstruction, the officers had to seek the aid of armed police to break open the locks, repair the railway line and clear the road block before the sugar could be removed from the factory. The main defense of the accused was that on a proper construction of Section 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary powers) Act, 1946 it was not competent for the Government to pass the order dated 05.12.1947, which was consequently illegal and void and that obstruction to the execution of that order could not constitute an offence under Section 186 I.P.C. The contention was rejected by the Court below and the accused was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three weeks under Section 186 of I.P.C. The Patna High Court confirmed the conviction and the sentence. The revision came up before this Court. This Court observed that the seizure of the Company’s sugar must therefore be regarded as duly authorized and lawful and the accused by obstructing its removal committed an offence under Section 186 of I.P.C.
26. In Collector of Customs and Central Excise v. Paradip Port Trust reported in (1990) 4 SCC 250, this Court while construing the expression obstruction’ used in Section 133 of the Customs Act, 1962 observed that:
“On the authority of Hinchliffe v. Sheldon [(1955) 1 WLR 1207], it can be said that obstruction is not confined to physical obstruction and it includes anything which makes [2025] 8 S.C.R. 1115Devendra Kumar v.
The State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.
it more difficult for the police or public servant to carry out their duties.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. It may be necessary to have a look at Section 133 of the Customs Act, 1962 which is analogous to Section 186 of the I.P.C. Section 133 reads thus: - “133. Obstruction of officer of customs. — If any person intentionally obstructs any officer of customs in the exercise of any powers conferred under this Act, such person shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.”
28. Now let us compare Section 133 of the Customs Act, 1962 with Section 186 of the I.P.C. Section 186 of I.P.C. reads:
“186. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions.— Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both”.
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