Vibhor Garg v. Neha
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 829; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 611
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
- Decided
- 14 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 9489/2025
- Sections
- 13, 122, 14, 20, 120, 7, 8, 65B, 65A, 65
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 611 : 2025 INSC 829 Vibhor Garg v.
Neha (Civil Appeal No. 9489 of 2025)
14 July 2025 [B.V. Nagarathna* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the conversation between spouses secretly recorded by one of them could be permitted to be made admissible in evidence; whether in light of the Evidence Act and the Family Courts Act, 1984, a conversation between spouses can be permitted to be given in evidence in a proceeding for divorce; whether such a recorded evidence should be disallowed solely on the ground that it is violative of the privacy of one of the spouses; and as to the correctness of the order passed by the High Court, declining permission to the husband to corroborate his evidence in the form of recording on his mobile phone and by means of a compact disc (CD) and transcription of the same containing the communication made by the wife to the husband in order to prove his case for seeking divorce.
Headnotes† Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – s.13 – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.122 – Family Courts Act, 1984 – Constitution of India – Art.21 – Divorce – Secretly recorded telephonic conversation of spouse – Admissibility in evidence – Right to Privacy – Husband sought permission to submit his supplementary affidavit by way of examination-in-chief along with memory cards/chips of the mobile phones, compact disc (CD) and transcript of conversations recorded in memory cards/ chips – Family Court allowed the application – However, in the revision petition by the wife, the High Court held that the CD cannot be accepted in view of the right to privacy of the wife – Correctness:
Held: Order passed by the High Court set aside and that by the Family Court restored – Three-fold test of relevance, * Author 612 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports identification and accuracy has to be satisfied before a Court admits a recorded conversation in evidence – The fact that the conversation was recorded without the consent and knowledge of the person speaking is not a prohibition on the admissibility of the evidence – Husband would have ordinarily been barred from disclosing any form of communication that was disclosed by the wife to him by virtue of being a privileged communication u/s.122 of the Evidence Act, however due to the exception provided in that Section, the bar on the disclosure of such communication is lifted since the communication sought to be disclosed is in a divorce proceeding between the husband and the wife – Thus, such privileged communication is not barred from being disclosed and brought before the Court and the objection taken by the wife with respect to s.122 is not acceptable – Adverting to s.14 of the F.C. Act is not required in the instant facts when the Evidence Act itself permits such a communication to be admitted in evidence by way of an exception – Furthermore, the exception u/s.122 has to be construed in light of right to a fair trial which is also an aspect of Art.21 – When the respective rights of the parties in a trial are weighed within the parameters of s.122, there is no breach of right to privacy – Thus, as per procedure established by law, s.122 does not touch upon the aspect of right to privacy as envisaged u/Art.21 of the Constitution, let alone invade upon such right because s.122 recognises the right to a fair trial, right to produce relevant evidence and a right to prove one’s case against a spouse so as to avail the relief sought for by a party – Rationale for s.122 was to protect the sanctity of marriage and not the right to privacy of the individuals involved. [Paras 9.5, 10, 10.2, 12, 12.6, 13] Evidence Act, 1872 – s.122 – Communications during marriage – Rule of privilege protecting disclosure of all communications between persons married to one another made during marriage, except in certain cases, i.e., in litigation between themselves – Principles and interpretations – Stated. [Para 8.8] Case Law Cited M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Poonan [1969] 2 SCR 692 : (1969) 1 SCC 37; Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P. (1954) 1 SCC 284; Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. The State of Maharashtra [1967] 1 SCR 720 : AIR 1968 SC 147; Shankar v. State of T.N [1994] 3 SCR 298 : (1994) 4 SCC 478; R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCR [2025] 7 S.C.R. 613Vibhor Garg v. Neha 417 : (1973) 1 SCC 471; K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India [2017] 10 SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1; Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. [2023] 8 SCR 581 : (2023) 4 SCC 1; People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 321 : (1997) 1 SCC 301; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248 – referred to.
Deepinder Singh Mann v. Ranjit Kaur, 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 4826; Tripat Deep Singh v. Paviter Kaur, 2018 (3) RCR (Civil) 71; Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari v. Nagaphanender Rayala, AIR 2008 AP 98; Anurima @ Abha Mehta v. Sunil Mehta s/o Chandmal (2016) 2 RCR (Civil) 773; Vishal Kaushik v. Family Court, 2016(1) RLW 693 (Raj.); Deepti Kapur v. Kunal Julka, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 672; Preeti Jain v. Kunal Jain, AIR 2016 Raj 153; Kethana Lokesh v. Rahul R. Bettakote, 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 6368; Jil v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 4363; Essaki Ammal @ Chitra v. Veerabhadra @ Kumar, 2012 (4) CTC 743; Havovi Kersi Sethna v. Kersi Gustad Sethna, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 120; Abhishek Ranjan v. Hemlata Chaubey, Misc. Petition No. 1300/2023 decided on 29.08.2023; Saroj v. Aashish Yadav, Misc. Petition No. 1422/2024 decided on 02.08.2024; Ram Talraja v. Sapna Talreja, Misc. Petition No. 949/2022 decided on 26.04.2022; Aasha Lata Soni v. Durgesh Soni, 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 3959; Neha v. State of Haryana, 2020 SCC OnLine P&H 4469; Dharmesh Sharma v. Tanisha Sharma, 2024 SCC OnLine HP 5208; Deepali v. Praveen, 2023 : KHCD : 11968; Norendra Nath Mozumdar v. State, AIR 1951 Cal 140; Vilas Raghunath Kurhade v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1967; Appu Alias Ayyanar Padayachi v. State, AIR 1971 Mad 194; Nawab Howladar v. Emperor, 1913 SCC OnLine Cal 447; RIT Foundation v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1404; S.J. Choudhary v. State, 1984 SCC OnLine Del 185; Essaki Ammal @ Chitra v. Veerabhadra @ Kumar, 2012 SCC OnLine Mad 2093 – referred to.
Doker v. Hasler (1824) 171 E.M. 992 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Sarkar’s Law of Evidence, 20th Edition, Volume 2 – referred to. List of Acts Constitution of India; Evidence Act, 1872; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Family Courts Act, 1984; Delhi Family Courts Rules, 1996; Delhi Family Courts (Amendment) Rules, 2024.
614 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports List of Keywords Marital discord; Memory cards/chips of the mobile phones; Compact disc (CD); Transcript of conversations recorded; Electronic instruments; Admissibility of tape recordings; Conversations between husband and wife; Right to privacy; Facet of right to life; Communications during marriage; Doctrine of privileged communications; Compellability and permissibility; Secretly obtained evidence; Best evidence available; ‘Common law rights’; Fundamental rights; Relationship between citizen and State; Right to privacy against private bodies; ‘Negative’ and ‘positive’ freedoms; Vertical or horizontal effect; Divorce; Secretly recorded telephonic conversation of spouse; Admissibility in evidence.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9489 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.11.2021 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CR No. 1616 of 2020 Appearances for Parties Ms. Vrinda Grover (Amicus Curie ), Ms. Devika Tulsiani, Soutik Banerjee, Yash S.Vijay, Afeef Mohammed.
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ankit Swarup, Nitin Sood, Neelmani Pant, Ms. Vidisha Swarup, Rishi Bhargava.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Gagan Gupta, Sr. Adv., Ananta Prasad Mishra, Jasbir Singh, Saurabh Gupta.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Nagarathna, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present civil appeal has been filed assailing the judgment dated 12.11.2021 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in CR No. 1616 of 2020 (O&M), wherein the High Court has allowed the civil revision petition filed by the respondent herein. [2025] 7 S.C.R. 615Vibhor Garg v. Neha Factual Background:
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the present case are that the marriage between the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife was solemnized on 20.02.2009. A daughter was born out of the said wedlock on 11.05.2011. Due to marital discord between the parties, the appellant filed a divorce petition being CIS No. DMC/405/2017 under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family Court, Bathinda, on 07.07.2017. The divorce petition was subsequently amended and filed again on 03.04.2018. 3.1 When the aforesaid case was listed for evidence, the appellant herein submitted his affidavit of examination-in-chief on 07.12.2018. Later, an application was moved by the appellanthusband on 09.07.2019 seeking permission to submit his supplementary affidavit by way of examination-in-chief along with memory cards/chips of the mobile phones, compact disc (CD) and transcript of conversations recorded in memory cards/ chips of the mobile phones. In the said application, the appellant stated that various telephonic conversations happened between the parties during the period from November 2010 to December 2010, as well as between August 2016 and December 2016 and the same had been recorded by the appellant and stored in the memory cards/chips of the mobile phones. The appellant had also prepared the transcripts of those recorded conversations. Thus, the appellant prayed that he may be allowed to file his supplementary affidavit by way of his examination-in-chief along with memory cards/chips of the respective mobile phones, CD and transcripts of the conversations so recorded in memory cards/chips of the respective mobile phones.
3.2 The respondent herein opposed the application on the ground that the examination-in-chief was already completed and moreover, the admissibility of memory card/chips along with CD and transcripts is in dispute and these electronic instruments cannot be exhibited. The respondent therefore sought the dismissal of the application filed by the appellant. 3.3 The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bathinda allowed the application filed by the appellant on 29.01.2020, on the ground that the conversation between the parties is relevant for the adjudication of the controversy between the parties and 616 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports there is no bar on the admissibility of such a tape recording. The Family Court observed that the appellant is only wanting to prove the conversation between him and the respondent and not with respect to a third party. Reliance was placed by the Family Court on Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (“F.C. Act” for short) which allows a Family Court to receive any evidence, statement, report, documents, etc., which is helpful in adjudicating the dispute between the parties and also on Section 20 of the F.C. Act, which has an overriding effect on the general rules of evidence. Thus, the appellant was allowed to prove the CD pertaining to the conversation between him and the respondent subject to its correctness. Consequently, on 18.02.2020 the appellant tendered by way of evidence the transcript of the audio recording, the original memory card of the phone and the CD prepared from the said memory card.
3.4 Being aggrieved by the order dated 29.01.2020 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bathinda, the respondentwife filed a civil revision petition before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana being CR No. 1616 of 2020 (O&M). On 05.03.2020, the High Court issued notice in the matter and granted an interim order of stay on the order dated 29.01.2020. 3.5 By the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2021, the High Court allowed the civil revision petition filed by the respondent and thereby set aside the order dated 29.01.2020 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bathinda. It was held that the CD tendered in evidence by the appellant-husband contained conversations between the husband and the wife recorded surreptitiously without the consent or knowledge of the wife and acceptance of the same in evidence would constitute a clear infringement of the right to privacy of the wife. While the High Court did not dispute that the Family Court is not bound by the strict rules of evidence, it held that the CD cannot be accepted in view of the right to privacy of the wife, which is a facet of the right to life accorded by the Constitution of India. 3.6 In the impugned order, the High Court supported its reasoning by placing reliance on the following judgments of various High Courts:
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 617Vibhor Garg v. Neha i. Deepinder Singh Mann vs. Ranjit Kaur, 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 4826 ii. Tripat Deep Singh vs. Paviter Kaur, 2018 (3) RCR (Civil) 71 iii. Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari vs. Nagaphanender Rayala, AIR 2008 AP 98 iv. Anurima @ Abha Mehta vs. Sunil Mehta s/o Chandmal, (2016) 2 RCR (Civil) 773 v. Vishal Kaushik vs. Family Court, 2016(1) RLW 693 (Raj.) 3.7 The crux of the observations made by the High Courts in all these judgments was that the recorded conversations between a husband and a wife cannot be made the basis for deciding a petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 since courts cannot judge under what circumstances the recorded statements were made by the parties. That recording any such conversation without the knowledge of the other partner would amount to violation of the right to privacy. On the basis of this reasoning, the High Court passed the impugned judgment in favour of the respondent herein.
3.8 Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 12.11.2021 passed in CR No. 1616 of 2020 (O&M), the appellant-husband has preferred the present civil appeal. This Court issued notice in the matter on 12.01.2022 and granted an interim stay of the proceedings in CIS No. DMC/405/2017 pending before the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court, Bathinda, Punjab.
3.9 However, on 03.12.2024, this Court directed that pending disposal of the present civil appeal, the Family Court shall continue the evidence of PW-1 pursuant to what had been recorded on 18.02.2020, though as a matter of safeguard, the recording of evidence and subsequent cross-examination was to happen in-camera. The transcription of the said recording of the evidence of PW-1 and cross-examination was directed to be placed in a sealed cover.
3.10 Subsequently, on 19.12.2024, this Court appointed Ms. Vrinda Grover, learned Advocate, as an amicus curiae to assist this Court in the case. The learned amicus has placed her written note of submissions before this Court and has advanced 618 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports detailed submissions on the different facets of the issue facing this Court in this present case.
Submissions:
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant Sri Ankit Swarup; learned senior counsel for the respondent Sri Gagan Gupta; and the learned amicus curiae Ms. Vrinda Grover. We have perused the material on record.
Submissions of Amicus Curiae:
4.1 The learned amicus has submitted that with the increase in accessibility to technology, covert recording of audio and video conversations has become an easier option for parties which would have direct implications for the nature and kind of evidence that will be presented before the law courts. The issue before this Court regarding admissibility of covertly recorded communications between spouses in matrimonial proceedings lies at the intersection of rights emanating from Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the erstwhile Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”, for short) and the F.C. Act which requires all three Acts to be harmoniously construed in the interest of justice. 4.2 The learned amicus submitted with reference to the provisions of the F.C. Act that an interpretation which incentivises surveillance and covert recording of interactions and communications without the consent and knowledge of the other married partner militates against the letter and spirit of conciliation, which is the central objective of the statute as stated in the preamble to the F.C. Act. That a conjoint reading of Section 122 of the Evidence Act and Section 14 of the F.C. Act shows that there is no explicit legal bar on covertly recorded audio/video recordings being produced as evidence in proceedings between parties to the marriage. However, certain considerations, including the avowed objective of the law to promote conciliation between parties to a marriage, the deleterious impact of covert recording and surveillance on matrimonial relations and the breach of the right to privacy of the spouse subjected to covert recording warrant that these elements of law, procedure, rights and public interest be harmonised in the interest of justice.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 619Vibhor Garg v. Neha 4.3 Learned amicus has brought to our attention the divergent views taken by various High Courts on the issue of admissibility of evidence with respect to the recording of conversations in proceedings between a husband and wife.
4.4 As per the compilation of case law submitted by the learned amicus for the perusal of this Court, the High Courts in the following cases have allowed the communication between the parties and other private information to be placed on record or summoned as evidence:
i. Deepti Kapur vs. Kunal Julka, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 672 ii. Preeti Jain vs. Kunal Jain, AIR 2016 Raj 153 iii. Kethana Lokesh vs. Rahul R. Bettakote, 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 6368 iv. Jil vs. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 4363 v. Essaki Ammal @ Chitra vs. Veerabhadra @ Kumar, 2012
(4) CTC 743
vi. Havovi Kersi Sethna vs. Kersi Gustad Sethna, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 120 4.5 However, the High Courts in the following cases have disallowed production of phone call recordings, text messages and other private materials as evidence:
i. Anurima @ Abha Mehta vs. Sunil Mehta s/o Chandmal, (2016) 2 RCR (Civil) 773 ii. Abhishek Ranjan vs. Hemlata Chaubey, Misc. Petition No. 1300/2023 decided on 29.08.2023 iii. Saroj vs. Aashish Yadav, Misc. Petition No. 1422/2024 decided on 02.08.2024 iv. Ram Talraja vs. Sapna Talreja, Misc. Petition No. 949/2022 decided on 26.04.2022 v. Aasha Lata Soni vs. Durgesh Soni, 2023 SCC OnLine Chh 3959 vi. Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari vs. Nagaphanender Rayala, AIR 2008 AP 98 620 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports vii. Deepinder Singh Mann vs. Ranjit Kaur, 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 4826 viii. Tripat Deep Singh vs. Paviter Kaur, 2018 (3) RCR (Civil) 71 ix. Neha vs. State of Haryana, 2020 SCC OnLine P&H 4469 x. Vishal Kaushik vs. Family Court and Anr., 2016(1) RLW 693 (Raj.)
xi. Dharmesh Sharma vs. Tanisha Sharma, 2024 SCC OnLine HP 5208 4.6 Therefore, in light of the above propositions, the learned amicus advocated for a set of guidelines to be formulated that may aid the Family Courts in exercising their discretion under Section 14 of the F.C. Act while dealing with admissibility of audio/ video recordings as evidence between a husband and a wife. Some factors suggested by the learned amicus for providing guidance in the exercise of judicial discretion are enumerated as follows:
a) A proximate and temporal nexus of the audio/video recording to the facts in issue or relevant facts.
b) The intention of defaming, harassing or prejudicing the spouse, or prolonging the litigation by placing on record the audio/video recording.
c) Burden of proof on the party producing the covert recording to demonstrate that it is the least restrictive and intrusive method of proving the claim, in line with the doctrine of proportionality.
d) Exercise of care and caution while giving weightage to such evidence by considering the context in which the conversation happened and was recorded covertly by one of the parties.
e) Control, ownership and access that each party to the marriage has to electronic recording devices since the socio-economic differential between parties to the marriage based on gender may have a direct bearing on their ability, capacity and opportunity to make covert audio/ video recordings.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 621Vibhor Garg v. Neha f) Authenticity and accuracy of the recordings is also an important factor, since the electronic audio/video recordings are highly vulnerable to manipulation.
However, while dealing with the issue of determining the authenticity of the audio/video recordings, the learned amicus sounded a note of caution that this might increase the burden on the already scarce Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) resources and lead to delay in the proceedings.
4.7 Lastly, it was submitted that specific directions are required to ensure that the audio/video recordings are filed, maintained and stored in a manner which safeguards the privacy of parties before the Family Court. Reliance was placed on the recently notified Delhi Family Courts (Amendment) Rules, 2024, which inserted Chapter VI, Rule 17 in the existing Rules, with regard to “protecting the privacy of parties or persons”. The said amendment prohibits parties from extracting in the pleadings the contents of a document which is of a sensitive nature and which is likely to affect the right to privacy or cause embarrassment, without the leave of the court and “a document” is said to include the electronic recordings as well. Further, the Family Court has been directed to keep in view the requirements of protecting the right to privacy and dignity of parties while applying the Rules to a given situation.
4.8 Therefore, it was suggested by the learned amicus that this Court may pass appropriate directions for exercise of judicial discretion under Section 14 of the F.C. Act and in the interim, consider directing all the States and Union Territories to adopt and follow the mandate under Chapter VI Rule 17 of the Delhi Family Courts Rules, 1996.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant:
5. Learned counsel Sri Ankit Swarup appeared for the appellant-husband and urged that the impugned order ought to be set aside. It was submitted by the learned counsel that in matrimonial proceedings involving allegations of cruelty, the parties are bound to recreate issues and events which were otherwise confined to the matrimonial home and the bedroom and away from the public eye. These proceedings involve a discussion on the aspects of the private married life of 622 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports parties. Often in such cases, there is neither any third-party witness to prove the allegations nor is there proof by documentary evidence. This is where modern technology and electronic devices can help in bringing such evidence to the court room. If an argument of privacy is permitted to be raised, it will impinge upon the right to fair trial accorded to the other spouse and the appellant herein would be unsuccessful in proving cruelty of the respondent and thereby be deprived from seeking divorce before the Family Court. 5.1 It was submitted that as per the exception contained in Section 122 of the Evidence Act, the communication between married persons can be disclosed in matrimonial proceedings like divorce. Further reliance was placed on Sections 14 and 20 of the F.C. Act to contend that the objective of these overriding provisions is to secure the right to fair trial of married persons and to effectively deal with the private dispute between the parties and that is why these provisions allow the Family Courts to deviate from the strict rules of evidence and admit into evidence materials that are necessary for the adjudication of the dispute. While the respondent has taken the defence of right to privacy, it is not an absolute right and has to be balanced with the right to fair trial of the appellant.
5.2 Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the judgments rendered by different High Courts to contend that right to privacy cannot be a defence to shun relevant evidence in the form of audio/video recordings or some other technologically collected private data. Apart from the High Court judgments which have allowed the evidence of recorded conversations and private information between the spouses and which have been cited by the learned amicus before us, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment of the Karnataka High Court, Dharwad Bench in Deepali vs. Praveen, 2023:KHC-D:11968, wherein also the High Court allowed a CD containing video recording and WhatsApp messages sent by the wife to be placed on record by the husband in a divorce proceeding, in light of the exception carved out under Section 122 of the Evidence Act. In addition, learned counsel also placed reliance on a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Norendra Nath Mozumdar vs. State, AIR 1951 Cal 140, to contend that the protection under Section 122 of the Evidence [2025] 7 S.C.R. 623Vibhor Garg v. Neha Act cannot exist in suits between married persons when one of the spouses is in litigation against the other, for, to prevent disclosure in that event will be to defeat justice. 5.3 Learned counsel for the appellant also placed before us the recommendation made by the Law Commission in its 69 th report with respect to Section 122 of the Evidence Act, wherein it had recommended creating an explicit exception to the bar of Section 122 in the proceedings between married persons. Reliance was also placed on a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Vilas Raghunath Kurhade vs. State of Maharashtra, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1967, wherein the court suggested an appropriate amendment to Section 122 of the Evidence Act to check the blanket ban on any type of communication which may not withstand the requirements of the modern times so as to do complete justice in a case.
5.4 Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant may be allowed to place the recorded conversations before the Family Court through his supplementary affidavit of examination-in-chief and the same may be considered by the Family court in light of the relevance of the evidence led and the cross-examination of the appellant with respect to the same. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent:
6. Learned senior counsel Sri Gagan Gupta who appeared for the respondent-wife, with reference to her counter affidavit, questioned the authenticity and admissibility of the purported conversations sought to be produced. It was submitted that the appellant had not mentioned anything about these recorded conversations in his pleadings and therefore, he cannot be allowed to bring in evidence something that does not have any foundational basis in any of the pleadings hereinbefore.
6.1 It was further submitted that permission to bring on record such evidence is fraught with inherent and imminent danger as the court would never be able to ascertain the circumstances in which the alleged conversation was held or the manner in which the conversation was initiated or continued. The same is a unilateral act of one of the spouses without knowledge or consent of the other spouse and in the present case, the same 624 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports relates to the years 2010 and 2016 and has been deliberately delayed to be filed in Court as late as in July 2019 and thus causes serious prejudice to the respondent herein inasmuch as while the appellant was as per his own admission indulging in call recording/phone tapping ever since 2010, the respondent cannot be expected to have complete memory of such old conversations between the husband and wife which were not documented. That the respondent would have no means to verify the genuineness and completeness of the said purported phone conversations. Thus, even if the respondent can be said to have the right of cross-examination or of forensic examination of the purported material, the said right would be an illusory right in the facts of this case.
6.2 Learned senior counsel for the respondent has stressed upon the right to privacy of the respondent and has highlighted that the conversations sought to be produced were recorded without the knowledge or consent of the respondent. Marriage is said to be a sacrosanct relationship and it is not expected of spouses either to illegally record the conversations between them or to produce them as evidence. Permission to lead such evidence would amount to licensing a married couple to betray the trust at any given moment and judicial recognition of the same would result in every married couple doubting their partner and becoming careful and apprehensive and running a risk of every conversation being recorded which could not be the objective behind either Section 122 of the Evidence Act, or Sections 14 and 22 of the F.C. Act.
6.3 In light of the same, learned senior counsel submitted that the unilateral and illegal recording of a private conversation by one spouse without informing the other spouse cannot be said to be a “communication” at all and thus any such purported evidence of any such alleged conversation is not admissible in law. Therefore, as per the learned senior counsel, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and the same ought to be upheld in entirety. Points for consideration:
7. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned senior counsel for the respondent as well as learned amicus, the following points would arise for our consideration.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 625Vibhor Garg v. Neha a) Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of the Family Court and thereby declining permission to the appellant herein to corroborate his evidence in the form of what has been recorded on his mobile phone and by means of a compact disc (CD) and transcription of the same containing the communication made by the respondent-wife to the appellant husband in order to prove his case for seeking divorce? b) What order?
Section 122 of the Evidence Act:
8. Section 122 of the Evidence Act reads as follows: “122. Communications during marriage.—No person who is or has been married, shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by any person to whom he is or has been married; nor shall he be permitted to disclose any such communication, unless the person who made it, or his representative in interest, consents, except in suits between married persons, or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.”
(underlining by us)
8.1 In the case of M.C. Verghese vs. T.J. Ponnan, AIR 1970 SC 1876, the three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, while dissecting the provision, held as follows:
“13. …The section consists of two branches – (1) that a married person shall not be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during marriage by his spouse; and (2) that the married person shall not except in two special classes of proceedings be permitted to disclose by giving evidence in Court the communication, unless the person who made it, or his representative in interest, consents thereto.” (underlining by us)
8.2 In the above case, this Court was dealing with a complaint of defamation by the appellant therein (Verghese). The appellant 626 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports therein claimed that the respondent therein (Ponnan) had written some letters to his wife (Rathi), which contained defamatory material against the appellant. The appellant claimed to be in possession of those letters and sought to make a case of defamation based on those letters. The same was being objected to on the ground that the communication in the letters was barred under Section 122 of the Evidence Act. This Court, while ruling in favour of the appellant therein, observed as follows: “14. A prima facie case was set up in the complaint by Verghese. That complaint has not been tried and we do not see how, without recording any evidence, the learned District Magistrate could pass any order discharging Ponnan. Section 122 of the Evidence Act only prevents disclosure in giving evidence in court of the communication made by the husband to the wife. If Rathi appears in the witness box to give evidence about the communications made to her husband, prima facie the communications may not be permitted to be deposed to or disclosed unless Ponnan consents. That does not, however, mean that no other evidence which is not barred under s. 122 of the Evidence Act or other provisions of the Act can be given.
15. In a recent judgment of the House of Lords Rumping v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1962)
All E.R. 256 Rumping the mate of a Dutch ship was tried for murder committed on board the ship. Part of the evidence for the prosecution admitted at the trial consisted of a letter that Rumping had written to his wife in Holland which amounted to a confession. Rumping had written the letter on the day of the killing, and had handed the letter in a closed envelope to a member of the crew requesting him to post it as soon as the ship arrived at the port outside England. After the appellant was arrested, the member of the crew handed the envelope to the captain of the ship who handed it over to the police. The member of the crew, the captain and the translator of the letter gave evidence at the trial, but the wife was not called as [2025] 7 S.C.R. 627Vibhor Garg v. Neha witness. It was held that the letter was admissible in evidence. Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest, Lord Hodson and Lord Pearce were of the view that at common law there had never been a separate principle or rule that communications between a husband and wife during marriage were inadmissible in evidence on the ground of public policy. Accordingly except where the spouse to whom the communication is made is a witness and claims privilege from disclosure under the Criminal Evidence Act. 1898, (of which the terms are similar to S. 122 of the Indian Evidence Act though not identical), evidence as to communications between husband and wife during marriage is admissible in criminal proceedings.
16. The question whether the complainant in this case is an agent of the wife because he has received the letters from the wife and may be permitted to give evidence is a matter on which no opinion at this stage can be expressed. The complainant claims that he has been defamed by the writing of the letters. The letters are in his possession and are available for being tendered in evidence. We see no reason why inquiry into that complaint should, on the preliminary contentions raised, be prohibited. If the complainant seeks to support his case only upon the evidence of the wife of the accused, he may be met with the bar of S. 122 of the Indian Evidence Act. Whether he will be able to prove the letters in any other manner is a matter which must be left to be determined at the trial and cannot be made the subject-matter of an enquiry at this stage.”
(underlining by us)
8.3 Another complexity posed before this Court in the aforesaid case was that by the time the matter reached this Court, the wife of the respondent therein had already taken a decree of divorce from the respondent therein and therefore it was prayed that the bar under Section 122 would no longer apply. This Court negated the said argument as under:
628 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “18. …When the letters were written by Ponnan to Rathi, they were husband and wife. The bar to the admissibility in evidence of communications made during marriage attaches at the time when the communication is made, and its admissibility will be adjudged in the light of the status at the date and not the status at the date when evidence is sought to be given in court.”
(underlining by us)
8.4 In the aforesaid case, this Court held that Section 122 only prevents disclosure in giving evidence by the other spouse in court of the communication made. It does not mean that other evidence, which is not barred under this Section or other provisions of the Act, is barred. The latter part of the Section states the exceptions to the rule of privilege, namely, (a) in suits between married persons (i.e., husband and wife), i.e., divorce proceedings or other cases, or (b) proceedings in which one of them is prosecuted for any crime against the other. In these cases, there is no privilege.
8.5 In the case of Ram Bharosey vs. State of U.P., (1954) 1 SCC 284, a three-Judge Bench of this Court had to deal with the deposition of PW-2, who was the wife of the appellant-accused therein. In her deposition, she had stated about seeing the appellant come down the roof of the house in the morning, taking bath and then having a conversation with her. The part of the wife’s statement where the appellant told her that he would give her jewels and that he had gone to the middle house to get them were held to be inadmissible under Section 122 of the Evidence Act but the part of the deposition that talked about the wife seeing the appellant in the morning was held to be admissible. The Court observed as follows with reference to the deposition of the wife in light of Section 122 of the Evidence Act: “3. …The middle house referred to in this deposition is the house in which Manna was living. The argument of the appellant is that his statements to P. W. 2 that he would give her jewels, and that he had gone to the middle house to get them were inadmissible [2025] 7 S.C.R. 629Vibhor Garg v. Neha under Section 122 of the Evidence Act, being communications made to his wife. This is plainly so, and the Courts below ought not to have taken this evidence into consideration.
xxx
6. Firstly, there is the evidence of P. W. 2 that the accused was seen in the early hours of the 27th May 1952 while it was still dark, coming down the roof of his house, that he went to the bhusha kothri and came out again and had a bath and put on the dhoti again. This is not inadmissible under Section 122, as it has reference to acts and conduct of the appellant and not to any communication made by him to his wife.”
(underlining by us)
8.6 In the case of Appu Alias Ayyanar Padayachi vs. State, AIR 1971 Mad 194, the Madras High Court was dealing with a confession made by the appellant-accused therein to his wife which was in the presence of other witnesses. While the wife was not allowed to disclose that communication due to the bar under Section 122, it was allowed to be disclosed by the other witnesses present at the scene. The Madras High Court observed as follows:
“6. But, as observed in Queen v. Donaghue, (1899) ILR 22 Mad 1 at page 3, the communication between a husband and his wife is not protected if it can be proved without their assistance, for, in these communications there is no question of any compulsion or permission to the wife or the husband to disclose it. The section protects the individuals and not the communication of it. Viscount Radcliffe in Rumping v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1962-3 All ER 256 at 265 observed that such communications could be proved by some other form of testimony as that of a witness who had overheard their confidence or by the production of a letter which contained the confidence, but had passed into other hands. In other 630 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports words, the law does not protect the communications as such, but only excludes the spouse from being a witness to prove it. Thus marital communications could be proved by the evidence of the over-hearers, even though the wife herself could not have been called to testify to them. The decision in R. v. Smithies, 1832-5 C and P 332, R. v. Simons, 1834-6 C and P 540 and R. v. Bartlett, 1837-7 C and P 832 are to this effect. In 1834-6 C and P 540, two over-hearers were allowed to prove at the trial what the husband, who was tried, had told his wife in confidence.”
(underlining by us)
8.7 Section 122 of the Evidence Act deals with rule of privilege protecting disclosure of all communications between persons married to one another made during marriage, except in certain cases, i.e., in litigation between themselves. According to Sarkar’s Law of Evidence, 20th Edition, Volume 2, the provisions of the Section may be summarised as under:
(i) The privilege extends to all communications made to a person during marriage, by any person to whom he or she has been married, but not to communications before marriage.
(ii) The communication need not be confidential. The rule applies to communications of every nature.
(iii) The rule of privilege applies equally whether or not the witness or his or her spouse is a party to the proceeding. It extends to all cases, i.e., to cases between strangers as well as to suits or proceedings in which the husband or wife is a party.
(iv) The privilege extends to communications made to a spouse and not to those made by a spouse. But the privilege is conferred not on the witness (unless the witness happens to be the spouse who made the communication), but on the spouse who made the communication; the witness cannot therefore waive it at his or her will, nor can the court permit disclosure even if he or she is willing to do it [2025] 7 S.C.R. 631Vibhor Garg v. Neha (Nawab Howladar vs. Emperor, 1913 SCC OnLine Cal
447. It is only the spouse who made the communication or his or her representative in interest who can consent to give up the privilege.
8.8 From a reading of the above section and the judgments, the following principles and interpretations can be culled out:
(i) Unlike Section 120 of the Evidence Act, which deals with competency of a husband or a wife to be a witness in a civil or criminal proceeding involving the other, Section 122 of the said Act deals with the admissibility of privileged communications made by a married person to a partner during the subsistence of the marriage.
(ii) Section 122 of the Evidence Act is worded in two parts – one, dealing with ‘compellability’ and the other, dealing with ‘permissibility’. These two parts are separated by a semi-colon, which shows that the two parts are separate and have to be read disjunctively.
(iii) The first part deals with ‘compellability’. Here, if one of the spouses is not willing to disclose the communication made to the other, the latter cannot be compelled by any court, authority or person, which by law is otherwise competent to compel the person to give evidence, to disclose what their married partner communicated to the said spouse during the time when the marriage was subsisting. This is a blanket bar which cannot be relaxed in any situation. This protects the right to privacy between a married couple.
(iv) The second part deals with ‘permissibility’. This is an even greater restriction than the first part. Here, even if one of the spouses is willing to disclose the communication made to him/her, the Court still cannot permit it to be taken as evidence, unless the other spouse who made that communication, or their representative-in-interest, consents to the disclosure of such communication. In other words, without the consent of the spouse who made the communication, the court cannot permit the other spouse to disclose that communication. Another way of looking at it is that if one of the spouses is willing to disclose the 632 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports communication, then it is not the court that can give consent to the disclosure but it is actually the other spouse who made that communication who can consent to disclosing it.
(v) The second part, relating to ‘permissibility’, is then followed by two exceptions which are – a. proceedings in suits between married persons, b. proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against each other.
Therefore, it means that in these two given scenarios, the requirement of taking consent from the other spouse before being permitted to disclose the communication is done away with.
[Ref.: M.C. Verghese vs. T.J. Poonan, (1969) 1 SCC 37]
(vi) The provision is neither an absolute bar on any person nor on the communication. It puts a specific and limited bar on a married person from disclosing the communication made to him/her by his/her spouse during the subsistence of a marriage between them.
(vii) If the marriage was subsisting at the time when the communications were made, the bar prescribed by Section 122 of the Evidence Act will operate. The bar to the admissibility in evidence of communications made during marriage attaches at the time when the communication is made and its admissibility will be adjudged in light of the status on the date and not the status at the date when evidence is sought to be given in court.
(viii) The provision applies vis-à-vis a legally wedded wife and not to any other kind of relationship. [Ref.: Shankar vs. State of T.N, (1994) 4 SCC 478]
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