National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 694; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 252
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- Justice Bela M. Trivedi, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
- Decided
- 14 May 2025
- Case number
- No. 995/2019
- Sections
- 14, 4, 26E, 4(2), 238, 27, 96, 2, 4(1), 63, 5, 35
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 252 : 2025 INSC 694 National Spot Exchange Limited v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 995 of 2019)
15 May 2025 [Bela M. Trivedi* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the Secured creditors would have priority of interest over the assets attached under the Provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, (PMLA) and Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999 (MPID Act), by virtue of the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and RDB Act, 1993; whether the properties of the Judgment Debtors and Garnishees attached under the Provisions of MPID Act, 1999 would be available for the execution of the decrees against Judgment Debtors in view of the Provision of Moratorium under Section 14 of the
IBC, 2016.
Headnotes† Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999 (MPID Act) – s.4 – Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) – s.26E – Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act) – Constitution of India – Article 246 – Commodity Exchange Platform of National Spot Exchange Limited committed payment defaults and fraud of about Rs.5,600 Crores – Secured creditors, if would have priority of interest over the assets attached under the PMLA and MPID Act, by virtue of the SARFAESI Act and RDB Act:
Held: No priority of interest can be claimed by the Secured Creditors against the properties attached under the MPID Act – The provisions of MPID Act would override any claim for priority of interest by the Secured Creditors in respect of the properties * Author [2025] 7 S.C.R. 253National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. which have been attached under the MPID Act – Monies or deposits of depositors/investors, who were allegedly defrauded by the Financial Establishment, and for the recovery of which the MPID Act has been enacted, could not be said to be a “debt” contemplated in s.26E of the SARFAESI Act, and hence also the provisions of s.26E are not attracted to the facts of the case – Order passed by the Supreme Court Committee on 10.08.2023 upheld. [Paras 43, 44, 53] Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999 (MPID Act) – ss.4, 4(2), 5, 7 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.14 – The properties of the Judgment Debtors and Garnishees attached under the MPID Act, if would be available for the execution of the decrees against Judgment Debtors in view of the provision of moratorium u/s.14, IBC:
Held: Yes – Properties of the Judgment Debtors and Garnishees attached under the provisions of the MPID Act, would be available for the execution of the decrees against the Judgment Debtors by the Supreme Court Committee, despite the provision of moratorium u/s.14, IBC – Order passed by the Supreme Court Committee on 08.01.2024 upheld. [Paras 52, 53] Constitution of India – Article 246, 254; Seventh Schedule – Federal Structure Doctrine – Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999 (MPID Act) – Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) – Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act) – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) – Conflict between the laws made by the Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature – Overlapping of legislative fields – Whether the MPID Act covers or relates to the same subject matter as covered under the Central Legislations i.e., SARFAESI Act and RDB Act as also PMLA:
Held: State of Maharashtra was within its legislative competence to enact the MPID Act, the subject matter of which in pith and substance was relatable to Entries 1, 30 and 32 of the State List (List II) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India – The subject matter of PMLA is traceable to the Entry-13 of Union List 254 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports (List-I) of Seventh Schedule – Further, both SARFAESI and RDB Act have been enacted with regard to the matter pertaining to “Banking,” which subject matter is relatable to the Entry 45 “Banking” falling in the Union List (List-I) of Seventh Schedule – Considering the pith and substance of the State and the Central Legislations in question, the Central Legislations i.e., SARFAESI Act or RDB Act cannot be permitted to prevail over the State Legislation i.e., MPID Act, merely because the Central Legislations are enacted by the Parliament – Since all these Acts have separate field of operations, provisions of SARFAESI Act or RDB Act cannot be permitted to override the provisions of MPID Act, a validly enacted State Legislation for the subject matter falling in List-II- State List, otherwise it would tantamount to violation of federal structure doctrine envisaged in the Constitution – MPID Act would prevail in the State of Maharashtra in respect of the specific subject matter for which the said Act was enacted, in view of Clause (3) of Article
246. [Paras 34-37, 40, 41] Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999 (MPID Act) – s.4, 4(2), 5, 7 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss.14, 238 – If there is any inconsistency between the MPID Act and the IBC:
Held: No – A conjoint reading of ss.4, 5 and 7, MPID Act makes it clear that though s.4(2) states about the attached properties being vested in the Competent Authority appointed by the Government, such vesting would be subject to the orders passed by the Designated Court – There is no inconsistency between the MPID Act and the IBC – In absence of any inconsistency having been brought on record, between the provisions contained in the MPID Act and in the IBC, s.238 of IBC, which gives overriding effect to the IBC over the other Acts for the time being in force, cannot be said to have been attracted – Constitution of India – Article 254. [Paras 50, 51] Constitution of India – Article 246(1), (2), (3); Seventh Schedule-List-I, II and III – Distribution of legislative powers between the Union and State Legislature – Principle of Federal Supremacy:
Held: A three-fold distribution of legislative power between the Union and the States made in the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule r/w Article 246, exhibits the Principle of Federal supremacy – Thus, in case of inevitable conflict between Union and State powers, the [2025] 7 S.C.R. 255National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. Union power as enumerated in List-I shall prevail over the State power as enumerated in Lists-II and III, and in case of overlapping between Lists II and III, the latter shall prevail. [Para 26] Constitution of India – Article 142 – Powers under – Plea of the intervenors that exercising powers u/Article 142, this Court appointed the Supreme Court Committee conferring upon the committee wide powers for the execution of the decrees/ orders/awards, which virtually superseded the statutory provisions contained in the Acts like SARFAESI Act, RDB Act, PMLA, IBC, etc. – Scope of powers u/Article 142, discussed. [Paras 13, 14, 19] Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999 (MPID Act) – s.4 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.14 – Constitution of India – Article 254; Seventh Schedule – List I-III:
Held: MPID Act has been validly enacted by the Government of Maharashtra for the matters falling in List-II- State List, and therefore would prevail in the State of Maharashtra – The MPID Act having been enacted for the matters relatable to the Entries-1, 30 and 32 in List-II-State List, and the IBC having been enacted for the matters relatable to the Entry-9 in List-III- Concurrent List, the provisions of Article 254 would not be attracted – The issue of repugnancy or conflict as contemplated in Article 254 would arise only when the State Legislation and the Central Legislation, both, are relatable to the Entries contained in List-III-Concurrent List of Seventh Schedule – In the instant case, there is also no overlap or inconsistency between the provisions contained in the IBC and MPID Act – s.14 of IBC has the connotation which is very much different from s.4 of MPID Act – s.14 of IBC is consequent upon the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority declaring Moratorium – However, so far as the attachment of properties u/s.4 of the MPID Act is concerned, it is beyond the realm of the Debtor-Creditor relationship as contemplated in the IBC. [Para 47, 48] Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999 (MPID Act) – Object:
Held: MPID Act was enacted by the State of Maharashtra to protect the interest of depositors of the Financial Establishments – 256 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports It was enacted in the public interest to curb the unscrupulous activities of the Financial Establishments, who had defaulted to return the deposits of the public in the State of Maharashtra. [Paras 24, 47] Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 – Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 – Object – Discussed. [Paras 21-23] Case Law Cited Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Another [1998] 2 SCR 795 : (1998) 4 SCC 409; Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan [2023] 5 SCR 165 : (2023) 14 SCC 231; State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Ors. [2010] 2 SCR 979 : (2010) 3 SCC 571; M/s Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors [1983] 3 SCR 130 : (1983) 4 SCC 45; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [1994] 2 SCR 375 : (1994) 3 SCC 569; Rajiv Sarin and Another v. State of Uttarakhand and Ors. [2011] 9 SCR 1012 : (2011) 8 SCC 708; Sonal Hemant Joshi and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2012) 10 SCC 601; State of Maharashtra v. 63 Moons Technologies Ltd. [2022] 10 SCR 465 : (2022) 9 SCC 457; K.K. Baskaran v. State [2011] 3 SCR 527 : (2011) 3 SCC 793; Mardia Chemicals Ltd and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [2004] 3 SCR 982 : (2004) 4 SCC 311; Union of India and Another v. Delhi High Court Bar Association and Others [2002] 2 SCR 450 : (2002) 4 SCC 275; ITC Limited v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee and Others [2002] 1 SCR 441 : (2002) 9 SCC 232; State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Limited and Others [2004] 1 SCR 564 : (2004) 10 SCC 201; Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank and Another [2017] 8 SCR 33 : (2018) 1 SCC 407 – referred to.
List of Acts Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999; Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002; Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993; Constitution of India; Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952. [2025] 7 S.C.R. 257National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. List of Keywords Commodity Exchange Platform; National Spot Exchange Limited (NSEL); NSEL Scam; Payment defaults and fraud; Secured Creditors; Priority of interest over the assets attached under the Provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, (PMLA) and Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999; Recovery of monies lost by the traders; Properties of the judgment debtors and garnishees attached; Supreme Court committee; Constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999; Debts due to the Secured Creditor have to be paid in priority; Fraudulent Default by a Financial Establishment; Security interest; Garnishee; Sale and purchase of commodities; Traders duped; Priority of interest of the charge over the attached properties; Speedy recovery of the outstanding amount; Doctrine of pith and substance; Powers under Article 142 of Constitution of India; Article 246 of Constitution of India; Federal Structure Doctrine; Principle of Federal Supremacy; Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India; List-I, II and III.
Case Arising From CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 995 of 2019 (Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioner:
Atul Nanda, Sr. Adv., Ms. Diksha Rai, Ms. Rameeza Hakeem. Advs. for the Respondents:
Amit Sibal, Sr. Adv., Aditya Verma, Y Suryanarayana, Vijay Kumar Singh, Ms. Shivani Tandon, Prem Prakash, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Sachin Patil, Himanshu Chaubey, Vikalp Mudgal, Shashwat Anand, Ms. Abha Jain, Ashok Kumar Gupta II, Bijoy Kumar Jain, Bhaskar Aditya, Ankur Mittal, Ms. Sanjana Saddy, Mohd. Zahid Hussain, Y. Raja Gopala Rao, Gopal Singh, Ms. Arti Singh, Chand Qureshi, Shashank Singh, Sumit Sinha, Ratish Kumar Sharma, Ananta Prasad Mishra, Sanyat Lodha, B. K. Satija, Nitesh Ranjan, Sanjay Kapur, Shiv Sagar Tiwari, Ms. Anindita Mitra, Ajay Kumar, Satish Vig, Anand Varma, Navneet R., Nikhil Jain, Ritwik Parikh, Rajat Sehgal, Ms. Shisba Chawla.
258 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Bela M. Trivedi, J.
1. While considering the validity of the orders dated 10.08.2023 and 08.01.2024 passed by the Supreme Court Committee appointed by this Court vide the order dated 04.05.2022, following two questions were framed by this Court to be heard in priority on the basis of the categorisation of the Applications filed in the captioned Writ Petition vide the Order dated 02.04.2024.
“(i) whether the Secured creditors would have priority of interest over the assets attached under the Provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, (PMLA) and Maharashtra Protection of Investors and Depositors Act, 1999 (MPID Act), by virtue of the Provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and RDB Act, 1993; (In view of order dated 10.08.2023 passed by the Committee)
(ii) whether the properties of the Judgment Debtors and Garnishees attached under the Provisions of MPID Act, 1999 would be available for the execution of the decrees against Judgment Debtors in view of the Provision of Moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, 2016; (In view of the Order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the Committee)”
2. The genesis of the Writ proceedings, is the scam which took place at the Commodity Exchange Platform of the Petitioner Company – National Spot Exchange Limited (NSEL), a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, on 18.05.2005. It is promoted by 63 Moons Technologies Limited (Formerly Financial Technologies India Limited), which holds 99.99% of total share capital of the company and the National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India Limited (NAFED) holds 0.01% of total share capital of company. The Exchange Platform of the NSEL committed payment defaults and fraud aggregating to about Rs.5,600 Crores vis-à-vis their trading counterparts numbering about 13,000 traders who traded through its Members/ brokers.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 259National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors.
PRELUDE
3. Brief facts germane for deciding the above stated two priority questions of law are as under: i. The Petitioner – National Spot Exchange Limited (hereinafter referred to as the “NSEL”) provided an electronic platform for trading of commodities between willing buyers and willing sellers through NSEL’s Members/ brokers representing them. On 05.06.2007, the Department of Consumer Affairs issued an Exemption Notification to the NSEL under Section 27 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as “FCRA”), exempting forward contracts of one day duration for sale and purchase of commodities traded on the NSEL from operation of the provisions of the FCRA. The NSEL commenced its operations in October, 2008.
ii. The trading on the Exchange Platform of the Petitioner could be undertaken only by the registered Members of the exchange either on their own behalf or on behalf of their clients. At the request of their clients, the Members of NSEL would place orders for buying/ selling commodities. When the orders placed by willing buyers and willing sellers of a particular commodity would get matched automatically on NSEL’s Exchange Platform, based on the price and time priority, it would result in a trade. iii. The NSEL launched contracts for buying and selling of commodities with different settlement periods ranging from T+0, T+1, T+2 days to T+36 days. In the said Contracts, ‘T’ meant the Trade date, that is the date on which the trade is executed on the exchange and ‘+ 2’ or ‘+ 25’ referred to the number of business days, after which the delivery of the commodity and payment of price (that is settlement of transaction) was to be affected by the buying Member and the selling Member as the case may be. At the end of the day all trades would get clubbed and the obligation of respective Members of NSEL would be generated.
iv. Thereafter, the funds “Pay – in” obligation would be intimated to the Members of NSEL whose clients purchased the commodities, and the funds “Pay – out” obligation would be intimated to the 260 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Members of NSEL whose clients sold the commodities. Similarly, the commodity “Pay-in” obligation would be intimated to the Members of NSEL whose client sold the commodities and the commodity “Pay-out” obligation would be intimated to the Members of NSEL whose clients purchased the commodities. Based on the intimation from the exchange, the clients would have to fulfil their respective obligations through the Members of the NSEL, through whom they had traded, on the Exchange Platform.
v. On 27.04.2012, the Department of Consumer Affairs, Government of India issued a Show Cause Notice to the NSEL as to why action should not be initiated against it for permitting transactions in alleged violation of exemption granted to it under the FCRA, vide the notification dated 05.06.2007.
vi. On 12.07.2013, the Department of Consumer Affairs, directed the NSEL to give an undertaking that no further contracts shall be launched until further instructions, and that all existing contracts shall be settled on due dates. Accordingly, the NSEL gave an undertaking to the Department of Consumer Affairs on 22.07.2013.
vii. On 31.07.2013, the NSEL suspended its Exchange operations and called upon its Members to inter alia complete their respective delivery and payment obligations for the outstanding trades as on 31.07.2013. In July 2013, 13,000 persons who traded on the platform of the NSEL claimed to have been duped by about 24 trading Members, who defaulted in payment of their obligations amounting to approximately Rs.5,600/- Crores. viii. An FIR in this regard was registered by the M.R.A. Marg, Police Station vide C.R. No.216 of 2013, which was transferred to and lodged in the EOW Police on 30.09.2013 as C.R. No.89 of 2013. Several suits also came to be filed by the traders who were allegedly duped on the trading platform. One Suit being No.173 of 2014 came to be filed in the Bombay High Court, as a representative suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The NSEL filed third party notices in the said suit for recovery of Rs.5,600/- Crores against its 24 defaulter members.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 261National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. ix. According to the NSEL, in the process of recovery proceedings filed by it, the decrees/ awards of about Rs.3,365 Crores out of Rs.5,600 Crores were passed against the defaulters. Additionally, the Enforcement Directorate also had attached assets worth approximately Rs.1740.59 Crores of the defaulters under the PMLA 2002. The provisions of the Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the “MPID Act”) were also added to the said F.I.R. in October 2013, as a result of which the State of Maharashtra also attached movable and immovable properties worth about Rs.8,548 Crores belonging to the 24 defaulters, the Directors and Sister concerns of the NSEL and its Directors and Promoters, in order to ensure recovery of the monies allegedly lost by the genuine trading clients on the NSEL’s platform.
x. Since the NSEL had also filed various Proceedings and the Suits, some of them having been decreed also, it was finding it difficult to file execution proceedings at various Courts. The NSEL, therefore filed the captioned Writ Petition seeking directions for the Consolidation of the Proceedings before the Committee appointed by the Bombay High Court vide the order dated 02.09.2014 in Notice of Motion No.240 of 2014 in Suit No.173 of 2014 and seeking other directions.
xi. This Court on 04.05.2022 for safeguarding of the interests of the Investors / Claimants passed the following Order: - “O R D E R Writ Petition(s)(Civil) No(s). 995/2019 The limited contours of the controversy before us emanating from the present proceedings is the safeguarding of the interests of the investors/ claimants.
In respect of the aforesaid, learned counsel for the petitioner had canvassed before us on 22.02.2022 that the way out would be that the properties attached by the respondent(s) are sold and monies brought into Court. This is in the context of decrees passed 262 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports for the benefit of the petitioner where the same very properties which were attached were sought to be utilized to satisfy the claims. He thus, suggested that once the monies are brought in, even the claims of the petitioners/investors can be satisfied and one will know exactly what is the balance amount which remains as otherwise both the processes are going on at cross purposes even though the properties from which recoveries can be made are attached.
We thus, called upon the respondents to look into the aforesaid notwithstanding that the petitioner may also be an organization which as been charged, concerned as we were with the investors’ money and properties remaining attached simplicitor could not be the solution for investors’ money for which decrees had been passed. It is only on liquidation of those properties could the monies be distributed to satisfy the claims of the investors.
We requested the parties to work out a scenario to sub-serve the aforesaid objective and a synopsis was filed on behalf of the petitioner setting out the relevant dates and suggesting solution for speedy recovery of victims annexing thereto the details of decrees, arbitral awards obtained by the petitioner and execution proceedings thereof.
The ground work has been done by the parties and more or less they were in agreement on most issues.
The other remaining issues have also been ironed out during the Court proceedings.
In view of the aforesaid, we are inclined to exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India with the objective of attaining a holistic solution for speedy recovery of the outstanding amounts to be distributed to be investors.
The agreed terms have been placed before us which are being incorporated in this order as under: - [2025] 7 S.C.R. 263National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. “(i) A high powered committee of a Hon’ble Mr.
Justice (Retd.) [ ], who has consented for the same, is hereby constituted (hereinafter referred to as the “Supreme Court Committee”). The Supreme Court Committee may in its discretion, hold meetings/hearings at Mumbai.
(ii) The proceedings for execution of all the decrees/orders/arbitral awards listed in Annexure-1, particular of which are set out in Annexure-2, currently pending in various Courts across the country, are hereby transferred to the Supreme Court Committee, for speedy execution thereof.
(iii) Against 5 additional Defaulters, the Committee appointed by Bombay High Court has crystallised the liability and the report of the said Committee is pending acceptance before Bombay High Court, details whereof are set out in Annexure-3. In the event the petitioner is granted decree/order by Bombay High Court in any or all of these matters, then the petitioner shall be at liberty to file the proceedings for execution of such decrees/orders before the Supreme Court Committee, and the Supreme Court Committee shall have the power to execute such decrees/orders.
(iv) In proceedings where the petitioner has already obtained decrees/orders against the Defaulters, the petitioner is seeking further decrees/orders against other persons as well. In the event the petitioner is granted decree/order by the Bombay High Court in any or all of these matters, then the petitioner shall be at liberty to file the proceedings for execution of such decrees/ orders before the Supreme Court Committee, and the Supreme Court Committee shall have the power to execute such decrees/orders.
264 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(v) The petitioner shall be at liberty to apply to this Hon’ble Court in case there are further decrees/orders/arbitral awards obtained by it against the Defaulters or any other person in relation to the NSEL payment default for the purposes of filing execution thereof directly before the Supreme Court Committee.
(vi) The Supreme Court Committee shall have all the powers of a civil court executing a decree or an order or an arbitral award under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for speedy execution of the above decrees/orders/abitral awards.
(vii) In execution of the above decrees/orders/ arbitral awards, the Supreme Court Committee shall be entitled to sell the properties of the judgment-debtors notwithstanding the attachment thereof by respondent No.2(ED)
under the PMLA and/or by respondent No.3 (State of Maharashtra) under the MPID Act, to the extent of recovering the amount of the decree/order/arbitral award.
(viii) For the purposes of executing decrees/ orders/awards to the extent they are not satisfied by recovery from the properties attached by the respondents or any of them as aforesaid, the Supreme Court Committee shall be at liberty to apply to this Hon’ble Court for suitable orders for attaching and/or liquidating properties of persons against whom decrees have been passed or of persons against whom the decrees can be executed as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or properties of persons to whom money trail from the judgment debtors has been traced by the respondents or any of them.
(ix) The Competent Authority appointed by respondent No.3(State of Maharashtra) has [2025] 7 S.C.R. 265National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. already opened an account with (a) Bank of India (for collection) and (b) AXIS Bank (for distribution). The sale proceeds so realized shall be deposited in either of these Bank Accounts at the discretion of the Supreme Court Committee.
(x) The Competent Authority appointed by respondent No.3 (State of Maharashtra) under MPID Act has invited claims from the victims and verified them to check genuineness and entitlement thereof.
(xi) The Competent Authority appointed by respondent No.3 (State of Maharashtra) under MPID Act shall file a report with the Supreme Court Committee setting out the names of the claimants and the amount that is due and payable to each of them, for passing necessary orders/directions/reverification, if required for equitable distribution of the sale proceeds to the victims from the accounts mentioned in Clause (ix) above.
(xii) The Supreme Court Committee shall be entitled to co-opt the services of such experts (such as Advocates, Chartered Accountants, Valuers etc.) and support staff as it may consider necessary for efficient and speedy execution of task assigned to it.
(xiii) Hon’ble Mr. Justice [ ] shall be entitled to fix such remuneration for himself and for other persons co-opted by him as he deems fit commensurate with the responsibilities assigned to them.
(xiv) In the first instance, the Competent Authority appointed by Respondent No.3(State of Maharashtra) under MPID Act shall bear all the expenses required to be incurred for the functioning of the Supreme Court Committee, 266 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports including but not limited to remuneration, fees, physical infrastructure etc. and shall keep proper accounts of the same.
(xv) As and when any monies are realised by the Supreme Court Committee in accordance with the process set out above, the Competent Authority appointed by respondent No.3 (State of Maharashtra) under MPID Act shall be reimbursed by this Hon’ble Court for the expenses incurred by it under paragraph (xiv) above on submission of proper accounts for the same.
(xvi) The Supreme Court Committee shall have liberty to apply to this Hon’ble Court for any further orders and/or directions as it may consider necessary for efficient and speedy execution of the task assigned to it.
(xvii) Any person aggrieved by an order and/ or direction passed by the Supreme Court Committee shall be entitled to move this Hon’ble Court.
(xviii) All the parties and the authorities shall render all necessary assistance and cooperation to the Supreme Court Committee.
(xix) Needless to say that respondent No.2(ED)
and/or respondent No.3 (State of Maharashtra)
shall continue to attach further properties of the defaulters as per the money trail found by them during investigation and inform the Supreme Court Committee of such further attachment.
Upon receipt of such intimation, the Supreme Court Committee shall be entitled to liquidate such further attached properties of the defaulters after hearing them, but only to the extent necessary for satisfaction of the decree/orders/ arbitral awards obtained by the petitioner against such defaulters.”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 267National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. We may note that insofar as the list of decrees, orders, awards and attachment against defaulters are concerned, we are not setting them out as part of the order though submitted as the annexure annexing along with the details of the execution proceedings as Annexure-2. The liability of the defaulters crystallized by the High Court Committee is pending before the Bombay High Court has been set out as Annexure-3.
This material can always be placed before the highpowered committee of an Hon’ble Judge appointed by this Court.
We may note that both the State of Maharashtra and Enforcement Directorate would naturally like to assist the Committee in all manners and the Committee will have the power to seek information from any one and run its affairs as expeditiously as possible.
On further discussion in the Court, it is agreed that a single Member Committee may be appointed who would have the assistance of all concerned.
With the consent of parties, Hon’ble Justice Pradeep Nandrajog, retired Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, whose consent has been taken, is appointed as the Single Member Committee for the said purpose to carry out the task. The learned Judge will fix his own fee. Insofar as the sitting of the Committee is concerned, it has already been mentioned aforesaid that it can be at the discretion of the Committee to hold proceedings in Delhi or Mumbai or for that matter anywhere else.
The arrangements for the sitting of the Committee shall be made by the Competent Authority as also the necessary arrangements for stay of the learned Judge and all other expenses including travel.
We would like to keep the matter pending and request the learned Judge to give a status report in about six months.
List after the status report is received.”
268 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports xii. In view of the afore stated Order dated 04.05.2022 passed by this Court, the Supreme Court Committee comprising of Justice (Retd.) Mr. Pradeep Nandrajog (hereinafter referred to as the S.C. Committee) was constituted. The Proceedings for execution of all decrees/ orders/ arbitral awards listed in Annexure-1 of the said Order, the particulars of which were set out in Annexure-2 thereof, pending in various Courts across the country were transferred to the S.C. Committee. The decrees/ orders already obtained and in respect of which the decree holder had not yet commenced the execution proceedings were also directed to be executed by the S.C. Committee. In the proceedings where decree holder had obtained decrees/ orders and was seeking further decrees/ orders against other persons as well, and upon being granted the same by the Bombay High Court, were also to be executed by the S.C. Committee. The proceedings against the parties, i.e., the defaulters, against whom the liability had been crystallised by the Committee appointed by the Bombay High Court, in the event, the decree holder was granted decrees/ orders by the Bombay High Court, such decrees for execution were also permitted to be transferred to the S.C. Committee for their execution. Qua future decrees/ awards or orders obtained by the decree holder, a liberty was granted to the decree holder to apply to the Supreme Court for execution of such decrees/ orders by the S.C. Committee.
xiii. As transpiring from the impugned Order dated 10.08.2023 passed by the S.C. Committee, one Modern India Limited, Shree Rani Sati Investment and Finance Private Limited, Modern Derivatives and Commodities Private Limited and F. Pudumjee Investments Company Private Limited had filed a Suit on the Original Side of Bombay High Court, impleading Financial Technologies India Limited (now known as 63 Moons Technologies Limited) as the Defendant No.1 and the NSEL as Defendant No.2, apart from 36 other Individuals and Companies who were impleaded as the Defendant Nos. 3 to
38. The said Suit was registered as Suit no.173 of 2014. The NSEL - Defendant No.2 took out third party notices in the said Suit against its Trading Members who had defaulted in their funds “Pay – in” obligations, resulting in decrees being passed [2025] 7 S.C.R. 269National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. against such Trading Members and their lands by the Bombay High Court in favour of the NSEL. Additionally, in some cases the Arbitral awards were obtained by the NSEL against some of the defaulting Trading Members. Therefore, such defaulting Trading Members of the NSEL were the Judgment Debtors, on whom the liability was affixed in respect of the Third-party proceedings in the Suit No. 173 of 2014. In separate actions, the Enforcement Directorate under the provisions of the PMLA and the Competent Authority under the provisions of MPID Act had also attached the properties belonging to the Judgment Debtors who were the defaulting Trading Members of the NSEL. xiv. During the course of Execution Proceedings before the S.C. Committee, a few Financial Creditors of some of the Judgment Debtors (the Secured Creditors) had filed Applications seeking intervention on the ground that in the capacity as Secured Creditors they would have priority of interest of the charge over the attached properties of the Judgment Debtors.
4. In view of the afore stated factual matrix, the S.C. Committee raised an issue as to “Whether the Secured creditors would have priority of interest over assets attached under the Provisions of PMLA, 2002, and MPID Act, by virtue of the Provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the “SARFAESI Act, 2002”) and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the “RDP Act”)?”
5. The S.C. Committee addressing the said issue concluded vide the Order dated 10.08.2023 that given the overriding effect, the secured property being in the nature of proceeds of crime, as held by the Attachment orders, no priority of interest can be claimed by the Secured Creditors against such attached property. As regard the properties attached under the MPID Act, on which the Secured Creditors laid their claims, the S.C. Committee further concluded that the provisions of the MPID Act, would override any claim for priority of interest by the Secured creditors in respect of the property which has been attached under the MPID Act.
6. It further appears that during the course of proceedings before the S.C. Committee another issue that was raised for determination, was 270 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “whether properties of the Judgment Debtor and Garnishees attached under the MPID Act would be available to the said Committee for execution of decrees against the Judgment Debtor in terms of the Order dated 04.05.2022 passed by the Supreme Court, in W.P. (C) No. 995 of 2019, in view of the commencement of Moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC, for short) , on account of the initiation of Insolvency Proceedings against the Judgment Debtors.” A similar issue also arose with regard to the commencement of the interim Moratorium under Section 96 of IBC in respect of the Garnishees in their capacity as personal Guarantors of a Corporate Debtor.
7. The S.C. Committee vide the Order dated 08.01.2024 concluded inter alia that as regards the properties which were attached under Section 4 of the MPID Act prior to imposition of the respective dates of Moratorium of the Judgement Debtor or Garnishee under Section 14 or Section 96 of IBC, the property having been vested in the Competent Authority appointed by the State of Maharashtra, such properties were not liable to be made part of Insolvency Proceedings, and could be available to the said Committee for realisation in terms of the Order dated 04.05.2022 passed by the Supreme Court. It further concluded that as regards the properties which were sought to be attached after the date of commencement of Moratorium (if any) or assets of Judgment Debtor/ Garnishee/ Corporate Debtor which were not yet attached under the Provisions of the MPID Act, the decree holder would be entitled to pursue its claim as a Financial Creditor/ Secured Financial Creditor, as the case may be in such individual cases under the Provisions of the IBC.
8. Being aggrieved by the aforestated two Orders dated 10.08.2023 & 08.01.2024 passed by the Supreme Court Committee, some SLPs came to be filed before this Court. The said SLPs were permitted to be converted into Interlocutory Applications (IAs) in the present Writ Petition filed by the NSEL.
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 142
9. At the outset learned Counsels appearing for the Applicants/ Intervenors have raised the preliminary objections against the order passed by this Court on 04.05.2022, by submitting that this Court [2025] 7 S.C.R. 271National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. while exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, had appointed the S.C. Committee and issued directions conferring upon the said committee wide powers with regard to the execution of the decrees/orders/awards, which had virtually superseded the statutory provisions contained in the Acts like SARFAESI Act, RDB Act, PMLA, IBC, etc. According to them, while exercising the powers under Article 142, the express statutory provisions cannot be circumvented or ignored, particularly when the exercise of such powers comes directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the statute.
10. Article 142(1) is reproduced hereunder for ready reference: “142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.-
(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.
(2) …………..”
11. In our opinion, the law with regard to the scope of the exercise of powers of under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is quite well settled. In Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India & Another1 , a Constitution Bench elaborately discussed the plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 and held as under: “47. The plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist
1 (1998) 4 SCC 409
272 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers. This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which this Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while administering justice according to law. There is no doubt that it is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the Court to prevent “clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice”. It, however, needs to be remembered that the powers conferred on the Court by Article 142 being curative in nature cannot be construed as powers which authorise the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it. This power cannot be used to “supplant” substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the Court. Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly. Punishing a contemner advocate, while dealing with a contempt of court case by suspending his licence to practice, a power otherwise statutorily available only to the Bar Council of India, on the ground that the contemner is also an advocate, is, therefore, not permissible in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The construction of Article 142 must be functionally informed by the salutary purposes of the article, viz., to do complete justice between the parties. [2025] 7 S.C.R. 273National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. It cannot be otherwise. As already noticed in a case of contempt of court, the contemner and the court cannot be said to be litigating parties.
48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law-maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem-solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subjectmatter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.
49. In Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra [(1995) 6 SCC 447 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1113] a Bench of this Court observed:
(SCC p. 458, para 23)
“23. The amplitude of powers available to this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is normally speaking not conditioned by any statutory provision but it cannot be lost sight of that this Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution with a view to do justice between the 274 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports parties but not in disregard of the relevant statutory provisions.”
50. Dealing with the powers of this Court under Article 142, in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., U.P. [AIR 1963 SC 996 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885] it was said by the Constitution Bench:
“In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that the wide powers which are given to this Court for doing complete justice between the parties, can be used by this Court, for instance, in adding parties to the proceedings pending before it, or in admitting additional evidence, or in remanding the case, or in allowing a new point to be taken for the first time. It is plain that in exercising these and similar other powers, this Court would not be bound by the relevant provisions of procedure if it is satisfied that a departure from the said procedure is necessary to do complete justice between the parties.
That takes us to the second argument urged by the Solicitor General that Article 142 and Article 32 should be reconciled by the adoption of the rule of harmonious construction. In this connection, we ought to bear in mind that though the powers conferred on this Court by Article 142(1) are very wide, and the same can be exercised for doing complete justice in any case, as we have already observed, this Court cannot even under Article 142(1) make an order plainly inconsistent with the express statutory provisions of substantive law, much less, inconsistent with any constitutional provisions. There can, therefore be no conflict between Article 142(1) and Article 32. In the case of K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 112 : (1961) 1 SCR 497] on which the Solicitor General relies, it was conceded, and rightly, that under Article 142(1) this Court had the power to grant bail in cases brought before it, and so, there was obviously a conflict between the power vested in this Court under the said article and that vested in the Governor of the State under Article 161. The possibility of a conflict between these powers necessitated [2025] 7 S.C.R. 275National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. the application of the rule of harmonious construction. The said rule can have no application to the present case, because on a fair construction of Article 142(1), this Court has no power to circumscribe the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32. The existence of the said power is itself in dispute, and so, the present is clearly distinguishable from the case of K.M. Nanavati [AIR 1961 SC 112 : (1961) 1 SCR 497] .”
51-54……………………
55. Thus, a careful reading of the judgments in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India [(1991) 4 SCC 584] ; the Delhi Judicial Service Assn. case [(1991) 4 SCC 406 : (1991) 3 SCR 936] and Mohd. Anis case [1994 Supp
(1) SCC 145 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 251] relied upon in V.C. Mishra case [(1995) 2 SCC 584] show that the Court did not actually doubt the correctness of the observations in Prem Chand Garg case [AIR 1963 SC 996 : 1963 Supp
(1) SCR 885] . As a matter of fact, it was observed that in the established facts of those cases, the observations in Prem Chand Garg case [AIR 1963 SC 996 : 1963 Supp
(1) SCR 885] had “no relevance”. This Court did not say in any of those cases that substantive statutory provisions dealing expressly with the subject can be ignored by this Court while exercising powers under Article 142.
56. As a matter of fact, the observations on which emphasis has been placed by us from the Union Carbide case [(1991) 4 SCC 584] , A.R. Antulay case [(1988) 2 SCC 602 :
1988 SCC (Cri) 372] and Delhi Judicial Service Assn.
case [(1991) 4 SCC 406 : (1991) 3 SCR 936] go to show that they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the observations of the majority made in Prem Chand Garg case [AIR 1963 SC 996 : 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885] . It is one thing to say that “prohibitions or limitations in a statute” cannot come in the way of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142to do complete justice between the parties in the pending “cause or matter” arising out of that statute, but quite a different thing to say that while 276 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports exercising jurisdiction under Article 142, this Court can altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute, dealing with the subject and pass orders concerning an issue which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed in another statute. This Court did not say so in Union Carbide case [(1991) 4 SCC 584] either expressly or by implication and on the contrary, it has been held that the Apex Court will take note of the express provisions of any substantive statutory law and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. We are, therefore, unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the observations of the Bench in V.C. Mishra case [(1995) 2 SCC 584] that the law laid down by the majority in Prem Chand Garg case [AIR 1963 SC 996: 1963 Supp (1) SCR 885] is “no longer a good law”.
12. In Shilpa Sailesh Vs. Varun Sreenivasan 2 , another Constitution Bench while considering the scope and ambit of power and jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, after due deliberations held as under: - “19. Given the aforesaid background and judgments of this Court, the plenary and conscientious power conferred on this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India, seemingly unhindered, is tempered or bounded by restraint, which must be exercised based on fundamental considerations of general and specific public policy. Fundamental general conditions of public policy refer to the fundamental rights, secularism, federalism, and other basic features of the Constitution of India. Specific public policy should be understood as some express pre-eminent prohibition in any substantive law, and not stipulations and requirements to a particular statutory scheme. It should not contravene a fundamental and non-derogable principle at the core of the statute. Even in the strictest sense [ Some jurists have opined that the judgments on the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the
2 (2023) 14 SCC 231
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 277National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors. Constitution of India can be divided into three phases. The first phase till late 1980s is reflected in the judgments of Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 10 : AIR 1963 SC 996 and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372, which inter alia held that the directions should not be repugnant to and in violation of specific statutory provision and is limited to deviation from the rules of procedure. Further, the direction must not infringe the Fundamental Rights of the individual, which proposition has never been doubted and holds good in phase two and three. The second phase has its foundation in the ratio of the judgment of the eleven-Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 14 : AIR 1967 SC 1643, dealing with the doctrine of prospective overruling, which held that Articles 32, 141 and 142 are couched in such wide and elastic terms as to enable this Court to formulate legal doctrines to meet the ends of justice, the only limitation thereon being reason, restraint and injustice. In Delhi Judicial Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406, this Court observes that any prohibition or restriction contained in ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation on the constitutional power of this Court to issue any order or direction to do “complete justice” in any “cause” or “matter”. Finally, the moderated approach has its origin in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584, which holds that this Court, in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of “complete justice” of a “cause” or “matter”, will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. The judgment of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, applies cautious and balanced approach, to hold that Article 142 being curative in nature and a constitutional power cannot be controlled by any statutory provision, but this power is not meant to be exercised ignoring the statutory provisions 278 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports or directly in conflict with what isexpressly provided in the statute. At the same time, it observes that this Court will not ordinarily discard a statutory provision governing the subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the parties to “iron out the creases” in a “cause or matter” before it. [See Rajat Pradhan, “Ironing out the Creases : Re-examining the Contours of Invoking Article 142(1) of the Constitution”, (2011) 6 NSLR 1; Ninad Laud, “Rationalising ‘Complete Justice’ under Article 142”, (2021) 1 SCC J-30; and Virendra Kumar, “Notes and Comments : Judicial Legislation Under Article 142 of the Constitution : A Pragmatic Prompt for Proper Legislation by Parliament”, (2012) 54 JILI 364]. As observed by us, the ratio as expounded in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 holds good and applies.] , it was never doubted or debated that this Court is empowered under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India to do “complete justice” without being bound by the relevant provisions of procedure, if it is satisfied that the departure from the said procedure is necessary to do “complete justice” between the parties. [ See Prem Chand Garg (Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 10 : AIR 1963 SC 996, para 13.]
20. Difference between procedural and substantive law in jurisprudential terms is contentious, albeit not necessary to be examined in depth in the present decision [ However, this aspect has been, to some extent, examined in paras 24 to 37, 56 and 57 herein.] , as in terms of the dictum enunciated by this Court in Union Carbide Corpn. [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584] and Supreme Court Bar Assn. [Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409] , exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India to do “complete justice” in a “cause or matter” is prohibited only when the exercise is to pass an order which is plainly and expressly barred by statutory provisions of substantive law based on fundamental considerations of general or specific public policy.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 279National Spot Exchange Limited v. Union of India & Ors.
21. As explained in Supreme Court Bar Assn. [Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409] , the exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India being curative in nature, this Court would not ordinarily pass an order ignoring or disregarding a statutory provision governing the subject, except to balance the equities between conflicting claims of the litigating parties by ironing out creases in a “cause or matter” before it. In this sense, this Court is not a forum of restricted jurisdiction when it decides and settles the dispute in a “cause or matter”. While this Court cannot supplant the substantive law by building a new edifice where none existed earlier, or by ignoring express substantive statutory law provisions, it is a problem-solver in the nebulous areas. As long as “complete justice” required by the “cause or matter” is achieved without violating fundamental principles of general or specific public policy, the exercise of the power and discretion under Article 142(1) is valid and as per the Constitution of India. This is the reason why the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India is undefined and uncatalogued, so as to ensure elasticity to mould relief to suit a given situation. The fact that the power is conferred only on this Court is an assurance that it will be used with due restraint and circumspection. [See DDA v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622.]”
13. In view of the above proposition of law laid down by the Constitution Benches of this Court, there remains no shadow of doubt that the exercise of power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India being curative in nature, the Supreme Court would not ordinarily pass an order ignoring or disregarding a statutory provisions governing the subject, except to balance the equities between conflicting claims of the litigating parties by ironing out creases in a “cause or matter” before it. Therefore, even while exercising the powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court has to take note of the express provisions of any substantive statutory law and accordingly regulate the exercise of its power and discretion to do complete justice between the parties in the pending “cause or matter” arising out of such 280 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports statutes. Though, the powers of this Court cannot be controlled by any statutory provisions, when the exercise of powers under Article 142 comes directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided in a statute, ordinarily, such power should not be exercised. Article 142 cannot be used to achieve something indirectly what cannot be achieved directly.
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