Daivshala & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 904; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1706
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Manoj Misra, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 28 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6986/2015
- Sections
- 51E, 3, 2(8), 46(1), 46, 2, 1(5), 4, 53, 22, 27, 139
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1706 : 2025 INSC 904 Daivshala & Ors.
v.
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 6986 of 2015)
28 July 2025 [Manoj Misra and K.V. Viswanathan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration The primary question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the accident which caused the death of the deceased could be said to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. Also, certain incidental questions also arise for consideration:
(i) Does s.51E of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act) have retrospective effect so as to cover an accident that has taken place on 22.04.2003 when the Section was enacted on 01.06.2010; (ii) Assuming Section 51E of the ESI Act applies, would the said interpretation enure to the benefit of the appellants whose claim arises under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923;
(iii) Lastly, assuming both the above questions are answered in favour of the appellants are the ingredients of s.51E attracted to the facts of the present case.
Headnotes† Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 – Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – Victim-watchman died in an accident while going to the factory-place of work – Claim filed – The employer and the insurance company set up the defence that the accident had not arisen out of or in the course of his employment, since the accident occurred outside the precincts of the factory – The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Civil Judge allowed compensation – However, the High Court reversed the findings of the Commissioner and held that since the deceased was on his way to his employment, the accident cannot be said to have its origin in the employment – Correctness:
Held: The phrase “accident arising out of and in the course of his employment” occurring in s.3 of the EC Act to include accident * Author [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1707Daivshala & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. occurring to an employee while commuting from his residence to the place of employment for duty or from the place of employment to his residence after performing duty, provided the nexus between the circumstances, time and place in which the accident occurred and the employment is established – The deceased was a night watchman and was dutifully proceeding to his workplace to be well on time, there was a clear nexus between the circumstances, time and place in which the accident occurred and his employment as watchman – The accident having clearly arisen out of and in the course of employment, the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Civil Judge was justified in ordering the claim under the EC Act. [Paras 55-56] Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – s.51E – Is s.51E of the ESI Act Clarificatory – Whether s.51E, enacted on 01.06.2010, will have retrospective application:
Held: It is settled that an Act will be declaratory if it is intended to remove doubts and if its object was to supply an obvious omission or to clear up any ambiguity as to the meaning of a previously existing statute – In such an event, the said statute being declaratory and clarificatory in nature, it can be given retrospective effect – s.51E, enacted on 01.06.2010 – There is a parade of case law which highlight that there was considerable doubt and ambiguity surrounding the phrase “accident arising out of and in the course of employment” insofar as cases concerning accident occurring to employees while proceeding to work and vice versa, and different rulings had, depending on facts, interpreted them differently – Even the theory of notional extension had its own peculiarities – It was to clarify and put beyond doubt the meaning of the phrase “accident arising out of and in the course of employment” insofar as accidents occurring to employees while proceeding to the workplace and vice versa that s.51E was enacted in the ESI Act – In view of that, there is no manner of doubt that the said amendment is clarificatory in character and will have retrospective effect. [Paras 25, 44] Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – s.51E – “Deemed to have” – Meaning of – Discussed:
Held: The words “deemed to have” used in s.51E is not in the context of legal fiction – It is well settled that the expression “deemed” is sometimes used to impose for the purpose of a statute an artificial construction for a word or phrase that would 1708 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports not otherwise prevail – Very often, it is also used to put beyond doubt a particular construction that might otherwise be uncertain – Sometimes it is used to give a comprehensive description that it includes what is obvious, what is uncertain and what is, in the ordinary sense, impossible – The word “deemed” in s.51E is employed to put beyond doubt a particular construction, that hitherto was uncertain. [Paras 45-46] Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 – s.3 – Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – s.2(8) – Statutes ‘In Pari Materia’: Held: First of all, the operative phraseology occurring in s.3 of the EC Act is the same as the one that it occurs in s.2(8) of the ESI Act which defines, ‘employment injury’ – Secondly, as held by this Court and as noticed hereinabove, both Acts are beneficial legislations intended as social security measures to ameliorate the conditions of employees – The only difference between the two statutes was that while the ESI Act applied to factories and notified establishments, the EC Act applied to other employers, as defined – It is well settled that where statutes in pari materia serve a common object in absence of any provision indicating to the contrary, it is permissible for a court of law to ascertain the meaning of the provision in the enactment by comparing its language with the other enactment relating to the same subject matter – Therefore, the phrase “accident arising out of and in the course of his employment” occurring in s.3 of the EC Act to include accident occurring to an employee while commuting from his residence to the place of employment for duty or from the place of employment to his residence after performing duty, provided the nexus between the circumstances, time and place in which the accident occurred and the employment is established. [Paras 48, 49, 55] Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – Beneficial nature of – Discussed. [Paras 18-21] Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 – Beneficial Nature of – Discussed. [Paras 22-23] Case Law Cited Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation & Another v. Francis De Costa and Another [1996] Supp. 5 SCR 797 : (1996) 6 SCC 1; Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation and Another [2009] 13 SCR 1139 : (2009) [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1709Daivshala & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. 9 SCC 61; Jaya Biswal & Others v. Branch Manager, IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Company Limited & Another [2016] 1 SCR 299 : (2016) 11 SCC 201; K. Govindan and Sons v. CIT, Cochin [2000] Supp. 5 SCR 285 : (2001) 1 SCC 460; Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak [1970] 1 SCR 869 : (1969) 2 SCC 607; General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay v. Mrs. Agnes [1964] 3 SCR 930 : 1963 SCC OnLine SC 252; Saurashtra Salt Mfg. Co. v. Bai Valu Raja & Ors., 1958 SCC OnLine SC 131 – relied on.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay and Others v. Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd. and Others [1997] Supp. 1 SCR 394 : (1997) 5 SCC 482; State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan and Anr. [2018] 10 SCR 974 : (2018) 17 SCC 394; State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer [1958] 1 SCR 580; State of Assam and Another v. Deva Prasad Barua & Another [1969] 1 SCR 698; Hira H. Advani v. State of Maharashtra [1970] 1 SCR 821 : (1969) 2 SCC 662 – referred to. In Sadgunaben Amrutlal v. ESI Corporation, 1981 Lab 1C 1653; Bhagubai v. Central Railway (1954) 2 LLJ 403; Regina v. National Insurance Commissioner, Ex Parte Michael (1977) 1 WLR 109; St. Aubyn v. Attorney-General (1951) 2 All ER 473; AG v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition); 62nd Report of the Law Commission of India; Craies on Legislation (9th Edition) dealing with statutes in pari materia; International Labour Convention of 1964.
List of Acts Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948; Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923; Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.
List of Keywords Accident; Claim for compensation; Accident of employee; Accident of employee going to work; Course of employment; Section 51E of Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948; Accident arising out of and in the course of employment; Declaratory and clarificatory nature; Retrospective effect; Theory of notional extension; Compensation for injury by accident; ‘Deemed to have’ used in s.51E of Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948; Statutes ‘In Pari Materia’. 1710 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6986 of 2015 From the Judgment and Order dated 01.12.2011 of the High Court of Bombay at Aurangabad in FA No. 2015 of 2011 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Atul Babasaheb Dakh, Siddharth Shinde, Diganta Gogoi, Bitu Kumar Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Amrreeta Swaarup, Gaurav Malhotra.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment K.V. Viswanathan, J.
1. Shahu Sampatrao Jadhavar was employed as a watchman in the Respondent no. 2-Sugar Factory. His duty hours were from early morning 3 am to 11 am. On 22 nd April 2003, he left home on his Motorcycle to report for duty. However, unfortunately, he never reached his place of work. When he was 5 kms away from the factory, his motorcycle was involved in a fatal accident. He left a large family behind. A widow, four children and his mother.
2. In a claim filed under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter the ‘EC Act’) the employer and the insurance company set up the defence that the accident had not arisen out of or in the course of his employment, since the accident occurred outside the precincts of the factory. Overruling the same, the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation and Civil Judge, Senior Division, Osmanabad awarded a sum of Rs 3,26,140/- along with interest @ 12 per cent per annum from 22.05.2003 to the family members. The Insurance Company was directed to deposit the amount since there was a valid Insurance Policy. The employer was asked to pay 50 per cent of the awarded amount as penalty. The employer and the Insurance Company were directed to pay the amount of penalty [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1711Daivshala & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. and the awarded compensation within one month from the date of the order.
3. Aggrieved, the Insurance Company filed First Appeal No.2015 of 2011 before the High Court of Judicature of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad. The High Court has reversed the findings of the Commissioner and set aside the order holding that since the deceased was on his way to his employment, the accident cannot be said to have its origin in the employment. The aggrieved family members are in appeal by way of special leave.
4. The High Court, to support its conclusion, relied on the judgment dated 11.09.1996 of this Court rendered in Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation & Another vs. Francis De Costa and Another, (1996) 6 SCC 1. The said judgment arose under the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter the ‘ESI Act’). However, the crucial phrase employed in the operating Section of both the ESI Act and the EC Act, were the same. The Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 was originally known as the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.
5. We have heard Mr. Atul Babasaheb Dakh, learned counsel for the appellants and Ms. Amrreeta Swaarup, learned counsel for the respondent No.1-Insurance Company. Respondent No.2 employer, though served, has not entered appearance.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that looking to the nature of the work of the deceased, the peril which he faced was not something personal rather it was incidental to his employment. Learned counsel contended that there was causal connection between the employment and the accident. Learned counsel relied on the theory of notional extension to support his plea. Learned counsel submitted that the EC Act is a beneficial legislation intended for the welfare of the employees. Learned counsel submitted that after the order of the trial Court, the Insurance Company had deposited the compensation with interest and the appellants were permitted to withdraw the principal amount. Learned counsel submitted that subsequent to the judgment in Francis De Costa (supra), Section 51E has been introduced in the ESI Act and, as such, the judgment in Francis De Costa (supra) can no longer govern the situation.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent No.1-Insurance Company submitted that the accident cannot be said to have its origin in the 1712 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports employment. Learned counsel contended that the employment cannot commence until the employee has reached the place of work and what happened before that could not be said to be in the course of employment. Learned counsel strongly relied on the judgment in Francis De Costa (supra) and certain judgments relied upon in the said judgment. Learned counsel distinguished the judgment in General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay vs. Mrs. Agnes, (1964) 3 SCR 930 = 1963 SCC OnLine SC 252 and submitted that in the said case the employee was given the facility to travel back home in the bus by the employer therein and, as such, the theory of notional extension was applied. According to the learned counsel, the said theory can have no application to the facts of the present case. According to the learned counsel, the employee was engaged in “a purely personal matter while commuting to or from work”.
8. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION:
9. The primary question that arises for consideration in this case is whether the accident which caused the death of the deceased could be said to have arisen out of and in the course of employment?
10. Certain incidental questions also arise which have been set out later in the judgment.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS: -
11. Before we advert to the holding in Francis De Costa (Supra), it will be useful to refer to the relevant statutory provisions in the EC Act as well as the ESI Act. Section 3 of the EC Act reads as under: - “3. Employer’s liability for compensation.- (1) If personal injury is caused to a employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:
Provided that the employer shall not be so liable ……….”
12. Section 46(1)(d) (which deals with ‘Benefits’) and Section 2(8) (which deals with ‘Employment Injury’) in the ESI Act, are set out hereinbelow: - [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1713Daivshala & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. “Section 46. Benefits
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the insured persons, their dependants or the persons hereinafter mentioned, as the case may be, shall be entitled to the following benefits, namely,-
(d) periodical payments to such dependents of an insured person who dies as a result of an employment injury sustained as an employee under this Act, as are entitled to compensation under this Act (hereinafter referred to as dependants’ benefit);
Section 2(8) “employment injury” means a personal injury to an employee caused by accident or an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, being an insurable employment, whether the accident occurs or the occupational disease is contracted within or outside the territorial limits of India.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. It will be noticed that both under the EC Act and under the ESI Act the entitlement arises to the employee for recompense if the accident arises out of and in the course of his employment.
HOLDING IN FRANCIS DE COSTA (SUPRA): -
14. In Francis De Costa (Supra) the employee met with an accident when he was on his way to the place of employment, at a distance of 1 km, from the place of work. This Court found against the employee by holding as under: - “5. …… Therefore, the employee, in order to succeed in this case, will have to prove that the injury he had suffered arose out of and was in the course of his employment. Both the conditions will have to be fulfilled before he could claim any benefit under the Act. It does not appear that the injury suffered by the employee in the instant case arose in any way out of his employment. The injury was sustained while the employee was on his way to the factory where he was employed. The 1714 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports accident took place one kilometre away from the place of employment. Unless it can be said that his employment began as soon as he set out for the factory from his home, it cannot be said that the injury was caused by an accident “arising out of … his employment”. A road accident may happen anywhere at any time. But such accident cannot be said to have arisen out of employment, unless it can be shown that the employee was doing something incidental to his employment.
6. In our judgment, by using the words “arising out of … his employment”, the legislature gave a restrictive meaning to “employment injury”. The injury must be of such an extent as can be attributed to an accident or an occupational disease arising out of his employment. “Out of”, in this context, must mean caused by employment. Of course, the phrase “out of” has an exclusive meaning also. If a man is described to be out of his employment, it means he is without a job. The other meaning of the phrase “out of” is “influenced, inspired, or caused by: out of pity; out of respect for him” (Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary — International Edition — 1984). In the context of Section 2(8), the words “out of” indicate that the injury must be caused by an accident which had its origin in the employment. A mere road accident, while an employee is on his way to his place of employment cannot be said to have its origin in his employment in the factory. The phrase “out of the employment” was construed in the case of South Maitland Railways Pty. Ltd. v. James [67 CLR 496] where construing the phrase “out of the employment”, Starke, J., held “the words ‘out of’ require that the injury had its origin in the employment”.
7. Unless an employee can establish that the injury was caused or had its origin in the employment, he cannot succeed in a claim based on Section 2(8) of the Act. The words “accident … arising out of … his employment”
indicate that any accident which occurred while going to [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1715Daivshala & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. the place of employment or for the purpose of employment, cannot be said to have arisen out of his employment.
There is no causal connection between the accident and the employment.
8. The other words of limitation in sub-section (8) of Section 2 are “in the course of his employment”. The dictionary meaning of “in the course of” is “during (in the course of time, as time goes by), while doing” (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, New Seventh Edition). The dictionary meaning indicates that the accident must take place within or during the period of employment. If the employee’s work-shift begins at 4.30 p.m., any accident before that time will not be “in the course of his employment”. The journey to the factory may have been undertaken for working at the factory at 4.30 p.m. But this journey was certainly not in the course of employment. If ‘employment’ beings from the moment the employee sets out from his house for the factory, then even if the employee stumbles and falls down at the doorstep of his house, the accident will have to be treated as to have taken place in the course of his employment. This interpretation leads to absurdity and has to be avoided.”
(Emphasis supplied)
ENACTMENT OF SECTION 51E WITH EFFECT FROM 01.06.2010
IN THE ESI ACT: -
15. If Francis De Costa (Supra) is to be applied as it is, the appellants will be out of Court. However, a very important statutory intervention happened on 01.06.2010 in the ESI Act, wherein Section 51E was introduced. Section 51E reads as under: - “51E. Accidents happening while commuting to the place of work and vice versa. - An accident occurring to an employee while commuting from his residence to the place of employment for duty or from the place of employment to his residence after performing duty, shall be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of 1716 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports employment if nexus between the circumstances, time and place in which the accident occurred and the employment is established.”
THE FURTHER INCIDENTAL QUESTIONS THAT ARISE IN THE
CASE:
16. Section 51E clearly neutralised the holding in Francis De Costa (Supra) when it provided that an accident occurring to an employee while commuting from his residence to the place of employment for duty or from the place of employment to his residence after performing duty, shall be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. The only condition was that nexus between the circumstances, the time and place in which the accident occurred and the employment had to be established.
17. In considering the applicability of Section 51E of the ESI Act to the case of appellant certain threshold questions need to be addressed:-
(i) Does Section 51E of the ESI Act have retrospective effect so as to cover an accident that has taken place on 22.04.2003 when the Section was enacted on 01.06.2010?
(ii) Assuming Section 51E of the ESI Act applies, would the said interpretation enure to the benefit of the appellants whose claim arises under the EC Act?
(iii) Lastly, assuming both the above questions are answered in favour of the appellants are the ingredients of Section 51E attracted to the facts of the present case?
BENEFICIAL NATURE OF THE ESI ACT 1948: -
18. The ESI Act was enacted to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury as well as for making provisions for certain other matters in relation thereto. Section 46 deals with the benefits that the insured persons, their dependents and other persons mentioned in the Act are entitled to. This Court in Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation and Another, (2009) 9 SCC 61, while rightly characterizing the ESI Act as a beneficial legislation and a law intended to provide for social security, held as follows: - [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1717Daivshala & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. “20. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a beneficial legislation. The main purpose of the enactment as the Preamble suggests, is to provide for certain benefits to employees of a factory in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto. The Employees’ State Insurance Act is a social security legislation and the canons of interpreting a social legislation are different from the canons of interpretation of taxation law. The courts must not countenance any subterfuge which would defeat the provisions of social legislation and the courts must even, if necessary, strain the language of the Act in order to achieve the purpose which the legislature had in placing this legislation on the statute book. The Act, therefore, must receive a liberal construction so as to promote its objects.”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. It was further held that the Act was intended to ameliorate various risks and contingencies which the employees face while working in an establishment or factory. This Court held that the Act was intended to promote the general welfare of the workers and, as such, called for a liberal interpretation: - “21. This Court (sic The High Court), in ESI Corpn. v. Jayalakshmi Cotton and Oil Products (P) Ltd. [1980 Lab IC 1078 (A.P.)] has observed that the ESI Act is a social security legislation and was enacted to ameliorate the various risks and contingencies which the employees face while working in an establishment or factory. It is thus intended to promote the general welfare of the workers and, as such, is to be liberally interpreted.” (Emphasis supplied)
20. What is important to note is that the ESI Act applies to all factories, including factories belonging to the Government and also to establishments or class of establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise notified in the official gazette under Section 1(5) of the Act. In fact, the principal difference between the ESI Act 1718 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and the EC Act is that while the ESI Act applied to the employees of factories and notified establishments as mentioned above, the EC Act applied to employees under all other employers as defined.
21. The 62 nd report of the Law Commission on the EC Act submitted under the chairmanship of former Chief Justice of India, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, in Para 1.11, rightly noticed the distinction as under: “1.11. After the passing of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, the area of application of the Workmen’s Compensation Act has diminished, to a certain extent. But the Employees’ State Insurance Act applies only to (i) factories, and (ii) notified establishments, and in the rest of the cases the Workmen’s Compensation Act still holds the field.”
BENEFICIAL NATURE OF THE EC ACT: -
22. The EC Act was enacted to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their employees of compensation for injury by accident. Section 3, as set out earlier, provides that if personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 4 sets out that where death results from the injury an amount equal to 50 per cent of the monthly wages of the deceased employee multiplied by the relevant factor ought to be paid.
23. The EC Act is also a beneficial piece of legislation. In 2016, this Court in Jaya Biswal & Others v. Branch Manager, IFFCO Tokio General Insurance Company Limited & Another, (2016) 11 SCC 201, while holding that the EC Act was a social welfare legislation meant to benefit the workers and their dependents and to give the employees a sense of security held as under: - “20. The EC Act is a welfare legislation enacted to secure compensation to the poor workmen who suffer from injuries at their place of work. This becomes clear from a perusal of the preamble of the Act which reads as under:
“An Act to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury by accident.”
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1719Daivshala & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. This further becomes clear from a perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which reads as under:
“… The growing complexity of industry in this country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent danger to workmen, along with the comparative poverty of the workmen themselves, renders it advisable that they should be protected, as far as possible, from hardship arising from accidents.
An additional advantage of legislation of this type is that, by increasing the importance for the employer of adequate safety devices, it reduces the number of accidents to workmen in a manner that cannot be achieved by official inspection.
Further, the encouragement given to employers to provide adequate medical treatment for their workmen should mitigate the effects to such accidents as do occur. The benefits so conferred on the workman added to the increased sense of security which he will enjoy, should render industrial life more attractive and thus increase the available supply of labour. At the same time, a corresponding increase in the efficiency of the average workman may be expected.”
21. Thus, the EC Act is a social welfare legislation meant to benefit the workers and their dependants in case of death of workman due to accident caused during and in the course of employment should be construed as such.” (Emphasis supplied)
24. At this stage, it is important to notice one provision in the ESI Act which bars receiving or recovering compensation under any other law 1720 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports if compensation has been received under the ESI Act, viz. Section 53, which is extracted hereinbelow: - “53. Bar against receiving or recovery of compensation or damages under any other law. - An insured person or his dependants shall not be entitled to receive or recover, whether from the employer of the insured person or from any other person, any compensation or damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise, in respect of an employment injury sustained by the insured person as an employee under this Act.”
This is only set out to demonstrate how the ESI Act and the EC Act operate in close tandem.
IS SECTION 51E OF THE ESI ACT CLARIFICATORY?
25. It is in this background that the question whether Section 51E, enacted on 01.06.2010, will have retrospective application needs to be decided. Thereafter, the further question of applying the said meaning to the EC Act will have to be addressed. Unless we find that Section 51E is clarificatory and declaratory in character, the question of applying it retrospectively will not arise. A declaratory Act is one which is enacted to remove doubts existing as to common law or the meaning or effect of any statute. Was Section 51E enacted to clarify and set at rest any serious doubt that obtained earlier? It has been held by this Court that an Act will be declaratory if it is intended to remove doubts and if its object was to supply an obvious omission or to clear up any ambiguity as to the meaning of a previously existing statute. In such an event, this Court has held that the said statute being declaratory and clarificatory in nature, it can be given retrospective effect.
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