M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 868; [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1183
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pankaj Mithal, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
- Decided
- 17 Jul 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 391/2017
- Sections
- 120B, 13(1), 7, 109, 20, 91, 378
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1183 : 2025 INSC 868 M Sambasiva Rao v.
The State of Andhra Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 391 of 2017)
17 July 2025 [Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court erred in convicting the appellant-accused no.1 u/s.120B, IPC and ss.7, 13(2) r/w s.13(1)(d), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by reversing the finding of acquittal of the Trial Court.
Headnotes† Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.7, 11, 12, 13(2) r/w13(1)(d) – Penal Code, 1860 – s.120B – Demand-andtrap proceedings – Evidentiary standard to prove – PW1complainant submitted the insurance claim and requested the appellant-accused no.1 (Administrative Officer in the Insurance Company) for early disposal of the claim – As per the prosecution, the appellant demanded bribe for himself and accused no.2-Regional Manager for settlement of the claim – Complaint made – Trap set up – Cash, whisky bottle and the shirt of accused no.3 (appellant’s brother) were seized – To prove criminal conspiracy between the appellant and accused no.2, the prosecution relied on the call made between them – Trial Court acquitted the accused persons – High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant and accused no.3 (accused no.2 passed away during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court) – Interference with:
Held: 1.1 Prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt the demand of and acceptance of the bribe in the trap laid by PW12 (Inspector, CBI) – Present is a case of a fabrication, attempted frame-up and botched-up trap with serious lapses committed by the investigative agency – There are glaring contradictions in the * Author 1184 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports prosecution evidence which cumulatively shake the foundations of the prosecution case. [Paras 31, 38] 1.2 High Court itself relied on inferences and conjectures alone – Even if the factum of phone call, as alleged, having been made stands accepted, the contents of the conversation are not available at all – Also, the protection of Art.20(3) of the Constitution would apply and the appellant could not be compelled to disclose the nature and content of the conversation, assuming it happened – Further, mere fact that accused no.3 is the appellant’s brother would not lead to a presumption in law that the money taken by him was meant for the appellant and that too, pursuant to demand being made by the appellant. [Para 28, 37] 1.3 Moreover, on facts, the allegation of demand of bribe, as projected by the prosecution, is shrouded in a cloud of dubiety – Mere fact that accused no.3 is the appellant’s brother would not lead to a presumption in law that the money taken by him was meant for the appellant and that too, pursuant to demand being made by the appellant – Further, except for PW1, no other witness/ person was privy to the demand made to the complainant by the appellant – This does not satisfy the requirement that in trap cases where after a complaint is received, independent witnesses of the trap team are also required to confirm the demand made by the accused personally, which has not been done in the present case – Thus, the procedure of the trap case itself from the very inceptual stage suffers from serious legal lacuna, which cannot be now overcome – For, the purpose of this requirement is that before the trap is set into motion, there should be corroboration of the allegation made by the complainant of actual and real demand being made by the accused-public servant as a quid pro quo for extending a favour to the complainant – On to the next stage of actual laying of trap, there also the appellant was nowhere in the picture – The prosecution’s effort of still trying to bring him under the ambit and scope of the corruption net clearly has not succeeded in the circumstances. [Paras 29, 31, 37] 1.4 Furthermore, in a case where the accused persons were acquitted by the Trial Court, there is a double presumption of innocence which accrues in their favour – Hence, it was all the more important for the High Court to have provided cogent reasoning for disturbing the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. [Paras 34, 35] [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1185M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh 1.5 Appellant entitled to benefit of doubt – Impugned Judgment set aside and that of the Trial Court is restored – Appellant acquitted. [Paras 38, 39] Case Law Cited Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2022) 5 SCR 104 : (2023) 4 SCC 731 – followed.
Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala [2022) 5 SCR 721 : (2022) 8 SCC 440; Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra [2023] 11 SCR 1135 : 2023 SCC OnLine 1038 – relied on.
D Velayutham v. State [2015] 6 SCR 361 : (2015) 12 SCC 348 – referred to.
List of Acts Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords Procedure of the trap case; Demand-and-trap proceedings; Settlement of claim; Request for Early disposal of claim; Demand and acceptance of the bribe; Bribe; Demand of bribe; Bribe not paid; Accident policy; Accidental death of insured; Teapoy; Tainted currency; Cash seized; Whisky bottle; White shirt; Claim file pending; Liaison; Regional Office; Administrative Officer; Insurance Company; Regional Manager; Criminal conspiracy; Circumstance of conspiracy; Demand and acceptance of the tainted currency; Trap team; Call for fixation of the bribe; Phenolphthalein; Sodium carbonate solution test; Solution turned pink; Moss-coloured shirt; Yellowish/brownish tinge; Tainted cash; Quantum of the bribe; Vigilance inquiry; Posttrap proceedings; Quid pro quo; Two views possible; Fabrication and attempted frame-up; Acquittal; Double presumption of innocence; Phone call; Protection of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
391 of 2017 From the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2015 of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in CRLA No. 548 of 2006 1186 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv., Venkateswara Rao Anumolu, Sunny Kumar, Prateek Raushan, Amartya Bhushan, Yogit Mehra.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Nachiketa Joshi, Sr. Adv., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Shubhendu Anand, Praneet Pranav, Shaurya Rai, Nring Chamwibo Zeliang, Piyush.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
The present appeal challenges the Final Judgment and Order dated 21.08.2015/09.09.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No.548/2006 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Judgment’) by the then High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’), whereby the appellant/accused no.1 and accused no.3 (Mr. M Venkata Siva Naga Prasad) were convicted, by reversing the finding of acquittal recorded in the Final Judgment and Order dated 07.06.2005 passed in C.C. No.17/2000 on the file of the Court of the learned Special Judge for CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’), and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year, alongwith imposition of fine(s). Accused no.2 (Mr. N Govindarao Naidu) passed away during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court on 15.12.2013.
THE FACTUAL MATRIX:
2. The appellant/accused no.1 was posted as an Assistant Administrative Officer in United India Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Insurance Company’), Branch Office-II, Guntur (hereinafter referred to as the ‘branch’), in the year 1999. His duty was, inter alia, to assist the Branch Manager in processing of claims submitted in the branch. Accused no.2 was posted as the Regional Manager, Visakhapatnam Region from June-October, 1999 and it was his duty to process claims submitted through the branches and forward it to [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1187M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh higher authorities for approval. The branch supra of the Insurance Company fell under his jurisdiction. Accused no.3 is the appellant’s younger brother and is engaged in agriculture and business.
3. Mr. L Laxman Reddy had taken a Janata Personal Accident policy (hereinafter referred to as the ‘policy’) from the branch on 21.11.1997 for a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs). After the accidental death of the insured on 28.03.1999, his wife and nominee for the policy, Mrs. Srilakshmi (PW2), submitted claim dated 05.06.1999 for the insured sum in the branch. This claim was submitted through Mr. L Srinivasa Rao, the surveyor appointed by the branch as instructed by the appellant. The complainant/Mr. T Kotireddy (PW1) is the maternal uncle of Mrs. Srilakshmi and was authorized to pursue the settlement of the claim.
4. During investigation, it emerged that Mr. L Srinivasa Rao had submitted Investigation Report dated 13.07.1999 on the claim of PW2 to the Manager of the branch on 20.07.1999. Thereupon, the appellant made his recommendation on 16.08.1999 and sent the file to the Branch Manager, who made his recommendation on 20.08.1999 and referred the file to the Senior Divisional Manager, who in turn, on 15.09.1999, recommended settlement of the claim and ordered to refer the file to the Regional Office for approval. The claim was sent for settlement and onward transmission to higher authority to the office of the accused no.2 on 18.09.1999.
5. Meanwhile, PW1 after submitting the claim met the appellant and requested for early disposal of the claim. Such request, for early settlement of the claim, was reiterated by PW1 when he met the appellant once again on 15.10.1999. It is then that the appellant told him, as the prosecution’s story goes, to arrange an amount of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand) as bribe for himself and accused no.2 for settlement of the claim and travel with him on 17.10.1999 to Hyderabad, where accused no.2 was available, to give him his share of the bribe. PW1 did not agree to pay the bribe and did not go to Hyderabad. Thereafter, PW1 again met the appellant on 20.10.1999 when the appellant told him that accused no.2 was still in Hyderabad and PW1 should arrange for the bribe and book two train tickets for their journey to Hyderabad by the Narsapur- Hyderabad Express on 22.10.1999. The appellant also told PW1 to arrange for a bottle of whisky as accused no.2 was fond of liquor. 1188 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports PW1 was told to convey his confirmation to the deal in the morning of 21.10.1999.
6. PW1 gave a complaint on 21.10.1999 to Mr. N Vishnu (PW12), Inspector of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter abbreviated to ‘CBI’), Visakhapatnam, who was camping at the Railway Retiring Room of the Vijayawada Railway Station, and on his instructions, he purchased the tickets and called the appellant to inform that the arrangement of money and berths in the train had been done. The appellant was to meet PW1 near his coach at the Guntur Railway Platform on 22.10.1999. Accordingly, PW12 secured the presence of another CBI Inspector, Mr. S B Shanker and two independent mediators, Mr. M Radhakrishnan and Mr. M Nagaraju (PW3), Excise Inspectors, and along with the complainant prepared the first mediators’ report dated 22.10.1999. The report noted that the tainted currency of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand) and whisky bottle was handed over to PW12. The numbers of each of the eighty (80) tainted notes of Rs.500 denomination and batch number of the whisky bottle was noted down. PW1 was instructed to signal by wiping his face with a handkerchief soon after the demand and acceptance of the tainted currency and the whisky bottle.
7. The trap party led by PW12 boarded the Narsapur Express at Vijayawada Station. The train left the station at 10:40 pm. When the train reached Guntur, the appellant, with accused no.3, came near S2 coach and informed PW1 that he was unable to come to Hyderabad due to some personal problem and, instead, the accused no.3 will accompany PW1. The train reached Secunderabad early in the morning of 23.10.1999 and PW1 and accused no.3 checked into the Rama Krishna Hotel. It is alleged that accused no.3 took an appointment with accused no.2 on a call and thereafter, both left for accused no.2’s house. The trap team followed them. On reaching the house of accused no.2, the independent witnesses saw accused no.2 waiting outside his house. PW1 and accused no.3 along with accused no.2 went inside the house. Once inside, accused no.3 introduced PW1 as the party and told accused no.2 that he had brought the bribe. Thereafter, accused no.2 sent PW1 outside the room and both these accused talked for some time, after which accused no.3 called PW1 inside. Thereafter, PW1 requested accused no.2 for settlement of the claim to which accused no.2 replied by stating that it would [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1189M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh be settled without delay. Then, on demand made by accused no.3, PW1 handed over the bribe to accused no.3, who took out 10 tainted notes amounting to Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) and kept it in his shirt pocket and handed over the rest of the bribe amount i.e., Rs.35,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Thousand) to accused no.2, who instead of handling it, told accused no.3 to keep the same on the teapoy. Accordingly, accused no.3 kept Rs.35,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Thousand) on the teapoy. Accused no.3 also took the whisky bottle from PW1 and placed it by the right side of the sofa on which accused no.2 was sitting. After this, PW1 went outside and gave the pre-arranged signal to the trap team, which rushed inside the house. The cash from the teapoy and the shirt of accused no.3 was seized alongwith the whisky bottle. The hands of accused no.2 were subjected to phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate solution test and the solution remained colourless. After this, the hands and shirt pocket of accused no.3 were subjected to the chemical test and the resultant solution turned pink. The numbers of the currency notes and the whisky bottle tallied with the first mediators’ report. The white shirt worn by accused no.3 was also seized. All of this was recorded in the second mediators’ report dated 23.10.1999.
8. On the basis of the above investigation, Crime No.RC.23(A)/99- VSP came to be registered on 24.10.1999 under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Chargesheet was filed against the three accused on 28.06.2000 under Section 120B, IPC along with Sections 7, 11, 12, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act. During trial, the prosecution examined PWs 1 to 13 and got marked Exhibits P1 to P49 and also MOs 1 to 9. The appellant and accused no.3 did not lead any evidence in defence. Accused no.2, on the other hand, got examined DWs 1 and 2 and got marked Exhibits D1 to D6. After appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court found the accused not guilty of the offences alleged and, accordingly, acquitted them of all the charges. Aggrieved, the State went up in appeal to the High Court by filing Criminal Appeal No.548/2006. After evaluation of the facts and evidence, the High Court vide the Impugned Judgment allowed the appeal and convicted the appellant and accused no.3 as under:
1190 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Position Sections Sentence Appellant/ accused no.1 Section 120B, IPC and Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act 1 year’s rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000 on three counts, and in default of payment o f f i n e , a d d i t i o n a l s i m p l e imprisonment for 2 months.
Accused no.3 Section 120B, IPC and Sections 12, 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Act read with Section
109, IPC
1 year’s rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000 on three counts, and in default of payment o f f i n e , a d d i t i o n a l s i m p l e imprisonment for 2 months.
9. This Impugned Judgment, as noted above, is challenged before us. APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
10. Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel, at the outset submitted that where two views are possible on the same evidence, and the Trial Court’s view favours the accused, the Appellate Court shall not ordinarily interfere unless the findings are perverse or unreasonable and based on no evidence. It was argued that, in a case of acquittal, there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the High Court should have reversed the acquittal only on cogent grounds. In the present case, the High Court erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the Trial Court, which has scrutinized all the evidence minutely.
11. It was pointed out that the appellant made his recommendation on the claim on 16.08.1999 itself and sent the file to the Branch Manager, who made his recommendation on 20.08.1999 and referred the file to the Senior Divisional Manager, who in turn, on 15.09.1999, recommended settlement of the claim and ordered to refer the file to the Regional Office for approval. Thus, it was submitted that there was no occasion for the appellant to collude with accused no.2 and demand a bribe of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand), precisely for the reason that there was lack of any official favour pending with the appellant.
12. It was further submitted that the mother-in-law of PW2 had filed O.S. No.63/1999 before the II Additional District Judge and also [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1191M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh preferred I.A. No.1163/1999 for restraining the Insurance Company from disbursing the policy amount to the nominee, pending the disposal of such suit. It was due to the order in this case that claim settlement was delayed and not due to the alleged demand of bribe by the appellant.
13. The only circumstance to establish conspiracy between the appellant and accused no.2 is the call made on the night of 21.10.1999. The High Court erred in drawing an adverse inference against the appellant for denying the call and not coming forth with the contents of the conversation. On the other hand, the Trial Court has rightly appreciated this circumstance in the view of the background facts and correctly noticed that if this was the only call, then the prosecution had failed to establish as to when the apparent quantum of the bribe was decided between the accused. The High Court also failed to take note of the most important fact i.e., that the appellant and accused no.2 were not on cordial terms as the accused no.2 had transferred the appellant twice to different offices after receiving complaint(s) against him. In such circumstance, it is inconceivable that the two would enter into a conspiracy, as alleged by the prosecution.
14. It was contended that the first mediators’ report noted that phenolphthalein was only applied on the currency and not on the whisky box. However, surprisingly the second mediators’ report conducted after the trap proceedings note that phenolphthalein powder was collected from the whisky box and the chemical solution turned pink. Learned senior counsel submitted that the High Court had given a bizarre explanation for the same when it reasons that since PW1 first handed over the tainted currency and then the whisky box, the powder must have transferred from the currency onto PW1’s hand and then onto the box.
15. During trap proceedings, the white shirt worn by the accused no.3 was seized. However, the Trial Court notes that the shirt exhibited in evidence was not white but rather it was moss-coloured. Another bizarre explanation, in the learned senior counsel’s opinion, that the High Court provides, is that the white shirt seized in 1999 would have turned moss-coloured as the colour would have withered away due to dust.
16. It was argued that there were multiple inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence. PW3 deposed that only two people went inside 1192 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the house of accused no.2, whereas the second mediators’ report provides that three people went inside the house. Further, there is inconsistency in the evidence with regard to the fact as to whether accused no.2 was watering the plants or standing at the gate, when the accused no.3 along with PW1 approached him. Moreover, there is material contradiction in the depositions apropos construction work going on in the upper portion of the house of accused no.2 on the relevant day. PW1 was sent out by the accused present in the house after entering the house. Some witnesses say that he came out after 2-3 minutes, whereas others estimate the time period to be 15 minutes. Furthermore, the second mediators’ report was prepared belatedly. It was submitted that all these material inconsistencies and contradictions would go on to show that the entire trap proceedings are false and concocted.
17. It was further argued that accused no.2 in his defence states that the then Superintendent of Police (hereinafter abbreviated to ‘SP’), Mr. A Sudhakara Rao came to his house and told him to be wise enough to come out of the case, to which accused no.2 did not agree. This, it was contended, is to be seen with the evidence of PW12 who had deposed to the effect that he did not inform the SP about laying of the trap from Hyderabad, but informed him about the same only after his return to Visakhapatnam. This evidence is falsified by the Tour Diary of the SP which shows that on 23.10.1999 he had reached Hyderabad and in that whole week, only a solitary trap case was registered. This goes to demonstrate, again, that the entire case was fabricated to falsely implicate the accused.
18. It was contended that there are too many loose ends in the case of the prosecution, which has miserably failed to prove the charges alleged against the appellant. We were reminded across the bar that the two co-accused have passed away. The appellant is aged around 74 years and suffering from multiple ailments. In view of the above, learned senior counsel urged us to allow the appeal and acquit the appellant.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
19. Per contra, Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General (hereinafter abbreviated to ‘ASG’), contended that the Trial Court had misdirected itself in appreciating the evidence and the High Court [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1193M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh has considered the same in the correct perspective. The High Court, submitted the learned ASG, has every power to re-appreciate the evidence and facts and interfere when the Trial Court’s judgment suffered from a perverse appreciation of the facts. It was submitted that the Impugned Judgment is based on cogent reasoning and does not call for any interference by this Court.
20. It was argued that the processing/clearing of the claim at the level of the appellant before the date of demand is of no consequence, as the demand made by the appellant was not to clear the file at his level but to liaison with accused no.2 to get the claim settled. This has been rightly noted by the High Court. The demand by the appellant and acceptance of the bribe by the other accused has been proven by the testimony of PW1, which remained unshaken in the cross-examination. The High Court has correctly analyzed the probative value of the evidence, including the deposition of PW1 and has rightly convicted the appellant. Reliance was placed on D Velayutham v State, (2015) 12 SCC 348 to argue that the Court has, previously, taken note of the byzantine methods of bribe-taking, and where an evader escapes a trap, constructive receipt has to be an alternate means of fastening criminal culpability.
21. It was contended that the injunction order passed in O.S. No.63/1999 was only with respect to disbursal of the amount. It should be noted that despite the injunction, the Assistant Divisional Manager and the Senior Divisional Manager approved the claim and forwarded the file to the accused no.2 for settlement of the claim, subject to judgment in the case. PW5 has deposed that accused no.2 instructed him to keep the file pending. Further, there was no noting in the file to the effect that it is pending due to vigilance enquiry.
22. Learned ASG further submitted that the appellant and accused no.2 were on cordial terms, as evident from the phone call made on 21.10.1999. This is also clear from the fact that even after receiving corruption complaint against the appellant, accused no.2 transferred the appellant locally in Guntur. Hence, it is clear that the transfer(s) were done only as a formality. Another crucial fact noted by the High Court is the call made by accused no.3 to accused no.2 on the morning of 23.10.1999 to take an appointment. This call has been proved through oral and documentary evidence and clinches that a conspiracy was hatched.
1194 [2025] 7 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
23. It was further contended that minor inconsistencies in the evidence of the witnesses is natural and should be ignored by this Court. On principally these grounds, learned ASG urged us to dismiss the appeal and uphold the conviction.
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
24. We have heard the learned senior counsel for the appellant and learned ASG for the State, considered their submissions and perused the material on record. We have bestowed anxious consideration to the issues involved. It is imperative to, at the outset, note that there are multiple contested facts apropos the demand-and-trap proceedings and given that there are divergent opinions expressed by the Courts below, it is all the more appropriate to analyze and appraise the evidence adduced. We may gainfully refer to the discussion by a 5-Judge Bench in Neeraj Dutta v State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 with regard to the evidentiary standard to prove offence(s) under the concerned provisions of the Act:
‘88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:
88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.
88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.
88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind: [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1195M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribegiver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribegiver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
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