Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 639; [2025] 5 S.C.R. 814
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 7 May 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 408/2023
- Sections
- 61(2), 2, 4, 238A, 12(2), 61, 30(2), 31, 7, 34, 34(3), 3(1)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 5 S.C.R. 814 : 2025 INSC 639 Tata Steel Ltd.
v.
Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 408 of 2023)
07 May 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the additional condonable period of 15 days as provided under section 61(2) IBC commences from the end of the prescribed limitation period of 30 days, in case the prescribed limitation period for filing the appeal falls on a day when the court is closed or commences from the day when the court reopens?
(ii) What is the meaning of the term ‘prescribed period’ as defined under Section 2(j) read with Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016?
(iii) Whether the NCLAT has the power to condone the delay beyond the said prescribed and condonable period under the IBC.
Headnotes† Limitation Act, 1963 – Sections 2(j) and 4 – Applicability to IBC proceedings in light of Section 238A IBC as inserted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 r/w Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016:
Held: The resolution plan of the appellant was approved by the NCLT vide order dated 07.04.2022 – Though the Company Secretary of the appellant duly informed the listing departments of both NSE and BSE about the NCLT order within 30 minutes of its pronouncement, the intimation of the said approval was given by the BSE and NSE only on 08.04.2022, making the respondent aware of it only then – The limitation period for filing the appeal commenced on 07.04.2022 and expired on 07.05.2022, a working Saturday for the registry of the NCLAT – The appeal, along with an application for condonation of delay was e-filed before the * Author [2025] 5 S.C.R. 815Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. NCLAT on 23.05.2022 and physically filed on 24.05.2022 by the respondent no.1 herein – The NCLAT condoned the delay vide impugned order.
Section 238A IBC makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to IBC proceedings – Section 2(j) of Limitation Act defines the terms ‘period of limitation’ and ‘prescribed period – Section 4 of Limitation Act states that when the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens including days wherein it is closed during any part of its normal working hours – Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 also extends the prescribed period of limitation to the next working day when the period ends on a day when the office of the Tribunal is closed. [Paras 10, 10.1] Thus, the benefit of exclusion of period during which Court is closed is available only when application for setting aside the award is filed within “prescribed period of limitation” and it is not available in respect of period extendable by the Court in exercise of its discretion [Para 10.2] IBC, 2016 – Section 61(2) – Computation of limitation period in appeals – Limitation period for filing an appeal to the NCLAT commences from the date of pronouncement of the order by the NCLT – Though Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates filing of a certified copy of the impugned order along with the appeal, the limitation period is not contingent upon the receipt of such a copy:
Held: The total permissible period for filing an appeal under Section 61(2) gives a total permissible period 45 days to appeal i.e., comprising 30 days as the prescribed period and an additional 15 days that may be condoned upon showing sufficient cause – In V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd., (2022)2 SCC 244 this Court held that the Limitation period for filing an appeal to the NCLAT commences from the date of pronouncement of the order by the NCLT and not from the date when the order is received or made available to the aggrieved party – Though Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates filing of a certified copy of the impugned order along with the appeal, the limitation period is not contingent upon the receipt of such a copy – If in case an appellant applies for a certified copy, the time taken to obtain it can be excluded from the limitation period under section 12(2) of the Limitation 816 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Act – The litigant has to file its appeal within thirty days, which can be extended up to a period of fifteen days, and no more, upon showing sufficient cause – In Sanjay Pandurang Kalate v. Vistra ITCL India Ltd. & Others, (2024) 3 SCC 27; A. Rajendra v. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 721 – The Court held that date on which the limitation begins to run is intrinsically linked to the date of pronouncement – Where the judgment was pronounced in open Court, the period of limitation starts running from that very day. [Para 10.3] The IBC prescribes strict timelines for filing appeals and taking legal action so as to ensure that insolvency proceedings are not misused to recover time-barred debts – The NCLAT cannot condone any delay beyond 15 days even on equitable grounds as the appellate mechanism under IBC is strictly time-bound by design to preserve the speed and certainty of the insolvency resolution process. [Paras 11, 11.1] The impugned order of the NCLAT is ultravires as it has no power to condone delay beyond the period stipulated under the statute – Allowing condonation in such cases would defeat the legislative intent and open the floodgates to belated and potentially frivolous petitions, thereby undermining the efficacy and finality of the appellate mechanism. [Paras 11-13].
Case Law Cited Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. M/s. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd. [2012] 1 SCR 403 : (2012) 2 SCC 624; Sagufa Ahmed and Others v. Upper Assam Plywood Products (P) Ltd. & Others [2020] 9 SCR 472 : (2021) 2 SCC 317; Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita v. Walchandnagar Industries Limited (WIL) [2023] 4 SCR 361 : (2023) 8 SCC 453; My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 70; V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd. [2021] 14 SCR 736 : (2022) 2 SCC 244; Sanjay Pandurang Kalate v. Vistra ITCL India Ltd. & Others [2023] 15 SCR 313 : (2024) 3 SCC 27; A. Rajendra v. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 721; Mobilox Innovations Private Limited v. Kirusa Software Private Limited [2017] 10 SCR 1006 : (2018) 1 SCC 353; Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another [2021] 2 SCR 677 : (2021) 10 SCC 401 – Relied on.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 817Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. Safire Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner & Another, Civil Appeal No. 2212 of 2021; National Spot Exchange Limited v. Mr. Anil Kohli, Civil Appeal No. 6187 of 2019; Ajay Gupta v. Raju @ Rajendra Singh Yadav [2016] 3 SCR 225 : (2016) 14 SCC 314 – Referred to.
List of Acts Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Limitation Act, 1963. List of Keywords Delay; Prescribed limitation period; Condonation of delay; Resolution plan; National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 408 of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2022 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal at New Delhi in CAAT(I) No. 615 of 2022 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ramji Srinivasan, Sr. Adv., Ashok Mathur, Udit Mediratta, Shivkrit Rai, Ms. Apeksha Singh, Arjun Bhatia, Ms. Shefali Munde. Advs. for the Respondents:
Brijesh Singh Bhaduriya, Aviral Kapoor, Ms. Sonal Alagh, Divyanshu Jha, Vedant Singh, Ms. Shagufa Salim, Ms. Ekta Choudhary, Anand Krishna, Ayush Kumar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
1. This appeal is filed against the order dated 14.12.2022 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal 1 . By the said order, 1 For short, “NCLAT”
818 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the NCLAT has allowed interlocutory application bearing No. 1667 of 2022 filed by Respondent No. 1 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal bearing no. C.A. (AT) (Insolvency) No. 615 of 2022.
2. The appellant is the successful resolution applicant for Rohit Ferro- Tech Limited (Corporate Debtor) having its resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors and subsequently by the National Company Law Tribunal 2 , Kolkata, by order dated 07.04.2022 in CP(IB)/1214(KB)/2018. Respondent No.1 is an erstwhile minority shareholder of the Corporate Debtor.
3. Respondent No.1 preferred an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 3 to set aside the order dated 07.04.2022 passed by the Adjudicating Authority and direct the Resolution Professional to scrutinise the resolution plan proposed by the appellant in accordance with Section 30(2) IBC. Along with the appeal, he also filed an interlocutory application bearing No. 1667 of 2022 praying for condonation of delay of 15 days in filing the same. By the order impugned herein, the NCLAT condoned the delay and allowed the said application. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant is before us with the present appeal.
4. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the NCLT passed the order approving the appellant’s resolution plan for the Corporate Debtor under Section 31 IBC on 07.04.2022. In terms of Section 61(2) IBC, the limitation period of 30 days for filing an appeal against the said order expired on 07.05.2022, which fell on a Saturday. Even assuming the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were available, the additional / grace/ condonable period of 15 days as provided under the proviso to Section 61(2), expired on 22.05.2022. Therefore, the right of Respondent No.1 to file an appeal stood extinguished on 22.05.2022 itself.
4.1. Adding further, it is submitted that after the expiry of the 30-day limitation period and the additional 15-day grace / condonable period, Respondent No. 1 e-filed the appeal along with an application for condonation of delay before the NCLAT, on 23.05.2022, which was the 46 th day from the date of the NCLT’s 2 For short, “NCLT”
3 For short, “IBC”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 819Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. order. The physical filing of the appeal was done on 24.05.2022, i.e., on the 47th day. Accordingly, the appeal was clearly barred by limitation and not maintainable in law. However, by the order impugned herein, the NCLAT erroneously allowed the application for condonation of delay by observing that Respondent No. 1 was entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It incorrectly held that the 30-day limitation period for filing the appeal expired on 09.05.2022 instead of 07.05.2022, on the ground that 07.05.2022 was a Saturday and, therefore, a court holiday. Consequently, the NCLAT wrongly computed the additional / grace/ condonable period of 15 days from 10.05.2022 instead of 08.05.2022, and concluded that this period expired on 24.05.2022 - the date on which Respondent No.1 physically filed the appeal before the NCLAT.
4.2. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat Powers Limited & Others4, Kalpraj Dharamshi & Another v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited & Another 5 , Safire Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner & Another 6 , and National Spot Exchange Limited v. Mr. Anil Kohli 7 , wherein, it was held that a litigant under Section 61 IBC can file an appeal before the NCLAT within 30 days, which may be extended by a further period of up to 15 days upon showing sufficient cause; and no appeal can be entertained beyond this extended period.
4.3. Referring to the judgment of this Court in Ajay Gupta v. Raju @ Rajendra Singh Yadav 8, the learned counsel submitted that the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not attracted where the last day for filing falls on a working Saturday, and the court registry is open. It has been judicially recognized that while Saturday may be a non-working day for the judges, it remains a working day for the registry. Therefore, if the last date for filing falls on such a Saturday, the benefit of Section 4 cannot be invoked. In the present case, 07.05.2022 was the
4 (2022) 2 SCC 244
5 (2021) 10 SCC 401
6 Civil Appeal No. 2212 of 2021 7 Civil Appeal No. 6187 of 2019
8 (2016) 14 SCC 314
820 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports first Saturday of May, 2022 and was a working Saturday for the Registry of the NCLAT. Hence, Respondent No.1 could have filed the appeal on that date, but failed to do so.
4.4. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the order of the NCLAT condoning the delay in filing the appeal beyond the statutorily permissible period of 30 days, and the additional condonable period of 15 days under the proviso to Section 61(2) IBC, is contrary to established legal principles and the scheme of the IBC, and is therefore liable to be set aside.
5. On the contrary, the learned counsel for Respondent No.1, at the outset, submitted that the appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 before the NCLAT is well within the statutorily condonable period of 15 days as mentioned in the proviso of Section 61(2) IBC and hence, the order impugned herein is sustainable in law.
5.1. Elaborating further, it is submitted that pursuant to the approval of the resolution plan, an intimation letter was issued by the Corporate Debtor to the Listing Departments of Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange of India Limited on 08.04.2022. This was the first time, on which Respondent No.1 became aware of the approval of the resolution plan. Accordingly, the initial limitation period of 30 days (22 days in April 2022 + 8 days in May 2022) ended on 08.05.2022, which was a Sunday. In accordance with the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, when the last day falls on a holiday, the period extends to the next working day. Hence, the limitation period ended on 09.05.2022 (Monday). Thereafter, the statutory condonable period of 15 days commenced from 10.05.2022 and ended on 24.05.2022. Respondent No. 1 e-filed the appeal along with the condonation application on 23.05.2022 and the appeal was physically filed on 24.05.2022, which is within the 45-day period prescribed under section 61(2) IBC (30 days limitation + 15 days condonable delay). Thus, the NCLAT rightly registered the appeal and passed the impugned order by allowing the condonation application.
5.2. It is further submitted that the Resolution Professional of the Corporate Debtor has failed to comply with the disclosure obligations mandated under the SEBI (Listing Obligation and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015. This failure directly [2025] 5 S.C.R. 821Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. contributed to the delay in filing the appeal before the NCLAT. Moreover, the failure of the Resolution Professional to adhere to the mandatory disclosure requirement adversely impacted the respondent’s right to access timely and material information, thereby delaying the initiation of the appeal process.
5.3. It is further submitted that the prescribed limitation period under section 61(2) IBC did not commence from the date of the approval order i.e., 07.04.2022, but rather from 08.04.2022 the date on which the Resolution Professional furnished the disclosure regarding the approval of the resolution plan. This is because Respondent No. 1 was not a party to the proceedings before the NCLT and was not privy to the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority or the deliberations of the Committee of Creditors (CoC). Additionally, as per the SEBI Circulars and Listing Regulations, the Corporate Debtor was under an obligation to intimate the stock exchanges at least two working days prior to the NCLT hearing, in which, the resolution plan was to be considered. This mandatory requirement was not complied with by the Corporate Debtor or the Resolution Professional. In view of these lapses, the limitation period did not commence from 07.04.2022, the date of the NCLT order, but from 08.04.2022, when the disclosure was finally made. This disclosure was the first time Respondent No.1 became aware of the approval of the resolution plan, and hence, the right to appeal accrued only from that date.
5.4. According to the learned counsel, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to the present case. It is reiterated that the limitation period commenced only after 08.04.2022 i.e., the date on which the appellant made the mandatory disclosure of the approval order to the stock exchanges and not from 07.04.2022, the date of passing of the approval order by the NCLT. The 30-day limitation period thus commenced on 08.04.2022 and expired on 08.05.2022 which was a Sunday. In view of section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, when the prescribed period expires on a day when the tribunal is closed, the filing may be done on the next working day. Accordingly, the limitation period was extended to 09.05.2022 (Monday). Subsequently, the 15-day condonable period under the 822 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports proviso to Section 61(2) IBC expired on 24.05.2022. Respondent No. 1 physically filed the appeal along with the application for condonation of delay on the same day i.e., 24.05.2022 well within the total period of 45 days. Therefore, the impugned order of the NCLAT allowing the application for condonation of delay is in consonance with the provisions of the IBC and the Limitation Act, 1963. In view of the same, the contention of the appellant that Saturday is the working day for the court registry, has no nexus with the present case.
5.5. The learned counsel finally submitted that Respondent No. 1 was not a party to the petition filed under Section 7 IBC and therefore, was not in possession of the relevant documents required to file an appeal under Section 61. This lack of access to essential documents contributed to the delay in filing the appeal. The NCLAT in the impugned order, duly acknowledged this fact and observed that the delay was attributable to the respondent’s inability to obtain necessary documents in a timely manner. In light of these circumstances, the only requirement under law is to demonstrate the existence of “sufficient cause” for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period, as per the proviso to Section 61(2) IBC. Respondent No. 1 has adequately met this threshold, and the delay was neither wilful nor deliberate, but rather due to practical constraints beyond the respondent’s control.
5.6. With these submissions, the learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 sought dismissal of the appeal filed by the appellant.
6. As a riposte, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Respondent No. 1 has raised a completely new and unfounded allegation that the Resolution Professional of the Corporate Debtor issued a disclosure to the listing departments of the NSE and BSE on 08.04.2022 - i.e., one day after the resolution plan was approved by the NCLT - instead of within the prescribed time period of 30 minutes from the pronouncement of the order. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the Company Secretary of the Corporate Debtor vide letter dated 07.04.2022, duly informed the listing departments of the NSE and BSE regarding the NCLT order within the prescribed period of 30 minutes - at 11.06.13 A.M. to NSE and 11.11.51 AM to BSE - following the pronouncement of the [2025] 5 S.C.R. 823Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. NCLT order. Therefore, the Resolution Professional fully complied with the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015.
7. Having considered the arguments advanced and the documents on record, the central issues for adjudication are:
(i) Whether the appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 was within the prescribed limitation period of 30 days, along with the additional condonable period of 15 days as provided under section 61(2) IBC; and
(ii) If not, whether the NCLAT has the power to condone the delay beyond the said prescribed and condonable period under the
IBC.
ISSUE NO. 1
8. Concededly, the resolution plan submitted by the appellant in respect of the Corporate Debtor was approved by the Committee of Creditors on 05.06.2021 and subsequently, by the NCLT, Kolkata, by order dated 07.04.2022. Any appeal, if aggrieved by the said approval, ought to have been filed before the NCLAT in accordance with the provisions of section 61(2) IBC, which prescribes a strict timeline for the same. For better appreciation, the said provision is reproduced below: “S.61 – Appeals and Appellate Authority
(1) ….
(2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed within thirty days before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal:
Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may allow an appeal to be filed after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days.
(3) .…”
Thus, the total permissible period for filing an appeal under section 61(2) is 45 days – comprising 30 days as the prescribed period and an additional 15 days that may be condoned upon showing sufficient cause.
824 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
9. In the present case, Respondent No. 1 e-filed appeal along with an application for condonation of delay before the NCLAT on 23.05.2022 and physically filed the same on 24.05.2022. The NCLAT allowed the application for condonation of delay by the order impugned herein. The appellant challenged the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the 45-day period prescribed under section 61(2) IBC – comprising a 30-day limitation period and a further 15-day condonable period – and was, therefore, time-barred. Whereas, according to Respondent No.1, although the resolution plan was approved by the NCLT on 07.04.2022, the intimation of the said approval was given to the listing departments of the BSE and NSE only on 08.04.2022; and he became aware of the approval on that date, as he was not a party to the petition filed under section 7 IBC. Accordingly, the 30-day limitation period for filing the appeal commenced on 08.04.2022 and was set to expire on 08.05.2022. However, since 08.05.2022 was a Sunday, by virtue of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the prescribed period was extended to the next working day i.e., 09.05.2022 (Monday). Thereafter, the additional grace period of 15 days for seeking condonation of delay, as permitted under the proviso to Section 61(2) IBC expired on 24.05.2022. As Respondent No. 1 physically filed the appeal along with the condonation application on 24.05.2022, it was within the statutorily permissible period of 45 days. Hence, the appeal was not barred by limitation. The NCLAT rightly allowed the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
10. Pertinently, Section 238A IBC which was inserted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018, makes the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to IBC proceedings, and the same reads as under:
“238A.Limitation – The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall, as far as may be, apply to the proceedings or appeals before the Adjudicating Authority, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be.”
10.1. Now, the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 – namely Section 2(j), which defines the term ‘period of limitation’ [2025] 5 S.C.R. 825Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. and Section 4, which deals with the expiry of the prescribed period on a holiday - are extracted below:
“Section 2 – Definitions In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -
(j) “period of limitation” means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and “prescribed period” means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act”.
“Section 4 - Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.
Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens. Explanation.— A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.”
Moreover, the same is also highlighted under Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016, which reads as under:
“3. Computation of time period- Where a period is prescribed by the Act and these rules or under any other law or is fixed by the Tribunal for doing any act, in computing the time, the day from which the said period is to be reckoned shall be excluded, and if the last day expires on a day when the office of the Tribunal is closed, that day and any succeeding days on which the Tribunal remains closed shall also be excluded.”
Thus, the above provisions clarify that the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Rule 3 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016, extends the limitation period to the next working day, if the prescribed period expires on a holiday.
826 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
10.2. At the same time, this Court has, in the following decisions, categorically explained the meaning of the term ‘prescribed period’ as defined under Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and clarified the scope and applicability of Section 4 of the said Act, particularly, in cases where the last date for filing an appeal or application falls on a court holiday:
(i) Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. M/s. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd.9 “10. The facts in the present case are peculiar.
The arbitral awards were received by the appellants on 26-8-2003. No application for setting aside the arbitral awards was made by the appellants before elapse of three months from the receipt thereof. As a matter of fact, three months from the date of the receipt of the arbitral award by the appellants expired on 26-11-2003. The District Court had Christmas vacation for the period from 25-12-2003 to 1-1- 2004. On reopening of the court i.e. on 2-1-2004, admittedly, the appellants made applications for setting aside those awards under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. If the period during which the District Court, Kamrup, Guwahati, remained closed during Christmas vacation, 2003 is extended and the appellants get the benefit of that period over and above the cap of thirty days as provided in Section 34(3), then the view of the High Court and the District Judge cannot be sustained. But this would depend on the applicability of Section 4 of the 1963 Act.
11. The question, therefore, that falls for our determination is whether the appellants are entitled to extension of time under Section 4 of the 1963 Act in the above facts.
12. Section 4 of the 1963 Act reads as under:
“4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.—Where the prescribed period for any
9 (2012) 2 SCC 624
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 827Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee & Ors. suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens.
Explanation.— A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.”
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