P. Nallammal v. State By the Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 643; [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1854
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Police, Justice Dindigul
- Decided
- 7 May 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2489/2025
- Sections
- 109, 107, 13(1), 13(2), 13, 109IP, 12, 106, 161, 452, 120
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1854 : 2025 INSC 643 P. Nallammal v.
State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu (Criminal Appeal No. 2489 of 2025)
With (Criminal Appeal No. 2490 of 2025)
Tmt. P. Nallammal & Ors.
A1: Tmt. P. Nallammal A2: Thiru A. M. Paramasivam (Died) Through Lrs.
A2.1: P. Rajakumar Pandian A2.2: P. Selvakumar Pandiyan A2.3: Selvi Suriyakala @ Sudarsena v.
State of Tamil Nadu, Represented By Inspector of Police With (Criminal Appeal No(s). 2491-2492 of 2025)
Thiru A. M. Paramasivam (Died) Through Lrs. & Ors.
A1.1: Tmt. P. Nallammal A1.2: P. Rajakumar Pandian A1.3: P. Selvakumar Pandiyan A1.4: Selvi Suriyakala @ Sudarsena v.
State of Tamil Nadu, Represented By Inspector of Police 07 May 2025 [Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to appeal challenging the conviction and sentence of the appellant u/s.109 IPC r/w ss.13(1)(e) and 13(2) of PC Act; appeal challenging the attachment Order as modified by the High Court; and the appeal challenging the Administrative Order passed * Author [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1855P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu by the Chief Justice of the High Court by which criminal appeals were listed for fresh hearing.
Headnotes † Penal Code, 1860 – s.109 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.13(2), 13(1)(e) – Offences under, abettable by a non-public servant – Appellant accused of abetting her husband, an MLAaccused no. 1, in the accumulation of disproportionate assets – Trial court convicted accused no. 1 u/ss.13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, whereas the appellant-accused no.2 u/ss.13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act r/w s.109 IPC, and sentenced accordingly – Attachment Order passed attaching the disproportionate assets belonging to the accused no. 1 and the appellant – Appeal thereagainst dismissed by the High Court, however, the High Court modified the attachment order by reducing the quantum of the disproportionate assets calculated by the trial court – Appeal before this Court challenging the impugned order upholding the appellant’s conviction and sentence; the attachment Order as modified by the impugned order; and the Administrative Order by which the Chief Justice of the High Court had listed the criminal appeals for fresh hearing: Held: Per Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J: It is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and a solitary circumstance of name-lending, such as the one at present, cannot lead to draw and sustain an inference which unerringly points to the guilt of the appellant – There has to be something more in the form of positive evidence to satisfy the essential requirements for the offence of abetment – Life and liberty are not things to be trifled with on the basis of conjectures and surmises – Presumption of innocence is a basic tenet of criminal jurisprudence and it gets dislodged only by presenting cogent and reliable evidence – No evidence on record, much less any evidence to satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to establish that the appellant conspired/colluded with or intentionally aided the 1st Accused in committing offences u/ss.13(2) r/w.13(1)(e) – Thus, the acts of the appellant do not fall within the ambit of s.107 and in such circumstances, it would be unsafe to sustain her conviction with the aid of s.109 IPC – Impugned Order set aside to the extent of conviction of the appellant and she stands discharged of the liability of her bail bonds and sureties – Since the appellant is acquitted, the attachment order does not require any interference as it attaches the assets standing in her name beyond the value 1856 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports which has been explained by the appellant and accepted by the courts below – Impugned Administrative Order, having worked itself out, does not call for any interference – As evincible from the impugned Administrative Order, there did not exist any ‘Judgment’, the then Chief Justice of the High Court, thus, cannot be faulted for restoring the criminal appeal for fresh hearing. [Paras 36-40] Per Sudhanshu Dhulia, J (Partly dissenting): Where there is abetment by a close relative in corruption matters, such as the spouse in the present case, the culpability of such a relative has to be tested by the surrounding circumstances and his/her overall conduct because in such cases, there would rarely be direct evidence of abetment – Appellant was an accomplice in the commission of the crime when she allowed accused no.1 to register the properties in her name – Appellant actively participated in the purchase of various movable and immovable properties in her name – It has come in unrebuttable evidence of the prosecution that the appellant had visited the office of the concerned Registrar for getting the sale deeds registered, and this had happened on more than one occasion for different sale deeds – Trial court and the High Court rightly accepted the prosecution’s case that the appellant knowingly allowed her husband to accumulate illegal wealth in her name and thus, committed an offence u/s.109 IPC r/w s.13(1)(e) and s.13(2), thus, no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court – No fault in the administrative order passed by the High Court. [Paras 15-19, 20, 21, 26, 27] Per curiam: In view of difference of opinion pertaining to the impugned order upholding the appellant’s conviction and sentence, the Registry to place the papers of the appeal before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions. [Paras 1, 3] Case Law Cited In the Judgment of Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State [1999] Supp. 1 SCR 135 : (1999) 6 SCC 559 – relied on.
K. Ponnuswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 97 : (2001) 6 SCC 674; State v. Uttamchand Bohra [2021] 9 SCR 821 : (2022) 16 SCC 663 – distinguished.
State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu [2022] 7 SCR 630 : (2023) 6 SCC 768 – referred to.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1857P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu In the Judgment of Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State [1999] Supp. 1 SCR 135 : (1999) 6 SCC 559; K. Ponnuswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 97 : (2001) 6 SCC 674; State v. Uttamchand Bohra [2021] 9 SCR 821 : (2022) 16 SCC 663; Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra [2023] 11 SCR 1135 : 2023 SCC OnLine 1038– relied on.
DSP v. K Inbasagaran (2006) 1 SCC 420; Kartarey v State of Uttar Pradesh [1976] 2 SCR 199 : AIR 1976 SC 76; Reena Hazarika v. State of Assam [2018] 13 SCR 1108 : (2019) 13 SCC 289; State of Karnataka v. J Jayalalithaa [2017] 5 SCR 525 : (2017) 6 SCC 263; Kedari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2015) 14 SCC 505; State of Tamil Nadu v. R Soundirarasu (2023) 6 SCC 768; Kishori Lal v State of Madhya Pradesh [2007] 7 SCR 1051 : (2007) 10 SCC 797; State through Inspector of Police CBI Chennai v. Naresh Prasad Agarwal (2024) 3 SCC 515; State through the Inspector of Police CBI, ACB, Chennai v. S Murali Mohan, Criminal Appeal No. 4166/2024 – referred to.
List of Acts Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860; Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance Act, 1944.
List of Keywords Public Servant; Relative of public servant; Corruption; Disproportionate assets; Check period; Abetment; Attachment Order; Administrative Order; Chief Justice of the High Court listed the criminal appeals for fresh hearing; Registry to place the papers of the appeal before the Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions; Offences abettable by a non-public servant; MLA; Accumulation of disproportionate assets; Bonafide belief; Presumption in law; Illegal acquisitions; Presumption of innocence; Criminal jurisprudence; Abetment by close relative in corruption matters; Difference of opinion.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2489 of 2025 1858 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports From the Judgment and Order dated 20.11.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 1170 of 2000 With Criminal Appeal No(s). 2490 and 2491-2492 of 2025 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., M. P. Parthiban, R. Sudhakaran, Shreyas Kaushal, Bilal Mansoor, S. Geyolin Selvam, Alagiri K Advs. for the Respondent:
D. Kumanan, Ms. Deepa S, Sheikh F Kalia, Veshal Tyagi, Chinmay Anand Panigrahi.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
1. I had the benefit of going through the Judgment authored by my learned brother Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. where the Accused No.2 (P. Nallammal) has been acquitted for the offence under Section 109 of IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PC Act’). Though I agree with some of the observations made by my brother Judge, yet I am unable to accept the conclusion and findings of acquittal as regards Accused No.2, who was the wife of the public servant Accused No.1. Consequently, I have found it necessary to pen down my reasons for doing so.
2. I would, first of all, make it clear that the delivery of this order has taken more time than usual. But then I was only handed over his opinion by my learned Brother a fortnight back and it has taken this much of time further for me to give my reasons.
3. Leave granted.
4. There are four appeals before us:
a. Appeal arising from SLP (Crl) No.2127/2024 filed by the Accused No.2 (P. Nallammal) challenging the impugned order dated 20.11.2023 by which appellant’s conviction and sentence of [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1859P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu one year R.I for offence under Section 109 of IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of PC Act by the Trial Court, has been affirmed.
b. Appeal arising from SLP (Crl) No.2288/2024 filed by Accused No.2 and Legal Heirs of the Accused No.1 (children of the Accused No.1 and Accused No.2), challenging the attachment Order as modified by the impugned order dated 20.11.2023. c. Appeals arising from SLP (Crl) No.5196-5197/2024 filed by the Legal Heirs of the Accused No.1 (children of the Accused No.1 and Accused No.2), challenging the Administrative Order dated 03.03.2022 by which the Chief Justice of the High Court had listed the criminal appeals for fresh hearing which finally resulted in the common impugned order dated 20.11.2023 by which order of Accused No.2’s conviction and sentence as well as the order of the attachment, with modification, were affirmed.
5. For the sake of convenience, the facts of the case are being taken from the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 2127 of 2024. However, the facts are not being reproduced in detail.
6. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to take note of the following details of this case:
a. Accused no.1 (husband of the appellant) who was a Member of the Legislative Assembly and a Minister, was accused of acquiring disproportionate assets while holding public office as a public servant. The properties were also accumulated in the name of the present appellant i.e. Accused no.2 and their minor children. The present appellant was thus accused of abetting the accumulation of disproportionate assets.
b. The Trial Court convicted Accused No.1 under sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, whereas the appellant (Accused No.2) was convicted under sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act read with section 109 of the IPC. Accused No.1 and appellant (Accused No.2) were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of two years and one year, respectively.
c. An attachment order dated 03.01.2001 was passed under sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ordinance’), whereby the disproportionate assets belonging to Accused No.1 and the appellant were attached.
1860 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports d. Against both these orders (of conviction and sentence, and attachment, respectively), the accused filed appeals before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the criminal appeals by the impugned judgment dated 20.11.2023. However, the High Court modified the attachment order by reducing the quantum of disproportionate assets calculated by the Trial Court. e. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, Accused No.1 (husband of the appellant) has passed away. Now, we have only Accused No.2 i.e. P. Nallammal, wife of the main accused (A.M Paramasivam) who is now deceased, before us.
7. The challenge before us is to a judgment delivered by the Madras High Court on 20.11.2023, whereby the conviction of the appellant under sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act read with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) and consequent sentence of rigorous imprisonment of one year imposed by the Trial Court was upheld.
8. At the outset, I must note that there are concurrent findings against the accused in this case, holding her guilty of abetment in amassing disproportionate assets during Accused No.1’s tenure in public office i.e. between 16.06.1991 and 09.05.1996 (hereinafter ‘check period’).
9. The prosecution case was that the accused had amassed disproportionate assets, since there was a vast difference between the assets in their name at the beginning of the check period i.e., between 16.06.1991 and 09.05.1996. The prosecution case against the present appellant was that although she had no independent income as such, she abetted her husband in acquisition of these assets in her name and in the name of her children as their representative and natural guardian.
10. On the other hand, defence would argue that the figure of disproportionate assets arrived at by the prosecution was grossly exaggerated and based on arbitrary calculations. They had also challenged the inclusion of many immovable properties by the prosecution, arguing that these were acquired before the check period. It was also the contention that their assets were traceable to legitimate sources of income, such as income from agriculture, gifts etc. and this was forthcoming from the Income Tax returns submitted by them. Moreover, the counsel for the appellant would also argue that the present appellant, in any case, is not a public servant and [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1861P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu thus, she has no obligation to explain her sources of income and further, she cannot be convicted under Section 109 of IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2).
11. We have heard both sides and perused the record.
12. The Trial Court undertook a thorough examination of the oral and documentary evidence on record, as well as the arguments made by both sides, to arrive at the conclusion that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the Accused No.1 was guilty of misusing his public office in order to accumulate disproportionate assets, which constituted ‘criminal misconduct’ under section 13 of the Act. Further, the present appellant, i.e. Accused no.2, was held guilty of abetment of the offence of Section 13(1)
(e) of the PC Act. It was specifically held that the accused had failed to establish that the assets treated as disproportionate by the prosecution were traceable to legitimate sources of income, since the evidence brought on record by the accused to prove the same was not satisfactory. These findings of the Trial Court were affirmed by the High Court by the impugned judgment.
13. Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant also tried to argue that many of the assets considered by the Courts as ‘disproportionate assets’, were actually gifted by the father of the appellant at the time of her marriage to accused No.1. Further, a substantial portion of the immovable properties sought to be included in the ‘disproportionate assets’ by the prosecution were, in fact, purchased long before the check period. These arguments have rightly been disbelieved as the Trial Court arrived at a specific finding on these on examination of documents and witnesses which show that the properties were purchased only between March and May 1996, which falls within the check period.
14. The story of defence that some portion of land, included in ‘disproportionate assets’, was purchased by Accused No.1 from his brother in the year 1988 (i.e. before the check period), but for which the sale deed was executed in favour of the children of the Accused No.1 and appellant only in the year 1994, is very difficult to believe, and the High Court and the Trial Court rightly rejected this line of reasoning.
15. The efforts to prove that the income alleged to be ‘disproportionate assets’ by the prosecution is from legitimate sources failed as the 1862 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports evidence presented by the defence was not only vague but lacked credibility as well.
16. We must also keep in mind that insofar as corruption cases under section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act are concerned, the burden of proof is reversed, and it becomes the responsibility of the accused to dislodge the presumption against him. This position has been reiterated by this Court in State of T.N. v. R. Soundirarasu (2023) 6 SCC 768: “83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a departure from the principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden will always lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offences charged and never shifts on the accused to disprove the charge framed against him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is that it is for the prosecution to establish that the accused was in possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources of income but the term “known sources of income”
would mean the sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for the accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his hands. The onus in this regard is on the accused to give satisfactory explanation… ”
In the present case, the prosecution succeeded in establishing that the accused were in possession of assets hugely disproportionate to their known sources of income. The prosecution had successfully discharged its initial burden. Thereafter, it was for the accused to satisfy the Court, through cogent evidence, that the assets are from legitimate sources. Upon perusal of the material on record and considering the concurrent findings of the Courts below, I am of the opinion that the accused miserably failed to discharge this burden of satisfactorily explaining the source of income behind the ‘disproportionate assets’.
17. In fact, as far as the evaluation of disproportionate assets is concerned, I and my learned brother (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), both agree that the High Court has rightly evaluated the assets, after considering the material on record. The only point of our disagreement is the question of the culpability of the appellant (P. Nallammal). In the opinion of my learned brother Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J., it was the appellant’s husband (Accused No.1) who had accumulated assets [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1863P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu disproportionate to his known sources of income and the prosecution could not prove that the appellant was aware that the money from which assets were being purchased or bought in her name, were from unlawful sources. It is this finding that I disagree with.
18. There is no doubt that mere registration of disproportionate assets in the name of a public servant’s relative or friend does not make that person guilty of abetment of the offence of Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. All the same, it is also a settled position of law that a person who is not a public servant still can commit an offence under Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the PC Act read with Section 109 of the IPC. I am of the opinion that the appellant was an accomplice in the commission of the crime when she allowed Accused No.1 to register the properties in her name. Where there is abetment by a close relative in corruption matters, such as the spouse in the present case, the culpability of such a relative has to be tested by the surrounding circumstances and his/her overall conduct. This is because, in such cases, there would rarely be direct evidence of abetment. This factor has to be kept in mind.
19. The appellant married Accused No.1 in the year 1983 and she was a housewife without any independent source of income. After going through the records, the High Court notes that from the year of marriage (i.e.1983) till 1991, there is no acquisition of immovable property either in the name of the appellant or Accused No.1. Accused No.1 became MLA in the year 1991 and minister in the year 1993 and then the acquisition of properties, moveable and immovable, also starts. After perusing the document showing the properties acquired by the accused, the Trial Court observed how land was purchased in the name of the appellant or in the name of minor children through the appellant, on more than one occasion. This is what was observed by the Trial Court:
“(5) On 25.11.92, the 2nd Accused purchased 0.45 Acres of land for a sale consideration of Rs.16,875 situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.2, Stamp fee is Rs.2,030, PW-1, PW-46 deposed about sale. (6) On 14.02.1992, the 2nd Accused purchased 9 cents of land for a sale consideration of Rs. 4500 situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex. P.11, Stamp fee is Rs.540, PW-2, PW-48 deposed about sale. (7) On 16.04.1993, the 2nd Accused purchased 1.45 acre of land for a sale consideration of 1864 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Rs.64,980 on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulum Village under Ex.P.3, Stamp fee is Rs.7860, PW-1, PW-47 deposed about sale. (8) On 22.09.1993, the 2nd Accused purchased a house situated at K.K Nagar, Madurai and 1 cents of land situated at Kerala, for a sale consideration of Rs1,50,000 under Ex.P.16, Stamp fee is Rs.9050, PW-4, PW-44 deposed about sale. On 04.04.1994, the 2nd Accused purchased 2.48 acres of Nanja land for a sale consideration of Rs.80,600 on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.4, Stamp fee is Rs.9680, PW-1, PW-54 deposed about sale. (10) On 12.09.1994, the 2nd Accused purchased 2.43 acres of Nanja land for a sale consideration of Rs.1,23,160 on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.5, Stamp fee is Rs.14,860, PW-1, PW-45 deposed about sale. (11)
On 23.09.1994, the 2nd Accused purchased 1.29 acre of Nanja land for a sale consideration of Rs.70,950 on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam Village under EX.P.6, Stamp fee is Rs.8520, PW-1, Pw-49 deposed about sale…..(14) On 11.04.1996, the 2nd Accused purchased 4.27 acres Nanja land for a sale consideration of Rs.2,32,210 on behalf of daughter Suriyakala situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.7, Stamp fee is Rs.28000, PW-1, PW-51 deposed about sale….(16) On 06.05.1996, the 2nd Accused purchased 1.61 acre of Nanja land for a sale consideration of Rs.87,620 on behalf of Rajkumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.6, Stamp fee is Rs.10,680, PW-1, PW-50 deposed about sale….”
Not only this, but additionally, two cars and other movable and immovable properties were also purchased in the name of the appellant and the minor children through the appellant.
20. Thus, it is not the case that there were only one or two transactions in the name of the appellant for which the appellant can say that she acted in a bona fide manner without knowing that the funds which were used for acquiring these assets were from unlawful sources. In my considered opinion, these transactions during the check period demonstrate how the appellant aided her husband in the accumulation of disproportionate assets by allowing him to register the same in her [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1865P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu name. The High Court notes that the total salary drawn by accused No.1 during the check period was Rs. 2,17,178, and considering this, it is impossible to imagine that the appellant was not aware of her husband’s legitimate income. It is very hard to believe that she was not aware that these assets which were in her name were not acquired from her husband’s legitimate sources of income.
21. Moreover, it was never the appellant’s case that she was not aware that her husband had been purchasing the properties in her name by using the funds gained from illegitimate sources. From the Trial Court to this Court, what the appellant has only been unsuccessfully arguing is that her independent income was not taken into account and her assets prior to the check period were not properly assessed. All these grounds have already been dealt with by the Trial Court and High Court, and the appellant has failed to show that there has been any discrepancy in the evaluation of assets. Even on re-evaluation by the High Court, the High Court has only found a discrepancy of around Rs.2 lacs and even by reducing that amount from the total worth of disproportionate assets, the percentage of disproportionality remained above 400% of the accused’s known sources of income. There is no doubt that the appellant intentionally aided her husband in the accumulation of disproportionate assets.
22. The Trial Court as well as the High Court have rightly relied upon the decision of this Court in P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559 to hold the appellant guilty of abetment of the offence of Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. In that case, this Court had accepted the submission of the State that a person who is not a public servant, can also be an abettor for the offences under Section 13 of the PC Act. Accepting and reiterating the illustrations suggested by the State’s Counsel, it was observed by this Court as follows: “24.… The first illustration cited is this:
If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him of how other public servants have become more wealthy by receiving bribes and A persuades the public servant to do the same in order to become rich and the public servant acts accordingly. If it is a proved position there cannot be any doubt that A has abetted the offence by instigation. 1866 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Next illustration is this:
Four persons including the public servant decide to raise a bulk amount through bribery and the remaining persons prompt the public servant to keep such money in their names. If this is a proved position then all the said persons are guilty of abetment through conspiracy.
The last illustration is this:
If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his, that he has acquired considerable wealth through bribery but he cannot keep them as he has no known source of income to account, he requests A to keep the said wealth in A’s name, and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it is a proved position A is guilty of abetment falling under the “Thirdly” clause of Section 107 of the Penal Code.
25. Such illustrations are apt examples of how the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act can be abetted by non-public servants. The only mode of prosecuting such offender is through the trial envisaged in the PC Act.” It is clear that the appellant’s case squarely falls within the third illustration produced above. Interestingly, the case cited above i.e. of P. Nallamal (Supra) relates to none other but the present appellant and her deceased husband, who had earlier approached this Court seeking quashing of the present criminal case.
23. My learned brother has also discussed two other cases of this Court, though in my humble opinion, these are distinguishable on facts and would be of no help to the appellant.
24. The first case is K. Ponnuswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001) 6 SCC 674. In this case, the High Court upheld the conviction of the main accused for acquiring disproportionate assets while his wife and daughter were acquitted. When the main accused came before this Court, this Court dismissed his criminal appeal, whereas in relation to the acquittal of wife and daughter, this Court did not say anything since the State had submitted that they are going to file an appeal challenging the acquittal of the daughter and wife of the main accused. No such appeal was filed by the State. On the contrary, the wife and daughter of the main accused therein approached this Court challenging the order confiscating their properties. This Court remitted [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1867P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu the matter to the High Court on the ground that the Courts below did not record proper reasons for confiscating the properties belonging to the wife and daughter. Finally, the High Court gave directions for the exclusion of their assets from the order of confiscation, considering that they stand acquitted in the matter. However, that case cannot be read as a decision in favour of the daughter and wife, since the innocence or guilt of the daughter and wife of the public servant involved in that case was never an issue before this Court. Hence, that case cannot come to the aid of the present appellant.
25. The second case which my learned brother relies upon is State v. Uttamchand Bohra (2022) 16 SCC 663. The facts of this case are also totally distinguishable from the case at hand. In that case, a public servant (main accused) working for the Central Government was accused of buying some property, in the name of a company named M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd., using the money from his unknown sources of income. There one Uttamchand Bohra (respondent therein) was also made an accused, alleging that he had abetted the public servant in the accumulation of disproportionate assets inasmuch as Uttamchand Bohra’s employee was the witness of the sale deed, and title deeds were also recovered from his house. The respondent moved a discharge application, which was dismissed by the Trial court. Later, in revision, the High Court quashed the case against Uttamchand Bohra. Thereafter, the State approached this Court against the order of the High Court. This Court dismissed the State’s appeal and affirmed the order of the High Court. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:
“25. The charge-sheet further does not contain any allegation which can amount to an offence under Section 109IPC. The prosecution has not suggested that he abetted A-1 to acquire disproportionate assets in any manner; the only allegation is that the title deeds to the flat, which is in the name of M/s Raviteja Trading Co.
Pvt. Ltd. was seized from his custody and that he had instructed his employee to witness the document. An allegation of the existence of signatures of Uttamchand’s employee, as a witness to the sale deed cannot amount to his aiding or abetting A-1 to acquire disproportionate assets. Witnessing a sale deed is a formal requirement. Likewise, the fact that the sale deed was in Uttamchand’s 1868 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports residence cannot satisfy the ingredient of any of the offences alleged against him.
26. The statements of the approvers, A-3 and A-4, who were tendered pardon by the Court, do not reveal any involvement by Uttamchand in commission of the alleged offence. During the pendency of the present proceedings the recording of depositions of 74 witnesses was completed. Those were part of this Court’s record; they do not show any incriminating material as far as Uttamchand is concerned. Furthermore, crucially, the money trail for the property bought under the sale deed, does not show Uttamchand’s involvement. It may implicate A-3 and A-4, however as stated before, the Court has granted a pardon to them, for which they have turned approvers.
….
29. CBI cannot deny that Uttamchand’s name was included in the present case, although the sale deed was seized during a search conducted in relation to another FIR (the earlier case) — and not in relation to the present case, which relates to the disproportionate assets case. The FIR in the present case names only A-1 and A-2 as the accused. The sale deed had already been seized from Uttamchand’s house by then.
….
36. An entire overview of the material produced before the trial court, with the charge-sheet and final report, as well as deposition of the 74 witnesses who were examined during the trial, does not support CBI›s allegation of Uttamchand. He did not directly or indirectly finance the transaction by which property was sold to M/s Raviteja Trading Co.
Pvt. Ltd., which, according to that prosecution, was in fact by A-1. The respondent also is not alleged to have facilitated the flow of money to fund acquisition of the flat. The material put against him is that the sale deed was seized, prior to the present case. The other circumstance put against him is that his employee witnessed the sale deed. The respondent is concededly neither the owner, [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1869P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu nor has any links with M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. In these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that no material which can prima facie support an inference that Uttamchand was either a conspirator or had abetted the commission of the offences alleged against the accused A-1 is made out.”
(Emphasis Provided)
Thus, it is clear that the facts of the above case are entirely distinct from the present matter. The accused in that case had no involvement in the offence as the assets were allegedly purchased by the public servant in the name of a company with which the accused (Uttamchand Bohra) had nothing to do. The only allegations against Uttamchand Bohra were that the title deeds were recovered from his residence, and that one of his employees was a witness to the sale deed by which assets disproportionate to known sources of income were purchased by the public servant.
26. In no way can the facts of the above cases be compared to the case at hand. In the present case, the appellant actively participated in the purchase of various movable and immovable properties in her name. It has come in unrebuttable evidence of the prosecution that the present appellant had visited the office of the concerned Registrar for getting the sale deeds registered. And this had happened on more than one occasion for different sale deeds. The Trial Court and the High Court had rightly accepted the prosecution’s case that the appellant knowingly allowed her husband to accumulate illegal wealth in her name and thus, committed an offence under Section 109 of the IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the PC Act.
27. In view of the above, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 20.11.2023 passed by the High Court. Also, like my brother Judge, I do not see any fault in the administrative order dated 03.03.2022 passed by the High Court. Accordingly, I dismiss all these appeals.
28. The appellant is directed to surrender within ten weeks from today to undergo her remaining sentence.
29. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.
30. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. 1870 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Judgment Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeals arise from a common set of facts and have, therefore, been heard together, and are disposed of by this Judgment. It is necessary to first advert to the relevant factual background, wherefrom the instant appeals have traversed to this Court.
FACTUAL LENS:
3. A. M. Paramasivam (hereinafter also referred to as the ‘1st Accused’) was an elected Member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly during the period 16.06.1991 to 09.05.1996. He also served as the Minister for Labour Welfare, Government of Tamil Nadu during the period 17.05.1993 to 09.05.1996. On 20.08.1996, CR No.5/AC/96/ Headquarters was registered against him and his wife, P. Nallamal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2 nd Accused’) alleging acquisition of properties beyond known pecuniary resources, which were disproportionate to the extent of Rs.38,72,545/- during the Check Period i.e., between 16.06.1991 to 09.05.1996. The 1st Accused and 2nd Accused are hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘Accused’.
4. A. M. Paramasivam was charged for the offence under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for acquiring properties and pecuniary resources which were disproportionate to his known sources of income to the extent of Rs.38,72,545/-, which he had not satisfactorily accounted for. Whereas, P. Nallamal was tried for offence under Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’) read with Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(c) of the Act for abetting the offence by permitting the 1st Accused to acquire a substantial portion of the properties in her name and in the names of her minor children and for holding such properties on his behalf.
5. Before the learned III Special Judge/XIII Additional Judge, Chennai (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’), on behalf of the prosecution, 62 witnesses (PW1 to PW62) were examined, 160 Exhibits (Ex.P1 to Ex.P160) were marked along with 31 material objects (MO1 to MO31). On the side of the defence, 30 witness (DW1 to DW30) were examined and 15 Exhibits (Ex.D1 to Ex.D15) were marked. [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1871P. Nallammal v. State By The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anticorruption Police, Dindigul, Tamil Nadu
6. The Trial Court vide Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2000 determined the value of the assets acquired by the 1st Accused disproportionate to his known source of income as being Rs.35,25,136/- for the purpose of action under Section 12 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance Act, 1944, and convicted both the 1st and 2nd Accused:
Accused Offence [under the Act as it then stood] Conviction and Sentence 1st Accused Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)
(c) of the Act To undergo two years Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/. In default of payment of fine, to undergo 2 months further Simple Imprisonment.
2 nd Accused Section 109, IPC r/w 13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) of the Act To undergo one year Rigorous Imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs.5000/-. In default of payment of fine, to undergo 1 month further Simple Imprisonment.
7. In view of the above conviction, the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Madurai by Order dated 03.01.2001 in Crl. O.P. No.2 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Attachment Order’) made the earlier interim attachment order dated 06.03.1997 of the schedule-mentioned properties in Crl. M.P. No.1168/1997, absolute and ordered that the amount of Rs.35,25,136/- shall be recovered by forfeiture of the attached properties.
8. The 1 st and 2 nd Accused filed Criminal Appeal No.1170/2000 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Criminal Appeal’) before the High Court of Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’) challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court. Along with this Criminal Appeal, the accused filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No.425/2001 challenging the Attachment Order. With the leave of the High Court, the accused marked two additional documents as Ex.D16 & Ex.D17.
9. The story takes a rather interesting turn from here. It would be material to note the case of the appellants. According to them, between 08.02.2013 and 20.02.2013, the Criminal Appeal was listed before the High Court and elaborate arguments were advanced by both sides, subsequent to which the judgment was reserved by a learned 1872 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Single Judge. On 30.04.2013, as put forth by the appellants, the learned Single Judge pronounced Judgment and acquitted both the accused. Thereafter, the counsel for the accused filed applications dated 30.04.2013, 09.12.2013 and 16.02.2015 praying for a Certified Copy of the Judgment/Order dated 30.04.2013, which was not made available. On 23.03.2015, the 1st Accused passed away. Later, the 2 nd Accused also made a complaint to the Registrar General of the High Court to the effect that a Certified Copy of the Judgment/ Order dated 30.04.2013 had not been furnished by the Registry and no reason was assigned for the same. The Assistant Registrar (Administration) of the High Court, on 19.08.2015, replied to the 2nd Accused, stating that no action could be taken in judicial proceedings on letters received by post.
10. After over five years, the High Court, on 19.07.2018, listed the criminal appeal for ‘fresh hearing’. The 2nd Accused filed Writ Petition (Criminal) No.437/2021 titled P Nallammal v The Registrar General High Court of Judicature at Madras before this Court challenging the fresh listing of the Criminal Appeal, which was disposed of vide Order dated 13.12.2021 with a request to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High Court to conduct an enquiry on the administrative side and to take a decision. Pursuant to this Order, an enquiry was conducted by the learned Chief Justice on 23.02.2022, in which the 2nd Accused participated. By an order dated 03.03.2022 in R.O.C. No.2/2022/Crl. Sec. (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Administrative Order’), the Chief Justice, in the absence of a judgment on record, directed the appeal to be listed for fresh hearing.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.