Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 668; [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1316
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale
- Decided
- 13 May 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5843/2014
- Sections
- 4(2), 4, 36, 36(2), 53T, 19, 26(1), 5, 26, 27, 19(4), 19(3)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:19 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1316 : 2025 INSC 668 Competition Commission of India v.
Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014)
13 May 2025 [Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.] Issue for Consideration I. Whether providing exclusionary volume based discounts, imposing contractual terms, refusing supply etc. will amount to abuse of dominant position?
II. Whether the functional-discount / “no-Chinese” scheme (including the later TMLA arrangement) imposes unfair or discriminatory conditions under Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act?
III. Whether the LTTSA with Schott Kaisha produced a marginsqueeze proscribed by Section 4(2)(e) of the Act?
IV. Whether Schott India tied or bundled NGA and NGC tubes, thereby breaching Section 4(2)(d) of the Act?
V. Whether an effects-based (harm) analysis is an essential component of an inquiry under Section 4 of the Act., and, if so, whether it was omitted in the present case?
VI. Whether the investigation and the Commission’s order are vitiated by denial of cross-examination and allied breaches of natural justice?
Headnotes† Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance – Whether target-discount scheme of Schott India amounts to discriminatory or exclusionary pricing in contravention of Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act – The rebate structure applied uniformly to all purchasers based solely on volume thresholds, irrespective of buyer identity – Thus not in contravention of provisions of Competition Act:
* Author [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1317Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Held: It is an undeniable fact that Schott India holds a dominant position in the Neutral Glass Tubing market in India – As per Section 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Act, an abuse of dominant position arises only where a dominant enterprise (i) impose unfair or discriminatory prices or conditions, (ii) limit production or technical development, (iii) block others from the market, (iv) force a buyer to accept an unrelated product or obligation, or (v) use power in one market to muscle into, or protect, another – Thus applying different prices only becomes abusive when it lacks an objective commercial justification or when equivalent customers cannot obtain the same terms – The rebate ladder introduced by Schott was directly proportional to the aggregate tonnage of Neutral Glass Clear (“NGC”) and Neutral Glass Amber (“NGA”) collected within the financial year by the customer – Every customer who reached a slab, whether by one purchase order or by several, obtained the corresponding allowance on the entire year’s turnover — The rebate therefore rose mechanically with volume and with nothing else – identity of the buyer was irrelevant – While larger buyers like Schott Kaisha availed higher rebates due to greater offtake, no evidence showed denial of similar rebates to similarly placed customers – Moreover, reliance is placed on the untested declarations of five converters alleging that Schott Kaisha received “special” terms – Those statements, taken ex parte and never subjected to cross-examination, thus cannot be relied upon – Therefore, the target-discount scheme of Schott India is not in contravention of Section 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Act. [Paras 10, 31, 33, 38, 39] Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance – Functional Discount / “No-Chinese” Scheme – Whether Unfair or Discriminatory under Sections 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Competition Act, 2002 – the functional rebate and its successor agreements are not unfair or discriminatory as the rebate terms remained consistent across similarly placed converters, with no price discrimination:
Held: The uniform 8% functional rebate was granted to converters that met three objective and commercially justifiable conditions: (i) fulfilling a purchase plan to ensure furnace stability; (ii) refraining from using certain Chinese tubing due to quality concerns (a condition later withdrawn); and (iii) complying with traceability and fair-pricing obligations – Each condition is therefore objectively 1318 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports connected with the legitimate aim, patient safety and brand integrity, and is proportionate to it – Ledgers for FY 2008-09 to FY 2011-12, collated by COMPAT, discloses no instance in which two converters performing the same function received different net prices – The rebate terms remained consistent across similarly placed converters, with no price discrimination – The only variation was credit timing which was commercially rational and not violative of Section 4(2)(a) –– Every converter prepared to assume the same traceability and quality-promotion obligations received exactly the same economic consideration – Therefore, the functional rebate and its successor agreements therefore do not offend either Section 4(2)(a) or Section 4(2)(b)(i) of the Act. [Paras 40, 41, 45] Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance – The Long-Term Tubing Supply Agreement (LTTSA) between Schott India and Schott Kaisha resulted into a market squeeze, prohibited by Section 4(2)(e) of the Competition Act, 2002 – As Schott India is absent downstream; the wholesale-to-retail spread left rivals with sustainable margins; and the market exhibited neither exit nor price elevation – Thus, LTTSA does not contravene Section 4(2)(e) of the Act:
Held: It is alleged that impugned LTTSA enabled Schott India to foreclose independent converters by compressing the margin between their input cost and the downstream selling price of Schott Kaisha – Three essential condition should be met in for a margin squeeze - (i). The respondent must itself operate downstream; (ii). The wholesale-to-retail spread must be insufficient for an equally efficient competitor; and (iii). The compression must threaten competitive harm – In the present case Schott India did not operate in the downstream market for converted glass containers, which was served by Schott Kaisha, a separate company in which the global Schott AG holds fifty per cent stakes, the balance being with the Kaisha promoters, with no board overlap, no common management, and separate audited accounts – Moreover, there is no evidence established that equally efficient independent converters were foreclosed or operated at a loss – There is no demonstrable squeeze of rivals’ margin, as there is no evidence that equally efficient rivals were forced into losses – Financial data from nine independent converters show positive EBITDA throughout the LTTSA period, with seven improving in both volume and margins – Accordingly, none of the three cumulative conditions for a margin squeeze were met. [Paras 48-53] [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1319Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Abuse of Dominance – Schott India tied or bundled NGA and NGC tubes, thereby breaching Section 4(2)(d) of the Competition Act:
Held: Section 4(2)(d) of the Act is attracted only where a dominant enterprise, (i). supplies two distinct products, (ii). makes the supply of the tying product conditional upon acceptance of the tied product, and (iii). thereby forecloses competitors in the tied-product market — In the instant case, NGA and NGC are not economically distinct products, but rather alternative specifications drawn from the same continuous-melt furnace, with customer demand dictated by downstream pharmaceutical requirements – Even assuming as arguendo, NGA and NGC were separate, no coercive condition was proven – Alleged tying of both the products was based on witness statements in which no opportunity of cross examination was granted and an outdated circular, both of weak evidentiary value – No contract, invoice, or purchase record demonstrated forced bundling – Thus, it is not proved NGA and NGC are not independent products and the converters were never compelled to buy both the products moreover no foreclosure was demonstrated – In these circumstances, the essential elements of Section 4(2)(d) of the Act are not proved as NGA and NGC are not independent products. [Paras 54, 55, 56, 58] Competition Act, 2002 – s.4 – Whether an effects-based (harm) analysis is an essential component of an inquiry under Section 4 of the Act, and, if so, whether it was omitted in the present case – That the CCI, having relied on untested statements and pre-2009 correspondence, Undertook no credible assessment of harm – The omission of a proper harm analysis vitiates the CCI’s order in limine:
Held: Section 4 of the Act prohibits the abuse of dominance – Abuse is conduct that distorts the competitive process or harms consumers – The statute therefore contemplates two logically separate findings: (i). that the impugned practice falls within one of the descriptive clauses (a)–(e) of sub-Section (2), and (ii). that it results in, or is likely to result in, an appreciable adverse effect on competition (“AAEC”) – The majority ruling of the CCI professed to have analysed effects yet adduced no economic evidence of price increases, output restriction or foreclosure – However, after compiling converter sales, EBITDA and price data for FY 2007-08 to FY 2011-12, it was found (i) that all independent converters expanded output and margins, and (ii) that pharmaceutical buyers paid identical or higher prices for containers 1320 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports from the joint-venture than from other converters – The CCI, having relied on untested statements and pre-2009 correspondence, Undertook no credible assessment of harm; and that, on the evidence marshalled by the COMPAT, converter growth, stable downstream prices, absence of foreclosure – No appreciable adverse effect on competition is shown. [Paras 59, 64, 66] Competition Act, 2002 – s.36 – Whether the investigation and the Commission’s order are vitiated by denial of crossexamination and allied breaches of natural justice:
Held: Section 36(2) of the Act incorporates the Code of Civil Procedure’s guarantees, including the right to “examine witnesses on oath” and to test them in cross-examination, Regulation 41(5) of the 2009 General Regulations obliges the DG or the CCI to grant that opportunity whenever it is “necessary or expedient” — In this case, the DG relied extensively on statements from converters commercially adverse to Schott India, by circulating questionnaires, recording their statements and “surfing the worldwide web”, no independent verification was attempted – The CCI adopted the same material without independent scrutiny – In short, uncorroborated testimony is the foundation of every adverse inference by the DG and CCI against Schott India – Schott India had repeatedly requested cross-examination, both in writing and orally, but the CCI rejected the request on technical grounds, ignoring the substantive right – If the CCI had allowed cross-examination, two courses were open: (i). either the allegations would have crumbled under questioning, or (ii). a tested evidentiary record would have emerged on which a reasoned decision, whichever way, could rest. Cross-examination would have revealed that several converters had, during the period in question, expanded output, raised prices independently of Schott India – The findings of CCI are not legally sustainable and are contrary to natural justice – COMPAT correctly allowed the appeal filed by Schott India, as CCI’s refusal to let Schott India cross-examine the converter-witnesses was a material infraction. [Paras 68, 69, 73, 75] Case Law Cited Rajasthan Cylinders v. Union of India [2018] 12 SCR 495 : (2020) 16 SCC 615; Indian National Shipowners’ Association v. ONGC, (2019) SCC OnLine CCI 26; Competition Commission of India v. Fastway Transmission Pvt. Ltd. [2018] 1 SCR 232 : (2018) 4 SCC 316; Raymond Woollen Mills Limited and Another v. Director [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1321Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. General (Investigation and Registration) and Another [2008] 8 SCR 1002 : (2008) 12 SCC 73; State of Kerala v. K.T. Shaduli Grocery Dealer Etc. [1977] 3 SCR 233 : (1977) 2 SCC 777; Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-II (2016) 15 SCC 785 – relied upon.
Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. CCI, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11229 – relied upon.
British Airways plc v. Commission, (Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-95/04 P, dated 15 March 2007); Telia Sonera Sverige AB v. Konkurrensverket, (Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-52/09, judgment dated 17 February 2011); Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities, (General Court of the European Union, Case T-201/04, judgment dated 17 September 2007); Intel Corporation Inc. v. European Commission, (Case C-413/14 P, judgment of 6 September 2017) – relied upon.
List of Acts The Competition Act, 2002; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. List of Keywords Dominant position; Tying or bundling; Target (volume) rebates; Abuse of dominance; Untested statements; Margin squeeze; Statements not subjected to cross examinations.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014 From the Judgment and Order dated 02.04.2014 of the Competition Appellate Tribunal, Delhi in AP No. 91 of 2012 With Civil Appeal No. 9998 of 2014 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
AN Haksar, Amit Sibal, Sr. Advs., Saurabh S Sinha, Ms. Chitra Y Parande, Gautam Prabhakar, Mrigank Prabhakar, Arjun Krishnan, Anand S Pathak, Shashank Gautam, Ms. Sreemoyee Deb, Ms. Anubhuti Mishra, Soham Goswami, Ms. Nandini Sharma, 1322 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Ms. Anisha Bothra, Ms. Aashana Manocha, Abhijeet Singh, Saksham Dhingra, Rishabh Sharma.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Percival Billimoria, A N Haksar, Sr. Advs, Mahesh Agarwal, Rahul Goel, Ms. Anu Monga, Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Victor Das, Himanshu Saraswat, Yash Jain, Ms. Aditi Sharma, Ms. Kriti Khatri, Ms. Rachita Sood, Tushar Bathija, E. C. Agrawala, Arjun Krishnan, Saurabh Sinha, Ms. Chitra Y Parande, Gautam Prabhakar, Mrigank Prabhakar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Vikram Nath, J.
1. India’s economic ascent rests on a delicate but decisive equilibrium. On the one hand, markets must remain contestable: no undertaking may extinguish rivalry by stratagems foreign to fair, merit-based competition. On the other hand, genuine achievement whether expressed in scale, efficiency or technological advance, must be rewarded and not punished, for it is the impetus for investment, innovation and consumer welfare. The Competition Act, 2002 1 , is the charter that secures both pledges. It equips the Competition Commission of India with wide-ranging powers of inquiry and remedy, yet it permits intervention only where hard evidence shows that the impugned conduct has caused, or is likely to cause, a demand rigorous fact-finding, adversarial testing of testimony and, above all, an effects-based appraisal that balances commercial justification against proven harm. Preserving this symmetry between discipline and encouragement is essential if the statute is to nurture robust rivalry while sustaining the confidence of domestic and global investors who increasingly view India as a premier destination for enterprise and innovation.
I. Background of the Case
2. These statutory appeals, preferred under Section 53T of the Act, challenge a common order dated 2 April 2014 passed by the 1 In short, the “Act”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1323Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Competition Appellate Tribunal 2 in Appeal Nos. 91 and 92 of 2012. Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014 has been filed by the Competition Commission of India3 . Civil Appeal No. 9998 of 2014 has been filed by Kapoor Glass India Pvt. Ltd.4 . In both the matters, Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd.5 is the contesting respondent.
3. The proceedings have their genesis in an information lodged on 25 May 2010 by Kapoor Glass under Section 19 of the Act. Kapoor Glass alleged that Schott India, then the principal domestic manufacturer of neutral USP-I borosilicate glass tubing, had abused its dominant position by offering exclusionary volume-based discounts, imposing discriminatory contractual terms, and, on occasions, refusing supply.
4. Forming a prima-facie opinion under Section 26(1) of the Act, CCI directed the Director General (Investigation)6 to inquire into the matter. The DG’s report dated 14 March 2011 concluded that Schott India had violated Section 4 of the Act. After hearing the parties, CCI by majority order dated 29 March 2012 levied a penalty equal at a rate of 4 per cent of Schott India’s average of 3 years turnover equivalent to about Rs 5.66 crores and also issued a cease-and-desist order against Schott India from doing any discriminatory practices to any of the converters.
5. Schott India challenged that order before COMPAT by Appeal No. 91 of 2012. Kapoor Glass also preferred a separate appeal by Appeal No. 92 of 2012 seeking a broader relief and reiterating its refusalto-supply grievance. By the impugned order COMPAT:
a) allowed Schott India’s appeal, annulled the penalty, and held that the evidentiary material did not establish any abuse of dominant position; and b) dismissed Kapoor Glass’s appeal with costs of ₹ 1,00,000/-.
6. Vide these appeals, CCI seeks revival of its original order and Kapoor Glass supports CCI on the liability of Schott India but contends that COMPAT erred in refusing effective relief and in discounting the 2 In short, “COMPAT”
3 In short, “CCI”
4 In short, “Kapoor Glass”, the original informant 5 In short, “Schott India”
6 In short, “DG”
1324 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports alleged “mixing risk”. Schott India, the contesting respondent herein, on the other hand, defends the COMPAT decision in its entirety. II. A Primer on the relevant Competition Law principles:
7. Before moving ahead, we believe it would be helpful to briefly explain the chief statutory provision and certain competition-law principles that recur throughout these appeals and are key to understand this case.
8. Section 4 of the Act is at the heart of the present dispute. It has been reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:
“Section 4 – Abuse of dominant position.
(1) No enterprise or group shall abuse its dominant position.
(2) There shall be an abuse of dominant position under sub-section (1) if an enterprise or a group—
(a) directly or indirectly imposes unfair or discriminatory—
(i) condition in purchase or sale of goods or service; or
(ii) price in purchase or sale (including predatory price) of goods or service;
(b) limits or restricts —
(i) production of goods or provision of services or market therefor; or
(ii) technical or scientific development relating to goods or services, to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) indulges in practice or practices resulting in denial of market access in any manner;
(d) makes conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts;
(e) uses its dominant position in one relevant market to enter into, or protect, another relevant market.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,
(a) “dominant position” means a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant market in India [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1325Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. which enables it to (i) operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market, or (ii) affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its favour;
(b) “predatory price” means the sale of goods or provision of services at a price below cost, as may be determined by regulations, with a view to reduce competition or eliminate competitors;
(c) “group” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (b) of the Explanation to Section 5.”
9. A bare perusal shows that the provision has two moving parts. First, it forbids only abuse, not dominance as such. Secondly, it gives five illustrations of the abuse of dominant position which are (i) price or contract discrimination, (ii) limiting output, (iii) blocking entry, (iv) tying or bundling, and (v) leveraging power from one market into another. If a dominant firm engages in any one of these practices, and cannot justify it as a legitimate business response to competition, the conduct is prohibited.
10. Section 4, sub-Section (1) of the Act states that “no enterprise or group shall abuse its dominant position.” Thereafter, sub-Section
(2) then lists, in clauses (a) to (e), the aforementioned five ways in which abuse may occur. Put shortly, an enterprise may not
(i) impose unfair or discriminatory prices or conditions,
(ii) limit production or technical development,
(iii) block others from the market,
(iv) force a buyer to accept an unrelated product or obligation, or
(v) use power in one market to muscle into, or protect, another.
11. Apart from Section 4 of the Act, in order to aid comprehension of the discussion that follows, we are outlining the relevant competitionlaw concepts that recur throughout the pleadings and the analysis that follows:
(i) Relevant market: Competition is measured within a field large enough that buyers can, at a reasonable cost, turn to alternative suppliers. In the present dispute, two layers of trade must be kept distinct yet viewed together:
1326 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports • Upstream market – the manufacture and sale of neutral USP-I borosilicate glass tubing, whether clear or amber. • Downstream market – the sale of pharmaceutical containers—ampoules, vials, cartridges and syringes— made by converters.
The first market supplies the raw material; the second transforms it into finished goods. Because the output of the upstream market is the indispensable input of the downstream market, the two are conventionally described as “upstream” and “downstream” respectively.
(ii) Dominant Position: A firm is dominant when its economic strength lets it act largely on its own terms. A town with a single water utility, or a manufacturer whose patented device has no practical substitute, offers the everyday picture. Dominance is lawful; the question is how the power is used.
(iii) Volume or “Target” Discounts: These are price reductions that grow purely with the quantity a buyer takes over an agreed period. For example, a supermarket chain that orders ten thousand sacks of rice may pay less per sack than a corner shop that orders ten. Such scale rebates are benign when offered to every purchaser on identical volume thresholds.
(iv) Functional discounts: Sometimes the buyer performs an extra function—say, warehousing, local advertising, or aftersales service. A seller may repay a buyer for performing that extra task like storing stock, advertising the brand, or providing repairs. Airlines, for example, pay travel agents a commission for marketing flights. If the rebate merely covers the cost of that task and is open to any buyer willing to do the same, competition law is usually satisfied.
(v) Margin squeeze: A vertically integrated supplier sells an essential input to rivals and also competes with them downstream. If it keeps the input price high and its own downstream price low, equally efficient rivals may be left with an unsustainable margin. Telecom operators that control not only broadband network but also sell retail internet access provide the classic example.
(vi) Tying or bundling: Where a supplier insists that customers accept product A as a pre-condition for buying product B, it is [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1327Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. tying; where A and B are sold only as a package, it is bundling. The practice becomes abusive if the supplier wields dominance in product A to force unwanted sales of B, thereby foreclosing choice.
(vii) Mixing risk: In the instant case, there is an allegation that certain converters might blend premium Schott tubing with cheaper imports and still market the containers as wholly premium. If true, the practice could endanger patients and tarnish the reputation of high-quality suppliers. Whether that risk existed, and how Schott India responded, will be examined in due course.
(viii) Procedural fairness: Even in an inquisitorial setting, the parties must see and test the evidence against them. Cross-examination of a witness is a recognised, though not in every case, an indispensable safeguard. A serious denial of that opportunity can itself undermine the findings of the adjudicating body. Having explained these basic concepts pertaining to the matter, we shall now proceed to detail the material facts of the case and the determinations made at each previous stage of the proceedings. III. Factual Matrix
12. Schott India, the first respondent, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Schott Glaswerke Beteiligungs-GmbH, which in turn is wholly owned by Schott AG of Mainz, Germany. Its Jambusar plant in Gujarat, acquired in 1998 from Bharat Glass Tubes, manufactures neutral borosilicate tubing in the following three grades: Fiolax-clear (for export and domestic sale), Neutral Glass Clear7 and Neutral Glass Amber8 .
13. Neutral borosilicate tubing constitutes the upstream market; converters re-heat and form that tubing into ampoules, vials, cartridges and syringes, which comprise the downstream market and are supplied to pharmaceutical undertakings. Of the five Indian tube-makers that existed prior to 1998, all except Schott India and Triveni Glass (now Nipro-Triveni) had exited by 2010 and the balance of demand was met by imports from Germany, Japan, Italy and, at the low-end, China. 7 In short, “NGC”
8 In short, “NGA”
1328 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
14. In May 2008, a Schott group company entered into a joint-venture with Kaisha Manufacturers, creating Schott Kaisha Pvt. Ltd.9 , the country’s largest converter. Schott Kaisha is neither a subsidiary nor a division of Schott India, but it purchases a substantial share of the latter’s annual melt.
15. Discount architecture and agreements: To secure economies of scale and steady furnace utilisation, Schott India offered two rebate schemes:
a. Target (volume) rebates: slabbed discounts, credited quarterly, rising with aggregate annual purchases of NGC and NGA; and b. Functional rebates: an eight-per-cent allowance extended to converters that (i) met annual purchase plans, (ii) refrained from using Chinese tubing, and (iii) adhered to “fair-pricing” commitments in their container sales.
16. Long-Term Tubing Supply Agreement10 : In 2008 Schott India and Schott Kaisha executed a three-year agreement under which the converter agreed to source at least eighty per cent of its requirements, approximately thirty per cent of Schott India’s capacity, in consideration of a price concession over the slab rate, a three-year price freeze and priority dispatch in periods of tight supply.
17. On 20 May 2009, the principal abuse-of-dominance provisions of the Act were brought into force. On 25 May 2010, Kapoor Glass, a Mumbai converter, lodged an information alleging, inter alia, that:
(i) The target-rebate structure coerced loyalty and tied clear and amber tubes;
(ii) The functional rebate and its successor Trade-Mark Licence Agreement 11 foreclosed the use of lower-priced Chinese tubes;
(iii) The LTTSA conferred on Schott Kaisha an unmatchable cost advantage; and
(iv) Schott India had rationed supplies to independent converters whilst fully meeting Schott Kaisha’s demands.
9 In short, “Schott Kaisha”
10 In short, “LTTSA”
11 In short, “TMLA”
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1329Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
18. Acting on a prima-facie opinion under Section 26 (1) of the Act, CCI directed the DG to investigate. In a report dated 14 March 2011, the DG gave the following findings:
(i) Schott India enjoyed a market share exceeding sixty per cent and was dominant in the upstream market;
(ii) The combined effect of the target rebates, functional rebates and the Long-Term Agreement was to foreclose rival suppliers, attracting clauses (a), (b) and (e) of Section 4(2) of the Act;
(iii) Aggregating NGC and NGA purchases for rebate purposes amounted to tying, offending clause (d); and
(iv) Selective supply curtailments denied market access to certain converters, invoking clause (c).
19. On 29 March 2012, the majority of the Commission substantially endorsed the DG’s analysis. The Economic Member of the Commission dissented on the discount issues and gave various relevant findings which would be important for the discussions that follow. The majority, however, reasoned that:
(i) The volume-based “target” rebates, the trademark-linked “functional” rebates, and the LTTSA, taken together, “tilted the playing field” in favour of Schott Kaisha and foreclosed effective competition in the upstream market;
(ii) The aggregation of clear and amber tubing for the purpose of achieving higher rebate slabs operated, in effect, as a tying arrangement; and
(iii) The temporary curtailment of supplies to certain converters reinforced the exclusionary strategy.
Having concluded that the conduct attracted Clauses (a) through (e) of Section 4 (2) of the Act, the CCI:
(i) Directed Schott India to cease and desist from the impugned practices with immediate effect; and
(ii) Levied a monetary penalty calculated at four per cent of the company’s average turnover for the three preceding financial years, amounting to ₹ 5.66 crore.
1330 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
20. Schott India and Kapoor Glass appealed the matter to COMPAT by way of Appeal Nos. 91 and 92 of 2012. The COMPAT gave the following finding in the impugned order:
(i) Appeal of Schott India allowed: The evidence against the company rested “for the most part on statements never subjected to cross-examination”; on that footing COMPAT found no proof of discriminatory rebates, margin squeeze or tying. It pointed out that, barring one exception, every converter had grown its output after 2009, a fact at odds with the charge of foreclosure.
(ii) All sanctions annulled: The penalty of one per cent of turnover and the attendant cease-and-desist directives were quashed in toto.
(iii) Appeal of Kapoor Glass dismissed with costs: Kapoor Glass’s prayer for wider relief was rejected and costs of ₹ 1,00,000 were imposed.
(iv) Serious procedural lapse recorded: COMPAT remarked that the CCI’s refusal to let Schott India cross-examine the converterwitnesses was a material infraction that gravely weakened the probative worth of their allegations.
21. In the present appeals against the COMPAT’s order, the parties seek the following reliefs:
(i) CCI seeks reinstatement of its original order and penalty, contending that COMPAT misread the evidence and overstated the impact of the procedural lapse.
(ii) Kapoor Glass, aligning with CCI on liability, argues that COMPAT further erred in downplaying the alleged “mixing” of Schott and Chinese tubes.
(iii) Schott India, being the main respondent, supports the COMPAT’s decision in full, submits that its rebates were open to all converters on equal quantitative terms, and renews its objection that denial of cross-examination fatally tainted the CCI’s process. IV. Arguments Advanced
22. Mr. Amit Sibal, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-CCI, has advanced the following main arguments:
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1331Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. A. Schott India’s unquestioned dominance: It is submitted that during the investigation period, Schott India supplied more than sixty per cent of neutral USP-I borosilicate tubing, controlled the only large-scale domestic melt tanks and possessed clear technological and capacity advantages. On any accepted test, it occupied a dominant position in the upstream market. B. Loyalty-inducing “target” rebates: It is argued that the annual-slab rebate scheme penalised converters who failed to meet their forecast: a single below-target month dragged the entire year’s purchases into a lower tier, clawing back earlier discounts. Converters therefore dared not split orders with alternative suppliers, while Schott Kaisha, by reason of volume, always secured the maximum twelve-per-cent rebate. Such discrimination, Counsel contends, is in violation of clause (a) of Section 4(2) of the Act.
C. Exclusionary functional rebates and the LTTSA: Schott Kaisha’s LTTSA locked in eighty per cent of its requirements for three years, guaranteed price freezes and monthly “functional” bonuses and gave it delivery priority. It is submitted that this package, unavailable to others, further foreclosed rivals and breached clauses (a), (b) and (e).
D. Tying of clear and amber tubes: Discounts were calculated on the combined quantity of clear and amber tubing. Because Schott India held over ninety per cent of amber tubes, indispensable for light-sensitive formulations, converters had little choice but to buy clear tubes from it as well. The appellants characterise this as a tie-in contrary to clause (d).
E. Margin squeeze on independent converters: It is argued that the preferential input price to Schott Kaisha enabled it either to sell containers below the cost level sustainable by equally efficient converters or to harvest abnormal margins, squeezing rivals out of the downstream market in violation of clauses (a) and (e).
F. Selective refusals to supply: Instances were cited where converters who sourced even modest volumes elsewhere found their subsequent Schott allocations curtailed or delayed. It is argued that such conduct amounts to denial of market access under clause (c).
1332 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports G. “Mixing” rationale a façade: It is submitted that the assertion that Chinese tubes might be secretly mixed with Schott tubes is speculative; no concrete incident was proven. The quality argument therefore serves only to cloak an exclusivity obligation. H. Procedural lapse not fatal: Finally, it is contended that Regulation 41(5) vests discretion in the CCI to refuse crossexamination. The converters’ statements, although not tested orally, were corroborated by documentary evidence, rebate circulars, purchase data and the LTTSA. The absence of crossexamination, it is argued, cannot outweigh this substantive proof of abuse.
I. The learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the following case laws in support of their arguments:
(i) Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India and another12 ,
(ii) Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.13 ,
(iii) Competition Commission of India v. Fastway Transmission Pvt. Ltd.14 ,
(iv) K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, (1984) 1 SCC 43
(v) Transmission Corporation v. Sri Rama Krishna Rice Mills15 ,
(vi) United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental BV v. Commission 16 ,
(vii) Irish Sugar plc, Commission Decision IV/34.621
(viii) HOV SVZ/MCN, Commission Decision IV/33.941
23. Shri A.N. Haksar, learned Senior Counsel for Kapoor Glass, has rendered similar submissions to CCI but has also made the following additional points:
12 (2017) 8 SCC 47
13 (2010) 10 SCC 744
14 (2018) 4 SCC 316
15 (2006) 3 SCC 74
16 Case 27/76, EUCJ [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1333Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. A. Two-decade exclusionary course of conduct. Kapoor Glass’s purchase orders for Schott tubes were first rebuffed in 2000. From that moment, nine years before Section 4 of the Act came into force, Schott India treated Kapoor Glass as a non-customer while continuing to serve other converters, thereby laying the ground for Schott Kaisha’s later entry. The chronological record (1996-2010) filed in evidence is said to reveal a pre-meditated plan to freeze Kapoor Glass out of both upstream and downstream trade B. Espionage and intimidation tactics. Kapoor Glass’s internal paperwork surfaced in Schott India’s possession; key employees were poached; and Schott Kaisha’s managing director reportedly “gloated” that Kapoor Glass had been finished (letter of 23 Jan 2010). These incidents, Kapoor Glass submits, show that upstream dominance was reinforced by unlawful means and by threats to converters who awarded job-work to Kapoor Glass. C. Absolute refusal to supply means abuse under Section 4(2)(c) of the Act. The boycott began in 2000, years before the 2002 label episode deployed by Schott India as an afterthe-fact excuse. Any private trade-mark grievance expired with limitation; competition law requires proportionality, not a perpetual embargo by the sole large-scale amber-tube supplier. D. Persistent mix-up hazard. Kapoor Glass maintains that a real and present danger existed of converters mis-labelling containers by “mixing” premium Schott tubes with lower-grade imports. The LTTSA and the functional rebate, it is submitted, were devised not to protect quality but to immunise Schott Kaisha from price rivalry on the pretext of that hazard; COMPAT, in discounting the risk, ignored contemporaneous complaints from Ranbaxy, Cadila and other buyers.
E. Quantum of penalty. Finally, Kapoor Glass submits that the four-per-cent turnover penalty originally imposed by the CCI was conservative, given both the duration of the abuse (2008-2012) and the deterrence objective set out in Section 27(b). It prays for reinstatement of the penalty and for broader behavioural remedies.
F. The learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the following precedents apart from those relied on by the Counsel for CCI: 1334 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(i) Voltas Ltd. v. Union of India 17 ,
(ii) Coal India Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India 18 ,
(iii) Samir Agarwal v. Competition Commission of India19 ,
24. Mr. Percival Billimoria, learned Senior Counsel, for the respondent- Schott India, has advanced the following main arguments: A. Reliance on un-tested statements vitiates the case: It is submitted that the Director-General’s report, and consequently the majority order of the CCI, rest almost entirely on questionnaires and witness statements procured from a handful of converters openly adverse to Schott India. None of those deponents was offered for cross-examination despite the respondent’s repeated requests. That denial, by itself, renders the evidentiary foundation infirm and justified the COMPAT’s rejection of the findings.
B. Volume (or “target”) rebates are legitimate and nondiscriminatory: The impugned discount ladder rewarded only the quantity actually lifted in a financial year; every converter, large or small, moved up the scale on identical tonnage slabs. Differential outcomes reflected differential volumes, not the identity of the purchaser. Such scale rebates, it is argued, are standard commercial practice and have been treated as lawful in the CCI’s own earlier decisions.
C. The LTTSA is objectively justified: Neutral USP-I tubing is produced in continuous-fire tanks that run at about 1600 °C and requires extremely high investment. To finance capacity expansion Schott India sought a three-year, eighty-per-cent offtake commitment from its then largest customer, Schott Kaisha. The modest extra rebate and price-freeze granted in return are submitted to be a normal quid pro quo for assured purchase and not an exclusionary device.
D. Functional rebate covered additional services, not loyalty: Converters who wished to emboss the “Schott” mark on the 17 (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 498
18 (2023) 10 SCC 345
19 (2021) 3 SCC 136
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 1335Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. finished container had to meet traceability and marketing obligations and bore the associated costs. The functional allowance merely reimbursed those outlays and was open to any converter prepared to undertake the same function. It neither required exclusivity nor penalised the use of rival tubing. E. No margin squeeze was possible or shown: Schott India does not operate in the downstream market. Schott Kaisha sold ampoules and vials at prices comparable to, and in many cases higher than, rival converters. The latter’s own sales volumes and EBITDA margins rose in the period under enquiry, facts extracted by the Economic Member and by COMPAT. With margins intact and output expanding, foreclosure is conceptually impossible. F. No tying or bundling of clear and amber tubes: NGC and NGA tubing emerge from the same tank; converters order each variant in the proportion demanded by their pharmaceutical customers. The rebate scheme merely aggregated annual purchases of both variants to compute the slab. Nothing in the contracts obliged a converter to buy clear tubes as a precondition to obtaining amber (or vice-versa).
G. “Mixing risk” furnished a bona-fide rationale for the no- Chinese clause later withdrawn: Documentary evidence from Ranbaxy and other pharma demonstrated that some suppliers were passing off low-quality imports as premium containers. The temporary restriction on Chinese tubing, in force only until March 2010, protected patient safety and Schott’s reputation; converters were always free to source from Nipro-Triveni or any approved foreign manufacturer.
H. Absence of competitive harm: No converter exited the business; imports held a double-digit share; Nipro-Triveni expanded capacity; and pharmaceutical buyers enjoyed stable or declining container prices. The respondent submits that Section 4 of the Act targets only conduct that harms the competitive process, not vigorous rivalry that benefits downstream customers.
I. The learned Senior Counsel for Schott India has placed the following case laws on record in their submissions:
(i) CCI v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra), 1336 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(ii) Voltas Ltd. (supra),
(iii) Coal India Ltd. (supra),
(iv) Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI (supra),
(v) Rajasthan Cylinder & Containers Ltd. v. Union of India 20 ,
(vi) Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. CCI 21 ,
V. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
25. Having carefully examined the material on record, the submissions of the parties and the orders of the Court below, we are of the view that the appeals present the following issues for adjudication: I. Whether the target-discount scheme of Schott India amounts to discriminatory or exclusionary pricing in contravention of Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act.
II. Whether the functional-discount / “no-Chinese” scheme (including the later TMLA arrangement) imposes unfair or discriminatory conditions under Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act.
III. Whether the LTTSA with Schott Kaisha produced a marginsqueeze proscribed by Section 4(2)(e) of the Act.
IV. Whether Schott India tied or bundled NGA and NGC tubes, thereby breaching Section 4(2)(d) of the Act.
V. Whether an effects-based (harm) analysis is an essential component of an inquiry under Section 4 of the Act., and, if so, whether it was omitted in the present case.
VI. Whether the investigation and the Commission’s order are vitiated by denial of cross-examination and allied breaches of natural justice.
VI. ANALYSIS
26. At the outset, we must clarify that unless the context expressly indicates otherwise, every factual recital or numerical datum herein
20 (2020) 16 SCC 615
21 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11229 [2025] 5 S.C.R. 1337Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. is drawn from, or corresponds verbatim with, the findings of fact recorded in the DG’s Investigation Report and thereafter relied on, adopted, or reiterated in substance by the CCI and/or by the COMPAT. Before dealing with each of the aforementioned issues, it is essential to ascertain the contours of the relevant market in the present dispute. The evidence placed by the DG and accepted, in substance, by the CCI, discloses that converters treat NGC tubes and NGA tubes as distinct and non-interchangeable inputs. The physicochemical attributes of NGA are required where the packed drug is photo-sensitive, whereas NGC is preferred when no such protection is demanded. No party has pointed us to any functional substitute capable of meeting the identical pharmaceutical standard. We accordingly identify two discrete upstream product markets: NGC and NGA. Each of them feeding the downstream market for containers (ampoules, vials, cartridges, syringes) fabricated from the respective tube.
27. As to geographic scope, the record shows that converters located across the country source tubes from the same limited set of manufacturers. The transport cost is marginal compared with the value of the product, import barriers are uniform nationally, and pharmaceutical end-buyers impose identical quality specifications regardless of State. Those considerations, noted both by the DG and by the CCI, warrant treating India as a single geographic market for present purposes.
28. Having decided on the relevant market, we next examine Schott India’s position in the same. Market-share data culled from statutory filings and sales declarations show that Schott India supplied approximately 61 per cent of NGC+NGA in 2008-09, rising to over 80 per cent in 2009-10. These findings have been endorsed by the DG, CCI and the COMPAT. The only domestic rival of any consequence, Nipro-Triveni, hovered in low double digits, while imports, mainly from China, were constrained both by price sensitivity at the high end and by quality reservations among major pharmaceutical companies.
29. Market share of the respondent is reinforced by economic strength. Schott India draws upon the financial and technological resources of the global Schott group, whose consolidated turnover exceeded €2.8 billion and workforce 17,500 during the period under review. That scale secures favourable raw-material procurement and sustained R&D, advantages that smaller rivals cannot replicate easily. The 1338 [2025] 5 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports firm’s vertical integration amplifies its clout. Through its 50 per cent participation in the downstream JV, Schott Kaisha, Schott India enjoys a guaranteed outlet for roughly one-third of its tube output, while simultaneously influencing a leading converter’s sourcing decisions. The CCI recorded that the JV was at the material time the largest Indian ampoule producer.
30. Finally, as has been observed by the COMPAT, countervailing buyer power is conspicuously absent in the relevant market. Converters, barring the JV, are fragmented and purchase volumes that are individually modest; the evidence shows they are “heavily dependent” on Schott India because many pharma customers insist upon its branded tubing to meet USP-I neutrality requirements.
31. Therefore, weighed cumulatively under Section 19(4) of the Act, factors in the present case such as commanding and persistent market share, economic and technological superiority, vertical integration, high entry barriers and weak buyer power, lead us to the undeniable conclusion that Schott India holds a dominant position in each of the two identified upstream markets during the period relevant to these appeals. With market definition and dominance thus determined, we turn to the specific allegations of abuse, taking them seriatim under the issues framed earlier.
Issue I - Whether the target-discount scheme of Schott India amounts to discriminatory or exclusionary pricing in contravention of Section 4(2)(a) and Section 4(2)(b) of the Act.
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