R. Nagaraj (Dead) Through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 478; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 734
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 9 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5131/2025
- Sections
- 100, 3, 37, 59, 851
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 734 : 2025 INSC 478 R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v.
Rajmani and Others (Civil Appeal No. 5131 of 2025)
09 April 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter to the trial Court for a fresh trial on the issue of limitation, despite the existence of concurrent findings, when section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 empowered the High Court to decide the matter. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.3 and Art.59 – Both the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, after detailed analysis of the oral and documentary evidence let-in by the parties, categorically held that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation – However, the High Court observed that both the Courts failed to frame any issue in respect of the limitation – Thereafter, the High Court remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh trial solely with respect to the issue of limitation – Correctness:
Held: Judgment of High Court unsustainable – U/s.100 CPC, the High Court possesses the authority to entertain second appeals strictly on substantial questions of law – Upon admitting such an appeal, the High Court is empowered to frame substantial questions and adjudicate them directly, without the necessity of remanding the matter to the trial court – This approach ensures judicial efficiency and prevents unnecessary prolongation of litigation – In the instant case, without deciding the substantial question of law involved in the second appeal, the High Court only considered the additional substantial question of law, observing that both the Courts failed to frame any issue in respect of the limitation, though held that the suit was barred by limitation – The failure of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court to formulate a separate issue, is not fatal to the judgment rendered by them and has not caused any prejudice to the parties – Further, the trial Court, in the performance of its * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. 735R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others duty, mandated u/s.3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has taken up the question of limitation and upon perusal of the overall pleadings and evidence, has rightly decided the same – It is a general rule that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below – In the present case, both the trial Court and the First Appellate Court, after detailed analysis of the oral and documentary evidence let-in by the parties, categorically held that the suit was hopelessly barred by limitation – Respondent nos.1 to 3, have knowingly slept over their right to challenge the sale and allowed further rights to flow, cannot later question the sale of larger extent of share in an un-partitioned property – Any plausible reasons for delay not found – Limitation is a matter of statute and must be strictly enforced, more so when the earlier transaction or sale is well within the knowledge of the parties – This principle assumes greater significance in the present case, where the delay extends to seventeen years for filing the suit, despite the fact that they were arrayed as respondents/Judgment Debtors in the execution proceedings – Furthermore, protection of bona fide purchasers for value is a significant consideration, and any disturbance to their rights or titles after such a long period, would create uncertainty in property transactions and undermine the sanctity of court sale – Therefore, the High Court was not justified in remanding the matter to the trial Court for fresh trial solely with respect to the issue of limitation; and that, the Courts below have rightly held that the suit was barred by limitation and respondent nos.1 to 3 are not entitled for any relief – Impugned judgment is set aside – Judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the suit, as affirmed by the First Appellate Court, are restored. [Paras 12.1, 17, 22, 23] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.100 – Second appeal – Legal position – Discussed. [Para 12] Framing of issues – Determination of the material point of disputes – Mixed question of facts and issues – Discussed. [Para 18] Limitation Act, 1963 – Object of – Discussed. [Para 18] Limitation – Mixed question of fact and law – No hard and fast rule that every question of limitation is to be treated as a mixed question of fact and law – Discussed. [Para 20] Procedural Laws – Violation of – Discussed. [Para 21.1] 736 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Case Law Cited Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs. [2001] 1 SCR 948 : (2001) 3 SCC 179; Surat Singh (Dead) v. Siri Bhagwan & Ors. [2018] 1 SCR 1063 : (2018) 4 SCC 562; Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) Through Lrs. v. Ahsanul Ghani [2019] 2 SCR 169 : (2019) 19 SCC 413 : AIR 2019 SC 1178; Ramakrishnan Kadinhipally & Ors. v. P.T. Karunakaran Nambiar, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 323; Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. and Another v. Employees State Insurance Corporation [1972] 1 SCR 867 : AIR 1972 SC 1935; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 403 : (1998) 7 SCC 123; V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. Board of Trustees of Port of Mormugao and Another [2005] 3 SCR 27 : (2005) 4 SCC 613; Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra (Dead) by L.Rs. & Others v. Pramod Gupta (Smt.) (Dead) by L.Rs. and Others [2002] Supp. 5 SCR 350 : (2003) 3 SCC 272; Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors. [2005] 3 SCR 289 : (2005) 4 SCC 480 – relied on.
Vaish Aggarwal Panchayat v. Inder Kumar & Ors. [2015] 9 SCR 637 : (2020) 12 SCC 809; Ramesh B. Desai & Ors. v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta & Ors. [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 414 : (2006) 5 SCC 638; Vijay Arjun Bhagat and Ors. v. Nana Laxman Tapkire and Ors. [2018] 4 SCR 452 : (2018) 6 SCC 727; Sugandhi (Dead) by LRs & Others v. P. Rajkumar (2020) 10 SCC 706 – referred to.
List of Acts Limitation Act, 1963; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords Second appeal; Substantial question of law; Remanding the matter to Trial Court; Framing additional issues in respect of limitation; Barred by limitation; Section 100 CPC; Violation of procedural law; Concurrent findings; Object of framing an issue.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5131 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 17.02.2020 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in SA No. 406 of 1998 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 737R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
M. Yogesh Kanna, Miss Meha Ashok Aggarwal, Vasu Kalra, Ms. Monica Saini.
Advs. for the Respondents:
S. Nandakumar, Sr. Adv., Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Viresh Kumar Bhawra, Sandhya Dutt, Aakash Elango, Naresh Kumar.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17.02.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras 1 in Second Appeal No.406 of 1998. By the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the second appeal, thereby setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, and remitting the matter to the trial Court for framing additional issues in respect of limitation. The trial Court was further directed to conduct the trial afresh on the aspect of whether the suit was barred by limitation, and to complete it within a period of six months.
3. The genesis of the litigation traces back to a joint Hindu family consisting of Rangappa Gowdar and his sons, Dasappa Gowdar and Samiappan. Originally, the suit bearing O.S.No.851 of 19652 had been filed by the wife and daughter of the said Samiappan viz., Sunderammal and Vennila, who are Respondent Nos.6 and 7 herein, seeking maintenance against the said Samiappan and his father Rangappa Gowdar and brother Dasappa Gowdar. The suit came to be decreed on 26.08.1965 and the suit properties were attached for the maintenance amount in the execution proceedings initiated by the plaintiffs. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, the said Rangappa Gowdar and Dasappa Gowdar died and their 1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
2 Hereinafter referred to as “the first suit”
738 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports legal heirs were brought on record. Through court auction, the suit ‘A’ schedule property was purchased by one Karivarada Gowdar and the sale was confirmed by issuing certificate dated 25.09.1970 in E.P.No.424 of 1969 in O.S.No.851 of 1965 by the Court of District Munsif, Coimbatore. Since the said Samiappan tried to encroach the suit ‘A’ schedule property, the said Karivarada Gowdar filed a suit viz., O.S.No.1978 of 1972 for permanent injunction and the same came to be decreed on 11.06.1973. Subsequently, the suit ‘A’ schedule property was purchased by Respondent Nos.8 to 10 from the said Karivarada Gowdar and they also filed a suit in O.S.No.3390 of 1981 seeking permanent injunction, which came to be decreed on 24.07.1982. Thereafter, the suit ‘A’ schedule property was purchased by Respondent No.11 and later-on, by Appellant Nos.1 and 2.
4. In the above background, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 who are the daughters and wife of Dasappa Gowdar, instituted a suit bearing O.S.No.257 of 1982 3 before the II Additional District Munsif, Coimbatore 4 , to set aside the decree passed by the Court of District Munsif, Coimbatore in O.S.No.851 of 1965 and to partition the suit ‘A’ and ‘C’ schedule properties by metes and bounds in 12 equal parts and to allot the 5/12 shares to the plaintiffs and for permanent injunction restraining the subsequent purchasers from in any manner disturbing with the peaceful possession of the suit properties by the plaintiffs.
5. After trial, the suit was dismissed, by judgment dated 08.09.1994, against which, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 filed Appeal Suit bearing No.207 of 1994 before the Additional District Judge, Coimbatore 5 . By judgment dated 28.01.1997, the appeal suit came to be dismissed. Challenging the same, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 went on further appeal viz., S.A.No.406 of 1998, which was allowed by the High Court, by judgment dated 17.02.2020. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants, who are the subsequent purchasers of the suit ‘A’ schedule property, have preferred this appeal before us.
6. On 25.01.2021, when the matter was taken up for consideration, this Court passed the following order:
3 Hereinafter referred to as “the second suit”
4 Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
5 Hereinafter referred to as “the First Appellate Court” [2025] 4 S.C.R. 739R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others “Exemption from filing O.T. and c/c of the impugned order is granted.
Issue notice.
In the meantime, further proceedings in pursuance of the order dated 17.02.2020 passed by the High Court shall remain stayed.”
7. During the pendency of this appeal, Respondent Nos.1 and 2 have passed away, and their legal representatives have been brought on record and accordingly, the cause title has been amended. Vide order dated 21.10.2022 passed in Interlocutory Application No. 101397/2022, Respondent Nos. 4, 8, 9, 11, 14 and 18 to 21 have been deleted from the array of parties, since they are proforma parties, and they do not have any surviving interest in the suit property. Vide order dated 21.10.2022 passed in Interlocutory Application No.101402/2022, the appellants have been exempted from the requirement of substituting the legal representatives of deceased Respondent Nos.10 and 12. Despite the service of notice, none appeared on behalf of the other proforma respondents viz., Respondent Nos.5 to 7, 13, 15, 16 and
17. Thus, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are the only contesting parties.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the contesting Respondent Nos.1 to 3 and also perused the materials available on record.
9. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that Respondent Nos.1 to 3 had been arrayed as respondents / judgment debtors in the execution proceedings initiated in O.S.No.851 of 1965 and hence, they had the knowledge of the proceedings even prior to filing of the suit in O.S.No.257 of 1982. Since the second suit was filed after a period of 17 years, it was hopelessly barred by limitation. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have allowed the second appeal and remitted the matter to the trial Court for conducting trial afresh, on the aspect of limitation. 9.1 It is further submitted that the suit ‘A’ schedule property could no longer remain as joint family property, when the same was brought into court auction and the sale was confirmed and possession was also handed over to the auction purchaser. However, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 did not take any steps to set aside the said sale, but they conveniently filed the second suit 740 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports bearing O.S. No. 257 of 1982 to set aside the decree dated 26.08.1965 passed in the first suit bearing O.S. No. 851 of 1965 without any subsisting legal right. Further, the documentary evidence clearly proved that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were aware of the execution proceedings and that, the courts below discussed the limitation point in detail before dismissing the suit / appeal suit filed by Respondent Nos.1 to 3, and therefore, the necessity to frame an issue on limitation does not arise. 9.2 The learned counsel also pointed out that the suit was not dismissed solely on the ground of limitation, but on merits as well, observing that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein are not entitled to any relief, since they had knowledge about the earlier suit. 9.3 It is further submitted that after admitting the second appeal, the High Court ought to have decided the question of law relating to limitation, instead of remitting the case to the trial Court, specially, after more than two decades from the inception of the Second Appeal. Further, according to the learned counsel, Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein, failed to approach the Court with clean hands and abused the process of law by filing such frivolous suit.
9.4 Thus, the learned counsel submitted that the suit was rightly dismissed by the trial Court as time-barred and the same was affirmed by the First Appellate Court. As such, the decision of the High Court to remand the matter for framing the issue of limitation and conducting trial afresh, is unwarranted and is liable to be set aside.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent Nos.1 to 3 submitted that the High Court rightly allowed the second appeal filed by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and remitted the matter to the trial Court for fresh trial, after framing the issue of limitation. According to the learned counsel, the said issue is a mixed question of fact and law; to decide the maintainability of the suit and without framing such question, the trial Court and the First Appellate Court ought not to have come to the conclusion that Respondent Nos.1 to 3 are not entitled to the relief to set aside the decree passed in the first suit viz., O.S. No. 851 of 1965 and to partition the suit ‘A’ and ‘C’ schedule properties by metes and bounds in 12 equal parts and to allot the 5/12 shares to Respondent Nos.1 to 3, and for a permanent injunction. In this [2025] 4 S.C.R. 741R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others regard, reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Vaish Aggarwal Panchayat v. Inder Kumar & Others6 .
10.1 The learned counsel further submitted that the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court without framing any issue, any pleadings, and without leading any evidence, rejected the relief sought by Respondent Nos.1 to 3 as barred by limitation. Therefore, the High Court rightly remanded the matter to the trial Court to frame a specific issue with regard to limitation and decide the matter afresh. Reliance was made to the decision of this court in Ramesh B. Desai & Ors. v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta & Others7 .
10.2 It is also submitted that the decree obtained in O.S. No. 851 of 1965 is an asseveration of fraud and collusion.
10.3 With these submissions, the learned counsel prayed for dismissal of this appeal filed by the appellants.
11. Upon considering the rival submissions, the only question that arises for our consideration is whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter to the trial Court for a fresh trial on the issue of limitation, despite the existence of concurrent findings, when Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 8 empowered the High Court to decide the matter.
12. It is a well settled legal position that Section 100 CPC confers jurisdiction on the High Court to entertain a second appeal, only when it is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. For better appreciation, the said provision is extracted below: “ 9 [100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
6 (2020) 12 SCC 809
7 (2006) 5 SCC 638
8 For short, “CPC”
9 Substituted by Act 104 of 1976, sec.37, for section 100 (w.e.f. 1-2-1977) 742 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.]”
Thus, sub-section (1) of Section 100 says that the second appeal would be entertained by the High Court only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-section (3) makes it obligatory upon the appellant to precisely state in memo of appeal the “substantial question of law” involved in the appeal. Subsection (4) provides that where the High Court is satisfied that any substantial question of law is involved in the case, it shall formulate that question. In other words, once the High Court is satisfied after hearing the appellant or his counsel, as the case may be, that the appeal involves a substantial question of law, it has to formulate that question and then direct issuance of notice to the respondent of the memo of appeal along with the question of law framed by the High Court. Sub-section (5) provides that the appeal shall be heard only on the question formulated by the High Court under sub-section (4). In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the second appeal is confined only to the question framed by the High Court under sub-section (4). The respondent, however, at the time of hearing of the appeal is given a right under sub-section (5) to raise an objection that the question framed by the High Court under sub-section (4) does not involve in the appeal. The reason for giving [2025] 4 S.C.R. 743R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others this right to the respondent for raising such objection at the time of hearing is because the High Court frames the question at the stage of admission, which is prior to issuance of the notice of appeal to the respondent. In other words, the question is framed ex parte and, therefore, sub-section (5) enables him to raise such objection at the time of hearing that the question framed does not arise in the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (5), however, also recognizes the power of the High Court to hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law which was not initially framed by the High Court under subsection (4). However, this power can be exercised by the High Court only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal [See: Surat Singh (Dead) v. Siri Bhagwan & Others (2018) 4 SCC 562].
12.1 Furthermore, this Court has consistently underscored that under Section 100 CPC, the High Court possesses the authority to entertain second appeals strictly on substantial questions of law. Upon admitting such an appeal, the High Court is empowered to frame substantial questions and adjudicate them directly, without the necessity of remanding the matter to the trial court. This approach ensures judicial efficiency and prevents unnecessary prolongation of litigation. A few decisions are outlined below:
(i) Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRs 10 “16. Reverting to the facts of the case at hand, prima facie we find the first appellate Court did not discharge the duty cast on it as a Court of first appeal. The High Court having noticed failure on the part of the appellant in not discharging the statutory obligation cast on him by sub-section
(3) of Section 100 of the Code, on account of the substantial question of law involved in the appeal having not been stated, much less precisely, in the memorandum of second appeal, ordinarily an opportunity to frame such question should
10 (2001) 3 SCC 179
744 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports have been afforded to the appellant unless the deficiency was brought to the notice of the appellant previously by the High Court Registry or the court and yet the appellant had persisted in his default. That was not done. In our opinion, the following substantial question of law does arise as involved in the case and worth being heard by the High Court:- “Whether on the pleadings and the material brought on record by the defendant, the first appellate Court was right in holding that the case of adverse possession was made out by the defendant and the suit filed by the plaintiff was liable to be dismissed as barred by time under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, more so when such finding was arrived at in reversal of the findings of the trial Court?”
17. The appeal is allowed. The case is remitted back to the High Court for hearing and deciding the second appeal afresh.
18. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion either way on any of the issues arising for decision in the case. We also make it clear that our framing the question of law involved in the appeal shall not take away the jurisdiction of the High Court vesting in it under proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 of the C.P.C. to formulate any other question of law involved in the case The second appeal shall be decided by the High Court uninfluenced by any of the observations made hereinabove which have been made solely to support our opinion that the appeal did not merit a summary dismissal by the High Court.”
(ii) Surat Singh (supra)
“29. The scheme of Section 100 is that once the High Court is satisfied that the appeal involves [2025] 4 S.C.R. 745R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others a substantial question of law, such question shall have to be framed under sub-section (4)
of Section 100. It is the framing of the question which empowers the High Court to finally decide the appeal in accordance with the procedure prescribed under sub-section (5). Both the requirements prescribed in sub-sections (4)
and (5) are, therefore, mandatory and have to be followed in the manner prescribed therein.
Indeed, as mentioned supra, the jurisdiction to decide the second appeal finally arises only after the substantial question of law is framed under sub-section (4). There may be a case and indeed there are cases where even after framing a substantial question of law, the same can be answered against the appellant. It is, however, done only after hearing the respondents under sub-section (5).”
(iii) Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) Through Lrs. V. Ahsanul Ghani11 “21. As per Section 100 CPC, the appeal would lie to the High Court from the decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law; such question is required to be stated in the Memorandum of Appeal; the High Court is required to formulate the question on being satisfied that the same is involved in the case; the appeal is to be heard on the question so formulated; and at the time of hearing, the respondent could urge that the case does not involve such a question. The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC makes it clear that the Court could hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law not formulated by it, but only after recording the reasons that the
11 (2019) 19 SCC 413 : AIR 2019 SC 1178
746 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports case involves such a question. In Surat Singh (Dead) v. Siri Bhagwan and others (2018) 4 SCC 562 this Court has pointed out the contours of the powers of High Court under the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC as under:- “21……… The proviso to sub-section (5), however, also recognises the power of the High Court to hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law which was not initially framed by the High Court under sub-section (4). However, this power can be exercised by the High Court only after assigning the reasons for framing such additional question of law at the time of hearing of the appeal”.
22. We are clearly of the view that the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC is not intended to annul the other requirements of Section 100 and it cannot be laid down as a matter of rule that irrespective of the question(s)
formulated, hearing of the second appeal is open for any other substantial question of law, even if not formulated earlier…”
(iv) This Court pointing out the principle laid down in Surat Singh case, set aside the judgment of the High Court on the ground of violation of mandatory procedure prescribed under section 100 CPC, and remanded the matter to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law [Refer: Vijay Arjun Bhagat and others v. Nana Laxman Tapkire and others, (2018) 6 SCC 727].
(v) This Court in Ramakrishnan Kadinhipally & Ors. v.
P.T. Karunakaran Nambiar12 criticized the High Court for remanding a case to the trial court without proper justification, especially when concurrent findings of fact existed. It reiterated that in second appeals under Section 100 CPC, the High Court should not interfere with 12 2023 SCC OnLine SC 323 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 747R. Nagaraj (Dead) through LRs. and Another v. Rajmani and Others concurrent findings unless there is a substantial question of law. The relevant paragraphs read as under:
“7. By the impugned judgment and order and without answering anything on the substantial questions of law framed/formulated, absolutely in a casual manner, the High Court has allowed the Second Appeal and has set aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below and thereafter has remanded the matter to the learned trial Court permitting the original plaintiff to amend the plaint and pray for fixation of the boundary.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, we are constrained to observe that the manner in which the High Court has dealt with the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC is not appreciable at all. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has exercised the powers as if the High Court was deciding the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High Court has not appreciated at all that the High Court was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC and that too against the concurrent findings of fact by both the courts below, which were, as such, on appreciation of evidence on record. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.
11. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the High Court was dealing with the Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC and the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below which were on appreciation of evidence on record. Neither at the stage of deciding the 748 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports suit nor even before the first Appellate Court even such a prayer was made to amend the plaint, which is now permitted by the High Court, despite the fact that earlier in the suit during the course of trial, the plaint was amended.
Under the circumstances also, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is unsustainable.
12. Even for remand, a specific case is to be made out as per Order 41 Rule 23, 23A and 25 of the CPC. No findings are recorded by the High Court that the case falls within Order 41 Rule 23, 23A and 25 of the CPC and the matter is required to be remanded to the learned trial Court on setting aside the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below. The High Court has mechanically remanded the suit, which is wholly impermissible.
13. Even the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, while admitting the second appeal, which are reproduced herein above cannot be said to be as such substantial questions of law at all. The same are on questions of fact. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing and setting aside the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below, while exercising the powers under Section 100 CPC, is unsustainable.
14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is hereby quashed and set aside.
The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court confirmed by the first Appellate Court is, hereby, ordered to be restored.”
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