Rakesh Bhanot v. M/S. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 445; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 573
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 31 Mar 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1607/2025
- Sections
- 138, 141, 96, 94, 482, 96(1), 7, 9, 14(1), 95, 14, 101
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 573 : 2025 INSC 445 Rakesh Bhanot v.
M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1607 of 2025)
01 April 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the proceedings initiated against the appellants u/s.138 rw s.141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should be stayed in view of the interim moratorium u/s.96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 having come into effect upon the appellants filing applications u/s.94 IBC.
Headnotes† Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss.94 and 96 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138 and 141 – Moratorium – Interim moratorium – Complaint u/s.138 NI Act upon failure of the appellant-accused to make payment after cheques were dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds – Appellant filed an application u/s.94 IBC for personal insolvency – During pendency, the appellant filed an application for adjourning s.138 proceedings sine die, in view of the pendency of s.94 IBC petition as well as the injunctive provision u/s.96 IBC – Trial court rejected application – Appellant then filed criminal petition – High Court dismissed the same – Interference with:
Held: Not called for – Prayer of the appellants to stay the prosecution u/s.138 of the NI Act relying on the interim moratorium u/s.96 IBC, cannot be entertained – Moratorium provisions under the IBC offer protection only to the corporate debtor-company, and is not intended to shield individuals from personal criminal liabilities arising from their actions outside the scope of corporate debt restructuring – Appellants having filed insolvency applications as personal guarantors u/s.94 IBC, cannot extend this protection to avoid prosecution u/s.138 – Object of moratorium or for that purpose, the provision enabling * Author 574 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the debtor to approach the tribunal u/s.94 is not to stall the criminal prosecution, but to only postpone any civil actions to recover any debt – Deterrent effect of s.138 is critical to maintain the trust in the use of negotiable instruments like cheques in business dealings – Criminal liability for dishonoring cheques ensures that individuals who engage in commercial transactions are held accountable for their actions – Thus, allowing the respective appellants to evade prosecution u/s.138 by invoking the moratorium would undermine the very purpose of the NI Act, which is to preserve the integrity and credibility of commercial transactions Personal responsibility persists, regardless of the insolvency proceedings and its outcome – Scope and nature of the proceedings under the IBC may result in extinguishment of the actual debt by restructuring or through the process of liquidation – But such extinguishment will not absolve its directors from the criminal liability – Statutory liability against the directors u/s.138 is personal and hence, continues to bind natural persons, irrespective of any moratorium applicable to corporate debtor. [Paras 11-13, 17, 19] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss.14, 96, 101 – Moratorium – Interim Moratorium – Object – Explained. [Paras 10.1, 17] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss.94, 96 – Interim moratorium to partners – Interim Moratorium to Company – Difference between:
Held: There is a subtle difference in the protection of interim moratorium available to Directors and Partners – For a partnership firm, the interim moratorium protects not only the firm, but also the partners – But for a company, such protection is available only to the company and not to its directors. [Para 10.1] Case Law Cited Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1530:(2024) 5 SCC 435 – Distinguished.
P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258; State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan [2018] 10 SCR 974 : (2018) 17 SCC 394; Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh and Co. & Ors. [2000] 3 SCR 509 : (2000) 5 SCC 694; Narinder Garg and Others v. Kotham Mahindra Bank Ltd. and Others (2022) SCC [2025] 4 S.C.R. 575Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd. OnLine SC 517; Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corpn. of India Ltd. (2023) 10 SCC 545 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 128 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 266 – referred to.
List of Acts Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
List of Keywords Noscitur a sociis; Moratorium; Interim moratorium; Personal insolvency; Stay of proceedings; Dishonour of cheques; Legislative intent behind Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code; Extinguishment of criminal liability of directors; Protection of moratorium; Moratorium does not extend to criminal liability; Personal insolvency; Adjourning s.138 NI Act proceedings sine die; Corporate debtor; Personal guarantors; Recovery of the debt.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE/CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1607 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 23.03.2023 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No. 37169 of 2022 With Criminal Appeal Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613-1649 of 2025, W.P. (C) No. 469 of 2024, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1650-1652, 1653-1688, 1689, 1690, 1691 And 1692 of 2025 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Dr. Yusuf Iqbal Yusuf, Bhavya Sethi, Ms. Gyanika Kochar, Mohd. Abid Sheikh, Ms. Neelam Singh, R K Rathore, Jawahar Lal, Danish Saifi, Subramaniam S, Naman Dwivedi, Shafik Ahmed, Bhaskar Sundaram, P.R. Sreejith, Ms. Pallavi Anand, V. Elanchezhiyan, Abhimanyu Tewari, Siddhant Saroha, Viren Sibal, Prashant Katara, Soin Khan, Jaydip Pati, Nitish Kumar Rai, Ms. Anushruti Tripathi, Ms. Anita, Chritarth Palli, Nakul Mohta, Puneet Pathak, Amulya Upadhyay, Ayush Kashyap, Shashank Khurana, Ms. Misha Rohatgi, Nitin Setia, Abhishek Baid, Mohit Kumar Bafna, Praneet Das, Anup Jain, Ashok Kumar Jain (for M/s.Expletus Legal).
576 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Advs. for the Respondent:
Ms. S Janani, Sr. Adv., Shailendra Babbar, Devendra Kumar Shukla, Avinash Das, Rahul Kumar, Rishi Kapoor, Ms. Deboleena Datta, Ms. Maitri Goal, Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Atul Mangla, Ashish Pandey, Inderjeet, Shubham Saxena, Prateek Rai, Ashutosh Bhardwaj, Pushkar Dwivedi, Anmol Goyal, Akshit Chauhan, Ms. Sharika Rai, Deepak Goel, Ms. Alka Goyal, Ms. Archana Preeti Gupta, Aditya Krishna, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Md. Naushad Alam, Raghav Vij, Suraj Kumar Jha, Ms. Sakshi Tiwari, Pratham Malik, Palash Singhai, S. Vinay Ratnakar, Apoorva Misra, Manish Gusain, Ankit Roy, Dr. Pankaj Garg, Milind Garg, Ms. Nikita Garg, Yaksh Garg, Suvidutt M.S., Dr. Pankaj Garg, Milind Garg, Ms. Nikita Garg, Yaksh Garg, Mrs. Saumya Jain, Ms. Yashna Ahuja, Ms. Atulika Ghawana, Ms. Shambhavi Sharma, Ms. Paromita Majumdar, Ms. Minakshi Vimal, Ms. Bhavana Jhakhar, Ms. Astha Tyagi, Akhil Sachar, Ms. Sunanda Tulsyan, Ms. Henna George, Ms. Purti Gupta, Ms. Henna George.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Since the facts and issues involved in all these cases are common, they are clubbed together and disposed of, by this common judgment.
3. All these appeals are filed against the orders passed by different High Courts, which dismissed the petitions filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 1 and thereby affirmed the orders passed by the trial Court rejecting the applications filed for staying the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 2 , sine die till the conclusion of the proceedings initiated under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 3 , before the National Company Law Tribunal. A writ petition has also been filed for declaration and direction that section 138 1 For short, “Cr.P.C”
2 For short, “N.I. Act, 1881”
3 For short, “IBC”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 577Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd. proceedings shall be deemed to be stayed during the operation of the moratorium period under section 96 IBC. The details of the cases are tabulated below:
Case No. Name of the parties Order impugned before this Court Order impugned before the High Court SLP(Crl)
No.6087 of Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s.
Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd Order dated 23.3.2023 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh in CRM – M –37169/ 2022 (O&M)
Order dated 23.05.2022 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bathinda in complaint No. COMA 1059/2019 SLP(Crl)
No.9316 of Sandeep Gupta v. M/s.
Sri Ram Steel Traders and another Order dated 15.5.2023 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, in Crl.M.C. No.381 of Order dated 03.12.2021 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, in CT No.12161/2018 SLP(Crl)
No.12328 of 2023 SLP(Crl)
No.12327 of 2023 SLP(Crl)
No.12329 of 2023 Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s.
Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd Order dated 23.03.2023 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh in CRM – M – 59371/ 2022 (O&M)
Order dated 07.02.2023 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh in CRM – M – 39859/ 2022 (O&M)
Order dated 23.03.2023 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh in CRM – M – 39885/ 2022 (O&M)
Order dated 12.09.2022 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bathinda in complaint No. COMA 89/2016 Order dated 23.05.2022 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bathinda in complaint No. COMA 1060/2019 Order dated 23.05.2022 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bathinda in complaint No. COMA 1061/2019 578 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports SLP(Crl)
No.6835 of Sanjeev Narula v.
M/s. Elkay International Ltd Order dated 06.3.2024 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh in CRM – M – 9799/ 2024 (O&M)
Order dated 18.01.2024 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Faridabad in complaint No.
NACT– 719/2016.
SLP (Crl)
Nos. 9104 -9140 of M/s. Shiva Shakti Grains (India) Pvt.
Ltd and Another Etc.
v. M/s.Kaur Chand Munish Kumar Etc.
Order dated 12.03.2024 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh in CRM – M – 12807/ 2019 etc. cases Complaint in No.
NACT– 704/2017 dated 21.11.2017 as well as the summoning orders dated 14.09.2018 issued by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Sri Muktsar Sahib and all consequential proceedings.
W.P(C) No.
469/2024 Vijay Chetan Lilaramani and another v.
Union of India and others (i)to declare that the proceedings under section 138 r/w 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, shall be covered under moratorium imposed by section 96 of the IBC or shall deemed to be stayed during operation of the moratorium under section 96 of the IBC; and (ii)to direct that the trial pending before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru in CC No. 54895/2023 stands deemed to be stayed, during the continuation of moratorium under the IBC.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 579Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd. SLP(Crl)
Nos.272- 274 of 2025 Ashok B.
Jeswani and another v.
M/s.Redington India Ltd Order of the High Court of Madras dated 07.12.2023 in Crl.OP. No. 24506 of 2023 and dated 06.06.2024 in Crl.
M. P. Nos.7782 and 7783 of 2024 in Crl.
RC No.911 of 2024 Stay further proceedings with respect to the recovery of debt u/s.138 of the N.l.
Act, 1881, qua the appellants in view of Sections 94, 96 and 101 of the IBC.
SLP(Crl)
Nos. 4822- 4857 of Jitender Singh Sodhi and another v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax and another Order dated 13.03.2024 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh in CRM – M – 52874/ 2023 etc. cases Order dated 21.08.2023 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh, in Complaint No. NACT /3656/2015 SLP(Crl)
No.15852 of 2024 Yogesh Jogindernath Mehra and another v.
State of Maharashtra and another Order dated 15.10.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay, in Criminal Writ Petition (ST) No.
11799 of 2024 Stay the proceedings in CC No.186/SS/ 2018 pending before the 30 th Metropolitan Magistrate, Kurla, Mumbai SLP(Crl)
No.15813 of 2024 Yogesh Jogindernath Mehra and another v.
State of Maharashtra and another Order dated 15.10.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay, in Criminal Writ Petition (ST) No.
11800 of 2024 Stay the proceedings in CC No.186/SS/ 2018 pending before the 30 th Metropolitan Magistrate, Kurla, Mumbai SLP(Crl)
No.15933 of 2024 Yogesh Jogindernath Mehra and another v.
State of Maharashtra and another Order dated 15.10.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay, in Criminal Writ Petition (ST) No.
11950 of 2024 Stay the proceedings in CC No.186/SS/ 2018 pending before the 30 th Metropolitan Magistrate, Kurla, Mumbai SLP(Crl)
No.15905 of 2024 Yogesh Jogindernath Mehra and another v.
State of Maharashtra and another Order dated 15.10.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay, in Criminal Writ Petition (ST) No.
12390 of 2024 Stay the proceedings in CC No.186/SS/ 2018 pending before the 30 th Metropolitan Magistrate, Kurla, Mumbai 580 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
4. The common legal question that arises for consideration herein is, whether the proceedings initiated against the appellants / petitioners under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the N.I. Act, 1881 should be stayed in view of the interim moratorium under Section 96 IBC having come into effect upon the appellants / petitioners’ filing applications under Section 94 IBC. In view of the commonality of issues involved in all the cases, we need not necessarily review the facts of each case individually.
5. However, for ease of reference, the facts leading to the appeal arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) No.6087 of 2023, in a nutshell are as under:
5.1. The respondent viz., M/s Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd. filed a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, against M/s Arjun Mall Retail Holdings Pvt. Ltd. through its Director- Kiran Bhanot, Kiran Bhanot (wife of the appellant), Rakesh Bhanot (appellant herein), and Arjun Bhanot (their son). It was alleged in the complaint that the accused issued four cheques each for Rs.50,00,000/- drawn on UCO Bank, Mid Corporate Industrial Area, Ludhiana, in order to discharge their legally enforceable liability. When the cheques were presented for encashment, the same were returned with the endorsement “Funds Insufficient”. After issuance of a legal notice and upon the failure of the accused to make payment within the stipulated time, the respondent / complainant preferred a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881. The said complaint was taken on file as COMA No.1059/2019 and is pending adjudication before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhatinda.
5.2. During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings under section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, the appellant Rakesh Bhanot filed an application in CP(IB) No.147/CHD/PB/2021 under Section 94 IBC before the National Company Law Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, for personal insolvency. His wife, who is a co-accused, also filed a similar application. The said applications are pending adjudication. Pending the said proceedings, the appellant moved an application before the trial Court for adjourning the section 138 proceedings sine die, in view of the pendency of section 94 IBC petition as well as the injunctive provision as envisaged under section 96 IBC.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 581Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd.
5.3. The trial Court, vide order dated 23.05.2022, rejected the aforesaid application. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh, by filing a criminal petition bearing No.CRM-M-37169-2022 (O&M) under Section 482 Cr.P.C. By order dated 23.03.2023, the said criminal petition came to be dismissed by the High Court. Challenging the same, the appellant is before us with the present appeal.
6. The other appeals as well as the writ petition arising out of similar set of facts, have been filed by the respective appellants / petitioners before this court.
7. The learned counsel appearing for all the parties, including the applicant(s) / intervenor(s), made detailed submissions with respect to the issues at hand. In order to avoid repetition, they are concisely outlined as under:
7.1. On the side of the appellants / petitioners
(i) There is a complete and unequivocal bar on continuation of proceedings of the N.I. Act, 1881, in view of pendency of the insolvency proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, as envisaged under Section 96 IBC.
(ii) Once the proceedings under Section 94 IBC have been initiated before the Adjudicating Authority for personal insolvency resolution process, on account of the appellants / petitioners having become personally insolvent, necessarily all further proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, would remain stayed in terms of Section 96(1)(b) IBC.
(iii) The legislative intent behind the IBC is to provide a structured framework for debt resolution, while ensuring that debtors are afforded a fair opportunity to reorganize their financial affairs. The moratorium is designed to prevent creditors from taking coercive actions that could further destabilize the debtors’ financial situation.
(iv) There is fine distinction in the statute between “Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process” and “Personal Insolvency Resolution Process”. In case, where a Company is a 582 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports corporate debtor and insolvency proceedings are initiated against such corporate debtor under Section 7 or Section 9 IBC, the Adjudicating Authority under Section 14(1) IBC passes an order to declare a moratorium. On the other hand, Section 94 IBC provides for a situation wherein a debtor may approach the Adjudicating Authority for initiation of Personal Insolvency Resolution Process. Similarly, Section 95 IBC provides for a situation wherein a creditor may approach the Adjudicating Authority for initiation of Personal Insolvency Resolution Process against an individual. Section 96(1) IBC provides that in either case, whether under Section 94 or Section 95, (a) Interim moratorium comes into effect on the date of the application itself; (b) This moratorium is in respect of all debts; (c) This moratorium shall cease to have effect on the date of admission of such application; (d) During this period, all pending legal action or proceedings in respect of any debt shall be deemed to have been stayed; (e) Creditors of debt shall not initiate any legal action or proceeding in respect of any debt.
(v) In the present case, the moratorium came into effect in a proceeding under Section 96 IBC and not under Section 14 IBC. However, the High Court erroneously relied on the judgment in P.Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd.,4 as in that case, this court was concerned only with the proceedings under section 14 IBC and not section 96 IBC. Hence, the observations made therein can be read only in the context of a moratorium under section 14 IBC.
(vi) Further, the reliance placed in the decision in Ajay Kumar Radheyshyam Goenka v. Tourism Finance Corporation of India Ltd.,5 is misconceived, since the said judgement merely holds that the moratorium under Section 14 IBC shall not protect the signatories and the directors of the corporate debtor because the said moratorium is only with respect to the corporate debtor, and not the individuals.
4 (2021) 6 SCC 258
5 (2023) 10 SCC 545
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 583Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd.
(vii) Once the application under Section 94 or 95 IBC has been admitted, Section 101 IBC states that “the debtor shall not transfer, alienate, encumber, or dispose of any of his assets of his legal rights or beneficial interest therein” thereby imposing an express bar on the individual/director/ signatory/cheque from making any payment in relation to the dishonoured cheque. Thus, when the law prohibits payment, it would create a dichotomy to simultaneously proceed against the said individual under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the N.I. Act 1881 for dishonour of the cheque and failure to make the payment to purge/ compound the said offence. Hence, the appellants / petitioners cannot be penalised for not performing an act expressly barred by law.
(viii) In State Bank of India v. V.Ramakrishnan 6 while adjudicating on the applicability of moratorium under Section 14 IBC to personal guarantors, it was held by this Court that personal guarantors are covered by the moratorium under Section 96 IBC, while stating the protection of moratorium under these sections 96 and 101 IBC is far greater than the moratorium under section 14 IBC.
(ix) The IBC must prevail over Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act, 1881, for the want of the non-obstante provision of Section 238. Further, it will override anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment, including the Income-Tax Act, 1961. Reference can be in this connection made to Dena Bank vs. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh and Co. & Ors.,7 which made it clear that income-tax dues, being in the nature of Crown debts, do not take precedence even over secured creditors, who are private persons.
(x) Reference was made to the decision in Dilip B. Jiwrajka vs. Union of India 8, wherein, while upholding the constitutional validity of Sections 95-100 IBC, this court explained the concept of a moratorium under Section 14 of Part II vis-
6 (2018) 17 SCC 394
7 (2000) 5 SCC 694
8 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1530) : (2024) 5 SCC 435 584 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports à-vis interim moratorium under Section 96 of Chapter III of Part III. Ultimately, it was inter alia concluded that the purpose of the interim moratorium under section 96 is to protect the debtor from further legal proceedings.
(xi) Thus, according to the learned counsel, the proceedings under section 138 r/w 141 of the N.I. Act, 1881, which is concerned with the dishonour of the alleged cheques under the signatures of the appellants / petitioners, would undoubtedly fall within the prohibition contained in section 96 IBC. However, the Courts below erred in rejecting the petitions filed for staying the 138 proceedings till the conclusion of the insolvency proceedings pending before the Tribunal. Hence, the impugned orders passed by them are liable to be set aside.
7.2. On the side of the applicant(s) / intervenor(s) Since the decision on the question of law involved herein, shall impact on the applicants / intervenors undergoing insolvency proceedings, they sought to make their submissions.
(i) The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was enacted in order to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals in a time bound manner for maximization of value of assets of such persons, to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interests of all the stakeholders. Further, it was enacted with an object to maximize the wealth of person undergoing insolvency proceedings, to enable a purposeful and constructive interpretation.
(ii) On initiation of insolvency proceedings under IBC, Section 14 provides for a moratorium during which all legal proceedings against the insolvent Company stand stayed. Whereas, on the filing/initiation of personal insolvency, moratorium under Sections 96 and 101 IBC come into effect. When the moratorium comes into effect, then, no legal proceeding against him can be initiated for recovery of any debt. Generally, when an individual is prosecuted [2025] 4 S.C.R. 585Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd. even for dishonour of cheque, then in effect, he is being prosecuted for “non-payment of debt”. As such, such legal proceedings are covered under Sections 96 and 101 IBC and the same do not lie/ cannot be continued. Therefore, all types of debt recovery proceedings are stayed and all types of assets of the individual are pooled to pay-off the debts.
(iii) During moratorium under section 14 IBC, the Company is protected from any civil or legal proceedings including Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881 proceedings. Similarly, when the resolution of debts of an individual takes place under the aegis of personal insolvency under IBC, in such a situation, continuing with the offence of cheque dishonour case shall double jeopardize the individual, since he has already utilized all his assets to enter into a resolution and shall have no means to compound/settle the offence of cheque dishonour and shall be forced to face criminal prosecution. Therefore, similar protection under Section 96 IBC ought to be granted to the individual under personal insolvency as is available to the Company under Section 14 IBC on the initiation of insolvency process.
(iv) The proceedings under Section 138 / 141 of the N.I. Act, 1881 qua the Directors are civil in nature and should be considered as such for the cases which lie under Section 96/101 IBC. The role of Directors has to be specific, meaning thereby that the liability under Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act, 1881, is vicarious in nature. Similarly, the offences under all the statutes, whether under the Companies Act, Income Tax Act, or any other Act, where punishment may be imposed by way of fine, must be considered under the domain of the provisions of section 96/101 IBC.
(v) Thus, according to the learned counsel, the benefit of moratorium under Section 96 IBC and Section 101 IBC be extended to the individuals against criminal proceedings pending under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881, as the same is in consonance with the scope and intent of the legislature.
586 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
7.3. On the side of the respondents
(i) The IBC is meant to resolve genuine financial distress, and not to shield individuals from criminal liability.
(ii) Furthermore, the interim moratorium under Section 96 IBC is intended to operate in respect of debt as opposed to a debtor and that the purpose of interim moratorium under Section 96 is to restrain the initiation or continuation of legal action or proceedings against the debt. The words used both in clause (b) (i) and clause (b) (ii) of Section 96(1) are “in respect of any debt” and therefore, moratorium would strictly apply to the security interest created by the debtors / appellants / petitioners herein in their personal capacity, wherein personal guarantee is given in respect of a debt and in no manner can be stretched to include the criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, since the same is not qua the debt, but is built on the principle of not honouring the cheques, when presented for encashment which in turn attract the criminal liability and fines.
(iii) The interim moratorium under Section 96 IBC will not apply to the criminal proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881 and hence, there is no bar for continuation of the said proceedings. In this regard, reference was made to the decisions of this Court in P.Mohanraj (supra), and Narinder Garg and Others v. Kotham Mahindra Bank Ltd., and Others.9
(iv) Reliance was also placed on the Report of the Insolvency Law Committee of 2020, Chapter V of which explained the scope of moratorium, and according to which, the moratorium provisions under Part III IBC were not meant to stay actions against the corporate debtor or other third parties involved in the debt. Therefore, the Committee agreed that the moratorium and interim moratorium under Part III should be interpreted only to be limited to the ‘debtor’ and its assets.
9 (2022) SCC OnLine SC 517 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 587Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd.
(v) Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, was enacted to enhance the credibility of cheques in commercial transactions and penalize the wilful dishonour of such instruments. It criminalizes the act of dishonouring cheques due to insufficiency of funds or other similar reasons. Section 141 extends liability to individuals who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business at the time of the offence. On the other hand, the appellants / petitioners attempted to use the insolvency proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal in order to stay the section 138 proceedings pending before the trial court. Thus, they cannot absolve themselves of personal liability merely by citing insolvency proceedings under the IBC.
(vi) As reiterated in P. Mohanraj (supra), “proceedings under Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act, 1881 are distinct and operate independently of insolvency proceedings.” Any contrary interpretation would render creditors powerless and undermine the effectiveness of the N.I. Act, 1881.
(vii) Whether moratorium is under Section 14 or Section 96 IBC, the provision of section 141 is equally applicable and remains the same. The judgement of this court in P.Mohanraj (supra) holding that “it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in Section 14 IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons mentioned in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act”, would be applicable in the case of moratorium under Section 96 IBC as well.
(viii) On proper appreciation of facts, the courts below rightly dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants and hence, the same need not be interfered with by this court.
8. We have considered the contentions made by the learned counsel appearing for all the parties and also perused the materials available on record.
9. Vide order dated 16.05.2023 in SLP (Crl) No.6087 of 2023 titled “Rakesh Bhanot v. M/s Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd.”, this Court granted an order of stay of further proceedings in COMA No.1059 of 2019. 588 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Following the same, an order of interim stay of further proceedings pending before the trial Court was subsequently granted in all other connected matters as well.
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