M/S Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 804; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2612
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
- Decided
- 8 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1868/2025
- Sections
- 372, 138, 2, 378(4), 378, 200, 255(1), 139, 401, 378(3), 20, 192
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2612 : 2025 INSC 804 M/s Celestium Financial v.
A. Gnanasekaran Etc.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 1868-70 of 2025)
08 April 2025 [B.V. Nagarathna* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the maintainability of an appeal under proviso to s.372 CrPC against order of acquittal in a case instituted upon a private complaint u/s.138 Negotiable Instruments Act, by treating the complainant in such proceeding as a victim within the meaning ascribed to the term u/s.2(wa) CrPC.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.2(wa), 372, 378, 200 – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Respondents issued cheques to appellant against the loan facility availed from the appellant – Cheques dishonoured with the endorsement “funds insufficient” on presentation – Statutory demand notices by appellant – Non-compliance by respondents – Criminal complaints by appellant against the respondents, however, the magistrate acquitted them – Appellant filed petitions before the High Court seeking special leave to appeal u/s.378(4) which were dismissed – Correctness:
Held: Victim of an offence has the right to prefer an appeal inter alia, against an order of acquittal in terms of the proviso to s.372, irrespective of whether he is a complainant or not – Such victim need not advert to sub-section (4) of s.378, which mandates obtaining special leave to appeal from the High Court – Thus, the person who is a complainant u/s.200 who complains about the offence committed by a person who is charged as an accused u/s.138 of the 1881 Act, thus has the right to prefer an appeal as a victim under the proviso to s.372 – Right to prefer an appeal is a statutory right – Right of a victim of an offence to prefer an appeal cannot be equated with the right of the State or the complainant to prefer an appeal – Thus, the statutory rigours for filing of an appeal by * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2613M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. the State or by complainant against order of acquittal cannot be read into the proviso to s.372 so as to restrict the right of a victim to file an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein, when none exists – Thus, if a victim who is a complainant, proceeds u/s.378, the necessity of seeking special leave to appeal would arise but if a victim whether he is a complainant or not, files an appeal in terms of proviso to s.372, then the mandate of seeking special leave to appeal would not arise – In the context of offences under NI Act, particularly u/s.138, the complainant is clearly the aggrieved party who has suffered economic loss and injury due to the default in payment by accused owing to the dishonour of cheque which is deemed to be an offence under that provision – It would be just, reasonable and in consonance with the spirit of the CrPC to hold that the complainant under NI Act also qualifies as a victim within the meaning of s.2(wa) – Consequently, such complainant ought to be extended the benefit of the proviso to s.372, thereby enabling him to maintain an appeal against an order of acquittal in his own right without having to seek special leave u/s.378(4) – Symmetrical to a victim of an offence, a victim of a deemed offence u/s.138 also has the right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing an inadequate compensation – Thus, u/s.138 both the complainant as well as the victim are one and the same person – Impugned order set aside – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.139-143. [Paras 7.7, 7.8-11] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.372, 378 – Appeal to be preferred by the complainant – Complainant also the victim, or complainant only an informant – Difference:
Held: s.378 clearly indicate that in case the complainant intends to file an appeal against the order of acquittal, his right is circumscribed by certain conditions precedent – If the complainant is not a victim and the case is instituted upon a complaint, then sub-section (4) requires that the complainant must seek special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal from the High Court – However, if the complainant is also a victim, he could proceed under the proviso to s.372, in which case the rigour of sub-section (4) of s.378, which mandates obtaining special leave to appeal, would not arise at all, as he can prefer an appeal as a victim and as a matter of right – Thus, if a victim who is a complainant, proceeds u/s.378, 2614 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the necessity of seeking special leave to appeal would arise but if a victim whether he is a complainant or not, files an appeal in terms of proviso to s.372, then the mandate of seeking special leave to appeal would not arise. [Para 7.11] Words and phrases – Victim – Meaning and scope – Discussed. [Para 6.2-6.7.2] Case Law Cited Mallikarjun Kodagali (dead) represented through Legal representative v. State of Karnataka [2018] 13 SCR 1 : (2019) 2 SCC 752; Esher Singh v. State A.P. [2004] 2 SCR 1180 : (2004) 11 SCC 585; Birichh Bhuian v. State of Bihar [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 328 : AIR 1963 SC 1120; Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan [1994] 1 SCR 445 : (1994) 3 SCC 440 – referred to. Books and Periodicals Cited Black’s Law Dictionary; Advanced Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar, 6th Edition, Volume I – referred to.
List of Acts Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008.
List of Keywords Dishonour of cheque; Funds insufficient; Victim; Complainant; Statutory demand notice; Justice Malimath Committee; Report on ‘Reforms of Criminal Justice System’; Victims right to appeal; 154th Report of the Law Commission; Committee on the Draft National Policy on Criminal Justice; Professor Madhava Menon Committee Report; Victim-oriented criminal justice; 221st Report of Law Commission of India; Couched in negative language; Loss; Injury; Criminologist B. Mendelsohn; Four fundamental criteria of a victim; Social character of suffering; Social implications of injurious act; Inferiority complex; Victimology; Charge; Accused of any offence; Deeming fiction; Deemed offence; Special leave to appeal; Mallikarjun Kodagali’s case; United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985).
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2615M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s). 1868-1870 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.06.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CRLOP Nos. 929, 931 and 1034 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Adv. for the Appellant:
Danish Zubair Khan.
Advs. for the Respondents:
G. Sivabalamurugan, Selvaraj Mahendran, Ms. Meenakshi Rawat, C. Adhikesavan, Ms. Ratna Priya Pradhan, Harikrishnan P.V. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Nagarathna, J.
Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been preferred by the appellant against the common judgment dated 12.06.2024 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl. O.P. Nos.929, 931 and 1034 of 2024 in Crl. A. SR. Nos.1282, 1300 and 1321 of 2024.
2.1 The central issue arising for adjudication in the instant appeals is, whether an appeal would be maintainable under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”) against an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a private complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, “the Act”), by treating the complainant in such a proceeding as a victim within the meaning ascribed to the term under Section 2(wa) of the CrPC.
Factual Background:
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case according to the appellant are as under:
2616 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 3.1 The appellant herein is the complainant being a registered partnership firm engaged in the business of finance. The appellant had extended financial assistance to the respondents over a period of time. It is the case of the appellant that respondent No.1 was the principal borrower and in order to avail further credit, he obtained additional loans through respondent Nos.2 and 3, who acted at his behest. Respondent No.1 is stated to be carrying on a catering business under the name and style of “R.R. Caterers”.
3.2 Respondent No.1 had on earlier occasions availed several loans from the appellant. As on 27.04.2015, an outstanding sum of Rs. 16,00,000/- stood due from him. Seeking further financial accommodation, respondent No.1 along with his spouse entered into a sale agreement dated 15.05.2015 with one Mr. S. Babu, an employee of the appellant. Pursuant thereto, a further sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- was sanctioned to him carrying interest at 18% per annum.
3.3 Thereafter, on 13.05.2016, respondent No.2 availed a loan of Rs. 15,00,000/- from the appellant at an interest of 20% per annum, repayable in twelve equal monthly instalments of Rs. 1,25,000/. Respondent No.2 made partial repayments through cash deposits dated 09.06.2016, 30.09.2016, and 15.07.2017. Subsequently, on 30.11.2016, respondent No.3 availed a loan of Rs. 12,00,000/- from the appellant, carrying interest at the rate of 24% per annum. The loan was repayable over a period of twelve months with EMIs fixed at Rs. 1,00,000/- each. 3.4 Thereafter, on 31.05.2017, respondent No.1 availed a further loan facility from the appellant to the tune of Rs. 21,00,000/-, carrying interest at 24% per annum. The interest component, amounting to Rs. 2,94,000/-, was deducted upfront, and the net sum of Rs. 18,06,000/- was disbursed to respondent No.1. The loan was repayable over a period of seven months in equated monthly instalments of Rs. 3,00,000/- each.
3.5 A few months later, on 17.07.2017, respondent No.1 secured an additional loan from the appellant in a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/-, with interest agreed at 22.5% per annum. From the sanctioned amount, Rs. 1,42,500/- was appropriated towards interest and the net principal of Rs. 13,57,500/- was determined. On the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2617M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. specific request of respondent No.1, one EMI of Rs. 3,00,000/pertaining to the earlier loan was deducted and the effective disbursal was Rs. 10,57,500/-. The loan was structured to be repaid in five monthly instalments of Rs. 3,00,000/- each. 3.6 Subsequently, on 11.09.2017, respondent No.1 once again sought financial assistance and was sanctioned a further sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- carrying interest at the rate of 18% per annum. After deducting interest to an extent of Rs. 3,75,000/-, the net amount available stood at Rs. 21,25,000/-. At the instance of respondent No.1, two EMIs of Rs. 3,00,000/- each relating to earlier borrowings were adjusted and a final amount of Rs.15,25,000/- was disbursed. The loan tenure was fixed at ten months with equated monthly instalments of Rs. 2,50,000/-. 3.7 In partial discharge of his liability, respondent No.2 issued a cheque bearing No.145325 dated 29.10.2018 for a sum of Rs. 6,25,000/- in favour of the appellant. However, upon presentation of the said cheque on 30.10.2018, it was dishonoured with the endorsement “Funds Insufficient”. Similarly, respondent No.3 issued a cheque bearing no. 491078 dated 24.10.2018 for an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- and when the same was presented on 30.10.2018, it was returned unpaid on 31.10.2018 for identical reasons.
3.8 Thereafter, the appellant issued separate statutory notices dated 12.11.2018 under Section 138 of the Act, calling upon respondent Nos.2 and 3 to honour the respective amounts. Upon their failure to comply, the appellant instituted criminal complaints before the Fast Track Court at Alandur, which came to be registered as C.C. No. 417 of 2018 and C.C. No. 418 of 2018 respectively.
3.9 In discharge of his liability, respondent No.1 issued three cheques bearing nos. 000150, 000191, and 000192, all dated 28.03.2019, in favour of the appellant. The said cheques were presented for encashment on 21.06.2019 but were returned dishonoured on 24.06.2019 with the endorsement “Funds Insufficient”. Consequently, a statutory demand notice dated 08.07.2019 was issued by the appellant to respondent No.1 under Section 138 of the Act. Upon his failure to make good the payment, the appellant instituted a criminal complaint before 2618 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the Fast Track Court at Alandur which was registered as C.C. No. 285 of 2019.
3.10 For the sake of clarity and convenience, the particulars of the cheques issued by the respondents said to be towards discharge of their respective liabilities are as follows: Sl.
No Cheque No.
Issued by:
Amount (Rs.)
Date of Issuance of cheques Date of Dishonour of cheques Case No.
1 145325 Respt.
No.2 Rs. 6,25,000 29.10.2018 31.10.2018 C.C.
No.
417 of 2 491078 Respt.
No.3 Rs.10,00,000 24.10.2018 31.10.2018 C.C.
No.
418 of 3 000150 Respt.
No.1 Rs. 9,00,000 28.03.2019 24.06.2019 C.C.
No.
285 of 4 000191 Rs. 12,00,000 5 000192 Rs. 25,00,000 3.11 By separate judgments dated 07.11.2023, the learned Judicial Magistrate acquitted respondent Nos.1 to 3 for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act in terms of Section 255(1) of the CrPC. The acquittal was premised on the finding that the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability and further, respondent Nos.1 to 3 succeeded in rebutting the statutory presumption available to the complainant under Section 139 of the said Act.
3.12 Being aggrieved by the judgments dated 07.11.2023, the appellant preferred petitions before the High Court seeking special leave to appeal under Section 378(4) of the CrPC in Criminal Appeal SR Nos.1282, 1300 and 1321 of 2024 by assailing the judgments rendered in C.C. Nos. 417 of 2018, 418 of 2018 and 285 of 2019, dated 07.11.2023.
3.13 By the common impugned order dated 12.06.2024, the High Court dismissed the petitions filed by the appellant seeking leave to appeal. The High Court observed that the grant of [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2619M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. leave under Section 378(4) of the CrPC is not a mere formality but a substantive safeguard designed to protect the rights of persons who, having been acquitted of criminal charges, ought not to be subjected to further protracted litigation. It was further held that the grant of leave is contingent upon the petitioner before the Appellate Court to establish a prima facie case that warrants interference. Referring to the present case, the High Court held that the appellant could not demonstrate that the conclusions arrived at by the learned Magistrate are so perverse or manifestly erroneous as to result in a miscarriage of justice. In the absence of such compelling grounds, the High Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal. It is in these circumstances that the appellant has approached this Court by way of the present appeal assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned order of the High Court dated 12.06.2024.
Submissions:
4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned senior counsel for the respondent at length. We have also perused the material on record and the judgments cited at the Bar. 4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High Court was not right in refusing to grant leave under Section 378(4) of the CrPC on the ground that the appellant had not demonstrated that the conclusions arrived at by the Magistrate were erroneous or contrary to law. The High Court ought to have exercised its discretion by granting leave to the appellant to prosecute his appeal inasmuch as the impugned order has now made the appellant remediless.
4.2 Alternatively, it was submitted that the appellant could also be construed to be a victim of the offence committed by the accused under Section 138 of the Act. If that is so, then as a victim the appellant has a right to assail the judgment of acquittal as per the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC. In such an event, the need for obtaining leave to file an appeal would not arise at all. In this regard, proviso to Section 372 was contrasted with sub-section (4) of Section 378 of the CrPC. It was contended that under proviso to Section 372 which has been in force with effect from 31.12.2009, as it 2620 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports was added by way of an amendment, the victim of an offence has a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation. Such an appeal would lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court. The right to file an appeal by a victim of an offence under the provision to Section 372 CrPC is not circumscribed by the necessity of obtaining leave to file an appeal. It was contended that under sub-section (4) of Section 378 which deals with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal in any case instituted upon a complaint then on an application made to the High Court by the complainant, it is only when special leave to appeal is granted by the High Court from the order of acquittal, that the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. In the present case, the complaint under Section 138 of the Act was no doubt filed by the appellant herein but not merely as a complainant but as a victim of the offence under Section 138 of the Act. It was submitted that in all cases, the victim may not be the complainant and vice-a-versa but if the victim is also the complainant, then the victim could always proceed under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC rather than as a complainant under sub-section (4) of Section 378 of the CrPC. Therefore, in the instant case, the appellant herein who ought to be considered as a victim of the offence under Section 138 of the Act having been committed by the accused has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 372 of the CrPC. Therefore, it was wholly unnecessary for the appellant to have obtained special leave to appeal from the High Court. For this reason also, the impugned order may be set-aside and the matter may be remanded to the High Court so that the High Court would enable the appellant herein to file his appeal before the competent appellate Court. Learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, sought for setting-aside of the impugned order.
4.3 Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/accused submitted that the order of the High Court was on merits and that the appellant has not proved his case against the respondents herein. Therefore, the learned Magistrate rightly acquitted the respondents herein. The High Court was also [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2621M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. justified in declining to grant the special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal. There is no merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant is the complainant and, therefore, he sought for special leave to appeal from the High Court against the judgment of acquittal which has rightly been declined. Therefore, there is no merit in this appeal and, therefore, the same may be dismissed.
5. In Mallikarjun Kodagali (dead) represented through Legal representative vs. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752 (“Mallikarjun Kodagali”), there is a reference to four reports that have dealt with the rights of victims of crime and the remedies available to them. The same may be briefly discussed as under: i. The first report is the 154th Report of the Law Commission of India of August, 1996. The said Report touched upon, inter alia, compensation to be paid to the victim of crime, their rehabilitation, etc.
ii. In March 2003, Justice Malimath Committee submitted its report on ‘Reforms of Criminal Justice System’. Paragraph 2.21 in the Chapter on Adversarial Rights under the sub-heading of ‘Victims Right to Appeal’, states as under:
“2.21. The victim or his representative who is a party to the trial should have a right to prefer an appeal against any adverse order passed by the trial court. In such an appeal he could challenge the acquittal, or conviction for a lesser offence or inadequacy of sentence, or in regard to compensation payable to the victim. The appellate court should have the same powers as the trial court in regard to assessment of evidence and awarding of sentence.”
There is also discussion on other rights of victims under the Chapter titled, ‘Justice to Victims’. In paragraph 6.(14) (v), Justice Malimath Committee made the following recommendations:
“6. (14)(v) The victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any adverse order passed by the court acquitting the accused, convicting for a lesser offence, imposing inadequate sentence, or granting 2622 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports inadequate compensation. Such appeal shall lie to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such court.”
iii. In July 2007, a Report of the Committee on the Draft National Policy on Criminal Justice was submitted which is also known as ‘Professor Madhava Menon Committee Report’. Observations with regard to providing victim-oriented criminal justice and a balance between the constitutional rights of an accused and victim of crime have been discussed. One of the suggestions made is that the victim must be impleaded in the trial proceedings so that such a party would have right to file an appeal against an adverse order, particularly an order of acquittal. iv. In the 221st Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in April, 2009, it has been noted that as the law then stood, an aggrieved person could not file an appeal against an order of acquittal. However, a revision petition could be filed. Noting that the powers of a revisional court are limited and the process involved is cumbersome, a recommendation was made by the Law Commission that as against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate, a victim should be entitled to file an appeal before the revisional court. Similarly, in complaint cases, the appeal should be provided to the Sessions Court instead of the High Court. However, it was suggested that the aggrieved person or complainant should have the right to prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court.
v. It was further recommended that Section 378 of the CrPC requires an amendment with a view to enable filing of appeals in complaint cases also in the Sessions Court, of course, subject to the grant of special leave by it. Limited scope of powers of a revisional court under Section 401 of the CrPC was taken note of and it was suggested that there is a need to amend the CrPC. 5.1 Taking note of the aforesaid reports an amendment was brought to Section 372 of the CrPC with effect from 31.12.2009 by adding a proviso thereto.
5.2 The decisions of the Full Benches of the High Courts in the matter of interpretation of the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC are highlighted by this Court in the case of Mallikarjun [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2623M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. Kodagali. There are also Division Bench decisions of the High Courts taking different views.
Mallikarjun Kodagali:
5.3 This Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali, speaking through Lokur, J. referred to the Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the 96 th Plenary Session on 29.11.1985. It was observed in paragraphs 74, 75 & 76 as under:
“74. Putting the Declaration to practice, it is quite obvious that the victim of an offence is entitled to a variety of rights. Access to mechanisms of justice and redress through formal procedures as provided for in national legislation, must include the right to file an appeal against an order of acquittal in a case such as the one that we are presently concerned with. Considered in this light, there is no doubt that the proviso to Section 372 CrPC must be given life, to benefit the victim of an offence.
75. Under the circumstances, on the basis of the plain language of the law and also as interpreted by several High Courts and in addition the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, it is quite clear to us that a victim as defined in Section 2(wa) CrPC would be entitled to file an appeal before the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction. …
76. … The language of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is quite clear, particularly when it is contrasted with the language of Section 378(4) CrPC. The text of this provision is quite clear and it is confined to an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a complaint. The word “complaint” has been defined in Section 2(d) CrPC and refers to any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate. This has nothing to do with the lodging or the registration of an FIR, 2624 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports and therefore it is not at all necessary to consider the effect of a victim being the complainant as far as the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is concerned.”
Consequently, the appeals in the said case were allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the High Court to hear and decide the appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal once again. 5.4 In the said judgment, Deepak Gupta, J. was in complete agreement with Lokur, J. on the fact that victims must be permitted to access justice because it is sometimes found that the investigating and prosecuting agency do not follow up cases with zeal which is required and therefore proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC must be given a meaning which is realistic, liberal, progressive and beneficial to the victim of the offences. However, Deepak Gupta, J. was of the opinion that one cannot ignore the rights of the accused and the procedure prescribed by law. Hence, he disagreed with Lokur, J.’s view that a victim can file an appeal in the High Court without seeking leave to appeal in terms of Section 378(3) of the CrPC.
5.5 The only difference of opinion was with regard to whether the victim is required to seek leave of the High Court even in an appeal filed in the High Court. While dealing with this issue, it was observed by Deepak Gupta, J. that prior to the insertion of the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, the victim had no right to file an appeal unless he was also a complainant. This was because the State would represent the victim of the crime. Therefore, the question, whether the victim, while filing an appeal against the acquittal of an accused under proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC in the High Court, is required to obtain leave under Section 378(3) of the CrPC was answered in the affirmative. In this regard, reference was made to subsection (4) of Section 378 which deals with an appeal filed by the complainant. In case the order of acquittal is passed in a case instituted upon a complaint, in such a case, an appeal has to be filed in the High Court. Such an appeal cannot be entertained unless the High Court grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal. Sub-section (5) provides the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2625M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. limitation period for filing the petition for grant of special leave to appeal in terms of sub-section (4). Sub-section (6) lays down that in case the application for special leave to appeal filed by a complainant under sub-section (4) is refused, then, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2). Thus, in a complaint case, complainant can file an appeal only by seeking special leave to appeal in case the appeal lay before the High Court.
5.6 Dealing with the concept of leave to appeal, especially when the appeals are filed in the High Court, it was observed by Deepak Gupta, J. that the presumption of innocence of every accused is fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial court. Therefore, the High Court, at the initial stage of deciding whether the leave is to be granted or not, can go into the merits of the case and only if there are arguable points involved, would the High Court grant leave to appeal. This preliminary stage is provided to prevent meritless appeals being filed before the High Court and to ensure that innocent persons are not drawn to the High Court at the appellate stage.
5.7 It was further noted that an appeal against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of cognizable and nonbailable offences would lie to the Sessions Court and no leave to appeal is required. However, an appeal with respect to offences which are non-cognizable or bailable would lie to the High Court. In such cases, leave to appeal is a prerequisite. The remaining kinds of appeals are those appeals which lie to the High Court against the judgments of the Sessions Court. These are serious criminal matters relating to graver offences. 5.8 Even appeals against acquittals filed before the High Court must be scrutinized with greater care. As opposed to Section 378(4) of the CrPC, where a complainant would file an appeal against an order of acquittal which would require special leave to appeal being obtained, in the case of an appeal filed by a victim under proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC, no such leave to appeal is required. Then the question raised was, whether, a victim is to be placed on a higher pedestal than 2626 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the complainant, although in certain cases, the victim and the complainant may be one and the same person. Deepak Gupta, J. considered a situation where there are two victims in a case and one of the victims files a complaint and sets the wheels of justice moving and the case is tried as a complaint case and the accused is acquitted. In such a case, the complainant would have to seek special leave to appeal whereas the victim who had not even approached the Court at the initial stage would be entitled to file an appeal without seeking leave to appeal. While considering this situation, Deepak Gupta, J. observed that while expanding the rights of the victim to file an appeal, such right must be balanced with the rights of the accused. Hence, it was the view of Deepak Gupta, J. that even in a case when an appeal is filed by a victim, there has to be scrutiny and special leave to appeal must be obtained as the victim cannot be placed on a higher pedestal than the State or the complainant. It was his view that by this condition being imposed, the right of the victim to file an appeal is not taken away or in any way diluted. Thus, according to his view, Sections 378 (3), 378 (4) and 372 of the CrPC have to be read together and the victim is also required to apply for leave to appeal before his appeal can be entertained. Therefore, Deepak Gupta, J. concluded that the right to file an appeal vested in the victim cannot be higher than the right of filing an appeal which inheres in the State and the complainant in a complaint case. Thus, if a victim files an appeal against acquittal in the High Court, he has to seek leave to appeal under Section 378 (3) of the CrPC.
5.9 If the interpretation as suggested by learned senior counsel for the respondent is to be accepted by restricting the right of a complainant in a cheque bounce case to file an appeal under Section 378(3) of the CrPC subject to the conditions mentioned thereto, we find that such a right would not only be illusory but contrary to the intent and purpose of the amendment to Section 372 of the CrPC, whereby the proviso thereto has been added with effect from 31.12.2009 to give a right of an appeal to a victim without there being any condition circumscribing such a right.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2627M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. 5.10 In light of the two opposite views expressed in the above judgment of this Court, it is necessary to discuss certain provisions of the CrPC and arrive at our own conclusions on the point for consideration. We observe that we are inclined to follow the view taken by Lokur, J. insofar as the right of a victim of a crime to file an appeal is concerned.
Analysis of the Relevant Provisions of CrPC:
6. Section 2 is the definition clause under which relevant definitions are extracted as under:
“2. Definitions.—In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires,— xxx
(d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.
Explanation.—A report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant;
xxx
(n) “offence” means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871 (1 of 1871); xxx
(wa) “victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression “victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir; xxx 2628 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
24. Public Prosecutors.xxx
(8) The Central Government or the State Government may appoint, for the purposes of any case or class of cases, a person who has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor: Provided that the Court may permit the victim to engage an advocate of his choice to assist the prosecution under this sub-section.
CHAPTER XV
COMPLAINTS TO MAGISTRATES
200. Examination of complainant.—A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:
Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses—
(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192:
Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them.
xxx
CHAPTER XXIX
APPEALS
372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.— No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2629M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. Court except as provided for by this Code by any other law for the time being in force:
Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.
xxx
377. Appeal by the State Government against sentence.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in subsection (2), the State Government may, in any case of conviction on a trial held by any Court other than a High Court, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy—
(a) to the Court of Session, if the sentence is passed by the Magistrate; and
(b) to the High Court, if the sentence is passed by any other Court.
(2) If such conviction is in a case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy—
(a) to the Court of Session, if the sentence is passed by the Magistrate; and
(b) to the High Court, if the sentence is passed by any other Court.
(3) When an appeal has been filed against the sentence on the ground of its inadequacy, the Court of Session or, as the case may be, the High Court shall not enhance the sentence except after giving to the accused a reasonable 2630 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement and while showing cause, the accused may plead for his acquittal or for the reduction of the sentence.
(4) When an appeal has been filed against a sentence passed under section 376, section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the appeal shall be disposed of within a period of six months from the date of filing of such appeal.
378. Appeal in case of acquittal.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5),—
(a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence;
(b) the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court not being an order under clause (a) or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal—
(a) to the Court of Session, from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence;
(b) to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2631M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran Etc. High Court not being an order under clause (a) or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.
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