Sachin v. State of Maharashtra
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 716; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2500
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
- Decided
- 21 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2073/2025
- Sections
- 386, 376, 376(2), 363, 29, 3, 4, 5, 6, 401, 396, 377
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2500 : 2025 INSC 716 Sachin v.
State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No(s). 2073-2075 of 2025)
21 April 2025 [B.V. Nagarathna* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether, the High Court could enhance the sentence under its revisional powers in a convict’s appeal against conviction.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.386 – Powers of the Appellate Court to enhance sentence in appeal against conviction – Conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable u/ss.3(a) and 4 of the POCSO Act and s.376 IPC for committing penetrative sexual assault on the minor victim, and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years and fine by the Special Court – Appeal against conviction by the appellant – High Court affirmed the finding of the Special Court as regards the commission of offence, however observed that the Special Court while convicting the appellant, overlooked the provisions of ss.5(m) and 6 of the POCSO Act and s.376(2)(i) IPC – High Court issued show cause notice to the appellant on enhancement of sentence and remitted the case to the Special Court for reconsidering the quantum of the sentence – Special Court convicted the appellant u/ss.5(m) and 6 of the POCSO Act to suffer life imprisonment and fine and also convicted for offence punishable u/ss.376(2)(i) IPC for which no separate sentence is provided – In appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court expressed its inability to proceed in the matter and instead suggested the High Court Legal Services take steps to restore justice to the appellant – Correctness:
Held: Appellate court, in an appeal filed by the accused cannot, while maintaining the conviction, enhance the sentence – While * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2501Sachin v. State of Maharashtra exercising its appellate jurisdiction at the instance of the convict, the High Court cannot act as a revisional court, particularly, when no appeal or revision has been filed either by the State, victim or complainant for seeking enhancement of sentence against accused – In an appeal filed by the accused/convict, the High Court cannot suo motu exercise its revisional jurisdiction and enhance the sentence against the accused while maintaining the conviction – Power to enhance the sentence can be exercised by the appellate court only in an appeal filed by the State, victim or complainant provided the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement – Appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the court passing the order of sentence under appeal – Thus, even in an appeal for enhancement of sentence, unless the conditions prescribed in the form of provisos are complied with by the appellate court, there cannot be an enhancement of sentence – No appellant by filing an appeal can be worse-off than what he was – In an appeal filed by an accused against a judgment of conviction and sentence, he cannot be remitted to the trial court to impose a higher sentence on him – Single Judge of the High Court was not right in remanding the matter to the Special Court for enhancing the sentence to be imposed on the appellant-accused, that too, in an appeal filed by accused seeking setting aside of a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed on him – Consequently, the Special Court not right in enhancing the sentence to life imprisonment by following the said direction – Appellant while initially subjected to imprisonment of seven years, has completed actual sentence of eleven years and eight months – Orders of the High Court and consequently of the Special Court erroneous and liable to be set aside – To do the complete justice in exercise of powers u/Art.142, the original sentence of seven years of rigorous imprisonment imposed on the appellant restored – Instead of rehearing his appeal on the original sentence, the matter is concluded and the appellant is released from jail forthwith – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 – ss.3(a), 4, 5(m), 6 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.363-A,
376. [Paras 23, 26, 27, 29.1, 31-33, 34.4-37] Jurisdiction – Appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction – Difference between:
2502 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Held: Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as on facts and is invoked by an aggrieved person – Ordinarily, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised even without it being invoked by a party – Extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction – Conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to the revising tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them act according to the procedure established by law and according to well defined principles of justice. [Paras 28, 28.4] Case Law Cited Kumar Ghimrey v. State of Sikkim [2019] 6 SCR 203 : (2019) 6 SCC 166; Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Admn.) [1975] Supp. 1 SCR 489 : (1975) 2 SCC 406; Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra [1977] 3 SCR 513 : (1977) 3 SCC 25; Sahab Singh v. State of Haryana [1990] 1 SCR 512 : AIR 1990 SC 1188; Govind Ramji Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra [1990] 1 SCR 855 : (1990) 4 SCC 718; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nirmala Devi [2017] 2 SCR 112 : (2017) 7 SCC 262; Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1984 Supp. SCC 518; Govind Ramji Jadhav and Surendra Singh Routela v. State of Bihar [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 340 : (2002) 1 SCC 266; AR Antulay v. RS Nayak [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : AIR 1988 SC 1531; James Joseph v. State of Kerala [2010] 10 SCR 844 : (2010) 9 SCC 642, para 19(i); Bolin Chetia v. Jagdish Bhuyan [2005] 2 SCR 692 : AIR 2005 SC 1872 : (2005) 6 SCC 81; State of Kerala v. Charia Abdulla & Co. [1965] SCR 601 : AIR 1965 SC 1585; Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy (1980) 4 SCC 259 – referred to.
Chautala Workers Co-op Transport Society Ltd. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 Punj 94 – referred to.
Attorney General v. Herman James Sillem (1864) 10 HLC 704 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition; P Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, 6th Edition, Volume–1; P Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, 6th Edition, Volume 4 – referred to. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2503Sachin v. State of Maharashtra List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Penal Code, 1860; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. List of Keywords Enhancement of sentence; Revisional powers; Appeal against conviction; Powers of the Appellate Court; Penetrative sexual assault on minor victim; Special Court; Show cause notice; Quantum of sentence; High Court Legal Services; Opportunity of hearing; Retrial; Appellate jurisdiction; Revisional jurisdiction; Incarceration. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s). 2073-2075 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 26.02.2016 in CRLA No. 30 of 2015, 08.03.2016 in CRLA No. 30 of 2015 and 28.04.2016 in CN No. 05 of 2013 passed by the Special Judge, Warora, in Special (POCSO) Case No. 05 of 2013 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, Mrs. Vithika Garg, Ms. Vidushi Garg, Hemant Kumar Tripathi.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Shrirang B. Varma, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Nagarathna, J.
Leave granted.
2. This is an unfortunate case where the appellant herein, instead of suffering a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years has been incarcerated for eleven years simply owing to the fact that 2504 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Criminal Appeal No.30/2015 preferred by him before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur, the matter was remitted to the Special Court for enhancement of sentence without even adhering to the salient principles of natural justice.
3. The appellant herein faced trial pursuant to FIR No. 154/2013 registered with P.S. Bhadrawati District, State of Maharashtra under Sections 3(a) and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, “POCSO Act”) and Section 363-A, 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and Sections 3(1)(xii) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. Charges were framed against the appellant under the aforesaid sections.
4. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant was a neighbour of the family of the minor victim, aged four years. On 15.09.2013, while the father of the minor victim was away for work and the mother had gone out for cooking, the appellant induced the minor victim to his house, undressed her and committed the offence of rape on her. Two independent witnesses residing in the same neighbourhood informed the minor victim’s mother about the incident. Later, the minor victim narrated the incident to the complainant who took his daughter to a doctor. After gathering courage, the complainant registered Crime No.154/2013 on 23.09.2023 under the aforesaid provisions.
5. By judgment dated 24.11.2014, the Special Judge, Warora, concluded that the prosecution had proved that the accused had committed penetrative sexual assault on the minor victim. Thereby, the Special Court convicted the appellant herein for the offences punishable under Sections 3(a) and 4 of the POCSO Act and Section 376 of IPC. Consequently, the appellant was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. As offence under Section 376 IPC was merged in the aforesaid offences, no separate punishment was awarded by the Special Court.
6. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, the accused-appellant herein preferred Criminal Appeal No.30/2015 before the High Court. It is pertinent to note that the State had not assailed by way of an appeal the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years imposed by the Special Court on the appellant herein. Neither was any appeal filed by the complainant or on behalf of the victim. [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2505Sachin v. State of Maharashtra
7. On the other hand, the appellant – accused assailed the judgment of conviction and sentence before the High Court. By impugned judgment dated 26.02.2016, the High Court affirmed the finding of the Special Court to the effect that the victim was present in the house of the accused at the time of incident and there was no one else in the house except the accused and the victim. Pertinently, the High Court was of the view that this exceptional fact had not been sufficiently explained by the appellant. Relying on the evidence of Dr. Dipti Vinay Shrirame (P.W.6) and the medical examination report of the victim issued by the General Hospital, Chandrapur, the High Court concluded that the fact of penetrative sexual assault was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Also, as per Section 29 of POCSO Act, the appellant was found to have failed to discharge the burden of explaining the presence of the victim in his house and the medical evidence which proved the commission of penetrative sexual assault.
8. Section 3 of POCSO Act defines when a person is said to commit penetrative sexual assault and Section 4 prescribes the punishment for the same. Prior to its amendment, Section 4 provided for imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. The Section has been amended with effect from 16.08.2016.
9. A comparison of aforesaid sections with Sections 5 and 6 of POCSO Act, is necessary. Section 5 provides when an accused is said to commit ‘aggravated penetrative sexual assault’. In particular, Section 5(m) provides that whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child below twelve years is said to commit aggravated penetrative sexual assault. At the time of commission of offence in the instant case, Section 6 enumerated punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. The aforesaid Sections read as under:
“3. Penetrative sexual assault.—A person is said to commit “penetrative sexual assault” if—
(a) he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or 2506 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(b) he inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or
(c) he manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of the child or makes the child to do so with him or any other person; or
(d) he applies his mouth to the penis, vagina, anus, urethra of the child or makes the child to do so to such person or any other person.
4. Punishment for penetrative sexual assault.—(1)
Whoever commits penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
xxx
5. Aggravated penetrative sexual assault.— xxx
(m) whoever commits penetrative sexual assault on a child below twelve years; or xxx is said to commit aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
6. Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.—(1) Whoever commits aggravated penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of natural life of that person and shall also be liable to fine, or with death.
(2) The fine imposed under sub-section (1) shall be just and reasonable and paid to the victim to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of such victim.”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2507Sachin v. State of Maharashtra
10. It is an undisputed fact that the minor victim was four years of age at the time of commission of the offences. In this context, the High Court observed that the Special Court in convicting the appellant under Sections 3(a) and 4 of POCSO Act had overlooked the provisions of Sections 5(m) and 6 of POCSO Act as well as Section 376(2)(i) of the IPC. Finally, the High Court held that the appellant herein is liable for punishment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC. While maintaining the findings recorded by the Special Court that the appellant indeed committed penetrative sexual assault on the victim, the High Court issued show cause notice to the appellant as to why he should not be sentenced as per Section 6 of the POCSO Act and for the offence under Section 376(2)(i) of IPC. Considering the minimum statutory punishment, it is apparent that sentencing under Section 6 of POCSO Act would inevitably result in enhancement of sentence by at least three years.
11. The contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant herein before the High Court was that such a course was impermissible in law as it would amount to altering/modifying the charge was to be considered on the next date. The appeal was listed before the High Court on 02.03.2016 for further hearing on the point of sentencing and the appellant was also directed to be produced before the Court. On 02.03.2016, the appellant was produced before the High Court and was made aware about the issuance of notice regarding hearing on enhancement of sentence. What appears is that despite the judgment of the High Court dated 26.02.2016, the appellant was made aware of the issuance of show cause notice only for enhancement of sentence on 02.03.2016. Subsequently, on 08.03.2016, the High Court passed the order and reiterated that appellant is liable to be punished under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(i) of IPC, both provisions having been overlooked by the Special Court and finally remitted the case to the Special Court for reconsidering the quantum of the sentence to be imposed on the appellant by way of enhancement for the offences said to have committed by the appellant.
12. Consequently, the Special Court vide order dated 28.04.2016 sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment and to pay fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six months.
2508 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
13. Aggrieved by the enhancement of sentence in pursuance of his own appeal, the appellant herein preferred Criminal Appeal No.311/2021 before the Division Bench of the High Court by assailing order dated 28.04.2016 which obviously expressed its inability to proceed in the matter and instead suggested that the High Court Legal Services Sub-Committee, Nagpur take steps to restore justice to the appellant herein.
14. It is in the above circumstances, that we have heard learned counsel Ms. Sangeeta Kumar appearing on behalf of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee for the appellant – accused and Shri Rang Verma, learned counsel for the respondent-State at length.
15. Ms. Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that in the absence of any appeal preferred by the State Government or the complainant, the High Court grossly erred in enhancing the sentence. The decision of the High Court has left the appellant worse-off in his own appeal, it was argued.
16. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State relied on the judgment of this Court in Kumar Ghimrey vs. State of Sikkim, (2019) 6 SCC 166 (“Kumar Ghimrey”) to buttress his submission that the High Court, even in the absence of a State appeal, is competent under Section 401 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”) to exercise its powers under Section 396(c) and enhance the sentence once appellant-accused’s appeal was filed.
17. On that note, learned counsel appearing for the appellant vociferously highlighted the grave injustice of prolonged incarceration has caused to the appellant due to High Court not granting an effective opportunity of hearing. It was contended that the Order dated 08.03.2016 does not reflect that the counsel for the appellant-accused or the accused himself was actually heard on the question of modifying the charge from a minor offence to a major offence and thereby altering the finding and enhancing the sentence.
18. We find merit in the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the record does not reflect that the counsel for the appellant-accused or the accused himself was heard on the question of modifying the charge from a minor offence to a major offence and thereby altering the finding and enhancing the sentence. The further and more important submission is that, in an appeal filed by the accused/convict the sentence cannot be enhanced by the appellate court.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2509Sachin v. State of Maharashtra
19. Section 386 CrPC discusses the powers of the appellate court. For ease of reference, Section 386 reads as under:
“386. Powers of the Appellate Court.—After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may—
(a) in an appeal from an order or acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law;
(b) in an appeal from a conviction—
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or
(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same—
(c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence—
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried by a Court competent to try the offence, or
(ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or, the nature and extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or reduce the same;
(d) in an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such order;
(e) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper:
2510 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement:
Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under appeal.”
The said provision delineates four categories of appeals, (i) an appeal from an order of acquittal; (ii) an appeal from conviction; (iii) an appeal for enhancement of sentence; and (iv) an appeal from any other order.
20. Section 377 CrPC which provides for appeal by the State Government against inadequacy of sentence was a novel provision brought in by the CrPC. The 41st Law Commission had noted in its report that, pre-1973, in the absence of a statutory provision which permitted the State to prefer an appeal against inadequate sentence, the State was compelled to invoke the revisional powers of the High Court for correction of any error in sentencing. Finding this to be unsatisfactory, the Law Commission recommended that the State Government should be able to appeal against an inadequate sentence before an ordinary Court of Appeal as well. To effectuate this intent, the Parliament inserted Section 377.
20.1 In Nadir Khan vs. State (Delhi Admn.), (1975) 2 SCC 406 (“Nadir Khan”), the petitioner was found in illegal possession of ganja weighing 7 kgs, and was convicted under Section 61(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 as extended to Delhi and sentenced to two months’ rigorous imprisonment. As no right to appeal was available, an unsuccessful revision application was preferred before the Sessions Court. Aggrieved, the petitioner had then moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC read with Article 227 of the Constitution against the conviction. In turn, the High Court left the petitioner worse off as it thought that the sentence awarded was inadequate. By suo moto invoking its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court enhanced the sentence to six months. In a special leave petition before this Court, the question raised was, whether, the High Court, in a revision under Section 401 CrPC, has the jurisdiction to [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2511Sachin v. State of Maharashtra enhance the sentence in the absence of an appeal by the State against the inadequacy of sentence under Section 377. 20.1.1 Noting that the High Court did leave the petitioner worse off, this Court speaking through Goswami, J., characterised the question to be an unmerited doubt on the undoubted jurisdiction of the High Court in acting suo motu in criminal revision in appropriate cases. It was observed that the High Court is not required to act in revision merely through a conduit application at the instance of an aggrieved party. It was held as follows:
“The High Court, as an effective instrument for administration of criminal justice, keeps a constant vigil and wherever it finds that justice has suffered, it takes upon itself as its bounden duty to suo motu act where there is flagrant abuse of the law. The character of the offence and the nature of disposal of a particular case by the subordinate court prompt remedial action on the part of the High Court for the ultimate social good of the community, even though the State may be slow or silent in preferring an appeal provided for under the new Code.
… This position was true and extant in the old Code of 1898 and this salutary power has not been denied by Parliament under the new Code by rearrangement of the sections.
It is true the new Code has expressly given a right to the State under Section 377 CrPC to appeal against inadequacy of sentence which was not there under the old Code.
That however does not exclude revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to act suo motu for enhancement of sentence in appropriate cases. What is an appropriate case has to be left to the discretion of the High Court.… Section 401 expressly preserves the power of the High Court, by itself, to call 2512 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports for the records without the intervention of another agency and has kept alive the ancient exercise of power when something extraordinary comes to the knowledge of the High Court. The provisions under Section 401 read with Section 386(c)(iii)
CrPC are clearly supplemental to those under Section 377 whereby appeals are provided for against inadequacy of sentence at the instance of the State Government or Central Government, as the case may be.
There is therefore absolutely no merit in the contention of the learned counsel that the High Court acted without jurisdiction in exercising the power of revision suo motu, for enhancement of the sentence in this case. The application stands rejected.”
(underlining by us)
20.2 In Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 25 (“Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar”), an appeal was indeed preferred by the State Government under Section 377(1) CrPC against the inadequacy of the sentence of the appellant convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Sections 2(i)(1) and 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs.500 and in default rigorous imprisonment for two months. The High Court allowed the appeal of the State with regard to the inadequacy of the sentence and while affirming the conviction of the appellant under aforesaid provisions enhanced the sentence to six months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1000 and in default simple imprisonment for two months. In appeal before this Court, the principal submission of the appellant was that the appeal under Section 377(1) was not maintainable due to the bar operating then under Section 377(2). This argument is not relevant for our consideration in the present case. Additionally and alternatively, it was argued that the appeal not being maintainable, the High Court could not have, in any event, invoked its revisional powers under Section 401 CrPC [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2513Sachin v. State of Maharashtra to enhance the sentence suo moto as the power of the High Court to enhance sentence which was available under Sections 435/439 CrPC of the old CrPC is absolutely replaced by the provision of appeal under Section 377 CrPC of the new CrPC. Rejecting the submission, a three-judge Bench of this Court held that the High Court has revisional powers to, suo motu, enhance the sentence. It was held that:
“6. We should at once remove the misgiving that the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has abolished the High Court’s power of enhancement of sentence by exercising revisional jurisdiction, suo motu. The provision for appeal against inadequacy of sentence by the State Government or the Central Government does not lead to such a conclusion.
High Court’s power of enhancement of sentence, in an appropriate case, by exercising suo motu power of revision is still extant under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, inasmuch as the High Court can “by itself” call for the record of proceedings of any inferior criminal court under its jurisdiction. The provision of Section 401(4) is a bar to a party, who does not appeal, when appeal lies, but applies in revision. Such a legal bar under Section 401(4) does not stand in the way of the High Court’s exercise of power of revision, suo motu, which continues as before in the new Code.”
(underlining by us)
The aforesaid judgments of this Court settled the question that a High Court has the jurisdiction to suo moto enhance the sentence under the CrPC by invoking its revisional powers. The pertinent question then is, whether, the High Court could enhance the sentence under its revisional powers in a convict’s appeal against conviction.
21. In this case we are concerned with an appeal from a conviction. In such an appeal the appellate court can exercise its powers in three ways, as per clause (b) of Section 386 CrPC. Clause (c) is with regard to an appeal for enhancement of sentence. While an appeal from a conviction is filed by the accused, an appeal from an order 2514 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of acquittal or for enhancement of sentence could be filed either by the State or by the complainant or even by the victim under Section 378 CrPC and in the case of a victim as per proviso to Section 372. In the case of an appeal from any other order i.e. not an order of conviction or acquittal, the High Court can either alter or reverse such order under clause (d). The High Court has also the power to make an amendment or pass any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper in any of the above situations. However, there are two provisos to Section 386. The first proviso states that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. The second proviso states that the appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing that order for sentence under appeal.
22. Some judgments of this Court on the interpretation of Section 386 CrPC may be referred to at this stage.
22.1 In Sahab Singh vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 1188 (“Sahab Singh”) seven appellants were convicted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat on three counts and sentenced as follows:
(a) rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 148, IPC;
(b) rigorous imprisonment for six months under Section 323/149, IPC; and
(c) imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 200 under Section 302/149, IPC.
All the said substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently.
The seven appellants preferred an appeal against the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. The High Court while dismissing their appeals clarified that their conviction were on six counts and altered the fine awarded under Section 302/149 IPC from Rs. 200/- to Rs. 5,000/- in respect of each appellant per count, i.e., Rs. 30,000/- per appellant. Being aggrieved by the enhancement of fine the appellant preferred their appeal before this Court on the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2515Sachin v. State of Maharashtra question of enhancement only. While discussing Sections 374 and 401 CrPC this Court observed that on a co-joint reading of Section 377, 386, 397 and 401, if the State is aggrieved about the inadequacy of the sentence, it can prefer an appeal under Section 377 (1) CrPC. The failure on the part of the State to prefer an appeal does not, however, preclude the High Court from exercising suo motu power of revision under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC since the High Court itself is empowered to call for the record of the proceeding of any court subordinate to it. Sub-section (4) of Section 401 operates as a bar to the party which has a right to prefer an appeal but has failed to do so but that sub-section cannot stand in the way of the High Court exercising revisional jurisdiction suo motu. But before the High Court exercises its suo motu revisional jurisdiction to enhance the sentence, it is imperative that the convict is put on notice and is given an opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence wither in person or through his advocate. The revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised to the prejudice of the convict without putting him on guard that it is proposed to enhance the sentence imposed by the trial court. Discussing the facts of the said case, it was noted that the accused convict had filed their appeals, while no appeal had been filed by the state against the sentence awarded by the trial court on the ground of its inadequacy vis- à-vis Section 302/149 IPC nor did the High Court exercise suo motu revisional powers under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC. If the High Court intended to enhance the sentence the proper course was to exercise suo motu powers under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC by issuing notice of enhancement and hearing the convicts on the question of inadequacy of sentence. Without following such procedure, it was not open to the High Court in the appeal filed by the convicts to enhance the sentence by enhancing fine as this would be without jurisdiction. On this ground the appeals were allowed and the enhanced fine imposed by the High Court set aside and fine imposed by the trial court was restored and direction was issued to refund the additional fine, if paid. 22.2 In Govind Ramji Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 4 SCC 718 (“Govind Ramji Jadhav”), the question was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to enhance the sentence without 2516 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports issuing notice and affording to the appellant an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement of the sentence in the absence of an appeal by the State for enhancement of sentence on the ground of inadequacy. The appellant therein had preferred criminal appeal against the conviction and sentence before the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench. The High Court neither issued notice to the appellant therein nor afforded him any opportunity of showing cause against the said enhancement while enhancing the sentence. There was no appeal for the said enhancement of sentence under Section 377 CrPC on the ground of its inadequacy. It was observed that the High Court enjoys the power of enhancing the sentence either in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 or its appellate jurisdiction under Section 377 read with Section 386(c) CrPC subject to proviso (1) and (2) to Section 386. That while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC for enhancement of sentence, opportunity must be provided to the accused.
Referring to certain judgments of this Court, it was observed that Section 386 CrPC deals with the powers of the appellate court in disposing of an appeal preferred under Section 374 and also in case of an appeal under Sections 377 or 378 CrPC. Under clause (c)(iii) of Section 386 CrPC, the appellate court may in an appeal for enhancement of sentence with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or, the nature and extent, of the sentence so as to enhance or reduce the same. That in both the above situations, for the power of enhancement of the sentence, the accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to showing cause as contemplated under the first proviso to Section 386 as well under sub-section (3) of Section 377 CrPC. Rules of natural justice would mandate issuance of notice to the appellant and affording an opportunity to be heard on the proposed action for enhancement of sentence. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the said case, it was observed that enhancement of sentence from three years to seven years for the conviction under Section 201 IPC was impermissible. Consequently, this Court set aside the High Court’s order enhancing the [2025] 4 S.C.R. 2517Sachin v. State of Maharashtra sentence and restored the order of the trial court imposing the sentence of three years rigorous imprisonment and the fine of Rs. 2500/- with the default clause.
22.3 In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Nirmala Devi, (2017) 7 SCC 262, the issue was whether the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction under Section 386 CrPC could have set-aside the sentence of imprisonment as imposed by the trial court under Sections 328, 392 and 307 IPC by enhancing the amount of fine to Rs.30000/- from the fine of Rs.2000/- as ordered by the trial court. There were two concurring opinions expressed through Dr. A.K. Sikri and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
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