Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 593; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1983
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 29 Apr 2025
- Case number
- WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No. 282/2021
- Sections
- 58, 2(7), 34(1), 47(1), 58(1), 11, 34, 17, 47, 21, 1(4), 4
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1983 : 2025 INSC 593 Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors.
v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 282 of 2021)
29 April 2025 [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Manoj Misra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Constitutionality of ss.34(1), 47(1)(a)(i) and 58(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 prescribing pecuniary jurisdictions of the district, state and national commissions on the basis of value of goods and services paid as consideration, instead of compensation claimed are challenged.
Headnotes† Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – ss.34(1), 47(1)(a)(i) and 58(1) (a)(i) – Constitution of India – Art.246 and Entry 95 of List I read with Entries 11-A and 46 of List III – Power to determine pecuniary jurisdiction:
Held: There is no doubt about the fact that the Parliament has the legislative competence to enact the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Under Entry 95 of List I r/w. Entries 11-A and 46 of List III and in exercise of power under Article 246, the Parliament has enacted the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – The legislative competence to prescribe jurisdiction and powers of a court, coupled with the power to constitute and organize courts for administration of justice, takes within its sweep the power to prescribe pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals – Parliament has the legislative competence to prescribe jurisdiction and powers of courts – This power extends to prescribing different monetary values as the basis for exercising jurisdiction. [Paras 9, 9.1] Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – ss.34(1), 47(1)(a)(i) and 58(1) (a)(i) – Contract Act, 1872 – Constitution of India – Art.14 – Whether ss.34, 47 and s.58 are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
* Author 1984 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Held: No – Classification based on value of goods or services on the basis of the amount paid as consideration is valid – “Consideration” is an integral part of forming any contract – It is also an integral part of the definition of a ‘consumer’ – It is in recognition of the first principles of formation of a contract that s.2(7) of the 2019 Act defines a consumer as any person who buys any goods or hires or avails any service for a consideration – The consideration could be in the present or future, in whole, part, or by deferred payment – Whichever be the mode, there must be a consideration – That is essential to be a consumer – Therefore, vesting jurisdiction in the district, state or national commission on the basis of value of goods or services paid as ‘consideration’, is neither illegal nor discriminatory – The determination of jurisdiction of the district, state or national commissions on the basis of value of consideration paid for purchase of goods and services has rational nexus to the object of provisioning hierarchy of judicial remedies – The relief or compensation that a consumer could claim remained unrestricted and at the same time, access to the state or the national commission is also not taken away – It is well settled that there is no right or a privilege of a consumer to raise an unlimited claim of compensation and thereby chose a forum of his choice for instituting a complaint – Thus, the classification of claims based on value of goods and services paid as consideration has a direct nexus to the object of creating a hierarchical structure of judicial remedies through tribunals. [Paras 10.2, 10.4, 11, 11.1] Contract Act, 1872 – Essentials of a Contract – Discussed. [Para 10.3] Statute – Performance Audit of the Statute:
Held: Legal reform through legislative correction improves the legal system and it would require assessment of the working of the law, its accessibility, utility and abuse as well – The Executive branch has a constitutional duty to ensure that the purpose and object of a statute is accomplished while implementing it – It has the additional duty to closely monitor the working of a statute and must have a continuous and a real time assessment of the impact that the statute is having – Reviewing and assessing the implementation of a statute is an integral part of Rule of Law – The purpose of such review is to ensure that a law is working out in practice as it was intended – If not, to understand the reason and [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1985Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. address it quickly – It is in this perspective that this Court has, in a number of cases, directed the Executive to carry a performance/ assessment audit of a statute or has suggested amendments to the provisions of a particular enactment so as to remove perceived infirmities in its working. [Para 12.4] Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – ss.3, 10 – Central Consumer Protection Council – Central Consumer Protection Authority – Directions for measures necessary for effective and efficient redressal and working of the statute:
Held: The Council and Authority being statutory authorities having clear purpose and objects and vested with powers and functions must act effectively and in complete coordination to achieve the preambular object of the statute to protect the interest of consumers – As they are impressed with statutory duty, their functioning will be subject to judicial review – Vibrant functioning of the Council and the Authority will subserve the purpose and object of the Parliament enacting the 2019 legislation – Central Consumer Protection Council and the Central Consumer Protection Authority shall in exercise of their statutory duties u/ss.3, 5, 10, 18 to 22 take such measures as may be necessary for survey, review and advise the government about such measures as may be necessary for effective and efficient redressal and working of the statute. [Paras 12.17, 13] Case Law Cited State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai [1951] 1 SCR 51 : (1950) SCC 905; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1991] Supp. 1 SCR 435 : (1952) 1 SCC 1; Nandita Bose v. Ratanlal Nahata [1987] 3 SCR 792 : 1987 AIR 1947 – relied on.
Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. [2024] 7 SCR 1443; M/s Pyaridevi Chabiraj Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors., CC No. 833 of 2020 – referred.
List of Acts Constitution of India, Consumer Protection Act, 2019, Contract Act, 1872.
1986 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports List of Keywords Sections 34(1), 47(1)(a)(i) and 58(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019; Performance Audit of the Statute; Central Consumer Protection Council and the Central Consumer Protection Authority; Legislative competence; Rule of Law; Consideration, Consumer; Pecuniary jurisdiction; Value of the goods or services paid as consideration.
Case Arising From ORIGINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 282 of 2021 Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India With Civil Appeal No. 5670 of 2025 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Petitioners:
Abhimanyu Bhandari, Sr. Adv., Somesh Tiwari, Ms. Vidula Mehrotra, Utsav Saxena, Shubhankar Singh, Aashna Mehra, Ms. Manisha Ambwani, Shreeyash Lalit, Haresh Raichura, Mrs. Saroj Raichura, Kalp Raichura.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Nachiketa Joshi, Anmol Chandan, Priyanka Das, T.S. Sabarish, A. Deb Kuamar, Sabarish Subramanian, Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, 1 Amrish Kumar, Viresh B. Saharya. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
Table of Contents*
1. Facts in the Writ Petition: ....................................................... 2
2. Facts in the Civil Appeal ......................................................... 3
3. Statutory Provisions: ............................................................... 4 * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1987Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
4. Submissions ............................................................................. 6
5. Analysis ..................................................................................... 8
6. Re: Power to determine pecuniary jurisdiction .................... 9
7. Re: Submissions that the provisions are discriminatory and violative of Article 14 ...............................................................
8. Re: Performance Audit of the Statute .................................... 17
9. Conclusions .............................................................................. 28
1. Constitutionality of Sections 34(1), 47(1)(a)(i) and 58(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 20191 prescribing pecuniary jurisdictions of the district, state and national commissions on the basis of value of goods and services paid as consideration, instead of compensation claimed are challenged in the writ petition2 under Article 32 of the Constitution and the civil appeal 3 against the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission 4 .
2. Facts in the Writ Petition: The short facts, to the extent that they are relevant for disposal of the writ petition are that the petitioner’s husband purchased a sedan –Ford Endeavour Titanium car from S.P. Vehicles Pvt. Ltd., authorised dealer of Ford India for an amount of Rs. 31.19 Lakhs. Tragically, the vehicle caught fire on 20.11.2018 while being driven leading to death of petitioner’s husband. Though criminal proceedings were initiated, the present proceedings are concerned with the statutory proceedings initiated under the 2019 Act by way of consumer complaint before the District Consumer Commission, Vadodara for compensation of Rs. 51.49 crores with interest thereon. Pending disposal of the consumer complaint, the appellant approached this Court by way of the present writ petition 1 Hereinafter referred to as the 2019 Act.
2 W.P. (C) No. 282 of 2021.
3 Leave Granted and arising out of SLP (C) No. 1738 of 2022 against the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Diary No. 19172/NCDRC/2021-CC dated 08.10.2021. 4 Hereinafter, “National Commission”.
1988 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports under Article 32 of the Constitution alleging that she was compelled to approach the district commission because of the statutory regime under the 2019 Act, whereas under the repealed Consumer Protection Act, 19865 , she could have directly approached the national commission based on compensation claimed. The relevant portion of the prayer made in the writ petition is as follows: “a) Be pleased to issue appropriate guidelines, Writ in the nature of Mandamus or such other Writ or declaration or directions to declare that newly added Proviso of Section 34(1), Proviso to Section 47(1) and Proviso to Section 58(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 directing that for Pecuniary Jurisdiction instead of “Compensation Claimed”, the “consideration paid at the time of purchase of Services” will be applicable as quoted in Para 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the ground of Arbitrariness and contrary for the purpose of hierarchy of Judicial System in India.
b)…..”
3. Facts in the Civil Appeal: In the civil appeal, the appellant’s husband, a District governor of the Lions Club of Jhansi, passed away due to COVID-19 on 25.07.2020. When her claim on the basis of insurance policy offered by Lions International Club, up to two million dollars as compensation to families of deceased members was denied, she approached the national commission seeking Rs. 14.94 crore. However, the national commission rejected her petition on the ground that the consideration for the insurance policy does not exceed Rs.10 crores. The relevant portion of the order passed by the national commission is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference;
“…The Pecuniary Jurisdiction has been specified in the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, where the consideration paid, if exceeds Rupees Ten Crores, will give power to the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission to entertain any Complaint. It has nothing to do with the amount of Compensation to be claimed by any of the Complainant. ”
5 Act No. 68 of 1986. Hereinafter, “1986 Act”.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1989Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
4. Statutory Provisions: Before we consider the legal submissions of the petitioner/appellant and the respondent, a comparative chart of the jurisdictions exercised by the district, state and national commission under the repealed 1986 Act and the present 2019 Act is as follows:
FORUM 1986 ACT 2019 ACT
District Commission Section 11.(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the District Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services and the compensation, if any, claimed does not exceed rupees twenty lakhs… Section 34.(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the District Commission shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as consideration does not exceed one crore rupees… State Commission Section 17. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have jurisdiction— (a) to entertain — (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees twenty lakhs but does not exceed rupees one crore… Section 47. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have j u r i s d i c t i o n — ( a ) t o entertain — (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as consideration, exceeds rupees one crore, but does not exceed rupees ten crore...
National Commission Section 21. Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction —
( a ) t o e n t e r t a i n — ( i )
complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees one crore… Section 58. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the National Commission shall have j u r i s d i c t i o n — ( a ) t o entertain — (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services paid as consideration exceeds rupees ten crore… 4.1 A plain and simple reading of the provisions makes it clear that the 2019 Act shifts the basis of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the district, state as well as national commission from value 1990 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of compensation claimed under the repealed 1986 Act to value of the consideration paid for the goods and services. The petitioners and the appellants claim that this legislative shift must have the effect of annulling sections 34, 47 and 58 of the Act as unconstitutional.
5. Submissions: Mr. Shreeyash Lalit and Mr. Abhimanyu Bhandari, Ld. Sr. Counsel represented the petitioner and the appellant respectively. Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee assisted by Mr. Nachiketa Joshi represented the respondents.
6. Mr. Shreeyash Lalit would submit that under the new legal regime, an anomaly has arisen regarding pecuniary jurisdiction and hierarchy of judicial system. The argument is that the impugned provisions gives rise to an anomalous situation wherein, for instance, a person claiming compensation of Rs. 50 Cr, for a defect or deficiency in goods purchased or services availed, for consideration lesser than Rs. One Crore will have to go before the district commission and at the same time one can approach the national commission even if the compensation is less than Rs. One Crore.
6.1 Ld. Counsel argues that the new criterion for determining the pecuniary jurisdiction is discriminatory as consumers who claim identical compensation, but have paid different considerations at the time of purchase of goods or services are treated differently. To buttress their argument, they referred to Section 2(7) of the 2019 Act which defines “consumer” and includes within its ambit any person who buys goods/ services for a consideration which is (i) fully paid or promised,
(ii) partly paid or promised, (iii) under a system of deferred payment, and also includes (iv) a user of such goods or services. Thus, when the definition of “consumer” itself does not discriminate on the basis of the consideration paid and includes every consumer in the wide spectrum, restricting access to judicial remedies on the basis of consideration paid is illegal and arbitrary.
6.2 As a logical extension of the same argument, it is submitted that there is no rationale for introducing the new criterion for determining the pecuniary jurisdiction. It is argued that even if the object sought to be achieved is to curb instituting exaggerated [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1991Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. claims, the same could have been done by way of increasing the pecuniary limits of the forums.
7. Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, Ld. ASG appearing on behalf of the Union opposed the writ petition and supported his argument on the basis of written submission.
7.1 The first limb of his submission is that Parliament has the legislative competence to determine the jurisdiction and also pecuniary limits of courts and tribunals. To exemplify his submission, he referred to some parliamentary enactments. 7.2 To counter the allegations of arbitrariness, Ld. ASG submitted that the impugned provisions are based on a reasonable classification. He would submit that classification created on the basis of value of goods and services paid as consideration not only creates an intelligible differentia, but also has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, which is “timely and effective administration and settlement of consumer disputes”. Further, it is argued, the impugned provisions are not manifestly arbitrary and that they were brought in to prevent exaggerated and inflated claims.
8. Analysis: The submissions made by the Ld. Counsels for the petitioner/ appellant and respondent can be considered in the context of (i) power to determine pecuniary jurisdiction, (ii) reasonable classification under Article 14, (iii) manifest arbitrariness, and (iv) loss of remedy. We will consider each of these submissions independently.
9. Re: Power to determine pecuniary jurisdiction: There is no doubt about the fact that the Parliament has the legislative competence to enact the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. Under Entry 95 of List I read with Entries 11-A and 46 of List III6 and in exercise of power under Article 246, the Parliament has enacted the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The legislative competence to prescribe jurisdiction and powers of a court, coupled with the power to constitute and organize 6 Item 95, List I: “Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to an of the matters in this List; admiralty jurisdiction.”
Item 11-A of List III: “Administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts, except the Supreme Court and High Courts.”
Item 46 of List III: “Jurisdiction and powers of all courts, except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List.”
1992 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports courts for administration of justice, takes within its sweep the power to prescribe pecuniary limits of jurisdiction of the courts or tribunals. In State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai,7 Justice Patanjali Sastri concurring with the majority held as under:
“88. It had long been the practice in this country to constitute and organise courts with general jurisdiction over all persons and matters subject only to certain pecuniary and territorial limitations, and to confer special jurisdiction limited to certain specified cases or matters either on the ordinary courts in addition to their general jurisdiction or on tribunals set up to deal with such matters exclusively. The various Provincial Civil Court Acts as well as the provisions of the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes invest the courts, both civil and criminal, with general jurisdiction, that is to say, power to adjudicate in respect of all persons and all matters except those that are specifically excluded or brought within the cognizance of tribunals with special or limited jurisdiction extending only to those matters. The grading of the court too in their hierarchy has reference to the pecuniary and territorial limits rather than to the nature and kind of the subject-matter which they are empowered to deal with.” 9.1 Parliament has the legislative competence to prescribe jurisdiction and powers of courts. This power extends to prescribing different monetary values as the basis for exercising jurisdiction. For example, under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, it is prescribed under Section 1(4) that the provisions of the Act shall not apply where the amount of debt is less than 10 lakh rupees. Section 4 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 provides that Part II of the Code, relating to insolvency resolution and liquidation for corporate persons is made applicable to matters relating to insolvency and liquidation of corporate debtors where the minimum amount of default is Rs. One Crore. Similarly, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 also provides under Section 31(h) that the Act shall not apply for securing repayment of any financial asset not exceeding Rs. 1 lakh. Further, the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 under
7 (1950) SCC 905
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1993Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. Section 22(c)(1) provides that the permanent Lok Adalat shall not have jurisdiction in matters where the value of the property in dispute exceeds 10 lakh rupees. In Narottamdas Jethabhai (supra), Justice Mahajan has observed as under:
“27. It seems to me that the legislative power conferred on the Provincial Legislature by Item 1 of List II has been conferred by use of language which is of the widest amplitude (administration of justice and constitution and organisation of all courts). It was not denied that the phrase employed would include within its ambit legislative power in respect to jurisdiction and power of courts established for the purpose of administration of justice. Moreover, the words appear to be sufficient to confer upon the Provincial Legislature the right to regulate and provide for the whole machinery connected with the administration of justice in the province. Legislation on the subject of administration of justice and constitution of courts of justice would be ineffective and incomplete unless and until the courts established under it were clothed with the jurisdiction and power to hear and decide cases. It is difficult to visualise a statute dealing with administration of justice and the subject of constitution and organisation of courts without a definition of the jurisdiction and powers of those courts, as without such definition such a statute would be like a body without a soul. To enact it would be an idle formality. By its own force it would not have power to clothe a court with any power or jurisdiction whatsoever. It would have to look to an outside authority and to another statute to become effective. Such an enactment is, so far as I know, unknown to legislative practice and history. Parliament by making administration of justice a provincial subject could not be considered to have conferred power of legislation on the Provincial Legislature of an ineffective and useless nature.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.2 In view of the above discussion, there can be no doubt about the legislative competence and also the power of the Parliament to 1994 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports prescribe limits of pecuniary jurisdiction of courts and tribunals and in our case, the district, state or the national commission.
10. Re: Submissions that the provisions are discriminatory and violative of Article 14: Sections 34, 47 and 58 vest jurisdictions in the district, state and national commission on the basis of value of goods or services paid as consideration. The precise question for our consideration is whether empowering the district, state and national commissions to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of value of the goods or services paid as consideration is violative of Article 14.
10.1 If there is one test for determining whether a provision of ‘law’ is violative of the equality norm, which has been articulated with precision and clarity, it is the independent and interconnecting twin test, as explained in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar8 as;
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