Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v. Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 570; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1921
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale
- Decided
- 23 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6681-6682/2023
- Sections
- 96, 96(3), 96(1), 21(2)
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1921 : 2025 INSC 570 Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin)
v.
Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 6681-6682 of 2023)
23 April 2025 [Vikram Nath and Prasanna B. Varale,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether a litigant who was already a party to the suit, yet contests the fact or legality of a compromise embodied in a decree, is restricted to an application before the trial court under the proviso to Ord. XXIII r.3 CPC or may maintain a first appeal u/s.96 CPC notwithstanding s.96(3) CPC.
Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – s.96, Ord.XXIII r.3, Ord.XLIII r.1A(2), r.1(m) – Compromise of suit – Appeals from original decrees – Right to challenge non-appealable orders in appeal against decree – Dispute between parties regarding sale deeds of suit land – Suit by respondent against the appellants wherein compromise between the parties resulting in first consent decree, thereafter another compromise in the suit filed leading to second consent decree – Appellant’s case that she had no notice of either compromise and both consent decrees obtained by fraud – Appellant filed AOs against both decrees u/Ord.XLIII r.1A – Transferee purchasers lodged parallel AOs – Single Judge of High Court, acting on the pronouncement of the larger bench that party to suit must first invoke proviso to Ord.XXIII r.3 and r.1A itself creates no independent right of appeal, dismissed AOs – Interference:
Held: High Court’s directions correctly apply the structure of the statute and does not call for interference – Larger Bench took the right view that such appeals are incompetent since 1976 – CPC, after the 1976 amendment, works in two distinct ways – If a person was already a party to the suit, and denies that any lawful compromise ever took place, CPC requires that person to go back to the trial court under the proviso to Ord.XXIII r.3 and ask that Court to decide whether the compromise is valid – Someone who was not a party to the suit, but whose rights are hurt by a consent * Author 1922 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports decree, may approach the appellate court in a first appeal u/s.96, but only after obtaining leave – Proviso to Ord. XXIII r.3 is not optional, it is the exclusive first port of call for any party on record who denies the compromise – Ord. XLIII r. 1-A does not create a new right of appeal; it merely enables an appellant, already before the appellate court, to attack the decree on the ground that the compromise should not have been recorded – When the fact of compromise is not disputed, the bar in s. 96(3) is absolute – On facts, the appellant never invoked the proviso to Ord.XXIII r.3 and instead lodged appeals from orders on the footing of the deleted Ord.XLIII r.1(m) – It cannot be said that fraud transform a consent decree to an ordinary decree – Fraud, want of authority or other vitiating elements are precisely the matters that the proviso directs the trial court to examine – Unless and until that route is pursued, the statutory bar in s.96(3) remains operative – Appellant was a party to the suits and cannot appropriate remedy reserved for third parties. [Paras 8, 11-17] Case Law Cited Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh and others [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 370 : (2006) 5 SCC 566; Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi and another [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 524 : (1993) 1 SCC 581; Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh [2020] 4 SCR 650 : 2020 SCC Online SC 444; H.S. Goutham v. Rama Murthy and another [2021] 4 SCR 996 : (2021) 5 SCC 241; Kishun Alias Ram Kishun (Dead) through LRS. v. Behari (Dead) By LRS. [2005] Supp. 2 SCR 383 : (2005) 6 SCC 300; Sree Surya Developers & Promoters v. N. Sailesh Prasad and others [2022] 3 SCR 1081 : (2022) 5 SCC 736 – referred to.
List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. List of Keywords Consent decree; Compromise; No independent right of appeal; Order recording or refusing a compromise; No separate appeal; No appeal against consent decree; Fraud; Legality of compromise; Legality of compromise embodied in decree; First appeal; Compromise of suit; Sale deeds; First consent decree; Second consent decree; Transferee purchasers; Independent right of appeal; Remedy reserved for third parties.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1923Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v. Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 6681-6682 of 2023 From the Judgment and Order dated 28.08.2019 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in AFO Nos. 33 and 16 of 2017 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Huzefa Ahmadi, Sr. Adv., Apurva Vakil, Ms. Anushree Prashit Kapadia, Ms. Rashmi Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Rakesh Uttamchandra Upadhyay, Ms. Aarti Upadhyay Mishra, Harsh Som, Pankaj B. Velani.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Prasanna B. Varale, J.
1. These appeals filed by Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (“the appellant”) assails the judgment dated 28.08.2019 rendered by a Larger Bench of the High Court of Gujarat on a reference arising out of Appeal from Order1 Nos. 16 and 33 of 2017 and cognate AOs. The High Court concluded that a litigant who was already a party to the suit, but disputes the existence or validity of a compromise recorded under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 2 must first approach the Trial Court; a First Appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, it held, is available only to a person who was not on the record of the suit. Following that pronouncement, the Single Judge of the High Court dismissed every pending AO on 06.09.2019 for want of maintainability. Both the reference judgment and the consequential order are impugned in these appeals.
1 AO
2 CPC
1924 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
2. The factual matrix giving rise to the appeal is as follows:
2.1. Three contiguous parcels of non-agricultural land at Siddhpur, District Patan, city survey Nos. 321, 322 and 323, together 36,354 sq. m., originally belonged to Moosabhai Mooman. On his death they devolved on his widow Noorbanu, his sons Sultan and Shaukatali (respondent no. 3) and his daughter Mumtaz (respondent no. 7). Sultan predeceased, leaving behind the appellant and two children, Salma (respondent no. 5) and Altaf (respondent no. 6) as his legal heirs.
2.2. Mumtaz executed an irrevocable General Power of Attorney 3 in favour of Hassan Ali Lad (respondent no. 4) on 15.02.2002; a second joint PoA dated 08.02.2005 in his favour was signed by the appellant, Salma, Altaf and Noorbanu.
2.3. On 09.03.2007, Shaukat Ali and Hassan Ali (purporting to act for all other co-owners) agreed to sell 28,978.51 sq. m. (“the suit land”) to ten individuals styling themselves ‘Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat, Siddhpur’ (respondent no. 1) for ₹ 2.51 crore. Only ₹ 15 lakh was paid; a notice terminating the agreement issued in August 2011.
2.4. Up until 2012, Salma, Altaf and Mumtaz conferred individual PoAs on the appellant; two of the original ten proposed purchasers had by then died. On 10.01.2013 the eight survivors executed a deed cancelling the agreement to sell and an indemnity bond. The appellant asserts custody of the originals of both joint PoAs, the agreement, the cancellation deed and the bond.
2.5. Later in 2013, Shaukat Ali, Salma, Altaf and Mumtaz relinquished their undivided interests in favour of the appellant; four mutation entries were certified, leaving her the sole recorded owner.
2.6. In August 2015, the appellant executed three registered sale deeds: two dated 10.08.2015 conveying 3,272 sq. m. and 6,385 sq. m. to Platinum Tradex Private Limited and one dated 12.08.2015 conveying 6,567 sq. m. to four individuals. Two of those individuals had themselves been among the original ten vendees.
3 PoA [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1925Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v. Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.
2.7. Later in 2015, Hassan Ali, accompanied by two of the original vendees, persuaded another member of that group, Kurban Momin, to revive the terminated transaction. On 24.11.2015 three revenue appeals were filed before the Deputy Collector, Siddhpur, challenging the mutation entries reflecting the appellant’s sale deeds. The appellant and Shaukat Ali were cited as respondents.
2.8. Regular Civil Suit No. 5 of 2016 (“the first suit”) was instituted on 5 January 2016, seeking a declaration that respondent no. 1 possessed the suit land. On 21.01.2016 respondent no. 1, through Kurban, filed Special Civil Suit No.6 of 2016 (“the second suit”) in Patan for specific performance of the cancelled agreement, showing the appellant and her two children through Hassan Ali and joining Shaukat Ali personally.
2.9. A compromise dated 12.03. 2016, signed by respondent nos. 1 and 2 (a trust said to represent the Jamat) on one side and Shaukat Ali and Hassan Ali on the other, was recorded on 15.03.2016, resulting in a first consent decree. Relying on that decree, the plaintiff withdrew the first suit unconditionally on 23.04.2016.
2.10. Respondent no. 1 then instituted Special Civil Suit No. 19 of 2016 (“the third suit”), again suing the appellant and her children through Hassan Ali. A further compromise dated 12.11.2016 led to a second consent decree on 17.12.2016.
2.11. The appellant maintains that she had no notice of either compromise and that both decrees were procured by fraud. She therefore filed AO No. 16 of 2017 against the first consent decree and AO No. 33 of 2017 against the second, invoking Order XLIII Rule 1-A. Transferee purchasers lodged parallel AOs.
2.12. The Single Judge of the High Court, noting conflicting Division Bench views on the powers of Rule 1-A, referred three questions to a Larger Bench, which held that a party to the suit must first invoke the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3 and that Rule 1-A itself creates no independent right of appeal. Acting on that pronouncement, the Single Judge dismissed all AOs on 06.09.2019.
3. Being aggrieved by the decision of the Larger Bench dated 28.08.2019, the appellant has filed the present civil appeal claiming 1926 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports that Section 96 of the CPC permits a direct First Appeal even where the compromise itself is in dispute.
4. Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has rendered the following submissions in brief:
4.1. Prior to the 1976 amendment to the CPC, Order XLIII Rule 1(m) permitted an Appeal from Order against an order recording or refusing a compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3. Amendment Act No.104 of 1976 deleted that clause and, in the same breath, introduced Order XLIII Rule 1-A(2). The new rule shifts the challenge to the decree and preserves a first appeal under Section 96; no separate Appeal from Order now lies.
4.2. The impugned judgment accords two avenues to a non-party (review or First Appeal with leave under Section 96) but limits a party on record to an application under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3. Such a view defeats the purpose of Rule 1-A(2), enacted to ensure that any litigant disputing a compromise may contest it directly in appeal.
4.3. The counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the ratios laid down in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat Vs. Rajinder Singh and others,4 Banwari Lal Vs. Chando Devi and another5 and Triloki Nath Singh vs Anirudh Singh6 are not correctly and completely considered by the Larger Bench of the High Court. It is submitted that in the case of Banwari Lal (supra) this Court in Paragraphs 9 and 13 has observed as follows:
“ 9.[.....]But after the amendments which have been introduced, neither an appeal against the order recording the compromise nor remedy by way of filing a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3A of Order 23. As such a right has been given under Rule 1A(2) of Order 43 to a party, who challenges the recording of the compromise, to question the validity thereof while preferring an appeal against
4 (2006) 5 SCC 566
5 (1993) 1 SCC 581
6 2020 SCC Online SC 444 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1927Sakina Sultanali Sunesara (Momin) v. Shia Imami Ismaili Momin Jamat Samaj & Ors.
the decree. Section 96(3) of the Code shall not be a bar to such an appeal because Section 96(3) is applicable to cases where the factum of compromise or agreement is not in dispute.
………….
13. [.......] Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code.”
(emphasis supplied)
4.4. The observation in Banwari Lal (supra) has been relied upon and approved in the case of H.S. Goutham Vs. Rama Murthy and another7 as well. The High Court relied on a solitary sentence in paragraph 17 of Pushpa Devi (supra) that “the only remedy … is to approach the court which recorded the compromise”. Counsel contends that the remark is per incuriam: it neither notices Banwari Lal (supra) nor distinguishes the later three-Judge Bench ruling in Kishun Alias Ram Kishun (Dead) through LRS. v Behari (Dead) By LRS.,8 which expressly recognises a first appeal where the compromise itself is disputed.
5. On the other hand, Mr. Rakesh Uttamchandra Upadhyay, learned counsel for the Respondents has made the following main submissions:
5.1. The respondents support the High Court’s conclusion that a party to the suit cannot invoke a first appeal. A consent decree, they urge, operates as estoppel and may be questioned only by an application to the Trial Court under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3; Section 96(3) bars an appeal and the deletion of Order XLIII Rule 1(m) removes the earlier avenue of an appeal from order.
7 (2021) 5 SCC 241
8 (2005) 6 SCC 300
1928 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
5.2. Reliance is placed on Pushpa Devi (Supra), especially para 17, which summarises:
● “No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree in view of Section 96(3).”
● “No appeal survives against the order recording the compromise after the omission of clause (m) of Order XLIII Rule 1.”
5.3. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Triloki Nath Singh (Supra), after considering Pushpa Devi (supra) and R Rajanna (supra), holds that post 1976 “neither an appeal nor a separate suit is maintainable” to impeach a compromise decree; Order XLIII Rule 1 A(2) is available only when the Trial Court has first decided, under the proviso to Order XXIII Rule 3, whether a compromise exists.
5.4. Any apparent divergence between Banwari Lal (supra) and Pushpa Devi (Supra) was resolved in Sree Surya Developers & Promoters v. N. Sailesh Prasad and others9, which affirmed that the Court passing the decree is the proper forum to examine the validity of the compromise. Paragraphs 9 and 13 of Banwari Lal (supra)-quoted by the appellant-must be read in that light.
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