Durga Prasad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 548; [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1572
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 23 Apr 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 5456/2025
- Sections
- 144, 188
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1572 : 2025 INSC 548 Durga Prasad v.
Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 5456 of 2025)
23 April 2025 [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to initiation of inquiry against the appellant (Inspector of Police at the time of riots) on account of dereliction of duty in controlling the 1984 riots. Whether, in the facts of the case, the High Court ought to have given liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to correct its mistake; whether it is a fit case to put a quietus to the proceeding.
Headnotes† Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – The charges against the appellant are in respect of failure to control the 1984 riots in the area under the command of the appellant – The appellant was exonerated of the charges by the Inquiry Officer – Initially, disagreeing with the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority directed for a de novo inquiry, which CAT found unjustified – However, CAT gave liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to issue a disagreement note – Instead of issuing a disagreement note simpliciter, the Disciplinary Authority issued a notice along with a note expressing its opinion that appellant is guilty and, thereafter, proceeded to impose punishment of reduction in rank – High Court set aside the order of punishment and gave liberty to issue a fresh note of disagreement – Correctness: Held: The observations in the inquiry report would indicate that it was not a case where there was inaction on the part of the appellant in controlling the riots – Arrests were made, lathi-charge was done and firing was resorted to, though not to injure – Considering the limited force available, focus was on saving crucial installations and potential targets – The immediate senior of the appellant appeared as a defence witness, he stated that the appellant did a commendable job with the limited resources available with him – * Author [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1573Durga Prasad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. In the context of the detailed inquiry report, the disagreement note is cryptic and ignores vital aspects that were considered by the Inquiry Officer in his report – Interestingly, the Disciplinary Authority in his disagreement note laid emphasis on what was not done, or what could have been done, namely, (a) entries were not made in the relevant diaries regarding announcement of prohibitory order; (b) no tear gas shells were used; (c) no injury caused to anyone in lathi-charge or police firing; (d) additional force not properly deployed; and (e) no preventive arrests effected between 31.10.1984 and 01.11.1984 – As regards observation of not making entries in relevant diaries regarding announcement of prohibitory orders, the statement of imputation in the context of that charge (i.e., charge no.3) makes no such allegation on the Charged Officer – Adverse inference ought not to have been drawn against the appellant on that count, as the same would be beyond the scope of the charge – Regarding non-use of tear gas shells, first there ought to have been evidence that they were available for use – Dissent note does not indicate presence of evidence in that regard – Absence of gunshot injury to any of the rioters is not a ground to assume inaction on the part of the police force – The plea of the Charged Officer that shots were fired not with a view to injure but to disperse the mob, is a bona fide plea, which does not call for any adverse inference against him – Regarding deployment of additional force, there is no evidence that such number of police personnel were to be deployed here and such number were to be deployed there – Dissent on this count also is unwarranted, particularly, in absence of evidence that police force was sitting idle with no deployment orders – As regards allegation that no preventive arrests were made by the Charged Officer – There is no evidence cited in the disagreement note that reports of a plan to indulge in rioting came to the knowledge of the Charged Officer but he took no preventive action – This Court is of the considered view that it would be too harsh upon the appellant to undergo a fresh exercise of disagreement note and consequential process, particularly when the incident is over 40 years old and the appellant has demitted office long time back – Thus, the order of the High Court giving liberty to the disciplinary authority to issue a fresh disagreement note, and proceed accordingly, is set aside. [Paras 24, 25, 26-32] Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Charges against the appellant that he failed to control the 1984 riots in an area 1574 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports under his command – Inquiry officer exonerated him – However, Disciplinary Authority disagreed and issued a notice along with a note expressing its opinion that appellant is guilty – High Court set aside the order of punishment and gave liberty to issue a fresh note of disagreement – Whether it is a fit case to put a quietus to the proceeding – Discussed:
Held: It is settled law that ordinarily where enquiry is found deficient, procedurally or otherwise, High Court should remand the matter back to the authority concerned for redoing the exercise from the stage where the error crept in – However, it is equally settled that where there is long time-lag or circumstances are such that a remand at that stage would be unfair, or harsh, or otherwise unnecessary, the High Court can exercise its discretion and pass suitable orders as the facts and circumstances of the case may demand – On facts, held, the disciplinary proceeding against the appellant was initiated after 8 years of the incident when by that time the appellant had already earned his promotion – It would be too harsh upon the appellant to undergo a fresh exercise of disagreement note and consequential process, particularly when the incident is over 40 years old and the appellant has demitted office long time back. [Paras 17, 32, 33] Case Law Cited Allahabad Bank & Others v. Krishna Narayan Tewari [2017] 1 SCR 389 : (2017) 2 SCC 308; M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [2006] 3 SCR 896 : (2006) 5 SCC 88; Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra [1998] Supp. 1 SCR 22 : (1998) 7 SCC 84; Yoginath Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Another [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 490 : (1999) 7 SCC 739 – referred to.
List of Keywords Service Law; Disciplinary Proceedings; 1984 riots; Failure to control the 1984 riots; De novo inquiry; Disagreement note; Fresh note of disagreement; Inquiry report; Prohibitory order; Charge; Scope of charge.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5456 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2022 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in WP (C) No. 1085 of 2002 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1575Durga Prasad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellants:
Atul Kumar, Ms. Sweety Singh, Ms. Archana Kumari, Rahul Pandey, Tara Chauhan, Himanshu Raj, Harsh Kumar, Sudipta Singha Roy. Advs. for the Respondents:
Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Sr. Adv., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Mrs. Alka Agarwal, Mukul Singh, Aman Sharma, Amit Sharma Ii, Raj Singh Rana, Ms. Manisha Chava.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Manoj Misra, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal impugns the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi 1 dated 12.09.2022 passed in W.P. (C) No.1085/2002 by which, though the writ petition of the appellant against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal 2 in O.A. No. 232/2002 was allowed, liberty was given to the disciplinary authority to issue a fresh note of disagreement to the appellant, within a period of four weeks, and pass appropriate orders after considering the response. Background Facts
3. This case has a checkered history. The appellant at the relevant time (i.e. 1984) was posted as Inspector of Police (i.e., Station House Officer3 ) at Police Station Kingsway Camp, North District, Delhi. During that period, post assassination of the then Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi, “Anti-Sikh Riots 4 ” broke out. In May 1985, the appellant was promoted to the post of Assistant Commissioner of Police, inter alia, on appraisal of service record. Later, a Committee was constituted to look into the failure of the police in effectively tackling the 1984 riots. In its preliminary report, the Committee castigated certain 1 The High Court
2 CAT
3 SHO
4 1984 riots 1576 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports police officers for their failure in controlling the riots. Based on that, charge memo was issued to the appellant on 20.08.1992, inter alia, charging him for dereliction of duty/ negligence in controlling those riots in the area under his command. In the ensuing inquiry, vide report dated 28.01.1999, the Inquiry Officer exonerated the appellant of the charges. However, the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the report of the Inquiry Officer and ordered a de novo inquiry vide office order dated 07.10.1999.
4. Aggrieved by direction for a de novo inquiry, the appellant filed Original Application 5 No.1841/2000 before Principal Bench of CAT at New Delhi. CAT allowed the said O.A. vide order dated 27.09.2000. The operative portion of the order is extracted below: “6…We find that the disciplinary authority is … not justified in ordering a de novo enquiry. If one has regard to the …..rule 15 ….., all that he could have ordered was a further enquiry and not a de novo enquiry. In the circumstances, the impugned order passed by the disciplinary authority on 06.08.1999…is quashed and set aside.
7. Consequent upon the aforesaid order of the disciplinary authority of 06.08.1999, a corrigendum has been issued by the disciplinary authority on 07.10.1999…, whereby, an amended charge has been framed. Since the order of the disciplinary authority of 06.08.1999 is set aside, aforesaid consequential corrigendum of 07.10.1999 is also quashed and set aside.
8. In view of the aforesaid order, we find that it would be open to the disciplinary authority, if he is so advised, to issue fresh orders disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer, but this he can do only after issue of a notice and after affording applicant a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Thereafter, in case he is inclined to issue a direction for a fresh enquiry, the same would not be a de novo enquiry in the matter.
9. Present OA is allowed in the aforesaid terms. No order as to costs.”
5 O.A.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1577Durga Prasad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
5. Pursuant to the aforesaid order of CAT, on 04.01.2001 the Disciplinary Authority issued a disagreement note calling upon the appellant to submit his representation within 15 days of its receipt. The Inquiry Report was supplied later vide letter dated 18.01.2001.
6. After getting response from the appellant, the Disciplinary Authority, vide order dated 28.12.2001, imposed a penalty of reduction in rank upon the appellant thereby demoting him to the post of Inspector from the post of Assistant Commissioner of Police, till retirement (i.e., till 31.03.2004).
7. The appellant challenged the order of punishment before CAT through O.A. No.232/2002, which was dismissed vide order dated 29.01.2002.
8. Aggrieved by CAT’s order dated 29.01.2002, the appellant filed writ petition (i.e., W.P. (C) No.1085/2002) before the High Court, which was allowed in the following terms:
“14. … This court is of the opinion that the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal as well as the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority are liable to be set aside. The Disciplinary Authority is, therefore, granted the liberty to issue a fresh note of disagreement to the petitioner within a period of four weeks, and the petitioner is also granted 4 weeks’ time to file a response to the note of disagreement. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority shall be at liberty to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.
15. This court has been informed that the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation and, therefore, the competent Disciplinary Authority shall be at liberty to pass the appropriate orders of punishment, keeping in view the date of retirement and the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.
16. The petition is disposed of with the above observations. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.”
9. The High Court found fault with the so-called disagreement note issued by the Disciplinary Authority before passing the punishment order. In the view of the High Court the disagreement note was not a note of dissent but an expression of opinion that the charged officer is guilty. Thus, in the view of the High Court, the Disciplinary Authority 1578 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports had pre-judged the matter and, therefore, the show cause notice was rendered nugatory, akin to a post decisional hearing, which violated the principles of natural justice as also the extant service rules.
10. Importantly, the correctness of the order of the High Court to the extent it set aside the order of punishment has not been questioned by the Govt. (i.e. the Disciplinary Authority). It is the appellant alone who has impugned the order of the High Court to the extent it grants liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to proceed afresh from the stage where the mistake crept in.
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the materials on record.
Submissions of the Appellant
12. The appellant contends that charges relate to the year 1984; inquiry was initiated in 1992; inquiry report was submitted in 1999; de novo inquiry directed by the Disciplinary Authority was set aside; punishment order was passed in 2001; the writ petition was filed in the year 2002 whereas the matter came up for final hearing in the year 2022; and, in between the appellant retired, therefore, once the order of punishment was found bad in law, the matter should have been closed with no liberty to the Disciplinary Authority. Otherwise, it would be nothing but persecution of the appellant on a charge which was found not proved by the Inquiry Officer. In anyway liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order in accordance with law would be an exercise in futility as the Disciplinary Authority has already disclosed its intent to punish the appellant. It was thus prayed on behalf of the appellant that this Court may look into the matter, satisfy itself as to whether there is any good reason to differ with the findings returned in the inquiry report and pass appropriate orders. Submissions on behalf of Respondent
13. On behalf of respondent it was submitted that though respondents have not challenged the order of the High Court, the facts disclosed in the disagreement note would indicate that there were good and cogent reasons to differ with the findings of the Inquiry Officer as from the materials on record charges were duly proved. However, since the High Court found fault with the disagreement note, fresh steps would be taken and there is no question of bias as by now there [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1579Durga Prasad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. would be a fresh set of officers. Hence, on behalf of the respondents, it was prayed that the appeal may be dismissed.
Analysis/ Discussion
14. Having taken note of the background facts as well as the rival submissions, in our view, the only question that arises for our consideration is whether, in the facts of the case, the High Court ought to have given liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to correct its mistake. If not, then what would be the appropriate relief to the appellant.
15. In that context, we have carefully perused the materials on record. A perusal of the record would reveal that the charges are in respect of failure to control the 1984 riots in the area under the command of the appellant. At the relevant time, the appellant was in the rank of an Inspector. Later, he was promoted to the post of an Assistant Commissioner of Police, which he held when the charge-sheet was served upon him in the year 1992. Notably, the appellant was exonerated of the charges by the Inquiry Officer. Initially, disagreeing with the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority directed for a de novo inquiry, which CAT found unjustified. However, CAT gave liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to issue a disagreement note and proceed. Instead of issuing a disagreement note simpliciter, the Disciplinary Authority issued a notice along with a note expressing his opinion that appellant is guilty and, thereafter, proceeded to impose punishment of reduction in rank. The High Court found fault with the procedure and held that the show cause notice was just an eye wash as the Disciplinary Authority had already made up its mind to punish the appellant. Consequently, the High Court set aside the order of punishment and gave liberty to issue a fresh note of disagreement and pass consequential order in accordance with law.
16. The aforesaid decision of the High Court has been questioned in this appeal to the extent it gave liberty to the Disciplinary Authority to proceed further. The appellant claims that in the facts of the case the writ petition should have been allowed in terms prayed for, with full consequential benefits to the appellant.
17. In our view, what assumes importance is that the decision of the High Court came in the year 2022 when already 38 years had passed from the year in which those riots occurred. In between, 1580 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the appellant retired from service and is now aged about 80 years. We are conscious of the law that ordinarily where enquiry is found deficient, procedurally or otherwise, High Court should remand the matter back to the authority concerned for redoing the exercise from the stage where the error crept in. However, it is equally settled that where there is long time-lag or circumstances are such that a remand at that stage would be unfair, or harsh, or otherwise unnecessary, the High Court can exercise its discretion and pass suitable orders as the facts and circumstances of the case may demand 6 . At times, where enquiry is found faulty, necessitating a remand, the Court may, on account of long delay, instead of remanding the matter, mould the relief as was done by this Court in the case of M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India7 .
18. In the instant case, admittedly, there was no procedural lapse in conducting the inquiry by the Inquiry Officer. No doubt, initially, the Disciplinary Authority ordered for a de novo inquiry but that order was set aside by CAT. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority issued a disagreement note and proceeded to impose punishment upon the appellant. There can be no cavil to the existence of power with the Disciplinary Authority to disagree with the opinion of the Inquiry Officer. But, in the event of disagreement, he has to give brief reasons for his disagreement and provide an opportunity to the employee to respond to such disagreement note before forming its own opinion with regard to imposition of punishment on the delinquent8 . In the instant case, the note issued by the Disciplinary Authority was more an expression of opinion regarding the appellant being guilty than a note of dissent with the findings returned by the Inquiry Officer. The High Court, therefore, set aside the order of punishment with liberty to the Disciplinary authority to issue fresh disagreement note.
19. In ordinary circumstances, the order of the High Court giving such liberty to the Disciplinary Authority may be justified. But here is a case of huge delay as also appellant retiring in between. Moreover, the Disciplinary Authority on its own did not impose punishment of dismissal or removal from service upon the appellant which might have 6 See: Allahabad Bank & others v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 (paragraph 8)
7 (2006) 5 SCC 88
8 Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, (1998) 7 SCC 84; and Yoginath Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Another, (1999) 7 SCC 739 [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1581Durga Prasad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. resulted in forfeiture of pension. No doubt, a punishment of reduction in rank, as was imposed, might also have a bearing on the quantum of pension payable to a retired employee but its consequences would be much less severe. In that light, and by taking into account the advanced age of the appellant, we propose to examine whether it is a fit case to put a quietus to the proceeding.
20. For that end, we propose to carefully examine the findings in the inquiry report as well as the dissent note issued by the Disciplinary Authority. The Inquiry Officer’s report, dated 28.01.1999, exonerating the appellant of the charges is on record as a part of Annexure P-6. The same is reproduced below:
“Inquiry Officer’s Report in case of Sri Durga Prasad Assistant Commissioner of Police, Charged Officer Sri Durga Prasad, Assistant Commissioner of Police (referred to as C.O hereinafter) is being proceeded against Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (vide Directorate of Vigilance Memorandum No. F7(9)/92-DOV /1017 dated 20.3.1992 for his alleged lapses in handling law and order situation which prevailed in Delhi in the wake of the assassination of the Prime Minister Smt. Indira Gandhi on 31.10.1984. The C.O. gave his written reply to the Articles of Charges on 20.8.1992 and this inquiry was referred to the undersigned vide Vigilance Department order No. F7(9)/92 /DOV/4297 dated 13.8.1998. By an order of the same date, Sri Puli Chand, Sales Tax Officer was appointed the Presenting Officer in this case.
In annexure IV to the Charge Memorandum, seven witnesses were those who had filed affidavits in connection with the Nov. ‘84 riots before Inquiry Commission set up in this matter. None of them appeared before this inquiry in spite of summons. It was learnt that Sri Piara Singh, Sri Rajinder Pal Singh, Jaimal Singh and Sri Pritpal Singh were not reciting at the addresses available with the Police Department. Since their present whereabouts are not known they could not be contacted. Two witnesses, namely, Sri J.S. Uppal and Shri Satnam Singh did not appear in spite of repeated summons and they had to be dropped.
1582 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports As a result, the Presenting Officer had to rely on the documentary evidence like the radio log book, curfew order etc., all of which have been admitted by the C.O. Now I propose to deal with each Article of Charge read with the imputations, and the evidence available against each. Charge No.1 That Shri Durga Prasad while functioning as SHO, Kingsway Camp failed to utilize his staff effectively and to take effective / preventive measures to control the violence which started in the wake of the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi which resulted in heavy loss of life and property during November 1984 riots. About 15 deaths occurred during riots in his area. No preventive arrests were made either on 31.10.1984 or up to 4.11.1984 when the riots were in full swing.
Statement of Imputations in support of Article 1 of Charge “Shri Durga Prasad, while functioning as SHO, Kingsway Camp was supposed to be (sic) and exercise overall supervision over the police station under his control. The facts emerge from the police records and affidavits that during Nov. ‘84 riots, Shri Durga Prasad failed to rise to the occasion. No preventive measures were taken when the riots were in full swing.”
On behalf of the disciplinary authority, radio logbook of North District has been produced as the evidence against the C.O. who has admitted the radio logbook entries as correct (exhibit S4). The Presenting Officer has, however, not been able to prove the Daily Diary register of police station Kingsway Camp as it was not made available to him.
Similarly, he could not produce the radio logbook of P.S. Kingsway Camp or the logbook of vehicles of P.S. Kingsway Camp for the relevant period. FIR Nos. 785, 786 and 789 all of which were cited as documents to be relied on for proving the charges against the C.O. as mentioned in [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1583Durga Prasad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. annexure III to the Charge Memo, have also not been made available. In short, the only items of documentary evidence produced to prove the charges are the order under section 144 CrPC (exhibit S1), curfew order (exhibit S 2), Deputy Commissioner, Delhi’s report on the number of deaths (exhibit S3) and radio logbook of North District (exhibit S4). All of these documents were readily admitted by the C.O. and he has been able to make better use of them in his defense.
None of the documents mentioned above throw any significant light on any laxity or lapses on the part of the C.O. They do not mention any occasions or locations where lathi-charge, tear gas or firing was needed but was not resorted to. There is nothing in these documents to show that effective preventive measures were not taken where the police was present. The Presenting Officer has argued that in departmental proceedings, preponderance of probability, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as applicable in criminal cases, should be seen while judging the culpability or otherwise of the delinquent officer. But here is a case where there is hardly any evidence to prove any of the charges, let alone preponderance of probability. Similarly, he argues that in departmental proceedings the question of proof of documents should not arise as most of the documents are maintained officially and should be presumed to be correct. If this argument was true, there would be no need of any departmental proceedings as the disciplinary authority which awards punishment could have summoned all these documents maintained officially then taken decision on the basis of them. The Presenting Officer has not appreciated time-honored maxim of natural justice that no evidence even in departmental proceedings can be made use of unless it has passed through the test of cross-examination by the C.O. The very object of cross-examination is to question the accuracy, credibility of the evidence adduced and highlight the discrepancies therein. Where this procedure has not been followed the evidentiary value of witnesses or documents becomes zero. A number of judicial pronouncements have 1584 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports emphasized that cross examination is a very valuable right, and prevention of its effective exercise would be shared the proceedings.
The Presenting Officer has also argued that the documentary evidence is to be considered more important than the oral evidence as the document does not lie or forget. Without questioning the validity of this argument, it may be observed that he has not been able to produce any document which is relevant to prove the charges regarding the lack of effective preventive measures, gross negligence or dereliction of duties with mala fide intention - the charges which have been cited in Annexure II as the constituents of misconduct in this case.
The Presenting Officer has further argued that the burden of proof in certain cases lies on the C.O as it is done in case of misappropriation etc. In such cases, according to him, the onus of disproving essential facts lies on the C.O. This principle is not applicable in the present case for the reason that a number of violent incidents or deaths occurring in the jurisdiction of a police officer do not, ipso facto, prove his incompetence, negligence or dereliction of duty unless it is established that he was given adequate men and resources to tackle the law and order situation and yet he willfully decided not to use them with some ulterior motive. In the present case, there is an abundance of evidence to show that the C.O. exercised all due care and caution at his command and made all possible efforts to control the law and order situation in his jurisdiction.
The Presenting Officer’s case is that according to the radio logbook entry dated 31.10.84 at 12.24 hours and 17.20 hours, C.O. was instructed to mobilize maximum force in the area of P.S. Kingsway Camp ensuring that no untoward incident took place. He argues that in spite of these instructions, C.O. failed to do this and his failure resulted into incidents of looting, arson and murder of many persons. In order to prove this allegation, the P.O. had to show that additional force was made available to [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1585Durga Prasad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. the C.O. in time and also that the C.O. had been informed in time to take preventive action. None of these points has been proved by any evidence. On the other hand, the C.O. has stated in his defense statement (placed on record on 30.10.98) that on 1.11.1984, he tried his level best with the help of force available with him, to control the situation and that special care was taken to protect the residences of Sardar Richpal Singh, Nirankari Baba and Ashwani Minna, proprietor of the newspaper ‘Punjab Kesri’ all prominent persons residing in the area of Kingsway Camp. Similarly, important installations like telephone exchange and the radio station were also protected by his force. In this connection, he has also given the sequence of events (annexure II of his defense statement) to show that he and his force made all possible efforts to combat the deteriorating situation during the riots. In the said annexure he has mentioned that on 1.11.84 he had no extra force except the meagre staff available at the police station. At 8:30 AM he also requested for the fire brigade. The fire brigade was not made available to him. His force, however, succeeded in stopping and disbursing a mob coming from Shakti Nagar side. A small additional force was made available to him consisting of 18 persons of the CRPF at 10:25 a.m. on 1.11.84 who were deployed at gurudwara Nanak Piau and the radio station. As a result, these places were saved from any kind of mischief or loss.
At about 11:00 AM, the C.O. received a message that more than a thousand persons (Sikhs) had gathered in Model Town making the situation tense. He reached the spot and pacified the crowd. Similarly, he tackled the law and order situation at GT Karnal Rd. by dispersing the mob assembled there and also at gurudwara Parmanand colony and gurudwara Gujranwala Town. He has also mentioned about a number of bogus calls received by him, which distracted the attention of force from the real troubled spots. In this way, the C.O. has mentioned number of incidents that took place at gurudwara Mukherjee Nagar, along the GT Karnal Rd., gurudwara Dhirpur, gurdwara 1586 [2025] 4 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports ‘D’ Block and a few residential units at Gujranwala Town, Model Town III, C.C. Colony, Rana Pratap Bagh, Nirankari Colony etc., which he and his force tackled during the day. The Presenting Officer has not been able to refute this portion of the defense statement by any evidence or cogent argument.
In annexure III (295/C) to this defense statement, the C.O. mentioned that the strength of his police station Kingsway Camp during the riots consisted of one Inspector, 9 Sub- Inspectors, 7 Assistant Sub-Inspectors, 18 Head Constables and 75 Constables - a force which was too inadequate to tackle hundreds of incidents that occurred within a short span of 2-3 days. The C.O. does admit 8 deaths that occurred in his jurisdiction out of which six were the Sikhs and two non-Sikhs.
The C.O. has also produced 6 defense witnesses to prove his case. Sri DL Kashyap (DW1) was the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Kingsway Camp and the C.O.s immediate superior. He has deposed that in the morning of 1.11.84, SHO Durga Prasad (the C.O.) accompanied him to Rana Pratap Bagh and they managed to disperse the unruly mob by resorting to a vigorous lathi charge. According to him, the C.O. did a good work in the area of Model Town, where he also rescued a Sikh family from the clutches of the rioters and protected a number of prominent Sikh leaders. He also ensured the safety and security of gurudwara Model Town, another sensitive and vulnerable place. In brief, he emphasized that the C.O. remained alert, vigilant and active throughout the period of riots continued and that in his opinion ‘he spared no efforts to combat the situation that arose in his jurisdiction’. It may be mentioned that Shri Kashyap (now Deputy Commissioner of Police) was not accused, in any manner, in these riots and got commendations from many quarters for his good work. His testimony in favor of the C.O. should therefore be totally relied on.
Shri Shiam Singh, ACP, Crime Branch (DW 2) has deposed that he investigated as a member of the special [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1587Durga Prasad v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. investigating agency headed by the DCP (Vigilance) the complaint of atrocities committed during the riots including complaint of Sardar Piara Singh of GT Karnal Road and found that the allegations of Sardar Piara Singh against the C.O. could not be substantiated.
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