M/S Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v. Snehasis Nanda
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 371; [2025] 3 S.C.R. 866
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
- Decided
- 20 Mar 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 14157/2024
- Sections
- 2(1), 24A, 11, 8
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 3 S.C.R. 866 : 2025 INSC 371 M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v.
Snehasis Nanda (Civil Appeal No. 14157 of 2024)
20 March 2025 [Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether on facts, the complainant-respondent would come under the definition of ‘consumer’ in terms of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986; whether any liability rested on the appellant to disburse the entire amount of Rs.31,00,000/- i.e., the remaining consideration amount for sale of the flat payable to the complainant-respondent by the borrower; whether borrower should have been joined in proceedings before the NCDRC.
Headnotes† Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – s.2(1)(d) – Respondentcomplainant took a housing loan of Rs.17,64,644/- from ICICI Bank and purchased a flat – Respondent and the borrower entered into an Agreement for the sale of the flat for Rs.32,00,000/-, Rs.1 Lakh paid by borrower – Appellant and the borrower entered into a Home Loan Agreement wherein the appellant agreed to grant a loan of Rs.23,40,000/- to the borrower – On request of the borrower, Rs.17,80,000/- were transferred by the appellant to the Bank – Respondent filed Complaint praying for directions to the appellant to pay compensation due to the loss caused to him for non-payment of the balance Rs.13,20,000/- under an alleged Tripartite Agreement – NCDRC allowed the complaint – Sustainability: Held: Impugned order not sustainable, set aside – A conjoint reading of all the agreements concludes that the essential transaction of sale was between the respondent and the borrower – Respondent, having no privity of contract with the appellant, cannot be termed a ‘consumer’ under the Act – Even the purported Tripartite Agreement, relied upon by the respondent himself, states that the appellant would only pay the foreclosure amount, out of the total loan amount * Author [2025] 3 S.C.R. 867M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v. Snehasis Nanda sanctioned to the borrower, to ICICI Bank for or on behalf of the borrower towards foreclosure of respondent’s loan facility with it – Appellant’s liability under the Agreement for sale was restricted only to satisfying the dues of the respondent with Bank which sum was in fact quantified at Rs.17,87,763/- and in anyway, could not have exceeded Rs.23,40,000/- – NCDRC could not have held that the appellant was liable to pay Rs.31,00,000/- both to the Bank as well as to the respondent, who was not a party to the ultimate sanction of the loan by the Home Loan Agreement between the appellant and the borrower. [Paras 17, 19, 20] Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Non-joinder of borrower in proceedings before NCDRC – Effect of:
Held: In the instant case, if the borrower had been arrayed as an Opposite Party in the NCDRC, the question of whether a Tripartite Agreement was duly executed and existed or not, could perhaps have been answered – In view of the borrower being the purchaser of the flat in question and party to the MoU, the Agreement for Sale, the Home Loan Agreement and the purported Tripartite Agreement, he was, at the very least a proper party, but looked at from the lens where the appellant denied the very existence of the Tripartite Agreement, the borrower being the sole link between the respondent and the appellant, the borrower would be a necessary party in the complaint. [Para 23] Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – s.24A – Limitation period – Discretion of NCDRC in condoning delay – Scope – On facts, purported Tripartite Agreement was dated 09.02.2008 – Cause of action statedly had arisen in/by April/May, 2008 – Respondent filed complaint under the Act on 16.04.2018:
Held: NCDRC is competent to condone any period of delay in filing a complaint beyond two years from the date when the cause of action arises, the discretion is circumscribed by twin conditions:
(i) that the complainant satisfy the NCDRC that he had sufficient cause for not filing his complaint within such period, and; (ii) that the NCDRC record the reasons for condoning such delay – In the present case, despite the appellant raising the issue of limitation, the impugned order is silent on it – Respondent was agitating the dispute before, inter alia, the Banking Ombudsman, Reserve Bank of India and even the High Court – Thus, at the initial stage(s) 868 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports of hearing, he ought to have satisfied/attempted to satisfy the NCDRC on the delay and the NCDRC ought to have passed a reasoned order condoning the delay or refusing to condone the delay. [Para 22] Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Consumer dispute – Arbitration, if provided under the agreement/ document, to be resorted to at the choice of the ‘consumer’ only:
Held: Even in a consumer dispute under the 1986 Act, or for that matter, the 2019 Act, arbitration, if provided for under the relevant agreement/document, can be opted for/resorted to, however, at the exclusive choice of the ‘consumer’ alone. [Para 23] Case Law Cited Snehasis Nanda v. M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited (Formerly Citi financial Consumer Finance India Limited), Civil Appeals No.10408-10409 of 2018; Indian Oil Corporation v. Consumer Protection Council, Kerala [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 884 : (1994) 1 SCC 397; Janpriya Buildestate Pvt. Ltd. v Amit Soni, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1269; Tata Motors Limited v. Antonio Paulo Vaz [2021] 1 SCR 625 : (2021) 18 SCC 545; Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 676; M Hemalatha Devi v. B Udayasri [2023] 13 SCR 258 : (2024) 4 SCC 255; Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab Singh [2018] 14 SCR 791 : (2019) 12 SCC 751 – referred to.
List of Acts Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Consumer Protection Act, 2019; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords Definition of ‘consumer’; No privity of contract; Not a ‘consumer’; Housing loan; Borrower; Tripartite agreement; Indemnity Bond; Consumer; Prima facie; Home loan agreement; Agreement for sale; Memorandum of understanding; Transaction of sale; Foreclosure; Foreclosure amount; Proper party; Necessary party; Non-joinder; Condoning delay; Delay in filing complaint; Arbitration; Period of limitation.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 869M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v. Snehasis Nanda Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14157 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 19.01.2023 of the National Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in CC No. 919 of 2018 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Ritin Rai, Sr. Adv., Sanjay Kumar, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli. Respondent-in-person.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
The present appeal impugns the Final Judgment and Order dated 19.01.2023 [2023 SCC OnLine NCDRC 19] in Consumer Complaint No.919 of 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) passed by the learned National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NCDRC’), whereby the complaint filed by the respondent was allowed and the appellant was directed to refund Rs.13,20,000/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs Twenty Thousand) with interest @ 12% per annum and pay Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) as litigation cost.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
2. The respondent-complainant purchased Flat No.701, B-Wing, 7th Floor, Riddhi Siddhi Heritage, Plot Nos.56 & 57, Sector-19, Airoli, Navi Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as the ‘flat’) on 30.05.2006. The respondent had availed a housing loan of Rs.17,64,644/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakhs Sixty-Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Four) from ICICI Bank, Malad, East Mumbai Branch. In February 2008, one Mr. Mubarak Vahid Patel (hereinafter referred to as the ‘borrower’) approached the respondent to purchase the flat for a consideration of Rs.32,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Two Lakhs). On 09.02.2008, the respondent and the borrower entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as the ‘MoU’) for sale of 870 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the flat. On the same day, a Tripartite Agreement was purportedly entered into between the respondent, borrower and the appellant. Subsequently, the respondent and the borrower entered into an Agreement for Sale dated 12.02.2008 for the sale of the flat for a consideration of Rs.32,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Two Lakhs). Out of the total consideration of Rs.32,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Two Lakhs), Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) was paid through a post-dated cheque dated 12.02.2008 and for the remaining Rs.31,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-One Lakhs), the borrower approached the appellant for a housing loan.
3. The appellant and borrower entered into a Home Loan Agreement dated 28.02.2008, by which the appellant agreed to grant a loan of Rs.23,40,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Three Lakhs Forty Thousand) to the borrower. As the flat was already mortgaged with ICICI Bank, the borrower requested the appellant to disburse an amount of Rs.17,80,000/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakhs Eighty Thousand) directly to the respondent’s ICICI Bank account, in order to secure the release of the flat. On 11.04.2008, the appellant granted in-principle approval for the loan. The above payment was made by the appellant and thereafter an amount of Rs.5,09,311/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Nine Thousand Three Hundred Eleven) remained to be disbursed to the borrower. The appellant issued a cheque for the balance sanctioned amount of Rs.5,09,311/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Nine Thousand Three Hundred Eleven) in favour of the borrower in 2009. However, the borrower did not encash this cheque and closed the loan account.
4. On 16.04.2018, the respondent filed Consumer Complaint No.919 of 2018 before the NCDRC, inter alia, praying for directions to the appellant to pay compensation due to the loss caused to him for non-payment of the balance Rs.13,20,000/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs Twenty Thousand) under an alleged Tripartite Agreement dated 09.02.2008. Vide Order dated 06.09.2018 [2018 SCC OnLine NCDRC 1416], the NCDRC, after hearing both parties, dismissed the complaint at the pre-admission stage holding that the respondent cannot be said to be a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The respondent then filed Review Application No.326 of 2018 in Consumer Complaint No.919 of 2018, which came to be dismissed by the NCDRC vide Order dated 20.09.2018. Thereafter, the respondent approached this [2025] 3 S.C.R. 871M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v. Snehasis Nanda Court by filing Civil Appeals No.10408-10409 of 2018. 1 By Order dated 06.09.2019, this Court allowed the said civil appeals and set aside the Orders of the NCDRC. It restored the matter back to the file of the NCDRC for the complaint to be decided on merits.
5. On remand, the NCDRC considered the matter and vide the Impugned Order allowed the complaint filed by the respondent. The appellant was directed to refund Rs.13,20,000/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs Twenty Thousand) with interest @ 12% per annum from 14.04.2008 till the date of actual payment along with Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One lakh) towards litigation cost. The respondent preferred Civil Appeal No.1593 of 20232 in this Court against the Impugned Order seeking enhancement of the amount awarded, which was dismissed on 17.04.2023.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:
6. Learned senior counsel Mr. Ritin Rai, for the appellant, submitted that the Impugned Order suffers from several infirmities and ought to be set aside. It was argued that the NCDRC failed to consider that the respondent is not a ‘consumer’ of the appellant within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. The MoU and the Agreement for Sale were purportedly entered into between the respondent and the borrower. The appellant is admittedly not a party to these and has undertaken no obligations thereunder. Similarly, the respondent is not a party to the Home Loan Agreement entered into between the appellant and the borrower. It was submitted that no service was ever provided by the appellant to the respondent and hence the respondent does not fall under the definition of ‘consumer’ under the Act.
7. It was argued that in such scenario, the NCDRC had concluded, without any evidence, that the appellant and the respondent were ‘possibly’ parties to a Tripartite Agreement under which the appellant was directly responsible for paying the total sale consideration to the respondent. The existence of such a ‘Tripartite Agreement’ has been denied by the appellant. Pertinently, no such ‘Tripartite Agreement’ signed by the appellant was ever filed by the respondent. 1 Snehasis Nanda v M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited (Formerly Citifinancial Consumer Finance India Limited).
2 Snehasis Nanda v M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Ltd.
872 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports The respondent, as the party averring the existence of such agreement, bears the burden of proving the existence of the same. The NCDRC erred by presuming the existence of a Tripartite Agreement and placing the burden of producing the same on the appellant.
8. It was further submitted that the appellant only had privity of contract with the borrower. It is on the instruction of the borrower - Mr. Mubarak Vahid Patel - that the appellant transferred an amount of Rs.17,80,000/- (Rupees Seventeen Lakhs Eighty Thousand) to the ICICI Bank for foreclosing the loan account of the respondent, as part of the sale consideration for the flat. This payment does not evidence the existence of any relationship between the appellant and the respondent, as it was made on the request of the appellant’s customer viz. the borrower.
9. Without prejudice to the aforesaid submissions, it was submitted that the appellant also took an objection before the NCDRC that the borrower was a necessary and proper party for the purpose of adjudication of the complaint. The NCDRC in the Impugned Order failed to adjudicate upon this objection raised by the appellant. Further, the NCDRC allowed the complaint without any reasoning on the appellant’s objection regarding the complaint being barred by limitation. Prayer was made to allow the appeal by the learned senior counsel.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT-IN-PERSON:
10. Mr. Snehasis Nanda, respondent-in-person, submitted that the Impugned Order has correctly taken note of the evidence and materials on record and allowed the complaint, which does not require any interference by this Court. It was submitted that the NCDRC, in a well-reasoned order, has rightly found the appellant to be guilty of deficiency in service and engaging in unfair trade practices, after going into the entirety of the complaint and the supporting documents.
11. It was submitted that the Home Loan of the borrower was approved by the appellant based on the Tripartite Agreement dated 09.02.2008 and the registered Agreement for Sale dated 12.02.2008, without which the appellant was not supposed to process the home loan application on the flat, as the said flat was mortgaged with another bank, i.e., ICICI Bank. The NCDRC has rightly upheld the existence of the Tripartite Agreement, after finding supporting evidence in the [2025] 3 S.C.R. 873M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v. Snehasis Nanda complaint. On the question raised by the appellant on the respondent’s status as a ‘consumer’ under the Act, the submission is that this Court in Order dated 06.09.2019 passed in Civil Appeals No.10408-10409 of 2018 held in his favour on this point.
12. It was argued that the appellant has deliberately misled all fora in order to hide the existence of the Tripartite Agreement dated 09.02.2008 and to escape the liability to pay. Prayer was made to dismiss the appeal by the respondent.
ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
13. We have heard learned senior counsel for the appellant and the respondent-in-person at length.
14. The lis before this Court basically can be broadly classified under two distinct heads. Firstly, as to whether the complainant would come under the definition of ‘consumer’ in terms of the Act. Secondly, assuming the first question is answered in the affirmative, whether any liability rested on the appellant to disburse the entire amount of Rs.31,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-One Lakhs) i.e., the remaining consideration amount for sale of the flat payable to the complainantrespondent by the borrower. Ancillary issues arising are considered at the appropriate place infra. At the outset, it would be useful to reproduce Section 2(1)(d) of the Act:
‘2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— …
(d) “consumer” means any person who,—
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose; or
(ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly 874 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purpose;
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, “commercial purpose” does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment;’
15. The respondent contends that this Court vide Order dated 06.09.2019 passed in Civil Appeals No.10408-10409 of 2018 has held that he is a ‘consumer’ under the Act. We reproduce the relevant discussion from the said Order:
‘xxx At this stage, we are considering whether prima facie there is material available on record to support and substantiate the plea that the appellant is a consumer within the meaning of the Act.
The documents referred to above prima facie do show and support the case of the appellant. The matter shall of course be gone into and if there are submission(s) to the contrary from the other side, they will also be considered before arriving at the final decision. However, the National Commission ought not to have disposed of the matter at the admission stage.
We, therefore, allow these appeals, set-aside the orders of the National Commission and restore the matter back to the file of the National Commission, which shall be decided in accordance with law.
We have considered the matter only from the perspective whether prima facie it is evident that the appellant is a consumer or not. The entire matter has to be gone into and our prima facie view shall not debar any of the parties to [2025] 3 S.C.R. 875M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v. Snehasis Nanda submit material and prove it to the contrary. The entirety of the matter shall be gone into by the National Commission on merits at the appropriate stages.
xxx’ (emphasis supplied)
16. A bare glance at the Order dated 06.09.2019 passed in Civil Appeals No.10408-10409 of 2018 makes it clear that this Court had nowhere conclusively held that the respondent-complainant was a ‘consumer’ under the Act. All that this Court did was to observe, upon perusing the documents produced before it, that it was of the prima facie view that the appellant was a ‘consumer’; that such view was only prima facie; that the other side could submit and show to the contrary; that the NCDRC ought not to have disposed of the matter at the admission stage; that the entirety of the matter be gone into, and; that the NCDRC should decide in accordance with law. Even at that time, the respondent had not produced a copy of the purported Tripartite Agreement before this Court. That apart, usage of the term ‘prima facie’ and its import is obvious – namely, that the NCDRC was left free to decide the issue, after hearing the parties. The NCDRC in the Impugned Order has offered no reasoning on how the respondent was a ‘consumer’ under the Act. As per the complainant-respondent, there was a Tripartite Agreement and an Indemnity Bond between the appellant, the complainant-respondent and the borrower intervened by a Home Loan agreement between the appellant and the borrower as also a MoU and an Agreement for Sale between the complainantrespondent and the borrower. Though the existence of the Tripartite Agreement was specifically denied by the appellant, the NCDRC has drawn an adverse inference against the appellant only because a specific affidavit was not filed before it. Pausing here, we may note that such statement re denial of the existence of the purported Tripartite Agreement was made in the appellant’s reply only, in the NCDRC, which was itself supported by an affidavit and thus, no separate/ special affidavit was required in this behalf. Moreover, and more importantly, the onus is on the person who asserts a fact to prove it. In the present case, where the respondent himself is a signatory to the purported Tripartite Agreement, the presumption will be that he has retained a copy of the same. Thus, non-production of the (complete) Tripartite Agreement, if at all there was one, would lead 876 [2025] 3 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports to an adverse inference, and under normal circumstances as also in the present case, against the complainant-respondent, and not against the appellant. What the complainant produced before the NCDRC was an unsigned, unstamped and partly blank document, which he asserts is the Tripartite Agreement between the appellant, the borrower and him.
17. Coming to the main merits, even if it is accepted that all the aforementioned agreements were validly there, primarily the Tripartite Agreement, as contended by the respondent, a conjoint reading of all would lead to the obvious conclusion that the essential transaction of sale was between the complainant-respondent and the borrower who was the buyer of the flat of the complainant-respondent for an agreed consideration of Rs.32,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Two Lakhs). In the specific factual setting, the respondent, having no privity of contract with the appellant, cannot be termed a ‘consumer’ under the Act. This alone was sufficient to dismiss the complaint. In Indian Oil Corporation v Consumer Protection Council, Kerala, (1994) 1 SCC 397, it was held that as there was no privity of contract between the concerned parties therein, no ‘deficiency’ would arise and the action (complaint) would not be maintainable before the concerned Consumer Forum. In Janpriya Buildestate Pvt. Ltd. v Amit Soni, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1269, the Court held:
‘25. We have indicated the scheme of the Act. A claim can succeed in a case of this nature if the consumer establishes deficiency of service. No doubt, the law giver contemplates other elements as contemplated in the definition of the word ‘complaint’. The word ‘deficiency’ has been widely worded. Equally so, is the word ‘service’. A statute of this nature must, indeed, if possible, be construed in favour of the consumer. However, that is a far cry from holding that if deficiency is not established, yet the opposite party must bear the liability which cannot be thrust on its shoulders. We would clarify that by making it clear that what we intend to say is that when there is no privity between the complainant and the opposite party, the opposite party could not become liable under the Act. In other words, if there is no law under which a person is to provide a service and if it does not fall within the residuary clause, namely, ‘otherwise’ as defined under the word ‘deficiency’, [2025] 3 S.C.R. 877M/s Citicorp Finance (India) Limited v. Snehasis Nanda it is necessary for a consumer to succeed, that there must be a contract. It is in that context, we indicated that the existence of an obligation under a contract is a sine qua non for a consumer to successfully prosecute a case under the Act.’ (emphasis supplied)
18. Ultimately, the loan which was sanctioned by the appellant to the borrower was only for a sum of Rs.23,40,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Three Lakhs Forty Thousand). Thus, here also we find that the Impugned Order of the NCDRC holding that the appellant was bound to pay the entire amount of Rs.31,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-One Lakhs) and directing it to pay the balance consideration of Rs.13,20,000/- (Rupees Thirteen Lakhs Twenty Thousand), appears to be wholly without basis. In Tata Motors Limited v Antonio Paulo Vaz, (2021) 18 SCC 545, the Court stated:
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