Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 201; [2025] 2 S.C.R. 574
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Manmohan
- Decided
- 11 Feb 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 301/2025
- Sections
- 4, 4(1), 4(2), 5, 10, 9
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:20 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 2 S.C.R. 574 : 2025 INSC 201 Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s.) 301-303 of 2025)
12 February 2025 [Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the challenge to the appointment of the third respondent as the Chairperson of the National Commission for Homeopathy on the ground of not fulfilling the requisite experience of working for ten years as a ‘leader’ in the area of health care. Headnotes† National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 2020 – s.4 Explanation – Appointment to the post of Chairperson of the National Commission for Homeopathy – Eligibility criteria that the Chairperson to have experience of not less than twenty years in the field of homeopathy out of which at least ten years shall be as a leader in the area of health care, as the Head of a Department or the Head of an Organisation – Third respondent, serving as the Director General of Central Council for Research in Homeopathy, appointed as Chairperson – Challenged by the appellant on the ground that the third respondent lacked the requisite experience of working for ten years as a ‘leader’ – Single Judge of the High Court quashed the appointment of the third respondent – However, the Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge – Correctness:
Held: In the matter of essential qualifications prescribed by the statute, there should neither be any deviation from the statutory requirements nor the advertisement inviting applications while conducting any selection process, unless power to relax the qualifications is shown to exist – Interference in matters relating to selection and appointment must be limited and the Court must not generally substitute the findings of the Search Committee – On facts, the Division Bench erred in holding that this was not a case to * Author [2025] 2 S.C.R. 575Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors. interfere in, considering, the clear violation of the applicable statutory rules – Selection process suffers from gross illegality and, thus, fails for serious breach of the statutory requirements – There was total lack of procedural fairness – No material before the Search Committee to hold that the third respondent was eligible, having had 10 years’ experience as the ‘Head of a Department’ – Third respondent fell short of the requisite experience – Third respondent misrepresented his work experience for being considered for the coveted position of Chairperson of the Commission – Division Bench grossly erred in failing to consider that mala fides, malice in fact-actual malice, not the only condition for interference, it is open to a Court to interfere when legal malice or malice in law is demonstrated to exist – Act of appointing the third respondent as Chairperson despite he not having the requisite experience suffers from malice in law – Tested on the touchstone of Art.16, the appointment of the third respondent fails to pass muster – Furthermore, it amounts to a fraud on the public to make appointments in departure of either the statutory requirements or a public advertisement, the fraud unravels everything – Thus, the appointment of third respondent quashed – Judgment of Division Bench set aside. [Paras 13, 21, 22, 35, 41, 46, 51, 52, 56, 57, 59, 60] Public appointments – Selection procedure – Selection by experts – Scope of judicial review:
Held: Court not to sit in appeal over decisions of selecting bodies, whatever be the nature of the post/office – If the selection made by the selectors-experts in the field, is challenged, a merit review is forbidden – Limited scrutiny of ascertaining the eligibility of the aspirants and the procedure followed, is permissible – However, merely because the Search Committee is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and such committee consists of experts, does not automatically make its recommendation immune from judicial scrutiny; rather, in an appropriate case warranting such scrutiny, the writ court would be justified in its interference with the process – If any of the grounds on which judicial review of administrative action is shown to exist, interference on such ground is permissible – It is not an arena in which intervention is completely barred. [Paras 20, 21, 49] Public appointment – Selection procedure – Eligibility criteria – Essential qualifications prescribed by the statute – Relaxation, if permissible:
576 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Held: Whenever appointment to a public office is sought to be made, irrespective of the nature of the office, the rules prescribing mandatory eligibility criteria must be applied in a strict manner – Every public appointment u/Art. 16 must be fair, non-arbitrary and reasonable – In the matter of essential qualifications prescribed by the statute, there should neither be any deviation from the statutory requirements nor the advertisement inviting applications while conducting any selection process, unless power to relax the qualifications is shown to exist. [Paras 51, 57] Interpretation of statutes – Purposive interpretation, when – Meaning of ‘Head’, in the National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 2020:
Held: When there is doubt as to the meaning of a word in the provisions of a statute, the rules of statutory interpretation call upon to interpret the words in a statute by giving a purposive interpretation having regard to the subject and object of the enactment – Explanation to s.4 of the 2020 Act defines the meaning of ‘leader’ as ‘Head of a Department’ or ‘Head of an Organisation’ – Meaning of ‘Head’ not defined in the Act – ‘Head’ in general parlance can be considered to mean an elevated position among other subordinate roles, often in the position of leadership – Taking into account the object and subject of the NCH Act read with s. 4, ‘Head’ must refer to a position held by an incumbent who performs the role of a leader and is tasked with making substantive decisions for the department/ organisation – Any claim for being ‘Head of a Department’ or ‘Head of an Organisation’ is strengthened if the incumbent exercises administrative or supervisory responsibilities – However, this is not the only factor to be considered – Any such determination must be on a case-to-case basis – National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 2020. [Paras 24, 25, 29] Case Law Cited Distt. Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [1990] 2 SCR 559 : (1990) 3 SCC 655 – relied on.
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate [1958] 1 SCR 1156 : AIR 1958 SC 353; Alka Ojha v. Rajasthan Public Service Commission (2011) 9 SCC 438; N.P. Verma v. Union of India [1989] 1 SCR 362 : (1989) Supp. 1 SCC 748; University of [2025] 2 S.C.R. 577Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors. Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao [1964] 4 SCR 575 : 1963 SCC OnLine SC 15; Mahesh Chandra Gupta v. Union of India [2009] 10 SCR 921 : (2009) 8 SCC 273; Veer Pal Singh v. Ministry of Defence [2013] 10 SCR 579 : (2013) 8 SCC 83; Tajvir Singh Sodhi v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [2023] 3 SCR 714 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 344; Sushil Kumar Pandey v. High Court of Jharkhand [2024] 2 SCR 217 : (2024) 6 SCC 162; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania [2010] 10 SCR 971 : (2010) 9 SCC 437; R.S. Garg v. State of U.P. [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 120 : (2006) 6 SCC 430; Swaran Singh Chand v. Punjab SEB [2009] 7 SCR 1084 : (2009) 13 SCC 758 – referred to.
List of Acts Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961; National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 2020; Constitution of India. List of Keywords Post of Chairperson, National Commission for Homeopathy; Public employment; Eligibility criteria; Requisite experience; Power to relax qualifications; Selection by experts; Purposive Interpretation; Judicial review of administrative action; Actual malice; Legal malice; Malice in fact; Malice in law; Head of Department/Office; Search Committee; Misrepresentation of work experience; Fraud in public employment.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 301-303 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 31.07.2024 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in W.A. Nos. 242 and 366 of 2024 and WA. CROB No. 2 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Devadatt Kamat, Sr. Adv., Nishanth Patil, Nishanth Patil, Mv Mukunda, Ayush P Shah, Revanta Solanki, Hruday Bajentri, Arijit Dey, Mehul Kumar Garg, Advs. for the Appellant.
Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Devashish Bharuka, Sr. Adv., Gurmeet Singh Makker, Ishaan Sharma, Saransh Kumar, Annirudh Sharmaii, Raghavendra M Kulkarni, Parmod Kumar Vishnoi, Avnish 578 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Dave, Kumar Prashant, Ms. Vanya Gupta, Raghav Sharma, Ms. Sanjeevani Shandilya, Vaibhav Diwedi, Shreyas Balaji, Shivendra Singh, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dipankar Datta, J.
1. A manifestly flawed process of selection, which was rightly interdicted by the writ court, has since been reversed by the writ appellate court premised on a fundamentally incorrect understanding of the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 19611 framed under Article 77 of the Constitution of India and an utterly mistaken notion of the scope of interference in matters relating to selection and appointment. It has, thus, not surprised us at all that Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General, representing the first respondent-Union of India2 and the second respondent-Search Committee, and Mr. Devashish Bharuka, learned senior counsel appearing for the third respondent, have made little effort to sustain the selection of the third respondent with reference to and/or relying on the said appellate judgment. Instead, the effort has been more towards sustaining the selection and appointment of the third respondent by highlighting the limited scope of judicial review in matters where the experts in the relevant field are the selectors and the process of selection is conducted by them. Much of this later, while we deal with their contentions.
2. The present lis concerns appointment to the high office of ‘Chairperson’ of the National Commission for Homeopathy.3
3. Facts giving rise to these three appeals from the appellate judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka,4 which are undisputed, lie in a narrow compass.
1 Business Rules 2 UoI 3 Commission 4 High Court [2025] 2 S.C.R. 579Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors. I. The National Commission for Homeopathy Act, 20205 is an enactment of recent origin. Section 4(1) of the NCH Act ordains that the Commission shall be comprised of a Chairperson, seven ex-officio Members and nineteen part-time Members. Section 4(2) specifically mandates that the Chairperson of the Commission shall be a person of outstanding ability, proven administrative capacity and integrity, possessing a postgraduate degree in Homoeopathy from a recognised University and having experience of not less than twenty years in the field of Homoeopathy, out of which at least ten years shall be as a leader in the area of healthcare delivery, growth and development of Homoeopathy or its education (emphasis supplied by us). The Explanation to Section 4 defines the term “leader” as the Head of a Department or the Head of an Organisation (emphasis supplied by us). Section 5, inter alia, prescribes that the Central Government shall appoint the Chairperson on the basis of the recommendation of a Search Committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary as the Chairperson [clause (a)], three expert members to be nominated by the Central Government [having qualifications as described in clauses (b) and (c)], a nominee of the Central Government [having qualifications as described in clause (d)] and the Secretary to the Government of India,6 in charge of AYUSH to be the convenor-member [clause (e)].
II. Vide Notification F. No. 21011/12/2020-EP(III) dated January 16, 2021, the Ministry of AYUSH invited applications for the post of Chairperson of the Commission. Inter alia, the Notification while indicating the eligibility criteria provided that the applicant must have not less than 20 years of experience in the field of Homeopathy, out of which at least 10 years as the Head of the Department or Head of an Organisation in the area of Health Care delivery, growth and development of Homeopathy or its education. This was entirely in consonance with the relevant statute and all concerned understood what the requirements were.
5 NCH Act 6 GoI 580 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports III. Responding to this notification, 37 (thirty-seven) aspirants applied for appointment to the office of the Chairman. The appellant and the third respondent, who was serving as the Director General, Central Council for Research in Homeopathy7 were two of the several aspirants.
IV. For a ready reference, the profile of the third respondent is reproduced hereinbelow:
Office/ Institution/ Organisation Post Held From To CCRH Research Assistant 07.09.1987 21.12.1995 CCRH Assistant Research Officer 22.12.1995 01.01.1996 CCRH Research Officer 01.01.1996 07.05.2008 CCRH Assistant Director May 2008 June 2014 CCRH Deputy Director (Tech.)
10.06.2014 27.12.2016 CCRH Deputy Director General 28.01.2016 13.09.2020 CCRH Director General 14.09.2020 Till the Date of Application V. The Search Committee, constituted for selection and appointment of the Chairperson of the Commission, upon scrutiny of the applications received from the several aspirants in response to the Notification dated January 16, 2021, resolved in its meeting
7 CCRH
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 581Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors. held on May 7, 2021 to recommend a panel of three aspirants in order of merit. In such panel, the third respondent figured at the top.
VI. The recommendation was accepted and after seeking the requisite approvals, the Central Government vide Notification No. S.O. 2694(E) dated July 5, 2021 constituted the Commission in purported compliance with the provisions of the NCH Act and, inter alia, conveyed the appointment of the third respondent as the first Chairperson of the Commission.
VII. The third respondent accepted the appointment and commenced a new innings of his life as Chairperson of the Commission. Since the term of his appointment is for 4 (four) years, the appellant is due to demit office on July 4, 2025.
VIII. Aggrieved by the selection and appointment of the third respondent as Chairman as well as his non-appointment in such office, the appellant preferred a writ petition8 before the High Court. The primary and the sole ground of challenge to such appointment was that the third respondent, despite not satisfying the eligibility criteria, came to be selected and appointed. According to the appellant, the third respondent lacked the requisite experience of working for 10 (ten) years as a ‘leader’ in terms of the Explanation to Section 4 of the NCH Act and, therefore, could not have entered the zone of consideration.
4. The Single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated January 10, 2024, accepted the contention of the appellant and held that the third respondent “did not possess the requisite experience as a ‘leader’ and therefore, his appointment as the Chairperson cannot be accepted as being in conformity with the provisions of the statutes”. The appointment of the third respondent was, accordingly, quashed. However, the Single Judge did not accept the contention of the appellant that he was eligible and meritorious and hence a direction should be issued to appoint him. It was reasoned that once an appointment is found to be illegal, all that the Court can do is to direct the Search Committee to re-do the process of appointment 8 W.P. No. 15859/2021 582 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports as per the statutory procedure. While allowing the writ petition, the Single Judge directed the Central Government to take necessary action to appoint a Chairperson of the Commission afresh, in the manner prescribed by the statute and also keeping in mind the observations made regarding the eligibility of the candidates vis-àvis the meaning of the word ‘leader’.
5. Aggrieved, the UoI and the third respondent carried the said judgment and order in separate appeals. The appellant filed a cross-objection challenging that part of the order of the Single Judge by which his contention, as noticed above, was rejected.
6. The Division Bench, vide judgment and order dated July 31, 2024 overturned, the decision of the Single Judge and allowed the intracourt appeals. It was, inter alia, held by the Division Bench that: “20. The workflow of the AYUSH Department, Government of India (Allocation of Business Rules, 1961) provides for organizational set up. The same is reflected at Page No.433 of the appeal. As per the Allocation of Business Rules, the Assistant Director is having independent control over the particular division. When the organizational set up does not provide for a head of the department, it is for the Court to examine whether a particular post would be head of that division. On consideration of the organizational set up in that view, Assistant Director though below the rank of Director General, the work and responsibilities entrusted to the Assistant Director are independent.
21. The Search Committee having examined the qualification and eligibility found that the different positions held by the appellant would be in the capacity of the head of the department. It is not open to the Court to substitute its opinion unless mala fides are being demonstrated in the process of selection. … ”
7. Consequently, the appeals of the UoI and the third respondent were allowed and the cross-objection dismissed. By presenting these three appeals, the said judgment and order has been called in question by the appellant.
8. Noticing the observations made in the judgment rendered by the Single Judge, to nullify the selection of the third respondent, we [2025] 2 S.C.R. 583Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors. had called upon Mr. Banerjee to place before us the relevant file pertaining to the selection in question in a sealed cover.
9. The file, which was placed, reveals that the third respondent had not submitted supporting documents to support his claim of possessing the requisite experience. The Search Committee after considering the application of the third respondent had, thus, remarked that it was “not clear” whether the third respondent possesses experience of 10 (ten) years as ‘Head of a Department’ or ‘Head of an Organisation’. It was also observed that the third respondent “may be eligible subject to submission and Verification of documents of experience as Head of Department from Competent Authority, cadre clearance & Certification of not having Major/Minor Penalties.”
10. While perusing the file, we came across a Departmental Order9 of the Secretary to the Government of India,10 Ministry of AYUSH, dated May 6, 2021. The second and final paragraph of the letter reads as follows:
“In this regard, I have got the matter examined in the Ministry of Ayush and after verifying the documents of experience, it is confirmed that Dr. Anil Khurana, DG, CCRH is having the requisite experience of 10 years equivalent to Head of Department. He, therefore, fulfils the eligibility requirements for the post in terms of the provisions of the Act.”
(emphasis supplied by us)
11. Since we could not trace in the file the precise ‘documents of experience’ which the Secretary, GoI in the aforesaid letter claimed to have verified, Mr. Banerjee was requested to throw light on it. He expressed regret having not been provided access to the file since the officers of the Ministry felt that it was directly to be placed before the Court in a sealed cover. However, at the same time, he submitted (upon receiving instructions from the officers present in Court) that the ‘documents of experience’, if not in the file, could lie somewhere else in a separate file. Assuring that such documents would also be placed before the Court, Mr. Banerjee added a caveat 9 D.O.
10 Secretary, GoI 584 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports that access to the file and the other documents to be produced may not be allowed to counsel for the appellant.
12. Having proceeded to hear the parties, we closed arguments and while reserving judgment on January 23, 2025, we required the officers of the UoI, who were present in Court, to produce the ‘documents of experience’ referred to in the D.O. of the Secretary, GoI.
13. Next morning, a sealed envelope was handed over to the Court Master for being placed before us. Such envelope had the handwritten inscription “Documents of Experience” as well as reference to these appeals. We record having devoted sufficient attention to all the papers in the file as well as the bunch of documents in the sealed envelope which, of course, on the ground of confidentiality claimed by Mr. Banerjee, was not given access to Mr. Kamath, learned senior counsel for the appellant. However, nothing much turns on such nonaccessibility since, the reasons to follow would demonstrate how the selection process suffers from gross illegality and, thus, has to fall through for serious breach of the statutory requirements, thereby supporting what we have said at the beginning of this judgment.
14. We have recorded above, what was the initial reaction of the members of the Search Committee. Had it been a clean and clear case where the members had no reason to object to the candidature of the third respondent, the present exercise need not have been undertaken, thereby yielding no difference in the outcome of the selection process.
15. At the outset, we cannot but express our dismay at the manner of appreciation of the organizational set up of CCRH11 by the writ appellate court and construing it to be part of the Business Rules. The page bearing the organizational set up of CCRH admittedly was part of the CCRH’s Annual Report of 2012-2013. Neither Mr. Banerjee nor Mr. Bharuka has attempted to justify the appellate judgment with reference to the Business Rules and, in fact, submitted that the Division Bench proceeded on a mistaken notion. We do not see it as a mistake, but as a blunder; and, for reasons of propriety, say no more.
16. We would assume, as submitted by Mr. Banerjee, that while issuing the D.O., the Secretary, GoI (who himself was a member of the Search 11 reproduced at the end of the judgment.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 585Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors. Committee) must have looked into the ‘documents of experience’ and what the same recorded must have weighed with the Chairperson and the members of the Search Committee to ultimately hold the third respondent eligible in all respects. However, two aspects appear to be truly striking. We may, at once, say that although in normal circumstances the first aspect of discussion might not have made a significant impact, it becomes relevant and the situation does call for a little deliberation in light of the initial observations made by the Search Committee regarding qualifications of the third respondent.
17. What has struck us, on perusal of the minutes of the meeting held on May 7, 2021, is that the Search Committee made no reference at all in its resolution to the D.O. dated May 6, 2021. Anyone, reading the minutes, would have no idea at all that at a previous stage of the process the members of the Search Committee themselves had doubted whether the third respondent was duly qualified or not and how such doubt came to be cleared. No explanation is proffered in regard to this omission. Obviously, this could not have been an inadvertent error.
18. According to Mr. Banerjee, the Secretary, GoI had referred to in the D.O. that the ‘documents of experience’ had been considered; and, having regard thereto, the Court ought not to sit in appeal over the satisfaction reached by the members that the third respondent was duly qualified.
19. The bunch of documents handed over to us have been duly looked into. We record having perused each and every page. What the bunch contains are documents mainly comprising office orders detailing the third respondent’s work allocation along with certain certificates of conferences attended and papers authored by him. Our examination of the documents yielded no conclusive evidence to prove the third respondent’s experience. On the contrary, there is one document in the bunch which is sufficient to seal the fate of the third respondent. We propose to refer to this document at a later stage of this judgment.
20. We preface further discussion recording our consciousness of what the law is. It is not for the Court to sit in appeal over decisions of selecting bodies, whatever be the nature of the post/office. If the selection made by the selectors, who are experts in the field, is laid to a challenge, a merit review is forbidden; what is permissible 586 [2025] 2 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports is, inter alia, a limited scrutiny of ascertaining the eligibility of the aspirants and the procedure followed, that is, whether a duly qualified aspirant has been selected and whether the procedure followed was fair and in consonance with statutory rules or not. However, merely because the Search Committee is chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and such committee consists of experts, does not automatically make its recommendation immune from judicial scrutiny; rather, in an appropriate case warranting such scrutiny, the writ court would be justified in its interference with the process.
21. What appears to be disturbing is the total lack of procedural fairness in the present case. If indeed a doubt had lingered in the mind of the members of the Search Committee as to whether an aspirant is eligible in terms of the requirements of the statute, is it not the duty of the Search Committee, in order to remain above board, to write even a single sentence and record its satisfaction in the minutes that the doubt has been cleared? The answer to this question cannot be in the negative.
22. We would not have given this aspect too much of an importance had the UoI been able to justify by placing relevant documents that the Secretary, GoI had, indeed, given a correct opinion as regards eligibility of the third respondent upon looking into all relevant documents. The contents of the D.O. as well as the relevant file and the other documents in the sealed cover are far from revealing what specific documents the Secretary, GoI had looked into for concluding, with a measure of assurance, that the third respondent possessed the required 10 years’ experience as ‘Head of a Department’. When attention to this was drawn, we were presented with the bunch of documents which, as stated before, cause more harm than good to the cause of the UoI and the third respondent. We have no hesitation to hold, based on reasons assigned hereafter, that there was no material before the Search Committee on the basis of which the third respondent could have been held to be eligible, having had 10 years’ experience as the ‘Head of a Department’.
23. This is considered sufficient to nullify the selection. But, having regard to the erudite arguments advanced at the Bar, we have ourselves proceeded to examine whether the common contention advanced by the UoI and the third respondent of the latter having the requisite experience, is acceptable or not.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 587Dr. Amaragouda L Patil v. Union of India & Ors.
24. The explanation to Section 4 serves as a guiding principle in this dispute, which defines the meaning of ‘leader’ as ‘Head of a Department’ or ‘Head of an Organisation’. What remains undefined in the NCH Act is the meaning of ‘Head’.
25. When there is doubt as to the meaning of a word in the provisions of a statute, the rules of statutory interpretation call upon us to interpret the words in a statute by giving a purposive interpretation having regard to the subject and object of the enactment. This Court in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate,12 observed that:
“9. …Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject-matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that ‘the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained’. (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn., p. 55).”
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