Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 104; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 934
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice Sandeep Mehta
- Decided
- 24 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1002/2025
- Sections
- 48(1), 53, 47, 128, 110, 30, 50
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 934 : 2025 INSC 104 Harshit Harish Jain & Anr.
v.
The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 1002 of 2025)
24 January 2025 [Vikram Nath*, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the amended six-month limitation, introduced by the 24.04.2015 amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 governs the Appellants’ claim for stamp duty refund, particularly when the Cancellation Deed was executed prior to the amendment but registered thereafter.
Headnotes† Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – s.48(1) – Amendment thereto, curtailed the time limit for seeking refund of stamp duty on a registered cancellation deed from two years to six months (from the date of registration of the deed) – Appellants executed Cancellation Deed on 17.03.2015 canceling the booking of the flats however, it was registered on 28.04.2015 (post-amendment) – On 06.08.2016, the appellants’ claimed refund of stamp duty – Claim was initially allowed but was later rejected as time-barred – Appellants, if entitled to the benefit of the unamended proviso of s.48(1):
Held: Yes – Appellants refund application cannot be repelled as time-barred merely because the deed’s registration was postamendment – Appellants’ accrued right to claim a refund arose the moment the Cancellation Deed was validly executed – The legislative scheme governing the earlier proviso to s.48(1) contemplated a broader two-year window – Constricting it retroactively merely because registration happened post-amendment defeats a vested cause of action – Amendment to provision as to limitation is inapplicable to accrued cause of action where the amendment has reduced the period earlier provided – The scheme of stamp duty refund provisions is designed to ensure fairness when * Author [2025] 1 S.C.R. 935Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. the underlying transaction is rescinded for bona fide reasons – Appellants were compelled to cancel the purchase due to the developer’s inability to deliver timely possession and were in no way at fault – The limitation provision to seek refund of stamp duty should not be enforced to oust the remedy when the applicant is otherwise not blameworthy – Impugned judgment dismissing the writ petition filed by the Appellants is set aside, writ petition allowed. [Paras 8-11, 15, 16] Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 – Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Maharashtra State, Pune (CCRA) – Absence of statutory review power – Appellants’ application for refund of stamp duty was initially allowed by the CCRA – However, it later recalled the said order and rejected the refund request as time-barred – Whether CCRA had power to review its own orders:
Held: No – CCRA having once granted a refund lacked any express statutory power to review or recall that decision – A quasi-judicial authority can only exercise such powers as the statute confers – There is no provision in the Act enabling the CCRA to sit in review of its own orders – In the absence of any enabling clause, the subsequent orders and ultimately the Order dated 16.12.2022, reversing the earlier sanction of the refund, cannot be sustained solely because the Appellants participated in the proceedings – Jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or waiver – High Court erred in endorsing of the CCRA’s review-like exercise – Participation in an erroneous procedure cannot confer review jurisdiction upon the CCRA where none exists in law – Thus, the subsequent orders recalling the already sanctioned refund, including the Order dated 16.12.2022 are quashed. [Paras 12-15] Case Law Cited M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise [2015] 7 SCR 291 : (2015) 7 SCC 58; Bano Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority & Inspector General of Registration & Controller of Stamps [2024] 5 SCR 730 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 979 – relied on.
List of Acts Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958.
936 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports List of Keywords Amendment to Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958; Refund of Stamp Duty; Time limit; Two year window; Sixmonth limitation; Cancellation deed; Date of registration of the Cancellation deed; Technical delay; Technical grounds of limitation; Legitimate refund; Right to claim a refund; Fiscal or quasi-judicial determinations; Vested cause of action; Accrued cause of action; Registered cancellation deed; Deed registered post-amendment; Refund not time-barred; Developer’s inability to deliver timely possession; Uncertainty over timely possession; Booking of flats cancelled; Refund order; Review jurisdiction; Review of own final orders; Absence of review power; Quasi-judicial authority; Power to review/recall.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1002 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 18.04.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 2018 of 2024 Appearances for Parties Santosh Krishnan, Adv. for the Appellants.
Shrirang B. Varma, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Vikram Nath, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal assails the final judgment and order dated 18.04.2024, rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (C) No. 2018 of 2024, whereby the writ petition preferred by the Appellants stood dismissed. The gravamen of the dispute concerns the rejection of the Appellants’ claim for refund of stamp duty under the provisions of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (hereinafter “the Act”).
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 937Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
3. The brief facts leading to the present appeal are as follows:
3.1. The Appellants entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 30.08.2014 with a real estate developer, M/s. Krona Realties Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter, “the Developer”), for the purchase of a residential flat (Flat No. 5102) in the “Lodha Venezia” project at Mumbai. The total consideration agreed was ₹5.46 crores, against which an advance payment of ₹1.08 crores was made to the Developer.
3.2. Pursuant to the execution of the Agreement to Sell, the Appellants paid stamp duty of ₹27,34,500, as mandated under the Act. The said Agreement was registered on 18.09.2014, upon payment of an additional registration charge of ₹30,000.
3.3. Sometime thereafter, on 05.11.2014, the Developer informed the Appellants of unavoidable delays tied to issues involving adjacent slums, thereby making it impossible to hand over possession of the flat by 31.03.2017, the date earlier envisaged. The Developer offered three options to the Appellants: (i) transfer the booking to another project, (ii) opt for cancellation with a refund along with interest at 12% per annum, or (iii) continue with the present booking but with a revised possession timeline.
3.4. Constrained by the uncertainty over timely possession, the Appellants chose to cancel the booking. Consequently, a Deed of Cancellation was executed on 17.03.2015. However, the said Cancellation Deed came to be registered only on 28.04.2015 before the Sub-Registrar of Assurances, Mumbai City. Subsequently, on 23.05.2016, a Deed of Rectification was also executed, clarifying the refund details and other particulars of the cancellation.
3.5. Meanwhile, by an amendment dated 24.04.2015 to Section 48(1) of the Act, the time limit for seeking a refund of stamp duty on a registered cancellation deed was curtailed from two years to six months (counted from the date of registration of such deed). On 06.08.2016, the Appellants filed an application for refund of the stamp duty amounting to ₹27,34,500, contending that they were governed by the earlier (pre-amendment) statutory regime, since their Cancellation Deed was executed before 24.04.2015.
3.6. The refund application was initially allowed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Maharashtra State, Pune 938 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports (CCRA), vide its Order dated 08.01.2018. Soon thereafter, however, the same authority, by a subsequent Order dated 03.03.2018, recalled its earlier decision and rejected the refund request as time-barred, citing the amended limitation period.
3.7. Aggrieved by the 03.03.2018 order recalling the earlier sanction of refund, the Appellants first attempted to challenge it before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) by way of an appeal under Section 53 of the Act. The CCRA dismissed the appeal on 16.04.2019, prompting the Appellants to file Writ Petition No. 8276 of 2019 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. In its judgment dated 04.10.2022, the High Court set aside the orders dated 03.03.2018 and 16.04.2019, noting that the Appellants had not been accorded proper opportunity of hearing. The matter was remanded to the CCRA for fresh consideration, particularly on the question of whether the original (unamended) or the amended provision under Section 48(1) of the Act would apply to the cancellation. Pursuant to that remand, the CCRA passed a fresh order on 16.12.2022, again rejecting the refund claim on the ground that the amended six-month limitation governed the Appellants’ case.
3.8. Aggrieved by the CCRA’s stance, the Appellants filed Writ Petition (C) No. 2018 of 2024 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, urging, inter alia, that (i) the right to seek refund accrued on the date of execution (17.03.2015), thus invoking the unamended two-year window, and (ii) the CCRA had no statutory power of review to recall its initial order granting refund.
3.9. By the impugned judgment dated 18.04.2024, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding, in essence, that the date of registration (28.04.2015) triggered the Appellants’ claim, which fell under the amended provision stipulating a six-month limitation. The High Court further opined that, in the specific facts, the CCRA’s recall could not be struck down solely on the ground of no express power of review.
4. Aggrieved with the dismissal of their writ petition, the Appellants have now approached this Court by way of the present appeal.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the Appellants and the Respondents, the primary issue for consideration before us is whether the amended six-month limitation, introduced by the 24.04.2015 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 939Harshit Harish Jain & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. amendment to Section 48(1) of the Act governs the Appellants’ claim for stamp duty refund, particularly when the Cancellation Deed was executed prior to the amendment but registered thereafter.
6. Section 48(1) of the Act reads as follows:
“48. The application for relief under section 47 shall be made within the following period, that is to say,—
(1) in the cases mentioned in clause (c)(5), within [six months] of the date of the instruments:
Provided that where an Agreement to sale immovable property, on which stamp duty is paid under Article 25 of the Schedule I, is presented for registration under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 and if the seller refuses to deliver possession of the immovable property which is the subject matter of such agreement the application may be made within two years of the date of the Instrument [or where such agreement is cancelled by a registered cancellation deed on the grounds of, dispute regarding the premises concerned, inadequate finance, financial dispute in terms of agreed consideration, or afterwards found to be illegal construction or suppression of any other material fact, the application may be made within two years from the date of such registered cancellation deed.]”
Through the amendment on 24.04.2015, the two-year period was curtailed to six months from the date of registration of the cancellation deed, thus altering the time frame under which a party could claim a refund.
7. The Appellants assert that, although the Cancellation Deed was registered on 28.04.2015, it was executed on 17.03.2015 — prior to the amendment dated 24.04.2015, which curtailed the time limit for seeking a refund from two years to six months. They rely upon Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, emphasizing that “a registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made.” In other words, the operative date for their right to seek refund would be 17.03.2015, placing them under the un-amended regime.
940 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
8. In our view, this contention carries substantial weight. The High Court laid undue emphasis on the registration date without fully appreciating that the Appellants’ accrued right to claim a refund arose the moment the Cancellation Deed was validly executed. The legislative scheme governing the earlier proviso to Section 48(1) of the Act, contemplated a broader two-year window. Constricting that window retroactively, merely because registration happened postamendment, unduly defeats a vested cause of action.
9. Moreover, in M.P. Steel Corporation v. Commissioner of Central Excise 1 , this Court has held that amendment to provision as to limitation is inapplicable to accrued cause of action where the amendment has reduced the period earlier provided. The relevant paras of this judgement have been extracted hereunder: “53. Shri A.K. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Revenue, has strongly contended before us that the present appeal must attract the limitation period as on the date of its filing. That being so, it is clear that the present appeal having been filed before Cestat only on 23-5-2003, it is Section 128 post amendment that would apply and therefore the maximum period available to the appellant would be 60 plus 30 days. Even if time taken in the abortive proceedings is to be excluded, the appeal filed will be out of time being beyond the aforesaid period.
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