My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M/S Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 56; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 729
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Justice Pankaj Mithal
- Decided
- 10 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 336/2025
- Sections
- 34, 4, 34(3), 10, 37, 43(1), 29(2), 3, 12, 14, 5, 17
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 729 : 2025 INSC 56 My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
v.
M/s Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
(Civil Appeal No. 336 of 2025)
10 January 2025 [Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Pankaj Mithal*, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition filed by the appellants u/s.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as barred by time; whether the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply to s.34 of the 1996 Act and to what extent; does s.4 of the 1963 Act apply to the 3-month limitation period or also to the 30-day condonable period in s.34(3); and will s.10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 apply to s.34(3) and in what manner. Headnotes† Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34 – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.4 – Limitation period – Application, if barred by limitation – Benefit of the additional 30 days under proviso to s.34(3), which expired during vacation, if can be given when the petition is filed immediately after reopening in exercise of power u/s.4 of the Act, 1963 – Appellants received the arbitral award on 14.02.2022 – 3-months limitation period for filing the application u/s.34(3), after considering the extension of limitation by operation of this Court’s COVID-19 pandemic order, expired on 29.05.2022, on which date the court was functioning – Further 30-day condonable period expired on 28.06.2022, which fell during the High Court’s summer vacation between 04.06.2022 and 03.07.2022 – Appellants filed application u/s.34 on the first date of court’s reopening on 04.07.2022, alongwith with the condonation application – Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the application u/s.34 and the Division Bench dismissed the application u/s.37 as barred by limitation:
* Author 730 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) Application u/s.34 is barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the condonable period of 30 days, which conclusively and absolutely expired on 28.06.2022 – There is no wholesale exclusion of ss.4 to 24 of the 1963 Act when calculating the limitation period u/s.34(3) – s.4 applies to s.34(3) of the 1996 Act only to the extent when the 3-month period expires on a court holiday – It does not aid the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday – Furthermore, in view of the applicability of s.4 of the 1963 Act to s.34 proceedings, s.10 of the GCA does not apply and will not benefit the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday – Thus, the judgment and order passed by the High Court upheld – General Clauses Act. [Paras 1.1, 37, 38] Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) Period of limitation prescribed for instituting a suit or filing an appeal or making an application has to be distinguished from a condonable period which cannot be made part of the period of limitation prescribed – As the period of limitation prescribed for filing a petition u/s.34 expired on a working day and not on a day on which the court was closed, the appellants not entitled to file it on the re-opening of the court after the summer vacation and as such the petition so filed was patently barred by limitation – As the period of limitation prescribed for filing a petition u/s.34 expired on 29.05.2022 whereas the petition was preferred on 04.07.2022 much beyond the period of limitation prescribed and the condonable period of 30 days stipulated under the proviso to s.34(3), the petition u/s.34 was beyond time and the delay could not have been condoned – No error or illegality on part of the High Court in dismissing the petition. [Paras 15-17] Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.3, 4-24, 29(2) – Schedule to the Limitation Act – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.43(1) – Limitations – Applicability of the Limitation Act to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act:
Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) s.29(2) of the 1963 Act stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation that is different from the Schedule, s.3 of the 1963 Act shall apply as if such period is the one prescribed in the Schedule – ss.4 to 24 shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law – Thus, s.29(2) imports the provisions of the Limitation Act to special and local laws that prescribe a different period of limitation, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 731My Preferred T ransformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M /s F aridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
unless there is an express exclusion contained in such law – s.43(1) of the 1996 Act fortifies the applicability of the Limitation Act not only to court proceedings under the 1996 Act but also to arbitrations – By virtue of s.29(2), the Limitation Act applies to court proceedings under the ACA – Since the Limitation Act is only applicable to court proceedings, s.43(1) is necessary to make it applicable to arbitrations in the same manner as it applies to court proceedings. [Paras 8, 10, 11] Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) Limitation Act is applicable to the arbitration proceedings as also to court proceedings under the ACA – Limitation Act is based on public policy to bring to an end the life of a dispute for which appropriate remedy has not been availed within a time bound period. [Paras 8, 9] Limitation Act, 1963 – ss.3, 4-24, 29(2) – Schedule to the Limitation Act – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) – Limitations – Applicability of the Limitation Act to s.34(3):
Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) As per s.29(2) of the Limitation Act, the effect of there being a different limitation period u/s.34(3) is that s.3 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings u/s.34 of the ACA as if the 3-month limitation period is the period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act – Further, ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to determine whether the application is within the period of limitation, “insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded” – Express reference to an exclusion is not essential and the court can examine the language of the special law and its scheme to arrive at a conclusion that certain provisions of the Limitation Act are impliedly excluded – Furthermore, s.12 of the Limitation Act applies for the purpose of calculating limitation u/s.34(3), and the same is not excluded by the provisions of the ACA – s.14 of the Limitation Act also applies to s.34(3), however, ss.5 and 17 of the Limitation Act are inapplicable – There is no wholesale exclusion of the provisions of the Limitation Act in calculating the period of limitation u/s.34(3). [Paras 12-23] Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) By virtue of s.29(2) of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application as contained in the Schedule of the Limitation Act stands substituted by the period prescribed in s.34(3) for the purposes of filing a petition u/s.34. [Para 11] 732 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.4 – Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed – Applicability of s.4:
Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) s.4 applies to s.34(3) of the 1996 Act – s.4 benefits a party only when the “prescribed period’’-3-month limitation period u/s.34(3) expires on a court holiday – In such a situation, the application u/s.34 will be considered as having been filed within the limitation period if it is filed on the next working day of the court – s.4 does not come to the aid of the party when the 3-month limitation period expires on a day when the court was working – 30-day condonable period expiring during the court holidays will not survive and neither s.4, nor any other provision of the Limitation Act, will inure to the benefit of the party to enable filing of the s.34 application immediately after reopening – Since s.4 applies to proceedings u/s.34, the applicability of s.10 of the GCA stands excluded in view of the express wording of its proviso that excludes the applicability of the provision when the Limitation Act applies. [Paras 35.1-35.4] Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) Appellants not entitled to the benefit of s.4 to permit them to prefer the petition on the re-opening of the court as the period of limitation prescribed had not expired on the day when the court was closed. [Paras 11] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.34(3) – Limitation Act, 1963 – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.10 – Applicability of: Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) Statutory language of the proviso to s.10 of the 1897 Act states that it does not apply to “any act or proceeding” to which the Limitation Act applies – It cannot be said that s.10 must apply to the 30-day period stipulated in the proviso to s.34(3) – Considering that s.4 of the Limitation Act applies to s.34 proceeding, the applicability of s.10 of the 1897 Act stands excluded in view of the express wording of its proviso that excludes the applicability of the provision when the Limitation Act applies. [Para 33] Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) (Supplementing) s.10 permits the filing of a petition on the re-opening of the court where the last day of prescribed period for filing it falls or expires on the day on which the court is closed – Proviso to s.10 in no uncertain terms states that the provisions of s.10 shall not apply to any Act or proceedings to which the Limitation Act applies – In proceedings of arbitration as also to court proceedings under the A & C Act, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 733My Preferred T ransformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M /s F aridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
the Limitation Act squarely applies – Thus, by proviso to s.10 of the 1897 Act, s.10 stands excluded and would not be attracted to accord any benefit to appellants. [Para 14] Judicial concern – Limitation statutes – Difficulties with current legal position – Stringent construction and curtailment of remedy available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity of an arbitral award – Need for addressal by the Parliament: Held: (per Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.) Construction of limitation statutes is quite stringent and unduly curtails remedy available to arbitrating parties to challenge the validity of an arbitral award – Purpose of reading the Limitation Act alongside the 1996 Act is not to restrict the special remedy under the ACA, but to enable exercise of such remedy in circumstances as contemplated under the Limitation Act – Substantive remedies available u/ss.34 and 37 by their very nature, limited in their scope due to statutory prescription – If this limited remedy is denied on stringent principles of limitation, it would cause great prejudice and has the effect of denying the remedy, and in the long run, it will have the effect of dissuading contracting parties from seeking resolution of disputes through arbitration, which is against public policy – It would be wrong to confine the period of limitation to just 3 months by interpreting it as the “prescribed period” and excluding the balance 30 days under the proviso to s.34(3) as not being the prescribed period through a process of interpretation – Applicability of provisions from ss.4 to 24 of the Limitation Act and the manner in which they apply are at the doorstep of the court, rather than being determined by clear and categorical statutory prescription – It is too late in the day to hold that “express exclusion” will not include implied exclusion – Legislature to take note of this position and bring about clarity and certainty – Overbearing intellectualisation of the Act by courts has become the bane of Indian arbitration – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Limitation Act, 1963. [Paras 36, 36.1-36.6] Legislation – Legislative reforms – Period of limitation – Deviation therein and creation of confusion – Need for uniform period of limitation:
Held: (per Pankaj Mithal, J.) Practically all new enactments are deviating from the prescribed period of limitation as per the Schedule of the Limitation Act and are generally prescribing its own period of limitation as under the ACA itself – Statutes further provide that the delay beyond a certain period cannot be condoned by the court – 734 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports This is in deviation to s.5 of the Limitation Act – Statutes ought not to provide different period of limitation for instituting suit, preferring appeal and making an application, rather all statutes should stick to a uniform period of limitation – Courts to be empowered to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown for not filing it within the time prescribed rather than restricting the condonable period to a fix period of 15 days or 30 days as provided in some of the statutes – Deviation and restriction create confusion – Even lawyers fails to notice that a different period of limitation has been prescribed for preferring an appeal under a particular statute – In genuine cases the litigant may not be able to approach the court in time for cogent reasons beyond his control – Legislature ought not to confine condoning the delay only for a prescribed period and not beyond it – Rather to follow the principle of condoning the delay as enshrined u/s.5 of the Limitation Act – This would not only avoid a good case to be thrown out on the ground of limitation but at the same time would bring about uniformity in law – Law makers to keep this in mind while enacting new Acts and ensure that uniform system is applied in all enactments – Limitation Act, 1963 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. [Paras 18-21] Case Law Cited Sridevi Datla v. Union of India [2021] 13 SCR 282 : (2021) 5 SCC 321 – distinguished.
Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subhash Projects & Marketing Limited [2012] 1 SCR 403 : (2012) 2 SCC 624; Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita v.
Walchandnagar Industries Limited [2023] 4 SCR 361 : (2023) 8 SCC 453; State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd. [2024] 7 SCR 1 : (2024) 7 SCC 257; In Re: Cognizance of Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No 3 of 2020; Union of India v. Popular Construction [2001] Supp. 3 SCR 619 : (2001) 8 SCC 470; Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Polywood Products Pvt Ltd. [2020] 9 SCR 472 : (2021) 2 SCC 317; Kirpal Singh v. Government of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3814 – relied on.
H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh [1957] 1 SCR 208 : 1956 SCC OnLine SC 111; Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil [1995] Supp. 6 SCR 421 : (1996) 1 SCC 169; Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department [2008] 5 SCR 1108 : (2008) 7 SCC 169; Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat [2025] 1 S.C.R. 735My Preferred T ransformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M /s F aridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
Puthanpurayil Aboobacker [1995] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1995) 5 SCC 5; Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Excise & Taxation Officer [2019] 13 SCR 534 : (2020) 17 SCC 692; State of Goa v. Western Builders [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 288 : (2006) 6 SCC 239; State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. [2010] 4 SCR 46 : (2010) 4 SCC 518; Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [1976] 2 SCR 260 : (1976) 1 SCC 392; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra [1974] 3 SCR 31 : (1974) 2 SCC 133; Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Pvt Ltd. [2009] 4 SCR 1197 : (2009) 5 SCC 791; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers [2010] 8 SCR 1025 : (2010) 12 SCC 210; Gulbarga University v. Mallikarjun S. Kodagali [2008] 11 SCR 703 : (2008) 13 SCC 539; Coal India Limited v. Ujjal Transport Agency (2011) 1 SCC 117; Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohanlal and Company [2016] 3 SCR 357 : (2016) 14 SCC 199; P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar [2018] 12 SCR 143 : (2019) 13 SCC 445 – referred to.
List of Acts Limitation Act, 1963; Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; General Clauses Act, 1897.
List of Keywords Barred by time; 3-month limitation period; 30-day condonable period; Extension of limitation; COVID-19 pandemic order; Condonable period; Barred by limitation; Court holiday; 30-day condonable period expires on court holiday; Period of limitation; Limitation; Arbitration proceedings; Court proceedings; Appropriate remedy; Delay beyond 30 days; Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed; Prescribed period; Re-opening of the court; Addressal by Parliament; Express exclusion; Overbearing intellectualisation; Uniform period of limitation; Condonation of delay; Express exclusion of Limitation Act; Prescribed period of limitation; Condonable period of limitation; Stringent interpretation of Limitation Act.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 336 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 03.04.2024 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in FAO (OS) (COMM) No. 67 of 2023 736 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports * Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
Appearances for Parties Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Adv., Harsh Kaushik, Ms. Adrija Mishra, Ms. Kanicka Mittal, Advs. for the Appellants.
Simhran Mehta, Syed Ahmed Naqvi, Yash Gupta, Ms. Aruna Gupta, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.
Table of Contents*
1. Introduction .......................................................................... 2
2. Facts .................................................................................... 4
3. Decision of the High Court under Section 34 and Section 37 of the ACA ...................................................................... 5
4. Submissions ......................................................................... 7
5. Issues ................................................................................. 12
6. Applicability of the Limitation Act to ACA ........................... 13
7. Applicability of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3) ............ 16 i. Section 5 of the Limitation Act ........................................ 18 ii. Section 12 of the Limitation Act ...................................... 20 iii. Section 14 of the Limitation Act ..................................... 20 iv. Section 17 of the Limitation Act ..................................... 22 v. Section 4 of the Limitation Act ........................................ 24
8. Applicability of Section 10 of the GCA ............................... 31
9. Summarising the Current Position of Law ......................... 32
10. Highlighting Certain Concerns with the Current Legal Position ............................................................................... 33
11. Conclusion .......................................................................... 37 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 737My Preferred T ransformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M /s F aridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
1. Introduction: Leave granted. Facts, to the extent that they are relevant for determining the issue of limitation for filing an application challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 1 are as follows. The appellants received the arbitral award on 14.02.2022. The 3-month limitation period for filing the application under Section 34(3) of the ACA expired on 29.05.2022, on which date the court was functioning, but closed after five days for vacation commencing from 04.06.2022 to 03.07.2022. The application under Section 34 was filed immediately on the court’s reopening, i.e. 04.07.2022. The High Court single judge under Section 34 and the High Court division bench under Section 37 dismissed the petition as barred by limitation. Under these circumstances, the issue before us is whether the benefit of the additional 30 days under the proviso to Section 34(3), which expired during the vacation, can be given when the petition is filed immediately after reopening in exercise of power under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 19632 .
1.1 After considering Sections 34(3) and 43(1) of the ACA, Sections 4 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act and Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 18973 , as well as precedents of this Court, we have answered the question in the negative and have dismissed the present appeal. While we have expressed certain concerns regarding the curtailment of a precious remedy to challenge an arbitral award due to a stringent construction of Section 4 of the Limitation Act vis-à-vis Section 34(3), we have held that in light of the current position of law, the Section 34 application preferred by the appellant is barred by limitation based on the following conclusions:
(i) There is no wholesale exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act when calculating the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the ACA.
(ii) Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3) of the ACA only to the extent when the 3-month period expires on a court holiday. It does not aid the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.
1 Hereinafter “ACA”.
2 Hereinafter “Limitation Act”.
3 Hereinafter “GCA”.
738 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
(iii) In view of the applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act to Section 34 proceedings, Section 10 of the GCA does not apply and will not benefit the applicant when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.
2. Facts: The detailed facts leading up to the present appeal are as follows. The appellants entered into lease agreements with the respondent, who is the owner of the property. Pursuant to certain disputes, the respondent invoked arbitration and an arbitral award dated 04.02.2022 was made in its favour. The appellants received a scanned copy of the award by email on 04.02.2022 itself, and later received a signed hard copy of the award on 14.02.2022, from which day limitation must be calculated. The 3-month limitation period under Section 34(3), after considering the extension of limitation by operation of this Court’s order dated 10.01.2022 on account of the COVID-19 pandemic,4 expired on 29.05.2022. The further 30-day condonable period expired on 28.06.2022. This fell during the High Court’s summer vacation between 04.06.2022 and 03.07.2022. The appellants filed the Section 34 petition along with an application for condonation of delay on the date when the court reopened, i.e., 04.07.2022. It would also be relevant to note the notification dated 20.05.2022 of the Registrar General of the Delhi High Court as per which 04.07.2022 would be considered the date of reopening for calculating limitation. In the meanwhile, the respondent filed for execution of the award.
3. Decision of the High Court under Section 34 and Section 37 of the ACA: The Section 34 application was dismissed by the single judge by order dated 07.02.2023 as being barred by limitation. The appellants preferred an appeal under Section 37, which was dismissed by the division bench by order dated 03.04.2024 that is impugned before us. The reasoning of the High Court proceeds as follows: 3.1 The limitation period commenced from 14.02.2022, when the appellants received a signed copy of the award. Under Section 34(3), an application to set aside the award must be made within a period of 3 months from the receipt of the award, which comes up to 14.05.2022. However, the High Court referred to 4 In Re: Cognizance of Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No 3 of 2020. [2025] 1 S.C.R. 739My Preferred T ransformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M /s F aridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
this Court’s order dated 10.01.2022 5 , which extended the period of limitation in cases where the limitation expired between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022. The extended period of limitation was 90 days from 01.03.2022, which expired on 29.05.2022. The condonable period of 30 days expired on 28.06.2022, which fell during the summer vacation. The application was filed on the first date of reopening of the court, i.e., on 04.07.2022. 3.2 The High Court referred to this Court’s decision in Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subhash Projects & Marketing Limited6 , where it was held that Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies only to cases where the “prescribed period” of limitation expires on a date when the court is closed. However, it does not apply when the 30-day condonable period expires on a court holiday.
3.3 It further held that the notification dated 20.05.2022, which permitted filing between 27.06.2022 to 02.07.2022 would not impact the applicability of Section 10 of the GCA, as 04.07.2022 would be considered as the date of court reopening for the purpose of limitation.
3.4 Finally, the High Court referred to this Court’s decision in Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita v.
Walchandnagar Industries Limited7 , which held that Section 10 of the GCA is inapplicable to the condonable period stipulated in the proviso to Section 34(3) of the ACA. While noting the submission of the learned counsel on an inconsistency in Bhimashankar (supra) regarding the applicability of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3), it held that nevertheless, the decision is binding and unambiguous. Therefore, the High Court held that it does not have the power to condone the delay in the present case and dismissed the Section 37 appeal.
4. This Court, by its order dated 10.05.2024 issued notice on the condition that the appellants must deposit Rs. 2 crores with the Executing Court and also stayed the execution proceedings. The deposit condition has been complied with by the appellants. 5 ibid.
6 (2012) 2 SCC 624
7 (2023) 8 SCC 453
740 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
5. Submissions: We have heard Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned senior counsel for the appellants, and Mr. Simran Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent. Mr. Kaul’s submissions proceed as follows: 5.1 First, referring to Union of India v. Popular Construction8 and its reliance in Assam Urban (supra), he submitted that the Limitation Act, including Section 4, does not apply to Section 34(3). Hence, he submitted that there was no occasion for the Court in Assam Urban (supra) to interpret Section 4 of the Limitation Act and delve into the difference between the ‘‘prescribed period’’ and the condonable period under Section 34(3).
5.2 Second, since the Limitation Act is excluded, Section 10 of the GCA applies to Section 34(3), including when the condonable period expires on a holiday. He relied on Sridevi Datla v. Union of India9 , where the benefit of Section 10 of the GCA was extended to the party when the condonable period under Section 16 of the NGT Act expired on a holiday and the appeal was filed on the next working day. Additionally, he submitted that the term ‘‘certain day’’ in Section 10 of the GCA gives it wider import than Section 4 of the Limitation Act, and extends its applicability to when the condonable period expires on a court holiday.
5.3 Third, Mr. Kaul expressed doubt regarding the correctness of Bhimashankar (supra), where Section 10 of the GCA was held to be inapplicable to Section 34(3) as the Limitation Act applies. He sought to highlight certain contradictions in the judgment by referring to paras 54, 55 and 57. He submitted that while paras 54 and 55 hold the Limitation Act to be inapplicable to Section 34(3), the Court rejected the benefit of Section 10 of the GCA in para 57 on the basis that the Limitation Act applies. In this manner, the Court distinguished Sridevi Datla (supra) and did not sufficiently deal with the reasoning there. Instead, the Court relied on Assam Urban (supra), which did not consider Section 10 of the GCA, and Sagufa Ahmed10 , which did not interpret Section 10 of the GCA sufficiently. He also submitted
8 (2001) 8 SCC 470
9 (2021) 5 SCC 321
10 Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Polywood Products Pvt Ltd, (2021) 2 SCC 317. [2025] 1 S.C.R. 741My Preferred T ransformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M /s F aridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
that the observations of the Court in Bhimashankar (supra) doubting Sridevi Datla (supra) on the ground that it did not deal with Assam Urban (supra) are untenable as Section 10 of the GCA was not under consideration in Assam Urban (supra).
5.4 The written submissions filed by the appellants adopt a slightly different line of argumentation. It is submitted that Section 4 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the proviso of Section 34(3), since that is not the ‘‘prescribed period’’. Hence, relying on Sridevi Datla (supra) and considering that Section 10 of the GCA is a beneficial legislation, 11 it is submitted that Section 10 of the GCA must apply to the proviso. Its inapplicability would be oppressive and would render the 30-day condonable period under Section 34(3) otiose when it expires on a court holiday, leaving the party remediless.
6. Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the respondent, first referred to this Court’s recent decision in State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd12 to submit that in identical facts, this Court followed Assam Urban (supra) and held that Section 4 of the Limitation Act only applies to the 3-month limitation period and not to the 30-day condonable period under Section 34(3). These judgments, along with Bhimashankar (supra), determine the issue.
6.1 Second, Mr. Mehta submitted that the entirety of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are not excluded from applying to Section 34 proceedings. He took us through certain portions of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department13 , which is a 3-judge bench decision, to submit that Popular Construction (supra) only deals with the exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In this case, Section 14 of the Limitation Act was held to be applicable. Similarly, he submitted that other decisions also apply Section 12 of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3). In the same vein, Section 4 of the Limitation Act also applies.
11 Relied on H.H. Raja Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 111; Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil, (1996) 1 SCC 169; and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169.
12 (2024) 7 SCC 257
13 (2008) 7 SCC 169
742 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 6.2 Third, regarding the manner in which Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3), he submitted that Sagufa Ahmed (supra) clearly distinguishes the prescribed period and condonable period. The wording of Section 4 only makes it applicable to the 3-month period and not the 30-day condonable period, which cannot be extended any further. He also submitted that Sridevi Datla (supra) did not notice the distinction drawn in Sagufa Ahmed (supra) when applying Section 10 of the GCA.
6.3 Fourth, he submitted that Section 10 of the GCA does not apply to Section 34(3) as the Limitation Act applies. He also responded to Mr. Kaul’s reliance on the words ‘‘certain day’’ in Section 10 of the GCA by submitting that they apply when a statute fixes a particular day or date for performing some act, which is not the case here. Therefore, the Section 34 application, which was filed on the 126 th day, was barred by limitation and the High Court could not have condoned the delay through reference to Section 10 of the GCA.
6.4 In the written submissions, the respondent has further submitted that once Section 4 of the Limitation Act applies to Section 34(3), the provision cannot be further split into individual sections, sub-sections, and provisos to make Section 10 of the GCA applicable. Moreover, Section 10 of the GCA cannot be applied to the condonable period as that would amount to reading the expression ‘‘prescribed period’’ in Section 10 as including the condonable 30-day period, which is contrary to various judgments of this Court. Lastly, that Sridevi Datla (supra) was decided in the context of Section 16 of the NGT Act, while Assam Urban (supra), Bhimashankar (supra), and Rajpath Contractors (supra) are specifically in the context of Section 34(3).
7. Issues: Before proceeding with our analysis, it is necessary to frame issues to systematically address the submissions of the learned counsels and the questions of law arising in this case regarding the applicability of Section 4 of the Limitation Act and Section 10 of the GCA to the condonable period under Section 34(3):
i. Do the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to Section 34 proceedings, and to what extent?
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 743My Preferred T ransformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M /s F aridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
ii. Does Section 4 of the Limitation Act apply to Section 34(3) as per an analysis of the statutory scheme as well as precedents of this Court on the issue? If Section 4 applies, does it apply only to the 3-month limitation period or also the 30-day condonable period? iii. In light of the answer in (ii), will Section 10 of the GCA apply to Section 34(3), and if so, in what manner?
The answers to these issues will determine whether the Section 34 application in the present case was filed within the condonable period of 30 days.
8. Applicability of the Limitation Act to ACA: Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes a period of limitation that is different from the Schedule, Section 3 of the Limitation Act14 shall apply as if such period is the one prescribed in the Schedule. Further, Section 4 to 24 shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Therefore, Section 29(2) imports the provisions of the Limitation Act to special and local laws that prescribe a different period of limitation, unless there is an express exclusion contained in such law. Section 29(2) reads:
“29. Savings.—
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from 14 Section 3 of the Limitation Act reads:
“3. Bar of limitation.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.
(2) For the purposes of this Act,—
(a) a suit is instituted,—
(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer;
(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue as a pauper is made; and
(iii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;
(b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted—
(i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded;
(ii) in the case of a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court;
(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is presented to the proper officer of that court.”
744 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
9. The effect of Section 29(2) has been summarised by this Court in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil15 as follows:
“8. …A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision.
(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application.
(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follow. These consequences are as under:
(i) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the Schedule.
(ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.” 15 Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, (1995) 5 SCC 5, as affirmed in Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Excise & Taxation Officer, (2020) 17 SCC 692, paras 13 and 14. [2025] 1 S.C.R. 745My Preferred T ransformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. M /s F aridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd.
10. Section 43(1) of the ACA fortifies the applicability of the Limitation Act not only to court proceedings under the ACA but also to arbitrations. It reads:
“43. Limitations.—(1) The Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in Court.”
11. This Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises (supra) considered the necessity of a provision in the nature of Section 43(1), when Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act already makes Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act applicable to special statutes, including the ACA. It held that the ACA does not prescribe the period of limitation for various proceedings under the Act, and deviates from the Limitation Act in specific instances like Section 34(3) and Sections 43(2) to (4).16 By virtue of Section 29(2), the Limitation Act applies to court proceedings under the ACA. The purpose of Section 43(1) of the ACA is to extend the applicability of the Limitation Act to arbitrations also, as these are private tribunals and not courts. Since the Limitation Act is only applicable to court proceedings, Section 43(1) is necessary to make it applicable to arbitrations in the same manner as it applies to court proceedings. 17
12. Applicability of the Limitation Act to Section 34(3): Once it is clear that the Limitation Act generally applies to arbitrations and court proceedings under the ACA, it is necessary to consider its applicability to Section 34 proceedings. Section 34(3) provides the limitation period and condonable period to file a Section 34 application, and it reads:
“34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.—
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
16 Consolidated Engineering (supra), para 42.
17 ibid, para 45.
746 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.”
13. From reading the provision, it is clear that an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 must be within 3 months from the receipt of the award or the date of disposal of a request under Section 33. This is the period of limitation.18 Further, the court may exercise discretion to entertain the application, within a further period of 30 days, if sufficient cause is shown, but not thereafter.19
14. As per Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the effect of there being a different limitation period under Section 34(3) is that: Section 3 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings under Section 34 of the ACA as if the 3-month limitation period is the period prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Further, Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to determine whether the application is within the period of limitation, “insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded.”
15. There are two aspects necessary for our consideration at this point: first, the interpretation of “express exclusion”; and second, the extent of such exclusion.
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