Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 3; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 190
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai, Justice K.V. Viswanathan
- Decided
- 1 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 17/2025
- Sections
- 28, 30, 28(1), 11, 4, 6, 4(1), 3, 17(4), 5A
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 190 : 2025 INSC 3 Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v.
Government of Karnataka and Others (Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2025)
02 January 2025 [B.R. Gavai* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The Lands of appellants herein were acquired and they were deprived of their property without paying any compensation for twenty-two years. For payment of compensation, the appellants pleaded to shift the date for considering the market value of land as on the date of the award and not as on the date of the Preliminary Notification. Whether this Court should direct shifting of the date for determination of the market value of the land in question of the appellants.
Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art.300-A – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 – From 1995 to 1997, appellants herein purchased various residential sites – On 29.01.2003, a preliminary notification was issued by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) for acquiring the said lands – The possession of the appellants’ land was taken over by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB), however, no award was passed immediately for such acquisitions – On 22.04.2019, Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) passed an award for payment of compensation in respect of lands belonging to the erstwhile land-owners – The Single Judge of the High Court quashed the award dated 22.04.2019 passed by SLAO – Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ Appeal filed by the appellants herein – Appellants’ plea to shift the date for considering the market value of land as on the date of the award and not as on the date of the Preliminary Notification:
Held: The appellants had purchased the plots in question for construction of residential houses – Not only have they not been able to construct, but they have also not been even paid any * Author [2025] 1 S.C.R. 191Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others compensation for the same – The appellants have been deprived of their property without paying any compensation for the same in the said period of last twenty-two years – Though Right to Property is no more a fundamental right, in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, it is a constitutional right – A person cannot be deprived of his property without him being paid adequate compensation in accordance with law for the same – In the instant case, it can clearly be seen that there is no delay which can be attributed to the appellants in not getting compensation, but it was on account of the lethargic attitude of the officers of the State/KIADB that the appellants were deprived of compensation – Only after the notices were issued in the contempt proceedings, the compensation was determined by the SLAO on 22.04.2019 taking guideline values prevailing in the year 2011 for determining the market value of the acquired land – The Single Judge of the High Court also does not say that the determination of compensation to be awarded by shifting of the date by the SLAO to that of 2011 was unjust but only sets aside the award on the ground that SLAO had no jurisdiction to do so – If on account of the inordinate delay in paying the compensation and thereby depriving the constitutional right to the appellants under Article 300-A, the land acquisition proceedings are quashed, the only recourse available to the State/KIADB in order to save the project will be to now issue a fresh acquisition notification by invoking the provisions as applicable under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 which would entail huge expenditure to the public exchequer – Therefore, in exercise of power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court finds it appropriate in the interest of justice that the SLAO be directed to determine the compensation to be awarded to the appellants herein on the basis of the market value prevailing as on 22.04.2019 – The appellants shall also be entitled to all the statutory benefits as are available to them under the 1894 LA Act. [Paras 49, 50, 54, 55, 57] Land Acquisition – Compensation – Value of money – Disbursal of compensation with promptitude:
Held: It cannot be controverted that money is what money buys – The value of money is based on the idea that money can be invested to earn a return, and that the purchasing power of money 192 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports decreases over time due to inflation – What the appellants herein could have bought with the compensation in 2003 cannot do in 2025 – It is, therefore, of utmost importance that the determination of the award and disbursal of compensation in case of acquisition of land should be made with promptitude. [Para 48] Case Law Cited Ram Chand and Others v. Union of India and Others, 1993 INSC 315 : [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 558 : (1994) 1 SCC 44; Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, 2020 INSC 23 : [2020] 1 SCR 749 : (2020) 2 SCC 569; Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram and Others, 2024 INSC 709 : [2024] 9 SCR 443 : 2024 SCC OnLine 2598 – relied on.
Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others Through Power-of-Attorney Holder v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, 2012 INSC 503 : [2012] 13 SCR 29 : (2013) 1 SCC 353; Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Maharashtra and Others, 2003 INSC 137 : [2003] 2 SCR 530 : (2003) 4 SCC 200; Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory and Others, 2005 INSC 585 : [2005] Supp. 5 SCR 421 : (2005) 13 SCC 477; Haji Saeed Khan and Others v. State of U.P. and Others (2001) 9 SCC 513; K. Krishna Reddy and Others v. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, 1988 INSC 265 : [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 853 : (1988) 4 SCC 163 – referred to.
List of Acts Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Land Acquisition Act 1894; National Highways Act, 1956; Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords Article 300-A of Constitution; Right to property; Constitutional right; Acquisition of land; Preliminary notification; Payment of compensation; Adequate compensation; Deprivation of compensation; Disbursal of compensation; Market value of land; Shifting the date for considering the market value of land; Inordinate delay in paying the compensation; Welfare State.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 193Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 17 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.2022 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 678 of 2022 Appearances for Parties R. Chandrachud, Dhuli Ventaka Krishna, Advs. for the Appellant. Avishkar Singhvi, A.A.G., Atmaram N.S. Nadkarni, Sr. Adv., Sharanagouda Patil, Mrs. Supreeta Patil, Jyotish Pandey, S.S. Rebello, Ms. Deepti Arya, Arzu Paul, Vidur Nair (for M/s. S-legal Associates), V.N. Raghupathy, Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, S.J. Amith, Mrs. Vani Vyas, Prakhar Singh, Advs. for the Respondents. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment B.R. Gavai, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal takes exception to the final judgment and order dated 22nd November 2022 in Writ Appeal No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB) passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, whereby the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeal filed by the appellants herein against the judgment and order dated 18 th April 2022 in Writ Petition No. 1627 of 2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissing their writ petition.
FACTS:
3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:
3.1. From 1995 to 1997, the appellants herein purchased various residential sites at Gottigere Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk, Karnataka vide registered sale deeds and became absolute owners of their respective sites.
3.2. On 3 rd April 1997, a Framework Agreement (hereinafter, “FWA”) was executed between Government of Karnataka (Respondent No. 1) and Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise Ltd. (hereinafter, “NICE”) (Respondent No. 6) envisaging the 194 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Infrastructure Corridor Project connecting Bengaluru-Mysuru (hereinafter, “Bengaluru-Mysuru Infrastructure Corridor Project” or “BMICP”). As per the FWA, the State Government undertook to acquire about 13,237 acres of land from private persons and about 6,956 acres of Government land. In all 20,193 acres of land was agreed to be conveyed and transferred in favour of Respondent No. 6 (NICE) for implementation of the BMICP.
3.3. On 14 th October 1998, Respondent No. 6 applied to Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (hereinafter, “KIADB”) (Respondent No. 2) to make available the lands for the project.
3.4. On 29 th January 2003, a preliminary notification was issued by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) under sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter, “KIAD Act”) for acquiring lands for the BMICP. Notices were issued under sub-section (2) of Section 28 of KIAD Act seeking objections from the land-owners. The appellants also submitted their objections.
3.5. On 5 th July 2003, upon consideration of the objections to the Preliminary Notification, the Final Notification was issued by Special Deputy Commissioner KIADB (Respondent No. 3).
3.6. On 22 nd November 2005, the possession of the appellants’ land was taken over by Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) and subsequently handed over to Respondent No. 6 (NICE) and its sister concern Nandi Economic Corridor Enterprises Ltd. (NECE) (Respondent No. 7). However, no Award was passed immediately for such acquisitions.
3.7. In 2009-10, the land-owners filed Writ Petitions before the High Court of Karnataka with a prayer to quash the acquisition notifications insofar as it relates to their lands. In the alternative, the land-owners sought a direction to the concerned authorities to allot residential sites of equal dimension.
3.8. Vide judgment and order dated 15 th June 2011, a Division Bench of the High Court held that the acquisition notifications cannot be quashed at such a belated stage and that there cannot be any direction for allotment of alternative sites to the land-owners. In the result, the batch of Writ Petitions filed by the land-owners were dismissed, however, liberty [2025] 1 S.C.R. 195Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others was reserved to approach the concerned authorities if any rehabilitation programme is specifically worked out or if any welfare programme is generally available.
3.9. On 12 th February 2016, in terms of the judgment and order of the High Court dated 15th June 2011, some of the land-owners submitted a representation inter-alia to the Government of Karnataka, KIADB and NICE to frame a rehabilitation scheme as mandatorily required under the FWA and to allot alternative sites along with benefits under the scheme at the earliest.
3.10. On non-consideration of their representation, the landowners filed Writ Petitions before the High Court being W.P. Nos. 49812-49863 of 2016 (LA-KIADB), with a prayer to direct the State of Karnataka and KIADB to implement the request made in the representation dated 12 th February 2016 at the earliest
3.11. Vide order dated 24 th March 2017, a learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed of the Writ Petitions filed by the land-owners by directing the State of Karnataka and KIADB to consider their representation and pass appropriate orders, in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.
3.12. Alleging non-compliance of the order of the learned Single Judge dated 24th March 2017, Contempt Petitions being C.C.C. No. 2434 of 2018 and C.C.C. No. 18-65 of 2019 came to be filed by the land-owners.
3.13. During the pendency of the Contempt Petitions, the Special Land Acquisition Officer-1, KIADB (BMICP), Bengaluru (hereinafter, “SLAO”) (Respondent No. 4), on 22nd April 2019, passed an Award for payment of compensation in respect of lands belonging to the erstwhile land-owners. In terms of the legal opinion given by the Advocate General, Respondent No. 4 decided to postpone the date of Preliminary Notification from 29 th January 2003 to the year 2011 and decided to consider the guideline rates prevailing in the said year and formulate an award. An amount of Rs. 32,69,45,789/- was, accordingly, awarded for 11 Acre 1.25 Guntas of land.
3.14. In view of the Award dated 22 nd April 2019, a compliance report along with an endorsement came to be filed by the KIADB in the contempt proceedings initiated by the land-owners before 196 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the High Court. Therefore, a Division Bench of the High Court, vide order dated 27 th November 2019, dismissed as withdrawn the Contempt Petitions with liberty to challenge the endorsement in accordance with law.
3.15. On 19 th June 2019, Respondents No. 6 and 7 (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Project Proponents”) filed Writ Petitions being W.P. No. 26085 of 2019 and W.P. No. 31407 of 2019 before the Karnataka High Court challenging several Awards passed by the SLAO, including the Award dated 22nd April 2019. The Project Proponents were aggrieved by the Award dated 22 nd April 2019 inasmuch as, on account of delay not attributable to them, they are being called upon to pay higher compensation. It was their contention that the compensation should be determined on the basis of the market value of land as on the date of the Preliminary Notification and that the date could not have been shifted.
3.16. On 5 th January 2021, the erstwhile land-owners filed impleadment application in the Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents. The appellants herein, thereafter, filed a substantive Writ Petition being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 on 1 st June 2021. The appellants were aggrieved by the Award dated 22 nd April 2019 inasmuch as, even though their lands were acquired in the year 2003, no compensation for such acquisition has been disbursed to the appellants despite a lapse of 18 years. It was their contention that the compensation should be determined as per the current market value of the lands.
3.17. Vide common judgment and order dated 18 th April 2022, a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court at Bengaluru allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents. The High Court quashed the Award dated 22 nd April 2019 passed by Respondent No. 4 (SLAO). In view of the decision in the Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents, the Writ Petition filed by the appellants herein was disposed of as the same did not survive for consideration inasmuch as the Award dated 22nd April 2019 was quashed. Ultimately, the High Court directed the concerned authorities to pass fresh awards in accordance with law and after providing sufficient and reasonable opportunity to the parties as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within a period of three months.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 197Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others
3.18. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants herein filed a Writ Appeal being W.A. No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB). Vide impugned judgment and order dated 22 nd November 2022, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Appeal filed by the appellants herein. Hence, the present appeal by way of special leave.
4. We have heard Shri R. Chandrachud, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, Shri Atmaram N. S. Nadkarni, learned Senior Counsel for Respondents No. 6 and 7, Shri Avishkar Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State of Karnataka and Shri Purushottam Sharma Tripathi for Respondents Nos. 2 to 5.
SUBMISSIONS:
5. Shri Chandrachud submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court erroneously dismissed the Writ Appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court as “premature”. It is submitted that the Writ Appeal was not premature as the appellants’ plea to shift the date for considering the market value of land as on the date of the Award and not as on the date of the Preliminary Notification was rejected by the learned Single Judge and thus the issue stood decided against the appellants. It is further submitted that more than 21 years have passed since the Preliminary Notification was passed acquiring the appellants lands and they have not received any compensation yet for the same. Relying on the judgments of this Court in Ram Chand and Others v. Union of India and Others1 and Tukaram Kana Joshiand Others Through Power-of-Attorney Holder v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others,2 it is submitted that in exceptional cases, the authorities must be directed to determine compensation on the basis of market value of the land as on the date of the Award by notionally shifting the date of the Preliminary Notification. It is lastly submitted that the compensation be determined as per the provisions contained in the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter, “2013 LA Act”) inasmuch as in terms of Section 30 of the KIAD Act, the provisions of 1 1993 INSC 315 : [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 558 : (1994) 1 SCC 44 2 2012 INSC 503 : [2012] 13 SCR 29 : (2013) 1 SCC 353 198 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter, “1894 LA Act”) have been made applicable mutatis mutandis for the purposes of determination and award of compensation. Reliance in this regard was placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on the judgment of this Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Maharashtra and Others.3
6. Per contra, Shri Nadkarni for Respondents No. 6 and 7 submitted that between 2009 and 2012, the Project Proponents wrote several letters to Respondent No. 2 (KIADB) requesting for awards to be passed. It is further submitted that as no awards were passed by the SLAOs, the Project Proponents were constrained to file Writ Petition before the High Court seeking direction to pass awards which was allowed in 2013, thereafter, on non-compliance the Project Proponents initiated contempt proceedings in 2015 as no awards were still passed. It was, therefore, submitted that if this Court is inclined to grant any relief in the form of additional compensation or direct shifting of date as sought for, it may be seen that there was no error or delay on part of the Project Proponents, who have deposited compensation with Respondent No.2 (KIADB) as per the agreement and therefore any additional liability should fall on the State Government and/or the KIADB. Relying on the judgment of this Court in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory and Others,4 it is submitted that shifting of date can only take place in very rare circumstances. It is further submitted that there is no question of awarding compensation under the 2013 LA Act and a completely new case has been sought to be made out before this Court, which was not contended before the learned Single Judge or Division Bench of the High Court. It is lastly submitted that the appellants never sought directions to the State Government/SLAO to pass awards and that steps in that regard were taken only in the year 2021 which was pursuant to the various proceedings initiated by the Project Proponents.
7. Shri Singhvi for Respondent No. 1 submitted that the appellants’ claims are premature and speculative, as they have yet to exhaust remedies available under the ongoing award proceedings. It is further 3 2003 INSC 137 : [2003] 2 SCR 530 : (2003) 4 SCC 200 4 2005 INSC 585 : [2005] Supp. 5 SCR 421 : (2005) 13 SCC 477 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 199Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment and order, expressly held that the issue of shifting the date of acquisition notification can only be examined after the award has been passed by the SLAO. It was, therefore, submitted that present appeal is untenable at this stage.
8. Shri Purushottam Sharma Tripathi for Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 submitted that the SLAO passed the Award dated 22 nd April 2019, on the basis of specific opinion tendered by the learned Advocate General with regard to shifting of the date. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge of the High Court, upon consideration of the material placed before it, has quashed the Award and directed the SLAO to pass fresh awards within a stipulated timeframe. It is further submitted that pursuant to the directions by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, the SLAO has now passed fresh awards for the acquired lands and if the appellants are aggrieved by the compensation awarded, they may take such steps as are permissible in law. It is, therefore, submitted that this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS:
9. To consider the case of the appellants, it would be appropriate to refer to the prayer clause of their Writ Petition before the High Court. The appellants herein had filed Writ Petition being W.P. No. 1627 of 2021 (LA-KIADB) with the following prayers:
“WHEREFORE, the Petitioners most respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to:
a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ of the same nature to quash and setting aside the Impugned Award dated 22.04.2019 passed by the Respondent No. 4 bearing No. LAQ, SR/39 (26B, 10, 13, 14)/1998-99, 39 (30, 31, 37, 38, 40)/2002-03 SLAO-1, produced at ANNEXURE – A;
b. Consequent to prayer (a) issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ of the same nature to direct the Respondents to issue notice to Petitioners for determining compensation and pass the Award as 200 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports per market value of land closest to date of passing the Award;
c. Grant such other reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the above circumstances of the case, in the interests of justice and equity.”
10. It is relevant to note that prior to the appellants herein Respondents No. 6 and 7 (Project Proponents) had also filed Writ Petitions before the High Court. From a perusal of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 18 th April 2022, it is clear that the Project Proponents by way of Writ Petitions being W.P. No. 26085 of 2019 and W.P. No. 31407 of 2019 had also challenged the awards. Therefore, in the three writ petitions before the learned Single Judge, a common question with regard to the legality, validity and correctness of the Award dated 22nd April 2019 was raised.
11. Before adverting to the findings of the learned Single Judge on the legality of the Award dated 22 nd April 2019, it would be appropriate to reproduce certain extracts from the Award, as under: “14. Valuation of land:
In the notification dated: 29/01/2003 issued under Section 28(1) of the Survey number lands, based on the above sales figures, the value is Rs. 2,90,532/- per acre and the guidance value is Rs. 6.00 lakhs. Therefore, if the guidance value is Rs. 6.00 lakhs including all other allowances, this rate will be found to be real and fair. Accordingly, it was decided and declared the award on 05/07/2018 and submitted for approval.
Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member wrote a letter vide No. KIADB/CEO&EM/16/2019-20 dated 16/04/2019. Along with the said letter, Government’s letter and Advocate General’s opinion are attached, it is suggested to prepare the revised award as per the opinion given by the Advocate General and submit it for approval. In this regard, this office letter No. KIADB/BMICP/LAQ(1)/ G.I/01/2019-20 dated 22/04/2019 has been written to the Special Deputy Commissioner, KIADB (BMICP) seeking clarification on other issues that there is no scope for revising the current decision. On 22/04/2019 as per the [2025] 1 S.C.R. 201Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others Chief Executive Officer and Executive Member’s letter No. KIADB/BMICP/LAQ/CR/31/2013-14 dated 22/04/2019, it is said that it has been suggested to submit again as per the Advocate General’s opinion and based on the previous judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases regarding framing of compensatory rate/award in land acquisition cases that even for the lands acquired for BMICP scheme, it has been again instructed to prepare a revised decision immediately as per the rules and submit it for the approval of the government. For revising the award and not considering the preliminary notification, the Advocate General in his legal opinion dated 16/04/2019 has given the following legal opinion:
“KIADB and the State do not have any choice but to pass the award which may be passed taking into account and consideration the market value of the property as on date.”
As per the opinion given by the present Advocate General, the award has to be made at current market rate equal to the current market rate. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases has issued preliminary notification, final notification and handed over the assets to the Claims Department, but in the case where no award has been made for ten years, it is appropriate to pay real and fair land compensation to the land owners to avoid injustice, in such cases, the date of preliminary notification should be changed to the date of handing over the assets to the Claims Department, which was prevailing on that date. The order is to create a judgment considering the market rate. The following civil appeal cases of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have been perused to form a award in this regard.
1. CA No. 7015-7018/2005 (Competent Authority V/s Barangore Jute Factory and Others)
2. SLP (Civil) No. 1787473/2004 (State of M.P. V/s Onkar Prasad Patel)
3. CA No. 965/1979 with CA No. 3325/1984, 2185-87/1980, 2381/1980, SLP No. 12352-53/1984, 202 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 10572-74/1984 and others (Gauri Shankar Gaur and others V/s State of U.P. and others)
4. CA No. 2739/2000 with Nos. 2737/2000, 2738/2000, 2736/2000 Contempt Petition (C) No. 62/1999 (Haji Saeed Khan and others V/s State of U.P. and others).
In the above cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ordered to change the preliminary notification to the date of handing over of the asset or to an appropriate date conducive to giving equitable relief in cases where there is severe delay in adjudication.
Based on the above judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the present case, the possession of the land was handed over on 05/04/2004, 22/11/2005 and 25/11/2005, if the award is framed considering the guideline rates of 2011 (sic), it is not possible to give real and fair compensation to the land owner.
Therefore, with a view to providing real and fair land compensation to the landowners, it was decided to postpone the date of preliminary notification to the year 2011 and decided to consider the guideline rates prevailing in the said year and formulate an award as per the legal opinion given by the Advocate General.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. It can thus be seen that the learned Advocate General rendered an opinion on 16th April 2019, wherein it was stated that while passing the awards, the market value as on date has to be taken on account of enormous delay in passing the awards. KIADB forwarded the opinion to the Special Deputy Commissioner (BMICP) and SLAO directing them to pass the awards as per the opinion. On 22nd April 2019, the SLAO wrote letters to the Special Deputy Commissioner (BMICP) raising certain queries with regard to passing of fresh awards and the compensation to be calculated in view of awards already passed by them and sent for approval on 3rd November 2018. In response to the said letters, the CEO of KIADB once again addressed a letter dated 22 nd April 2019, to the Special Deputy Commissioner (BMICP) and the SLAO instructing them to pass the awards as directed in the opinion of the learned Advocate General.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 203Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others
13. It can further be seen that the opinion of the learned Advocate General as well as the judgments of this Court referred to in the Award were the only two factors that were taken into account for the purpose of passing the Award dated 22 nd April 2019, by Respondent No. 4 (SLAO) by shifting/postponing the date of the Preliminary Notification to the year 2011 and by considering the guideline rates prevailing in the said year.
14. Aggrieved by the suo-motu shifting/postponing of the date of the Preliminary Notification, the Project Proponents, who as a result were called upon to pay higher compensation, had filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. The appellants herein filed an impleadment application in the Writ Petition filed by the Project Proponents so also a substantive Writ Petition with prayers referred to hereinbefore. Their grievance was two-fold to quash the Award and to direct passing of an Award as per market value of land closest to date of passing the Award.
15. For the common prayer qua quashing of the Award dated 22nd April 2019, it will be profitable to refer to the following paragraphs of the judgment and order dated 18 th April 2022, passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court:
“17.8 A perusal of the impugned awards will indicate that the opinion of the learned Advocate General as well as the judgments of the Apex Court referred to in the awards were the only two factors that were taken into account for the purpose of passing the awards by the SLAOs. As stated supra, in so far as the opinion of the learned Advocate General is concerned, the same with regard to shifting of the date to reckon the market value of the land from the date of the preliminary notification to a later date is concerned, the said opinion was beyond the scope and ambit of the query put forth to him and consequently, the said opinion could not have been made the basis by the SLAOs to pass the impugned awards.
X—X —X —X —X —X —X 17.10 The second factor/circumstance that has been taken into account by the SLAOs to shift the date to reckon the market value of the lands from the date of the preliminary 204 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports notification to a later/subsequent dates is by placing reliance upon the following decisions of the Apex Court viz., a. Competent Authority Vs. Barangor Jute Factory C/w State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Onkar Prasad Patel – (2005) 13 SCC 47 b. Gaurishankar Gaur Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh – (1994) 1 SCC 92; and c. Haji Saeed Khan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh –
(2001) 9 SCC 513.
17.11 In this context, it is relevant to state that as can be seen from the aforesaid decisions as well as various decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court referred to supra by both sides, that the market value of the acquired lands has to be taken as on the date of the preliminary notification as contemplated under Section 11 of the L.A. Act, 1894; it has been held that under exceptional circumstances, where either the Apex Court or High Courts came to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings themselves were liable to be quashed on account of certain illegalities or infirmities in the acquisition process/procedure, it was permissible only for the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 32/142 or the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to shift the date to a later/ subsequent date; however,this power to shift the date is available only to either the Apex Court or the High Courts and not definitely/certainly to the SLAOs or the State Government; in other words, a perusal of the decisions referred to supra, will indicate that in cases, where the Apex Court as well as this Court deemed it necessary to shift the date in order to do complete and substantial justice, inherent powers of the Courts were invoked and the dates were shifted in order to ensure no hardship, loss or prejudice would be caused to the land losers.
17.12 A perusal of the decisions relied upon by the SLAOs in the impugned awards referred to supra, will [2025] 1 S.C.R. 205Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others clearly indicate that in the said cases, the Apex Court has invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction and powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and in the peculiar/ special facts and circumstances obtaining in the said cases, the Apex Court had shifted the date to reckon the market value. The SLAOs clearly fell in error in placing reliance upon the said decisions of the Apex Court for the purpose of shifting the date from the date of the preliminary notification without appreciating that the said shifting of the date by the SLAOs or the State Government is not legally permissible in law either under the provisions of the L.A. Act, 1894 or the KIAD Act or the Rules or by any judicial precedent.
It is also relevant to state that even as per the aforesaid judgments, shifting of the date from the date of the preliminary notification to any later/subsequent date has been done only up to the date of taking possession from the land losers. In the instant case, the impugned awards disclose that the SLAOs have shifted the date to a date subsequent/later to the date of taking possession. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the impugned awards purporting to shift the date suffers from several legal and factual infirmities and illegalities which vitiate the impugned awards, which deserve to be quashed on this ground also.” (emphasis supplied)
16. It can thus be seen that the learned Single Judge of the High Court, upon appreciation of the material placed on record, was of the view that insofar as the opinion of the learned Advocate General with regard to shifting of the date of the preliminary notification to a later date is concerned, the said opinion was beyond the scope and ambit of the query put forth to him and consequently, the said opinion could not have been made the basis by the SLAO to pass the Award. It is further to be seen that the learned Single Judge of the High Court after considering the provisions of 1894 LA Act, KIAD Act and various decisions of this Court, observed that the market value of the acquired land has to be taken as on the date of the preliminary notification as contemplated under Section 11 of the 1894 LA Act. Further, the learned Single Judge of the High Court observed that only in exceptional circumstances, where either this 206 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Court or the High Court comes to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings themselves were liable to be quashed on account of certain illegalities or infirmities in the acquisition process/procedure, it was permissible only for this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 32/142 or the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to shift the date to a later/subsequent date. It was further observed that this power to shift the date is available only to either this Court or the High Courts and not definitely/certainly to the SLAOs or the State Government.
17. We are in agreement with the findings of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, inasmuch as the SLAO cannot shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification. In case, upon appreciation of the material placed on record if this Court or the High Court, in exceptional circumstances, came to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings themselves were liable to be quashed only then by exercising inherent powers this Court under Article 32/142 or the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India respectively can shift/postpone the date of preliminary notification to a later date. In our considered opinion, therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court rightly came to the conclusion that the Award dated 22 nd April 2019 be quashed and set aside and ordered accordingly.
18. Having decided thus, in the Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents, the learned Single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that the Writ Petition filed by the appellants herein before the High Court does not survive for consideration and the same was, accordingly, disposed of.
19. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants herein filed an intra-court appeal being Writ Appeal No. 678 of 2022 (LA-KIADB) before the Division Bench of the High Court.
20. The Division Bench of the High Court vide impugned judgment and order dated 22nd November 2022 upon consideration of the material placed before it, in paragraph 9, observed thus:
“9. Further, the learned Single Judge held that the SLAO has to determine the compensation as on the date of issuing the preliminary notification as contemplated under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and not to shift the date to a later/subsequent date. The learned Single Judge has [2025] 1 S.C.R. 207Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others set aside the award passed by the SLAO and directed the SLAO to reconsider and pass award. The grievance of the petitioner regarding shifting the date at any later or subsequent date could be considered only if award is passed by the SLAO. The SLAO is yet to pass an award. The grievance raised by the petitioner in this writ appeal is premature. If the petitioner is dissatisfied with the award to be passed by the SLAO, liberty is reserved to the petitioner to raise the grounds urged in this appeal in the appropriate proceedings before the appropriate forum. The question of considering the shifting of date from the date of preliminary notification to any other date would arise only when the award is passed. The cause of action arose for the petitioner to raise the said issue only after the award is passed. The shifting of the date to a later/subsequent date is available only to the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court, but not to the SLAO or State Government…”
(emphasis supplied)
21. It can thus be seen that the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Writ Appeal on the ground that the learned Single Judge has set aside the award passed by the SLAO and directed the SLAO to reconsider and pass award and so the grievance regarding shifting the date at any later or subsequent date could be considered only if an award is passed by the SLAO. The Division Bench of the High Court was, therefore, of the opinion that the grievance sought to be raised in the writ appeal is premature and that the question of considering the shifting of date of preliminary notification to any other date would arise only when the award is passed.
22. In the present appeal, it was sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Writ Appeal was not pre-mature inasmuch as the prayer to shift the date for considering the market value of the land as on the date of the award and not as on the date of the preliminary notification was rejected by the learned Single Judge of the High Court and thus the issue stood decided against the appellants, as a consequence of which the cause of action remained.
23. We are of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is liable to be accepted. We say so because upon 208 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports adjudication of the Writ Petitions filed by the Project Proponents, the learned Single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that the Award dated 22 nd April 2019, is liable to be quashed and set aside and ordered accordingly. However, upon consideration of the extant position of law, the learned Single Judge further directed that the SLAO has to determine the compensation as on the date of issuance of the preliminary notification and not to shift the date to a later/subsequent date. Therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court while exercising inherent powers under Article 226 of the Constitution quashed and set aside the Award dated 22 nd April 2019, but decided against granting relief to the appellants by shifting/ postponing the date of the preliminary notification to a later/ subsequent date. In our opinion, therefore, the cause of action with regard to prayer clause (b) of the Writ Petition filed by the appellants herein still survives for consideration. The Division Bench of the High Court should have, especially taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case, at least considered the case of the appellants herein with regard to said prayer. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order dated 22nd November 2022, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is liable to be quashed and set aside on this short ground alone. We order accordingly.
24. Having set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on the aforesaid ground, we shall now proceed to examine if the relief sought by the appellants herein in prayer clause (b) of the Writ Petition referred to hereinbefore is liable to be granted or not.
25. For the purpose of consideration of the relief sought by the appellants herein, it will be appropriate to refer to a few judgements of this Court on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the parties.
26. In the case of Ram Chand (supra), proceedings were instituted for quashing the land acquisition proceedings, which had been initiated between the years 1959 and 1965 by issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the 1894 LA Act but in which no awards were made upto the years 1979-80, although the declarations under Section 6 of the 1894 LA Act had been made in the years 1966 and 1969. The question sought to be answered by this Court in the aforesaid case was as to if a person is paid compensation in the year 1980/81 at the [2025] 1 S.C.R. 209Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz and Others v. Government of Karnataka and Others market rate prevailing twenty years back, will that be in compliance of the constitutional and statutory mandate. In this regard, this Court observed thus:
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