H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 121; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1755
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 29 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 1180/2025
- Sections
- 146, 52, 96, 17, 5, 11
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1755 : 2025 INSC 121 H. Anjanappa & Ors.
v.
A. Prabhakar & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 1180-1181 of 2025)
29 January 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether a transferee pendente lite has a right to be impleaded in the suit by seeking leave to appeal and in case he is not impleaded, whether he is bound by the decree passed in the said suit. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) - Order XXII, Rule 10, Order XII, Rule 10, Order I, Rule 10, Section 146; Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TP Act”) – Section 52 discussed.
Principles governing grant of leave to appeal in an impleadment application made by a third party/transferee pendente lite summarised:
Held: A transferee pendente lite does not have a right to be impleaded in a pending suit and the trial court can allow his / her impleadment either under Order I Rule 10 CPC or under Order XXII Rule 10, CPC after appreciating the specific facts of the case and the material on record – It is not an absolute rule that a transferee pendente lite, by way of leave, in all cases, be allowed to come on record as a party – Since a transferee pendente lite, is an assignee of interest in the property, as per Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, he can seek leave of the Court to come record on his own or at the instance of either party to the suit – If no such leave is sought, transferee pendente lite would be at its own peril and still be bound by the outcome of the concerned proceedings – A transferee pendente lite is governed by Section 52 of TP Act. [Para 58] Held: High Court erred in condoning the delay of 586 days in filing of first appeal by the Respondent No.1 and 2 as they were not at all vigilant of their rights and the High Court should have declined to interfere on the ground of delay itself [Para 23] * Author 1756 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Held: Though Section 96 and 100 of CPC do no enlist persons who can file an appeal against a decree, a stranger can only file an appeal after he/she is granted leave to appeal by the appellate court on satisfying such court that he is “aggrieved” by the decree sought to be challenged – In this regard, Court relied on various judgments including Sri V.N. Krishna Murthy & Anr. v. Sri Ravikumar & Ors. C.A. No. 2701-2704 of 2020; Adi Pherozshah Gandhi vs. H.M. Seervai, AIR 1971 SC 385; Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha vs. Golcha Properties Private Limited, (1970) 3 SCC 573; State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Amar Singh & Anr., (1974) 2 SCC 70, Baldev Singh vs. Surinder Mohan Sharma & Ors (2003) 1 SCC 34, Srimathi K. Ponnalagu Ammani vs. The State of Madras represented by the Secretary to the Revenue Department, Madras and Ors., AIR 1953 Madras 485, Province of Bombay vs. W.I. Automobile Association, reported in AIR 1949 Bombay 141. [Paras 25-28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 43] Held: Mere rejection of impleadment application filed under Order I Rule 10, CPC itself will not disentitle the transferee pendente lite to obtain leave to appeal and the same needs to be examined based on facts of the case. [Para 42] Concept of “person aggrieved” – Discussed:
Held: “Person aggrieved” would mean a person whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized – Court relied on Shanti Kumar R. Canji vs. Home Insurance Co. of New York, (1974) 2 SCC 387 and State of Rajasthan & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (1977) 3 SCC 592), Indian Bank Limited, Madras vs. Seth Bansiram Jashamal Firm through its Managing Partner, AIR 1934 Mad 360. [Paras 35, 38] Principles governing “grant of leave to appeal” – Summarised: Held: Though Section 96 and 100 of CPC, which govern filing of first appeal do not enlist as to who can be an “appellant”; it is settled law that a complete stranger cannot be granted leave to file a first appeal unless he satisfies the court that he is a “person aggrieved” i.e., he is prejudicially affected and is bound by the decree – The grievance does not mean a psychological or an imaginary injury or a remote or indirect prejudice. [Para 43] Court clarified impact of Section 52, TP Act on the interest of the transferee pendente lite:
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1757H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors. Held: In light of Section 52 of TP Act, a transfer pendente lite is itself not void but subservient to the outcome of the pending litigation – Reliance placed on Nagubai Ammal & Ors. vs. B. Shama Rao & Ors., AIR 1956 SC 593 and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj, (2010) 8 SCC 1 and Thomson Press (India) Ltd. vs. Nanak Builders & Investors P. Ltd., [2013] 2 SCR 74. [Paras 46, 47] Nature of the rights of a transferee pendente lite discussed in light of Section 146, Order XXII Rule 10 and order I Rule
10 CPC:
Held: In light of Section 146, CPC which allows a litigant’s representatives to pursue the case, a transferee pendente lite though not necessarily arrayed as a part to the lis but still a person claiming under the defendant – Court then referred to Order I Rule 10 (Suit in name of wrong persons) and Order XXII Rule 10 (Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit) and held that both these provisions provided similar relief to a transferee pendente lite seeking to be brought on record in a pending suit – Court added that while dealing with any of these provisions, it is not material to adjudicate if the person sought to be impleaded as party in the suit is either necessary or proper party and it is enough he is claiming right under a party to the suit. On facts, Respondent No.1 and 2 bought the disputed property without the permission of the court and during the operation of an injunction order – As regards Respondent No.1 and 2’s claim of being bona-fide purchasers unaware of the fact that suit property was disputed and encumbered, they were permitted to initiate appropriate legal proceedings against Respondent No.7 who was their vendor. [Paras 9, 61] Case Law Cited Sri V.N. Krishna Murthy & Anr. v. Sri Ravikumar & Ors. [2020] 7 SCR 1148 : C.A. No. 2701-2704 of 2020; Adi Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai [1971] 1 SCR 863 : AIR 1971 SC 385; Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties Private Limited [1971] 3 SCR 247 : (1970) 3 SCC 573; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Amar Singh & Anr. [1974] 3 SCR 152 : (1974) 2 SCC 70; Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma & Ors. [2002] Supp. 4 SCR 43 : (2003) 1 SCC 34; Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York [1975] 1 SCR 550 : (1974) 2 SCC 387; State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1978] 1 SCR 1 : (1977) 3 SCC 592; 1758 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Nagubai Ammal & Ors. v. B. Shama Rao & Ors. [1956] 1 SCR 451 : AIR 1956 SC 593; Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj [2010] 7 SCR 424 : (2010) 8 SCC 1; Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. Nanak Builders & Investors P. Ltd. [2013] 2 SCR 74; Smt. Saila Bala Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi and Anr. [1958] 1 SCR 1287; Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal [2004] 1 SCR 838 : (2004) 2 SCC 601; Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University [2001] 3 SCR 1129 : (2001) 6 SCC 534; Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon [2005] 3 SCR 509 : AIR 2005 SC 2209 – relied on.
Srimathi K. Ponnalagu Ammani v. The State of Madras represented by the Secretary to the Revenue Department, Madras and Ors., AIR 1953 Madras 485; Province of Bombay v. W.I. Automobile Association, AIR 1949 Bombay 141; Indian Bank Limited, Madras v. Seth Bansiram Jashamal Firm through its Managing Partner, AIR 1934 Mad 360 – relied on.
In re Ex Tsar of Bulgaria (1921) 1 Ch D 107; In re Markham Markham v. Markham (1881) 16 Ch D 1; In re Padstow Total Loss and Collision Assurance Association (1882) 20 Ch.D 137; Attorney General v. Marquis of Ailesbury (1885) 16 QBD 408 – relied on. List of Acts Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Transfer of Property Act, 1882. List of Keywords Transferee pendente lite; Lis pendens purchaser; Third party; Bona-fide purchaser; Necessary and proper party; Impleadment; Leave to appeal; Specific performance of contract; Subsequent purchaser; Agreement to sell; Sale consideration; Power of attorney; Section 52 Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XXII Rule 10; Order I Rule 10; Section 146; Aggrieved person; Person aggrieved.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 1180-1181 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 16.11.2022 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in IA Nos. 1 and 3 of 2018 With Civil Appeal No(s). 1182-1183 of 2025 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1759H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors. Appearances for Parties Anand Sanjay M Nuli, Sr. Adv., M/s. Nuli & Nuli, Ms. Akhila Wali, Harpawan Kumar Arora, Ms. Prashi Tyagi, Advs. for the Appellants.
Gautam Narayan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Asmita Singh, Abheet Mangleek, Tushar Nair, Anirudh Anand, Punishk Handa, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Since the issues raised in the above captioned appeals are the same, the parties are also same and the challenge is also to the self-same judgment and order passed by the High Court, those were taken up for hearing analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.
3. The appeals arise from the order passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru dated 16.11.2022 in I.A. Nos. 1 & 3 of 2018 respectively in Regular First Appeal No. 1303 of 2018 by which the High Court allowed the said I.A. Nos. 1 & 3 of 2018 respectively filed by the respondents herein and thereby condoned the delay of 586 days in filing the said appeal against the judgment and decree dated 16.09.2016 passed by the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Devanahalli in Original Suit No. 458 of 2006 instituted for specific performance of contract. By the order passed in I.A. Nos 1 & 3 of 2018 respectively, the High Court granted leave to appeal to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein (subsequent purchasers) against the original judgment and decree of specific performance as they were not parties in the suit proceedings.
4. The facts giving rise to these appeals may be summarised as under.
The description of the parties before this Court and before the Trial Court is tabulated as follows:
1760 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
BEFORE
THIS COURT
BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT
REMARKS
Appellants Plaintiffs Agreement of Sale Holders/Purchasers Respondent Nos. 1-2 Not a party as their impleadment application was rejected. Order remained unchallenged and hence, attained finality L i s P e n d e n s Purchasers (Alleged to have purchased from Subsequent Purchaser)
Respondent Nos. 3-5 LRs. Of Original Defendant No. 1 Original Owner Respondent No. 6 Defendant No. 2 GPA Holder Respondent No. 7 Defendant No. 3 Subsequent Purchaser For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their status before the Trial Court.
(I) One Late Smt. Daisy Shanthappa – Original Defendant No.1 (since deceased represented through her LRs-Respondents Nos. 3-5 herein) was the absolute owner of lands bearing Sy. No. 176/42 measuring 32 acres and Sy. No. 176/43 measuring 10 acres, situated adjacent to each other in Bagalur Village, Jala Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. The Suit Schedule Property was agreed to be sold to the plaintiffs, the appellants herein, vide an Agreement of Sale dated 05.09.1995 for a total sale consideration of Rs.20,00,000/- by the Defendant No.1 through her Power of Attorney holder one Shri V. Chandramohan (Original Defendant No. 2/ Respondent No.6 herein). Earnest money of Rs.5,00,000/- was paid and the Defendant Nos. 1 & 2 undertook to get the unauthorized occupants in the Suit Schedule Property evicted.
(II) Since the unauthorized occupants on the Suit Schedule Property were not evicted by the Defendant Nos.1 & 2, a Supplementary Agreement dated 10.03.1997 was executed extending the time for execution of Sale Deed. Out of the entire sale consideration of Rs.20,00,000/- a substantial amount of Rs.15,00,000/- was paid by the appellants herein to the Defendant No. 1.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1761H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors. (III) While such being the case, and during the subsistence of Sale Agreement in favour of the Plaintiffs, the Defendant No.1 having lost her right over the suit schedule property in pursuance of the general power of attorney executed in favour of Defendant No.2, which has been acted upon, allegedly executed a Sale Deed in favour of Respondent No. 7/Defendant No. 3 selling land to an extent of 40 acres out of 42 acres for a sum of Rs.40,00,000/-. The plaintiffs became aware of the aforementioned sale transfer, when the Defendant No.3 attempted to change the revenue records in his name.
(IV) Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs filed O.S. No.1093/2003 (later renumbered as O.S. No.458/2006) before the Court of Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) Bengaluru Rural District (hereinafter referred to as the Trial Court) inter alia seeking Specific Performance of the Agreement of Sale. The Trial Court upon appreciating the case of the plaintiffs admitted the suit and on 17.12.2003 passed a specific Order of Temporary Injunction restraining the Defendant Nos. 1-3 from alienating and creating third party rights in the Suit Schedule Property.
(V) The Defendant No.3 however, in contravention of specific order of injunction and during the subsistence of the order of injunction, sold a portion of Suit Schedule Property to the extent of 4 Acres (and 6 Acres) in Sy. No. 176/43 in favour of Respondents Nos. 1-2 herein.
(VI) It is relevant to note that the Defendant No.1 executed a Deed of Confirmation in favour of the plaintiffs admitting the Agreement of Sale in favour of the plaintiffs and further acknowledged the receipt of a substantial sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- out of Rs.20,00,000/- in furtherance of the Agreement of Sale dated 05.09.1995 and further stating that the sale made by her in favour of Defendant No.3 was due to the fact that she was being misled by some persons of oblique mindsets.
(VII) At this stage, on 10.07.2007, the Respondent Nos. 1-2 respectively herein filed an Interlocutory Application - I.A. No.4 in O.S. No.458/2006 seeking to implead themselves as Defendants in the said suit. The said I.A. No.4 was however rejected by the Trial Court vide Order dated 06.08.2014 on the ground that the Respondent Nos. 1-2 herein had purchased 1762 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports the portion of Suit Schedule Property without the permission of the court, during the pendency of suit and in contravention of a Specific Order of Injunction against alienation and creation of third party rights. The same being contrary to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, “Transfer of Property Act”). The said order of rejection of impleadment never came to be challenged in appeal and thereby, the said issue has attained finality.
(VIII) Thereafter, the Trial Court upon appreciation of evidence on record passed its final Judgment and Decree in O.S. No. 458/2006 decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs and granting relief of specific performance with a specific direction to execute a sale deed within a period of 2 months. Assailing the legality of the said Order, the Defendant No. 3 (who is the Vendor of Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 herein) filed R.F.A. No.396/2017 before the High Court which came to be dismissed on 04.07.2017. (IX) It is in the aforestated backdrop that the Respondent Nos.1 & 2 respectively, in spite of a Specific Order of Injunction against the Defendant No. 3 (Vendor of the Respondent Nos.1 & 2) of not creating third party rights, purchased the suit property in contravention of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. More importantly the application for impleadment in the Suit also came to be rejected and having not been challenged by the contesting Respondent Nos. 1 & 2, the issue had attained finality. After dismissal of the appeal filed by their Vendor i.e., Defendant No. 3, Respondent Nos 1 & 2 proceeded to challenge the order of Trial Court decreeing the Suit of the plaintiffs. After almost 2 years of passing of the Judgment and Decree dated 16.09.2016 in O.S. No.458/2006 and 11 years from the filing of the Impleadment Application, the Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 herein preferred RFA No.1303/2018 before the High Court challenging the said Decree.
(X) The Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 filed I.A. No.1 & 3 of 2018 seeking condonation of delay of 586 days in preferring RFA No.1303/2018, and also prayed for leave to appeal. The said I. A.s were opposed by the plaintiffs. The High Court, however, vide the impugned order allowed both the I.A. Nos. 1 & 3 of 2018 respectively by condoning the inordinate and unexplained [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1763H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors. delay of 586 days and further permitting the Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 herein to prefer the appeal by granting leave.
5. Being aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs are here before this Court with the present appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS
6. Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants (original plaintiffs) vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a serious error in condoning the unexplained and inordinate delay of 586 days in preferring the regular first appeal and also by granting leave to file appeal to the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 i.e., subsequent purchasers of the suit property. According to the learned counsel, it is not just enough for the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively to say that they were not aware of the suit proceedings before the Trial Court. The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had, in fact, preferred an application for being impleaded in the suit as defendants and such application which was filed on 10.07.2007 came to be rejected vide order dated 06.08.2014. The said order was never challenged by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein and it has attained finality.
7. Mr. Nuli submitted that having purchased the suit property pendente lite on 05.04.2004 and that too in contravention of the order of temporary injunction dated 17.12.2003 passed by the Trial Court, the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively do not deserve any indulgence. It was argued that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be said to be bona fide purchasers of the suit property for value without notice.
8. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned senior counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeals, those may be allowed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS. 1 AND 2
RESPECTIVELY
9. Mr. Gautam Narayan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the subsequent purchasers i.e. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, may be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order. According to the learned counsel, there is no question of law involved in the present appeals warranting any interference with the impugned 1764 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports order passed by the High Court. He would submit that his clients are bona fide subsequent purchasers of the suit property and as subsequent purchasers, they have a substantial interest in the suit property and also in the final outcome of the suit.
10. The learned counsel submitted that the order passed by the Trial Court, in itself, would not render the transfer made to the subsequent purchasers ineffective and the validity of such transfer is always subject to the outcome of the litigation.
11. The learned counsel submitted that in the present case, collusion between the vendor of the answering respondents who are subsequent purchasers pendente lite i.e., Defendant No. 3 and the plaintiffs, is writ large on the face of the record. He submitted that the bar on transfer of immovable property which is subject matter of a litigation under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable to the present case as Section 52 expressly excludes from its ambit collusive proceedings and, therefore, the High Court correctly granted an opportunity to his clients to establish this fact by allowing them to prefer an Appeal.
12. He submitted that unfortunately the Defendant No. 3 colluded with the plaintiffs in order to get the suit decreed vide judgment dated 16.09.2016 as is borne out from the following facts:
(i) Defendant No. 3 did not cross-examine the witnesses of the Plaintiffs;
(ii) Defendant No. 3 did not lead any rebuttal evidence in the suit;
(iii) Despite filing an appeal against the decree dated 16.09.2016, he withdrew the Appeal without stating any reason on 04.07.2017, and
(iv) In fact, even after having succeeded in the suit and obtaining a decree dated 16.09.2016, the plaintiffs did not get the same executed and have allowed the Defendant No.3 to enter into a registered agreement of sale dated 12.09.2019 for the suit property for a consideration of Rs.20 crores with third parties. In light of the aforesaid facts, he submitted that the High Court was justified in granting permission to the answering respondents to prefer an appeal against the decree dated 16.09.2016 in order to defend their rights.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1765H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors.
13. He further submitted that the impugned order is also justified in the context of settled law that a subsequent purchaser should ordinarily be allowed to implead himself in pending proceedings in order to protect his interests when the transferor fails to do so.
14. He submitted that the approach of the High Court in the impugned order is only a logical extension of the aforesaid principle in so far as it only extends to subsequent purchasers, i.e., the answering respondents, the opportunity to defend their interests in the face of ex facie collusion by their vendors with plaintiffs in the suit.
15. No prejudice would be caused to the plaintiffs if the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are merely allowed to agitate their appeal on merits keeping in view the fact that they are subsequent purchasers for value who were duped by their vendor.
16. He submitted that the condonation of delay in preferring the appeals is justified in view of Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 5 thereof.
17. He submitted that his clients, both of whom are senior citizens, were residing with their children in Scotland when their application for impleadment was rejected by the Trial Court and were assured by Defendant No. 3 that he would defend their interest in the suit and therefore due to the trust and faith reposed in him, they did not make any efforts to prosecute the suit or the Appeal.
18. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that the lis pendens purchasers although not arrayed as parties in the suit, yet they are the persons who could be said to be claiming as defendants under Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”).
19. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned senior counsel prayed that there being no merit in the present appeals, those may be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned order.
21. The High Court in the impugned order observed as under:- 1766 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “13. In these two applications, we are concerned with the prayer for leave to prosecute the appeal and condonation of delay. It is not disputed that appellants have purchased 4 acres of land out of the suit schedule property. They did file an application to implead themselves in the suit, but unsuccessfully. One of the main ground urged in support of the application for condonation of delay is that they were assured by their vendor-third defendant that he would protect their interest.
14. Shri Holla, pointed out in para 18 of the judgment that the learned trial Judge has adverted to the evidence of P.W. 2 and his evidence has remained unchallenged as he was not subjected to cross-examination and none of the defendants stepped into the witness box. Further the third defendant has filed R.F.A.No.396/2017 and withdrew the same. It is pleaded in the affidavit in support of the application for condonation of delay that the appellants are aged 75 and 66 years respectively and living with their children in Scotland. This averment has remained unrebutted.
15. Keeping in view the fact that appellants have purchased the immovable property measuring 4 acres, that they are senior citizens and their vendor has not defended the suit nor prosecuted the first appeal filed before this Court, we are of the opinion that rights of the parties cannot be scuttled by dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay. Curiously appellants’ vendor namely the third defendant/ respondent No.8, though served and represented by advocate has remained absent. Thus, the allegations made against him in appellants’ affidavit have remained uncontroverted. Therefore, in our considered view, the instant applications merit consideration.
16. In view of the above, I.As.No.1 & 3 of 2018 are allowed subject to appellants paying cost of Rs. 25,000/- for each of the applications and cumulatively Rs.50,000/- to the plaintiffs/ respondent Nos.1 to 3.”
22. Thus, a plain reading of the impugned order passed by the High Court would indicate that what weighed with the High Court was the fact [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1767H. Anjanappa & Ors. v. A. Prabhakar & Ors. that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively are aged 75 and 66 years and are living with their children in Scotland. The High Court proceeded further to observe that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have purchased 4 acres of land out of a large chunk of subject property and their vendor i.e. the original owner failed to protect their interest in the suit proceedings.
23. We are of the view that the High Court committed an egregious error in condoning delay of 586 days in filing the regular first appeal on mere asking. We are not convinced with the sufficient cause assigned by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively for the delay of 586 days. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were vigilant of their so called rights. The High Court should have put an end to the entire litigation by declining to condone the delay itself far from granting leave to appeal.
24. Having taken the view that the High Court committed an egregious error in condoning the delay, we could have closed this matter without observing or saying anything further by setting aside the impugned order passed by the High Court. However, we would like to say something also as regards the grant of leave to appeal by the High Court in favour of the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, more particularly in light of two submissions canvassed by Mr. Nuli, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants herein. The first submission canvassed by the learned counsel is that once the impleadment application filed by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively herein invoking the provisions of Order I Rule 10 CPC came to be rejected by the Trial Court and the said order attained finality, thereafter there is no question of seeking leave to appeal against the final decree granting specific performance, and the second submission canvassed by the learned counsel is that the findings recorded by the Trial Court while rejecting the impleadment application would operate as re judicata in the appeal that may be filed by the transferee pendente lite against the final decree of specific performance.
LAW GOVERNING THE GRANT OF LEAVE TO APPEAL
25. Sections 96 and 100 respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, the “CPC”) provide for preferring an appeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal respectively. The aforesaid 1768 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. However, it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the court that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. It is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not a party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate court. [see : Sri V.N. Krishna Murthy and another vs. Sri Ravikumar and others (Civil Appeal Nos.2701-2704 of 2020, decided on 21st August 2020)].
26. A five-Judge Bench of the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey vs. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165, speaking through Sir Dinshaw Mulla observed that there is no definition of appeal in the CPC, but there is no doubt that any application by a party to an appellate Court, asking it to set aside or revise a decision of a subordinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal because it is irregular or incompetent.
27. A party to a suit adversely affected by a decree or any of his representatives-in-interest may file an appeal. But a person who is not a party to a decree or order may, with the leave of the court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by a decree or order or is aggrieved by it or is otherwise prejudicially affected by it.
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