B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 4; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 12
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice N Kotiswar Singh
- Decided
- 1 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 50/2025
- Sections
- 353, 186, 195, 195(1), 161, 155, 155(2), 2, 482, 156(1), 156, 172
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 12 : 2025 INSC 4 B.N. John v.
State of U.P. & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 2025)
02 January 2025 [B.V. Nagarathna and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Appellant herein has sought quashing of criminal proceedings arising under sections 353 and 186 of IPC.
Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – s.353 and s.186 – According to the appellant, he is the owner of a hostel used for underprivileged children – Appellant alleges that the officials illegally conducted the raid on 03.06.2015 and sought to transfer the children accommodated in the said hostel to some other location – Appellant also contended that a false allegation was made against him that he, along with his party, had attacked and assaulted the officials while they were conducting the raid – Pursuant to which, an FIR was lodged against the appellant and his wife u/s.353 IPC – Subsequently, on completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed alleging commission of offences u/ss.353 and 186 of the IPC – The appellant has sought quashing of the said criminal proceedings:
Held: A bare perusal of s.195 (1) of the CrPC clearly indicates that there is a bar on the court to take cognizance of any offence punishable u/ss.172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the IPC except on a complaint in writing made by the concerned public servant to the court – The State has made a feeble attempt to show that there was indeed a complaint filed by the District Probation Officer to the City Magistrate, Varanasi, on 03.06.2015, alleging that the appellants and his party were creating obstructions to the officials – A careful examination of the aforesaid letter, however, would reveal that the said letter in the form of complaint is addressed to the City Magistrate and not to any Judicial Magistrate – A complaint within * Author [2025] 1 S.C.R. 13B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.
the meaning and scope of the Criminal Procedure Code would mean such a complaint filed before a Judicial Magistrate and not an Executive Magistrate – The complaint which is required to be filed u/s.195 (1) of the CrPC, can only be before a Judicial Magistrate and not an Executive Magistrate who does not have the power to take cognizance of an offence or try such cases – In the instant case, since the complaint was filed before the City Magistrate and not before a Judicial Magistrate, the requirement of s.195 (1) of the CrPC was not fulfilled – Under such circumstances, the appellant has been able to make out a case that taking cognizance of the offence u/s. 186 of the IPC by the Court of CJM, Varanasi, was illegal, as before taking such cognizance it was to be preceded by a complaint in writing by a public servant as required u/s.195(1) of the CrPC – As far as taking cognizance of the offence u/s.353 of the IPC is concerned, in the FIR there is no allegation of use of criminal force or assault by the appellant so as to invoke the provision of s.353 of the IPC – The ingredients of offence u/s. 353 of the IPC are clearly absent in the FIR – Since no ingredient for the offence u/s.353 of the IPC is found in the FIR, taking cognizance by the CJM of an offence that is not made out in the FIR does not appear to be correct – Nothing was mentioned in the complaint/ FIR of any specific acts apart from alleging that the appellant and his party were creating disturbance – If “disturbance” has to be construed as “assault” or “criminal force” without there being specific acts attributed to make such “disturbance” as “assault” or “criminal face” within the scope of s.353 of the IPC, it would amount to abuse of the process of law – Also, the contents of the statements recorded later u/s. 161 of the CrPC clearly appears to be an afterthought and the allegation of assault/attack was introduced later on, which is inconsistent with the contents of the original FIR – Thus, the appellant has been able to make out the case for quashing the criminal proceedings pending against him. [Paras 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 33, 34, 42] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.155 – Specific bar on police to investigate non-cognizable offence:
Held: Section 155 (2) of the CrPC provides that when information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State 14 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer the informant to the Magistrate – Section 155(2) of the CrPC further provides that no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such a case or commit the case for trial – Thus, there is a specific bar on the police to investigate any such non-cognizable offence, without the order of a Magistrate. [Para 11] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.155 – s.155 refers to a Judicial Magistrate or Executive Magistrate:
Held: Since the Magistrate referred to u/s.155 under Chapter XII of the CrPC refers to a Magistrate who has the power to try such case or commit the case for trial and thus exercises judicial function, he has to be a Judicial Magistrate – Further, u/s.195 (1) of the CrPC r/w.s.2 (d) of the CrPC, the complaint, has to be filed before the court taking cognizance, and the complaint which is required to be filed u/s.195 (1) of the CrPC, can only be before a Judicial Magistrate and not an Executive Magistrate who does not have the power to take cognizance of an offence or try such cases.[Para 19] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – FIR must disclose nature of offence:
Held: A criminal process is initiated only with the lodging of an FIR – Though FIR is not supposed to be an encyclopedia containing all the detailed facts of the incident and it is merely a document that triggers and sets into motion the criminal legal process, yet it must disclose the nature of the offence alleged to have been committed as otherwise, it would be susceptible to being quashed. [Para 25] Case Law Cited State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335; Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P. [1982] 1 SCR 1077 : (1982) 1 SCC 71; CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh [2003] 3 SCR 485 : (2003) 6 SCC 175 – relied on.
State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [2011] 15 SCR 540 : (2011) 14 SCC 770; R P Kapoor v. State of Punjab [1960] 3 SCR 388 : AIR 1960 SC 866; State of Bihar v. PP Sharma [1991] 2 SCR 1 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 192; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. [2025] 1 S.C.R. 15B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.
Mohd. Saraful Haq and another [2004] Supp. 5 SCR 790 : 2005 SCC(Cr) 283 – referred to.
List of Acts Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Right to Information Act, 2005; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India.
List of Keywords Section 353 of IPC; Section 186 of IPC; Section 155 of CrPC; Section 195 of CrPC; Cognizable offence; Non-cognizable offence; Public servant; Assault; Criminal Force; Disturbance; Public servant; Obstructing public servant; Judicial Magistrate; Executive Magistrate; Nature of offence; Specific acts.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
50 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 22.09.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No. 35311 of 2023 Appearances for Parties Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Anmol Kheta, Mrs. Tanya Srivastava, Ms. Anshala Verma, Monu Kumar, Suraj Mishra, Ayush Anand, K.S. Jaggi, Advs. for the Petitioner.
Ajay Kumar Mishra, AG/Sr. Adv., Garvesh Kabra, Ajay Singh, Avanish Deshpande, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal has been preferred being aggrieved by the judgment dated 22.09.2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 16 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports (‘CrPC’ for short) in Application No. 35311 of 2023 by which the appellant’s plea for quashing of the chargesheet No.162 of 2015 dated 20.06.2015, order dated 11.08.2015 taking cognizance and issuing summons, and the entire proceedings in Case No. 9790 of 2015 arising out of Case Crime No. 290 of 2015 under Sections 353 and 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ for short), P.S. Cantt. District Varanasi, U.P., was rejected.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. It is the plea of the appellant that he is the owner of the premises and was in charge of managing & maintaining the hostel, which was being operated by a Non-Governmental Organization, named Sampoorna Development India. This hostel at the relevant time was used for underprivileged children by providing facilities for their accommodation, education and other needs.
3.1 According to the appellant, because of certain personal disputes with one K.V. Abraham, the latter instituted six false cases against him, four of them resulted in his acquittal, while in the other two discharge applications are pending. According to the appellant, it was at the instance of the said Abraham that the officials conducted a raid in the said hostel arbitrarily without authorization and also without providing any prior notice, alleging that provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (‘JJ Act’ for short) as applicable then, were not followed in running and managing the said hostel.
3.2 It is the allegation of the appellant that the officials illegally conducted the raid on 03.06.2015 and sought to transfer the children accommodated in the said hostel to some other location purportedly on the ground that the hostel was being run without proper authorization from the competent authority under the JJ Act.
3.3. It was further contended that a false allegation was made against the appellant that he, along with his party, had attacked and assaulted the officials while they were conducting the raid in connection with which an FIR came to be lodged against the appellant and his wife, which was registered as FIR No. 290 of 2015 dated 03.06.2015 at the PS Cantt. District, Varanasi under Section 353 of the IPC.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 17B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.
3.4. On the basis of the said FIR, the appellant was arrested on 08.06.2015. However, he was granted bail on the same day. Subsequently, on completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi in connection with the said FIR on 20.06.2015 alleging commission of offences under Sections 353 and 186 of the IPC.
3.5. Pursuant to the filing of the chargesheet, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi took cognizance and issued summons to the appellant vide order dated 11.08.2015, against which the appellant submitted an application for recalling the said order, which is pending before the Court of CJM, Varanasi.
3.6. According to the appellant, a complaint alleging commission of an offence under Section 186 of the IPC would be maintainable only ifit is preceded by a complaint filed by a public servant as mentioned under Section 195 (1)(a) of the CrPC before the court/Magistrate, but there was no such prior complaint filed by any public servant before the Magistrate.
Further, though the FIR was filed under Section 353 of the IPC, there were no ingredients to make out a case under the said section. It is also the case of the appellant that the authorities had maliciously invoked the penal provision of Section 353 of the IPC in the FIR merely to make out a cognizable offence against the appellant to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance, even though there was no case of any assault or use of criminal force by the appellant to deter any public servant from discharging his duty. Hence, taking cognizance of the said FIR by the CJM, Varanasi under Section 353 of the IPC was unwarranted and illegal.
3.7 Accordingly, the appellant approached the Allahabad High Court invoking jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of the aforesaid proceedings, that is, Crime Case No. 290 of 2015 pending before the CJM, Varanasi and orders taking cognizance and issuing summons in that regard.
3.8 The Allahabad High Court on perusal of the FIR No.290/15 and the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC held that a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant for being summoned and for prosecution under 18 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the aforesaid Sections 353 and 186 of the IPC and declined his plea for quashing the aforesaid criminal case which was pending before the CJM, Varanasi.
3.9 While dismissing the petition filed by the appellant, the Allahabad High Court referred to an earlier decision of the High Court in rejecting the application filed by the co-accused seeking quashing of the aforesaid proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC which was affirmed by this Court on 13.04.2017 by dismissing the SLP in limine.
In the present impugned order, the High Court observed that the allegations against the present appellant and co-accused are same as well as the evidence collected against them and since the plea of quashing the charge sheet and cognizance taken against the said co-accused had already been rejected on merits by the High Court, which was not disturbed by this Court, no interference was warranted for quashing the proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC, filed by the present appellant and dismissed the petition. Accordingly, the appellant is before us.
SUBMISSION OF THE APPELLANT
4. It is the specific plea of the appellant that cognizance in respect of an offence under Section 186 of the IPC can be taken by the court only after a complaint is made in writing by the public servant to the court as provided under Section 195 (1) of the Cr.P.C. It has been submitted that in the present case no such written complaint was filed by any public official as also ascertained by him from the concerned authority through an application filed to the competent authority under the Right to Information Act, 2005, whereby he was informed that no written complaint was filed before the court by any public servant in connection with Case No. 9790 of 2015 (State Vs B.N. John and Anr.).
4.1 Further, for invoking the provision of Section 353 of the IPC there must be a clear allegation of assault or criminal force by the accused for preventing the public servant from discharging his duty. However, a careful reading of the FIR would indicate that no such allegation was made against the appellant of using criminal force or assault and accordingly, even if the allegations made in the FIR are taken at their face value, it [2025] 1 S.C.R. 19B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.
does not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence as contemplated under Section 353 of the IPC.
4.2 Accordingly, it has been submitted that taking cognizance by the CJM, Varanasi, of the aforesaid case under the stated facts and circumstances is quite illegal and perverse in law, as such, the same ought to have been quashed by the Allahabad High Court. It was contended that the Allahabad High Court, however, had misdirected itself by observing that a prima facie case is made out on the basis of the contents of the FIR and the statement of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC.
4.3 It has also been contended that the Allahabad High Court in the present case ought not to have taken into consideration the order passed in respect of the other co-accused, as the legal issues as highlighted in this appeal, were not considered by the Allahabad High Court while rejecting the plea of the co-accused for quashing the complaint. As such, the said decision cannot be used against the present appellant.
PLEA OF THE RESPONDENT
5. Per contra, it has been submitted on behalf of the State that the decision rendered by the Allahabad High Court is in consonance with the law and no grievance can be made as the High Court had applied the relevant law to the facts of the present case. Further, it has also been submitted that this Court must be very slow in interfering with a reasoned order passed by the High Court, and the impugned order cannot be said to be perverse, illegal, or without any jurisdiction. It was contended that merely because a different view could have been taken by the High Court, it does not render the decision of the High Court illegal, warranting interference from this Court, and the High Court passed the order after going through the records.
ANALYSIS
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. As far as quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards to the principles to be applied by the 20 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer [2025] 1 S.C.R. 21B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
(emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clauses no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings is instituted, such proceeding can be quashed.
22 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
9. Our criminal justice system, rooted in the rule of law, contemplates different approaches for dealing with serious and non-serious offences. When complaints pertaining to serious offences are filed, which are generally categorized as cognizable offences under the CrPC, the police, on receiving such information of the commission of a cognizable offence can immediately start the investigation as contemplated under Section 156 of the CrPC. On the other hand, when it relates to non-serious offences which are generally categorized as noncognizable offences, the law is more circumspect in letting the full force of the criminal justice system operate. When it is related to non-cognizable offence there are certain safeguards put in place so that the invasive, intrusive, and coercive power of the police is not immediately brought into operation, as enabled under Section 156 of the CrPC. In such a situation any complaint alleging commission of non-serious offence(s) or non-cognizable offence(s) made before the police, has to be vetted by a legally trained person in the presence of a Judicial Magistrate before the police can initiate the investigation. Thus, even if the police receives any such complaint relating to non-cognizable offence, the police cannot start investigation without there being a green signal from the Magistrate. Further, when such non- cognizable offence(s) pertaining to officials who are obstructed from discharging their official duties, there is the additional safeguard before the Magistrate which permits the investigating authority to investigate. It must be preceded by a complaint filed by a public servant before the court/Magistrate. This is to ensure that only genuine complaints relating to non-serious offences or non-cognizable offences are entertained by the Magistrate. This is so for the reason that in a democracy, interactions of the citizen with the public servants is more frequent in wherein there may be instances where the members of the public cause obstruction to public servants preventing them from discharging public duties properly.
With these safeguards, the fine balance between the liberties of the citizens and the imperatives of the State endowed with coercive authority to maintain law and order is preserved.
10. Keeping the aforesaid principles and aspects in mind, we shall proceed to examine the issues and contentions of the parties before us.
11. Chapter XII of the CrPC deals with information given to the police and their powers to investigate.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 23B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.
Section 155 (2) of the CrPC provides that when information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer the informant to the Magistrate. Section 155(2) of the CrPC further provides that no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such a case or commit the case for trial. Relevant portions of Section 155 of the CrPC reads as under: “155. Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases.—
(1) When information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer the informant to the Magistrate.
(2) No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial.
........................................................................................... ............................................................................................” Thus, there is a specific bar on the police to investigate any such non-cognizable offence, without the order of a Magistrate.
12. However, no such bar has been placed when it relates to a cognizable offence as provided under Sections 154 and 156 of the CrPC, under which, any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case that a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XII, as reproduced herein below:
“154. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his 24 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf:
Provided that if .................................................................” “156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case.—(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) ........................................................................................ ............................................................................................”
13. While Section 155 of the CrPC deals with all non-cognizable offences, where the police cannot investigate without a prior order of the Magistrate, Section 195 of the CrPC provides additional conditions under which the Magistrates can take cognizance in respect of certain kinds of non-cognizable offences as mentioned in the said section, which includes Section 186 of the IPC with which we are directly concerned, only after a written complaint is filed by the concerned public servant to the court/Magistrate.
Relevant portions of Section 195 of the CrPC read as follows: “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.
(1) No Court shall take cognizance—
(a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860), or
(ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 25B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.
except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate;
................................................................................. .................................................................................”
14. Since, the appellant has been charged for committing offences under Sections 186 and 353 of the IPC, it may be appropriate to reproduce the same.
Section 186 of the IPC reads as follows:
“186. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions.—Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
Section 353 of the IPC reads as follows:
“353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty.—Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such person to the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
15. A bare perusal of Section 195 (1) of the CrPC clearly indicates that there is a bar on the court to take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the IPC except on a complaint in writing made by the concerned public servant to the court. Therefore, if it is found as contended by the appellant that in respect of the offence under Section 186 of theIPC against him,no such complaint was filed by the concerned public servant as contemplated under Section 195 (1)(a) CrPC, the CJM could not have taken cognizance of the offence under Section 186 of the IPC. 26 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports In this regard, the appellant has specifically pleaded to which there is no rebuttal from the State that no such complaint was made in writing by a public servant as required under Section 195(1) of the CrPC relating to the commission of offence by the appellant under Section 186 of the IPC.
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