Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 126; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1173
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, Justice Sarasa Venkatanarayana Bhatti
- Decided
- 29 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4806/2011
- Sections
- 3, 40, 100, 5, 53, 70, 95, 168, 22A
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1173 : 2025 INSC 126 Krishnadatt Awasthy v.
State of M.P. & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 4806 of 2011)
29 January 2025 [Hrishikesh Roy,* Sudhanshu Dhulia and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the selection is vitiated for violation of the first limb of natural justice i.e. rule against bias; whether it is a case of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem and is demonstration of prejudice necessary to succeed with a claim of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem; whether the breach of the principle of audi alteram partem at the original stage can be cured, at the revisional stage. Headnotes† Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 – Principle of natural justice – Rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) – Challenge was made to the validity of appointments of the appellants as school teachers (Shiksha Karmi Grade III) alleging that the selection process was vitiated by bias as some of the members of selection committee were close relatives of the appellants – Split verdict by two judge bench of Supreme Court, wherein one of the Judge held that selection of appellants was erroneously set aside, in breach of principle of audi alteram partem whereas, the other upheld the cancellation of the appointment of appellants and held that the first limb of natural justice i.e. ‘rule against bias’ was proved, as reasonable likelihood of bias was established – Matter before the larger bench:
Held: Present is a case of allegation of bias/mere suspicion of bias without any foundation – The Janpad Panchayat unanimously passed a resolution mandating that members who had close relatives among the candidates would recuse themselves from the interview process – As a matter of fact, the concerned members had recused and did not participate in the interview and did not award any marks, thus, a reasonable likelihood of bias cannot reasonably be inferred – Selection is not vitiated on account of * Author 1174 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports violation of the nemo judex rule – Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995. [Paras 29, 30, 35, 37] Principle of natural justice – Audi alteram partem – Violation of – Appointment of the appellants was set aside by the Collector, without issuing any notice, holding that the recruitment was vitiated by bias as some of the members of selection committee were close relatives of the appellants – Whether it is a case of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem and is demonstration of prejudice necessary to succeed with a claim of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem:
Held: In the present case, there has been a gross violation of the principle of audi alteram partem – In the absence of notice, the breach strikes at the fundamental core of procedural fairness, rendering the decision invalid – The selectees were not arrayed and they could not contest the selection before the Collector – The absence of opportunity of hearing at the initial stage prevented the selectees to show that no relative had influenced their selection – The vitiation of selection was not only a breach of the principles of natural justice but also contrary to the express statutory provision that required for an opportunity to show cause and an opportunity to provide self-defence – The prejudice theory must be understood as an exception to the general rule and cannot be the norm – Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993. [Paras 29, 35, 54] Principle of natural justice – Denial of, at the initial stage if, can be cured by an appellate body – Appointment of the appellants was set aside by the Collector without issuing any notice – Revision petition filed by the appellants, dismissed – Challenged before High Court, writ petition also rejected – Writ appeal thereagainst was also dismissed – Eventually, split verdict delivered by the bench of two judges of Supreme Court – Matter before the larger bench:
Held: A defect at the initial stage cannot generally be cured at the appellate stage – Even in cases where a ‘full jurisdiction’ may be available at the appellate stage, the Courts must have the discretion to relegate it to the original stage for an opportunity of hearing – Therefore, in the present case, the ex-parte decision to set aside the selection of the appellants was vitiated – However, since the selection pertains to the year 1998, and the appellants have continuously held office and performed their duties for over twenty-five years under interim orders, remanding the matter for a fresh inquiry not practical and will be an injustice to the [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1175Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors. appointees – Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993. [Paras 67, 71] Principle of natural justice – Denial of, at the initial stage taints the decision-making process leading to flawed orders at subsequent stages – Appointment of the appellants was set aside by the Collector without issuing any notice – Revision petition filed by the appellants, dismissed – Challenged before High Court, writ petition also rejected – Writ appeal thereagainst was also dismissed – Eventually, split verdict delivered by the bench of two judges of Supreme Court – Matter before the larger bench:
Held: The orders of the Collector and Commissioner in Revision are practically identical – An ineffective hearing at the initial stage tainted the entire decision-making process leading to flawed orders at subsequent stages – Providing a hearing to the affected individual, minimizes the risk of administrative authorities making decisions in ignorance of facts or other relevant circumstances allowing all pertinent issues to be brought to light – This process not only aids the administration in arriving at correct decisions but also enables courts to more effectively review such actions – Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 – Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995 – r.5(b). [Para 66] Principle of natural justice – Right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem) – Object of – For an allegation of bias to be proved, fair hearing is imperative. [Paras 68, 69] Doctrine of necessity – Applicability – Assumption of impartiality to be contextual for the application of the doctrine of necessity – Discussed. [Para 30] Judicial review of administrative actions, discussed – Selections made by expert bodies – Scope of interference with, under writ jurisdiction. [Paras 14, 15] Case Law Cited State Bank of Patiala v. SK Sharma [1996] 3 SCR 972 : (1996) 3 SCC 364; AK Kraipak v. Union of India [1970] 1 SCR 457 : (1969) 2 SCC 262; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr [1978] 2 SCR 272 : (1978) 1 SCC 405; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 533 : (1981) 1 SCC 664; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; SL Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1981] 1 SCR 746 : (1980) 4 SCC 379; 1176 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Dy. Comm. of Central Excise, Gauhati and Ors. [2015] 6 SCR 437 : (2015) 8 SCC 519; State of UP v. Sudhir Kumar Singh [2020] 13 SCR 571 : (2021) 19 SCC 706; Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India [2023] 10 SCR 595 : (2023) 13 SCC 401; Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L. K. Ratna [1986] 3 SCR 1049 : (1986) 4 SCC 537; State of U.P. v. Mohammed Nooh 1958 SCR 595; Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirja Khasim [1977] 2 SCR 282 : (1977) 2 SCC 457; Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 597 : (1990) 1 SCC 613; J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa [1985] 1 SCR 322 : (1984) 4 SCC 103; Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 657 : (1985) 4 SCC 417; Kirti Deshmankar v. Union of India [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 355 : (1991) 1 SCC 104; Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab (1997) 10 SCC 641; Utkal University v. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi [1999] 1 SCR 19 : (1999) 2 SCC 193; Govt. of T.N. v. Munuswamy Mudaliar [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 673 : (1988) Supp. SCC 651 : AIR 1988 SC 2232; Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd. [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 812 : (2003) 7 SCC 418; State of A.P. v. McDowell & Company [1996] 3 SCR 721 : (1996) 3 SCC 709; Tata Cellular v. Union of India [1994] Supp. 2 SCR 122 : (1994) 6 SCC 651; Mohd. Mustafa v. Union of India [2021] 11 SCR 163 : (2022) 1 SCC 294; Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan (1990) 1 SCC 305; Badrinath v. State of T.N. [2000] Supp. 3 SCR 573 : (2000) 8 SCC 395; National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. K. Kalyana Raman (1992) Supp. 2 SCC 481; I.P.S. Dewan v. Union of India [1995] 2 SCR 532 : (1995) 3 SCC 383; UPSC v. Hiranyalal Dev [1988] 3 SCR 302 : (1988) 2 SCC 242; M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC [2007] 13 SCR 624 : (2008) 2 SCC 119; UPSC v. M. Sathiya Priya [2018] 6 SCR 701 : (2018) 15 SCC 796; Om Kumar v. Union of India [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 693 : (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [1997] Supp. 3 SCR 549 : (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 44 : (1990) 4 SCC 594; Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India [1976] Supp. 1 SCR 489 : (1976) 2 SCC 981; CCI v. SAIL [2010] 11 SCR 112 : (2010) 10 SCC 744; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan [2010] 10 SCR 1070 : (2010) 9 SCC 496; Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Co., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219; Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi [1957] 1 SCR 575 : 1957 SCC OnLine SC 10; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [1988] [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1177Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors. 1 SCR 512 : (1987) 4 SCC 611; Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School [1993] 3 SCR 863 : (1993) 4 SCC 10; S Parthasarathi v. State of AP [1974] 1 SCR 697 : (1974) 3 SCC 459; SK Golap and Others v. Bhuban Chandra Panda, 1990 SCC OnLine Cal 264; GN Nayak v Goa University [2002] 1 SCR 636 : (2002) 2 SCC 712; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398; Charanjit Singh v. Harinder Sharma (2002) 9 SCC 732; Javid Rasool Bhat v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (1984) 2 SCC 682; Jaswant Singh Nerwal v. State of Punjab [1991] 1 SCR 411 : (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 313; State Govt. Houseless Harijan Employees Association v. State of Karnataka [2000] Supp. 5 SCR 483 : (2001) 1 SCC 610; East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs [1963] 3 SCR 338 : AIR 1962 SC 1893; Uma Nath Pandey and Ors. v. State of UP [2009] 4 SCR 374 : (2009) 12 SCC 40; Fareed Ahmed v. Ahmedabad Municipality [1977] 1 SCR 71 : AIR 1976 SC 2095; Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Government of Delhi [1975] 1 SCR 597 : (1975) 4 SCC 298; Mysore SRT Corp v. Mirza Khasim [1977] 2 SCR 282 : AIR 1977 SC 747; Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India [1996] Supp. 4 SCR 443 : (1996) 9 SCC 650; United Planters’ Association of Southern India v. KG Sangameswaran [1997] 2 SCR 756 : (1997) 4 SCC 741; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 51 : (1985) 3 SCC 545; Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 684 : (2000) 7 SCC 529 – referred to.
Hira Lal Patel v. Chief Executive Officer, District Panchayat, Sarangarh (1998) 2 MP WN 39; Laxmidhar v. State of Orissa, AIR 1974 Ori 127; Kashiram Dalmia v. State, AIR 1978 Pat 265; G Rajalakshmi v. Appellate Authority, AIR 1980 AP 100; Serajuddin Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1974 Cal 296 – referred to. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC 374; Dimes v. The Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HLC 759; R v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256; Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) v. Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577; Porter v. Magill (2002) 1 All ER 465; Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40; Annamunthodo v. Oilfield Workers’ Trade Union [1961] AC 945 (PC); Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders (1970) 2 All ER 713; Calvin v. Carr (1979) 2 WLR 755; Lloyd v. McMahon (1987) 1 AC 625; R v. Gough, 1993 AC 646; Australian Workers’ Union v. Bowen (No. 2) (1948) 77 C.L.R. 601 – referred to. 1178 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Books and Periodicals Cited H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law (5th Edition); H W R Wade and C F Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 11th ed, 2014); I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (8th Edition, 2012); Lawrence H. Tribe, ‘American Constitutional Law’ (The Foundation Press 1978) – referred to.
List of Acts Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993; Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995.
List of Keywords Audi alteram partem; Rule against bias; Allegation of bias/mere suspicion of bias; Principles of natural justice; Nemo judex in causa sua; Selection; Appointment; School teachers; Shiksha karmi(s); Selection committee; Relatives of the candidates; Family members; Selection not vitiated; Interference with selections; Procedural impropriety; Rule of fair hearing; Recuse; Recusal; Resolution for recusal; Doctrine of necessity; Judicial review of administrative actions; Collector; Ineffective hearing; Notice not issued; Without issuing notice to the selectees; Absence of opportunity of hearing; Violation of right of hearing; Prejudice; Full jurisdiction. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4806 of 2011 From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.2008 of the High Court of M.P at Jabalpur in WA No. 892 of 2008 With Civil Appeal Nos. 4807, 4808 and 4809 of 2011 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Vivek Tankha, Sr. Adv., Neeraj Shekhar, Mrs. Kshama Sharma, Ramendra Vikram Singh, Divyam Sikka, Amrendra Singh, Ram Bachan Choudhary, Rajesh Maurya Singh, Rajesh Maurya.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, Saurabh Singh, Shiv Vinayak Gupta, Ms. Shruti Verma, Avdhesh Kumar Singh, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Parth Sarathi, Gyanendra Vikram Singh, Ms. Soumya Gulati. [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1179Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Hrishikesh Roy, J.
1. Heard Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. The respondents are represented by Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, learned counsel and Mr. Avdhesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel.
2. This matter is posted before this larger Bench on account of the split verdict rendered on 4.4.2024 by the two learned Judges of this Court. The case pertains to the validity of appointments made for the post of school teachers (Shiksha Karmi Grade III) in Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar in the year 1998. Four Civil Appeals were filed before this Court by ten persons, who are alleged to be the relatives of the members of the selection committee and were placed in the final select list of 249 Shiksha Karmis.
3. While Justice JK Maheshwari upheld the finding to set aside the selection of Shiksha Karmis on account of the violation of the first limb of the principle of natural justice i.e. rule against bias, Justice KV Vishwanathan has however upheld the selection, citing inter alia, a breach of the right to a fair hearing. Therefore, in this case, we are confronted with a conflict between the two foundational principles of natural justice i.e. rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) and the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem).
I. RELEVANT FACTS
4. Initially, one Kunwar Vijay Bahadur Singh Bundela challenged the preparation of the select list by filing an appeal before the Collector, District Chhatarpur, who quashed the select list, vide order dated 31.8.1998 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. Thereafter, a fresh select list consisting of 249 candidates including the names of appellants (and four others) was published on 16.9.1998 and the appointment order was issued on 17.9.1998. The selection and appointment of the appellants was challenged by an unsuccessful candidate- Archana Mishra (Respondent No. 4 herein), before the Collector, District Chatarpur, Madhya Pradesh, under Section 3 of Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995(for short “Appeal and Revision Rules,1995) alleging that elements of nepotism, corruption and bias have seeped into the selection 1180 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports process because of the composition of the selection committee. The Collector, accepting the challenger’s contention vide order dated 02.06.1999, set aside the appellants’ appointment by concluding that the recruitment was vitiated on account of bias and nepotism. The Collector found fault with the composition of the selection committee, some of whom were the family members of the appellants herein and opined that the award of marks in the selection, was improper. Relying on Section 40(c) and Section 100 of Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 (for short “Adhiniyam, 1993), it was noted that office bearers cannot facilitate financial gains to relatives. The Collector further noted that:
‘…it is proved that the appointment of these relatives could not be deemed to be according to the prescribed procedure and the scheme and therefore, it is not necessary to call them up’.
5. Relying on the MP High Court’s judgment in Hira Lal Patel v Chief Executive Officer, District Panchayat, Sarangarh 1, the Collector without issuing notice to the selectees observed that if the appointment is not made as per the scheme, it can be terminated without giving any opportunity of hearing.
6. Aggrieved by the above interference with the selection, the appellants filed a Revision petition before the Commissioner, Revenue, Sagar Division under section 5 of the Appeal and Revision Rules,1995. The selectees contended therein that without arraying them and without affording them any hearing, the Collector could not have interfered with the selection and this would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Revision Petition was however dismissed by the Commissioner vide order dated 14.3.2000. In the said order the Commissioner observed in para (6) that the selection is contrary to Section 40(C) of the Adhiniyam, 1993. The Revisional Authority brushed aside the plea of non-joinder and of not affording opportunity of hearing, by relying on the admission of the relationship of the appellants with the members of the selection committee, as noted in the reply filed by the Chief Executive Officer. Aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner, the appointees filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Madhya Pradesh High Court which was however dismissed by the learned single judge 1 (1998) 2 MP WN 39 [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1181Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors. vide order dated 31.7.2008. Relying on State Bank of Patiala v SK Sharma2, it was observed that the opportunity of hearing has to be tested on the touchstone of actual prejudice being caused to the writ petitioners. It was also noted that full opportunity of hearing was granted at the Revisional stage by the Commissioner. According to the learned Judge the Chief Executive officer’s reply established that few selectees were relatives of Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi(Chairperson of the selection Committee) and similarly, close relatives of Shri Swami Singh(member of the Education Committee) such as his sister-in-law, son, daughter-in-law and nephew were also among the selected candidates. The Single Judge relied on the five-judge bench decision of this Court in AK Kraipak v Union of India 3(for short “AK Kraipak”) where it was emphasized that the presence of interested parties in the selection committee creates a reasonable likelihood of bias, even if direct participation is limited. It was therefore concluded that even though Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi(Chairperson) and Swami Singh(member) recused themselves during interviews of their alleged relatives, their presence on the committee could have influenced the overall selection process.
7. The appellants then preferred a writ appeal which was dismissed by the Division bench of the High Court on 15.12.2008. The Division Bench noted inter alia that:
‘though it was imperative on the part of appellants to implead the affected parties, yet as the affected parties had been given full opportunity from all aspects by the revisional forum as well as by the Learned Single Judge, we do not think it apt and apposite to quash the order and remand the matter to the Collector’.
8. Relying on decisions of this Court on bias 4 , the Division Bench observed that bias is a state of mind at work and when the degree of relationship is in quite proximity, bias has to be inferred.
2 (1996) 3 SCC 364
3 (1969) 2 SCC 262
4 A.K. Kraipak v Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262; J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa, (1984) 4 SCC 103, Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417, Kirti Deshmankar v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 104, Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 10 SCC 641, Utkal University v. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi, (1999) 2 SCC 193, G.N. Nayak v. Goa University, (2002) 2 SCC 712, Govt. of T.N. v. Munuswamy Mudaliar, (1988) Supp. SCC 651 : AIR 1988 SC 2232, Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 418. 1182 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
9. Thereafter when the matter reached the Supreme Court, Justice KV Vishwanathan concluded that the selection of appellants was erroneously set aside, in breach of the principle of audi alteram partem. It was further held that the principle must be adhered to at the original stage. Furthermore, Rule 9 of the Appeal and Revision Rules, 1995 was not complied with. It was also observed that the orders of the Collector & Commissioner made no reference either to definition of ‘relative’ in explanation to Section 40(c) of Adhiniyam nor to the resolution providing for recusal. Non-impleadment of parties amounted to ‘no opportunity at all’ for hearing was the conclusion reached by Justice KV Vishwanathan.
10. On the other hand, Justice J.K. Maheshwari upheld the decision to cancel the appointment of the appellants and opined that the first limb of natural justice i.e. ‘rule against bias’ was irrefutably proved, as reasonable likelihood of bias was established. The plea of nonimpleadment was considered to be a useless formality. It was further held that unless prejudice is demonstrated, mere non-joinder at the initial stage does not violate the principles of natural justice.
II. SUBMISSIONS
11. The foundational contention of the appellants is that since their appointments were cancelled without affording them any hearing and without arraying them as a party in the challenge by the respondent no. 4(Archana Mishra), the adverse decision taken against the appellants, is legally unsustainable. Mr. Vivek Tankha, the learned Senior Counsel would argue that an incorrect narrative was the basis for the allegation made by the respondent No. 4, about unfair selection. It is specifically pointed out that none of the relatives of the candidates had participated during the selection of the appellants. More importantly, the related persons had not awarded any marks to influence the selection. Specifically adverting to the marks obtained by the challenger and the selectees, the appellants argue that it was a fair selection and that intervention was unmerited.
12. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent, Mrinal Gopal Elker, and Avdhesh Kumar Singh, would rely on Section 40(c) of the Adhiniyam,1993 to project that the said section provides that ‘any of the office bearers shall not cause financial gain to his relatives’. According to them, the presence of close relatives in the selection process vitiated the process of selection of Shiksha Karmis. They [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1183Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors. projected that non-adherence to the principles of audi alteram partem, if any, was cured by the proceedings before the commissioner wherein appellants were given full opportunity. On that basis, it was submitted that the non- granting of opportunity of hearing by the Collector at the original stage was inconsequential. According to the respondent, the reasonable likelihood of bias in selection is established by the close relationship between the Committee members and the selected candidates who have been awarded high marks in comparison to other candidates in the interview process.
III. ISSUES
13. Going by the above submissions, the following broad issues fall for our consideration:
A. Whether the selection is vitiated for violation of the first limb of natural justice i.e. rule against bias?
B. Where it is a case of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem? Is demonstration of prejudice necessary to succeed with a claim of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem? C. Whether the breach of the principle of audi alteram partem at the original stage can be cured, at the Revisional stage?
IV. DISCUSSION
14. Judicial review of administrative actions are permissible on the grounds of illegality, unreasonableness or irrationality and procedural irregularity 5 . Lord Diplock 6 succinctly described each of the aforementioned grounds for judicial review as under:
“By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the Judges, by whom the judicial power of the State is exercisable.
5 State of A.P. v. McDowell & Company, (1996) 3 SCC 709; Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651; and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC 374 (HL); Mohd. Mustafa v. Union of India, (2022) 1 SCC 294.
6 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC 374. 1184 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports By “irrationality” I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as “Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] unreasonableness”. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that Judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the court’s exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe’s ingenious explanation in Edwards v. Bairstow [Edwards v. Bairstow, 1956 AC 14 : (1955) 3 WLR 410 (HL)] , of irrationality as a ground for a court’s reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by the decision-maker. “Irrationality” by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by judicial review.
I have described the third head as “procedural impropriety” rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an Administrative Tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. But the instant case is not concerned with the proceedings of an Administrative Tribunal at all.”
15. It is equally well-settled that courts under its writ jurisdiction do not interfere with selections made by expert bodies by reassessing the comparative merits of the candidates. Interference with selections is limited to decisions vitiated by bias, malafides and violation of statutory provisions 7 . Additionally, this Court has also held that 7 Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan (1990) 1 SCC 305; Badrinath v. State of T.N. (2000) 8 SCC 395; National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. K. Kalyana Raman (1992) Supp. 2 SCC [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1185Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors. administrative action can be reviewed on the ground of proportionality if it affects fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India 8 .
16. In this case, our primary focus is on procedural impropriety and in particular, the breach of the principles of natural justice. The process for arriving at a decision is equally significant as the decision itself. If the procedure is not ‘fair’, the decision cannot be possibly endorsed. The principles of natural justice as derived from common law which guarantee ‘fair play in action’ 9 , has two facets which include rule against bias and the rule of fair hearing. Additionally, a reasoned order has also been regarded as a third facet of the principles of natural justice 10 and holds utmost significance in ensuring fairness of the process.
ISSUE A
17. The first issue that falls for our consideration is whether the selection stands vitiated on the ground of violation of the rule against bias. It must be borne in mind that when a statute specifies the procedure for administrative decision making, the principles of natural justice supplement but do not substitute the statutory procedure11 . However, even if the statute does not provide for the administrative procedure, the authorities are bound to make decisions in adherence to the principles of natural justice.
18. Let us now consider the relevant statutory provisions in the present case which operate alongside the common law principles. The Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997 is framed in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 53, sub-section (1) of Section 70 read with subsection (1) of Section 95 of Adhiniyam, 1993 is apposite. Rule 2(h) defines ‘Shiksha Karmi’ as under:
481; I.P.S. Dewan v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 383; UPSC v. Hiranyalal Dev (1988) 2 SCC 242; M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC (2008) 2 SCC 119 and UPSC v. M. Sathiya Priya (2018) 15 SCC 796 8 Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham
(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806
9 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 10 S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594; Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 981; CCI v. SAIL (2010) 10 SCC 744; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496 11 AK Kraipak v Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262 1186 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports “Shiksha Karmi” means the person appointed by Zila Panchayat or Janpad Panchayat, as the case may be, for teaching in the schools under their control.”
19. Rule 5 deals with ‘Methods of Selection and Recruitment’. Sub-rule 8 provides that the Selection Committee shall be constituted consisting of members as specified in Schedule II by the Zila Panchayat or the Janpad Panchayat, as the case ,may be. The relevant sub-Rule 9 reads as under:
(i) the Committee will assess the candidates called for interview and award marks in the following manner:
“a) 60% marks for marks obtained in the qualifying examination specified in Schedule II;
b) 25% marks for the teaching experience in the schools of concerning Janpad Panchayat or Zila Panchayat. Similar benefits will be given for teaching experience of equivalent rural school. The decision of the Committee on the validity and valuation of the certificate of teaching experience of rural schools will be final;
c) 15% marks for oral test which may include the test fori) communication skills in local dialect ii) knowledge of local environment iii) general knowledge iv) training and teaching aptitude and v) any other test which the Selection Committee may deem fit.
d) Other things remaining the same, preference, preference will be given to candidates who possess certificate in B. Ed, BTI or D. Ed.
e) All other things remaining the same, in the final selection, those who have teaching experience of schools of Janpad Panchayat or Zila Panchayat will be given preference.
(ii) Select list of each category shall be prepared on the basis of above assessment in order of merit and shall include 10% names in waiting list which shall be valid for six months.”
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1187Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.
20. The statutory Rules clearly specify the designation of those who must be included in the selection committee, as outlined in Schedule II of the Rules,1997. They are following:
“1. Chairperson, Standing Committee of Education of Janpad Panchayat;
2. Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat;
3. Block Education Officer (Member Secretary);
4. Two specialists in the subject to be nominated by the Standing Committee for Education of whom one shall be woman; and
5. All members from the Standing Committee of whom atleast one belongs to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or OBC, in case there is no SC/ST/OBC member in the Standing Committee then the same shall be nominated from the General Body.”
21. Therefore, ‘all members from the Standing Committee’ were required to be a part of the selection committee. It is also important to note that the following resolution was passed by the Standing Committee on recusal:
“(C) Letter No. 423/S.T.98 dated 26.07.1998 of the Collector, Chhatarpur was read over by Chief Executive Officer, in which it has been mentioned that at the time of recruitment of teachers those members and officers also take part in the interview whose close relatives are the candidates due to which the entire selection process is likely to be affected. Therefore, the directions are given toimmediately examine whether any candidate is the close relative of the member of the Committee in the interview. If any near relative of the member or the officer is the candidate, then such member or officer should not be present on the date of interview and any impartial person should be kept in his place. The Committee unanimously decided that if any close relative of any member, officer or subject expert appears for interview then the marks to be given by that member, officer or subject specialist should be given by Chief Executive Officer and that member, officer or subject expert shall not be present at the venue of interview. This resolution has been passed unanimously.” 1188 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
22. Rule 40 deals with the removal of office bearers of Panchayat and provides as under:
“40. Removal of office-bearers of Panchayat- (1) The State Government or the prescribed authority may after such enquiry as it may deem fit to make at any time, remove an office bearer-
(a) if he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties; or
(b) if his continuance in office is undesirable in the interest of the public: Provided that no person shall be removed unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed from his office.
Explanation-For the purpose of this sub-section “Misconduct” shall include-
(a) any action adversely affecting,-
(i) the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India; or
(ii) the harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of State transcending religious, linguistic, regional, caste or sectional diversities; or
(iii) the dignity of women; or
(b) gross negligence in the discharge of the duties under this Act;
[(c) the use of position or influence directly or indirectly to secure employment for any relative in the Panchayat or any action for extending any pecuniary benefits to any relative, such as giving out any type of lease, getting any work done through them in the Panchayat by an officebearer of Panchayat.
Explanation. - For the purpose of this clause, the expression “relative” shall mean father, mother, brother, sister, husband, wife, son, daughter, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother -inlaw, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law : ]”
23. The explanation to clause(c) provides for the definition of the expression ‘relative’ to mean ‘father, mother, brother, sister, husband, [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1189Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors. wife, son, daughter, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sisterin-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law’. Rule 100 of the Adhiniyam which has some relevance reads thus:
“100. Penalty for acquisition by a member, office bearer or servant of interest in contract. - If a member or office bearer or servant of Panchayat knowingly acquires, directly or indirectly any personal share or interest in any contract or employment, with, by or on behalf of a Panchayat without the sanction of or permission of the prescribed authority he shall be deemed to have committed an offense under Section 168 of the Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860).”
24. Having noted the relevant statutory provisions, a brief survey of the jurisprudence on the appropriate test for bias and the applicable standard of proof would now be in order before the statutory law and the common law principles are applied to the facts of the present case.
25. The principle of nemo judex causa sua found its origin in English law. In Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal12, the House of Lords in a case concerning pecuniary interest observed that the rule against bias extends not only to actual bias but also to the appearance of bias. This principle was later extended to other forms of interest in R v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy13 where it was held that ‘even a suspicion that there has been improper interference with the course of justice’, would lead to the vitiation of proceedings. Lord Hewart noted that it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. Lord Denning in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) v Lannon14 noted that, ‘if right minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a ‘real likelihood of bias’ on his part, he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision does not stand’. It was further held that ‘there must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it likely or probable that the justice, or chairman as the case may be, would, or did, favour one side at the expense of the other.’
26. The emphasis on ‘likely or probable’ as noted by Lord Denning, was considered in R v Gough 15 (for short “Gough”) where the Court 12 Dimes v. The Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HLC 759 13 [1924] 1 KB 256 14 (1969) 1 QB 577 15 R v. Gough, 1993 AC 646 1190 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports shifted the focus to the possibility of bias rather than its probability. The test articulated in Gough(supra), was whether there was a ‘real danger of bias’ rather than a ‘real likelihood’ of bias. It prioritised the court’s assessment of bias over the perception of a fair-minded and informed observer emphasising that the court ‘personifies the reasonable man’. This test was criticised in other common law jurisdictions for veering away from the public perception of bias. The House of Lords modified the said test in Porter v Magill 16 and pronounced as under:
“The Court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased, it must then ask whether those circumstances would lead to a fair minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the Tribunal was biased.”
27. Indian Courts have consistently adopted the ‘real likelihood’ test to determine bias 17 . In a recent decision in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Co. 18 , a constitution bench of this Court speaking through DY Chandrachud CJ(of which one of us was a member), summarised the Indian position thus:
“Although there have been vacillations about the test in England, the Indian courts have been largely consistent in their approach by applying the test of real likelihood of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias. Recently, the court has used the real danger of bias test. However, the above discussion shows that there is no significant difference between the real danger of bias test and the real possibility of bias test if the question of bias is inferred from the perspective of a reasonable or fair-minded person.”
28. Turning now to the facts of the present case, let us first examine whether the selection can be set aside if there are circumstances which would give rise to a reasonable likelihood of bias from the perspective of a fair-minded person:
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