Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 115; [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1009
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Surya Kant, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 28 Jan 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 413/2025
- Sections
- 112, 151, 7, 125, 26, 23, 55A, 4, 11
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[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1009 : 2025 INSC 115 Ivan Rathinam v.
Milan Joseph (Criminal Appeal No. 413 of 2025)
28 January 2025 [Surya Kant* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the presumption of legitimacy, if not displaced, determines paternity in law; whether the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the Original Suit and whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the Maintenance Petition; whether the second round of litigation, initiated by the Respondent, was barred by the principle of res judicata.
Headnotes† Evidence Act, 1872 – s.112 – Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy – Respondent and his mother claimed the appellant to be the respondent’s biological father despite the fact that the respondent was born during the subsistence of his mother’s marriage to ‘RK’ – Respondent’s mother alleged that she had an extra-marital relationship with the appellant due to which he was begotten – Presumption of legitimacy, when not displaced, whether determines paternity:
Held: : Legitimacy determines paternity u/s.112 until the presumption is successfully rebutted by proving ‘non-access’ – There exists a strong presumption that the husband is the father of the child borne by his wife during the subsistence of their marriage – Conclusive proof of legitimacy is equivalent to paternity – The object of this principle is to prevent any unwarranted enquiry into the parentage of a child – Since the presumption is in favour of legitimacy, the burden is cast upon the person who asserts ‘illegitimacy’ to prove it only through ‘non-access’ – Admittedly, when the Respondent was begotten in 2001, his mother and Mr. ‘RK’ were married – They had been married since 1989 and neither had ever questioned the validity of the marriage – They were, admittedly living under the same roof from 1989 till 2003, when they decided to separate – * Author 1010 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Thus, the Respondent’s mother and Mr. ‘RK’ had access to each other throughout their marriage, as concurrently held by the courts at multiple stages of litigation – Even assuming that the Respondent’s mother had relations with the Appellant during her marriage and especially when the Respondent was begotten, this per se would not be sufficient to displace the presumption of legitimacy – This allegation only shows that there were simultaneous access with the Respondent’s mother, by the Appellant and Mr. ‘RK’ – However, an ‘additional’ access or ‘multiple’ access does not automatically negate the access between the spouses and prove non-access thereof – Consequently, there is a statutory mandate that the Respondent must be presumed to be the son of Mr. ‘RK’ – Plea that ‘paternity’ and ‘legitimacy’ are distinct/independent concepts, rejected – High Court’s view that ‘paternity’ can be determined independent of the concurrent findings regarding the legitimacy of the child, unsustainable – Impugned judgment of the High Court and the order of the Family Court, set aside – Respondent is presumed to be the legitimate son of Mr. ‘RK’. [Paras 28, 32, 33, 70] Evidence Act, 1872 – s.112 – Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy – “access”; “non-access” – Meaning: Held: Access and non-access u/s.112 do not require a party to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they had or did not have sexual intercourse at the time the child could have been begotten – ‘Access’ merely refers to the possibility of an opportunity for marital relations – In cases where parties may be on non-speaking terms, engaging in extra-marital affairs, or residing in different houses in the same village, it does not necessarily preclude the possibility of the spouses having an opportunity to engage in marital relations – Non-access means the impossibility, not merely inability, of the spouses to have marital relations with each other – For a person to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, they must first assert ‘nonaccess’ substantiated by evidence. [Para 29] Constitution of India – Art.21 – Right to privacy and dignity – DNA Test – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.112 – Balancing of interests of the parties involved and the ‘eminent need’ for a DNA test – Respondent and his mother claimed the appellant to be the respondent’s biological father despite the fact that the respondent was born during his mother’s marriage to ‘RK’ – Respondent’s mother alleged that she had an extra-marital [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1011Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph relationship with the appellant due to which the Respondent was begotten – Respondent sought DNA test of the Appellant to prove his paternity claiming that he had the right to know his true parentage – On facts, is there an ‘eminent need’ for a DNA test:
Held: No – While permitting an enquiry into a person’s paternity through a DNA test, the Court must be mindful of the collateral infringement of privacy – It must satisfy itself that the threshold for the three conditions mentioned in K.S. Puttaswamy case is satisfied – Failure of even one of these conditions is an unwarranted invasion of privacy and consequently, of life and personal liberty u/Art.21 – Furthermore, the law permits only a preliminary enquiry into a person’s private life by allowing the parties to bring evidence on record to prove non-access to dislodge the presumption of legitimacy – When the evidence submitted does not rebut this presumption, the court cannot subvert the law to attain a particular object, by permitting a roving enquiry into a person’s private life through a DNA test – Respondent is already declared to be the legitimate son of Mr. ‘RK’ – Despite concurrent findings of three courts as to the legitimacy of the Respondent, he and his mother continued to claim that the Appellant is his biological father – Appellant maintained a consistent stance across all fora that he never had sexual relations with the Respondent’s mother – An order necessitating a DNA test based on mere allegations of adultery would violate the Appellant’s right to dignity and privacy – On facts, there is ample evidence to presume legitimacy and there is absolutely no confusion as to whether the presumption would apply – The balance of interest does not support mandating a DNA test, as it will have a disproportionately adverse impact on the Appellant and the Respondent’s mother – High Court erred in holding that the Respondent’s legitimate interest to know his father outweighs the infringement of the Appellant’s right to privacy and dignity. [Paras 38, 42, 44, 45, 51] DNA Test – ‘Eminent need’ for a DNA test – Balancing of interests of the parties involved; ‘eminent need’ for a DNA test– When can a DNA test be ordered – Factors to be considered: Held: There are two blockades to ordering a DNA test (i) insufficiency of evidence (ii) a positive finding regarding the balance of interests – Firstly, the courts must consider the existing evidence to assess the presumption of legitimacy and if that evidence is insufficient to 1012 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports come to a finding, only then should the court consider ordering a DNA test – Once the insufficiency of evidence is established, the court must consider whether ordering a DNA test is in the best interests of the parties involved and must ensure that it does not cause undue harm to the parties. [Para 47] Family Courts Act, 1984 – ss.7, 8 – Whether the Family Court can entertain proceedings for a declaration of legitimacy without a claim on the marital relationship – Present case, if fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court: Held: No – Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of a person however, it cannot entertain any proceedings for a declaration of legitimacy without a claim on the marital relationship – The jurisdiction conferred upon the Family Court is for the settlement of issues arising out of matrimonial causes – A matrimonial cause relates to the rights of marriage between a husband and wife – However, in the present case, there was no claim regarding the marital relationship between the Respondent’s mother and Mr. ‘RK’, and instead, it pertains to an alleged extra-marital relationship between the Appellant and the Respondent’s mother – Thus, the present matter did not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court and was thus, rightly entertained by the Munsiff Court and subsequently, the Sub-Judge Court. [Paras 56, 58] Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – s.151 – Family Courts Act, 1984 – s.7 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.125 – Respondent and his mother claimed the appellant to be the respondent’s biological father despite the fact that the respondent was born during his mother’s marriage to ‘RK’ – Respondent claimed maintenance from the Appellant – However, in view of the Munsiff Court order dismissing the Original Suit filed by respondent and his mother declaring the Appellant to be the Respondent’s father, Family Court closed the Maintenance Petition with the condition that it can be opened depending on the outcome of the civil proceedings – Whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the Maintenance Petition by imposing a condition on itself:
Held: By virtue of s.151, CPC r/w s.7, Family Courts Act, 1984, the Family Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the court’s process – Through its order dated 05.02.2010, the Family [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1013Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph Court merely kept the Maintenance Petition in abeyance only to be opened depending on the outcome of the civil proceedings – This condition was necessary in the interest of justice to avoid multiple proceedings, and it did not cause any prejudice to the rights of the parties – Order dated 05.02.2010 is valid – However, as the condition imposed was not satisfied, the Maintenance Petition could not have been revived or reopened – Thus, the Family Court erred in reviving the Maintenance Petition vide its order dated 09.11.2015 – Proceedings before the Family Court quashed. [Paras 59, 63] Doctrine of res judicata – Issue of legitimacy was decided in favour of the Appellant vide High Court’s order in 2011 which was not challenged and had thus, attained finality – Second round of litigation initiated by the Respondent, if was barred by res judicata:
Held: Yes – Vide High Court’s order in 2011, the issue of legitimacy was conclusively decided in favour of the Appellant – This order was never challenged and attained finality – As the lis stood adjudicated, no court of law, except in appeal, could have proceeded to decide the same issue arising between the same parties, regardless of whether it was incidental to other proceedings – The aspects of legitimacy and its effects on maintenance issues are interdependent – Thus, the Family Court in 2015 could not have revived the Maintenance Petition under the guise that the issue of maintenance would be entirely divorced from an analysis of the issue of legitimacy – Permitting a second round of litigation when the issue was already settled inter partes is a grave misuse of judicial time and resources – Family Court’s order dated 09.11.2015, reviving the Maintenance Petition, was ex-facie in contravention with the principles of res judicata. [Paras 66-68] DNA Test – Effects of, on all the stakeholders involved, especially women – Discussed.
Presumption of ‘Paternity’; ‘Legitimacy’ – Law in foreign jurisdictions vis à vis India – Discussed.
Case Law Cited Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy [2014] 11 SCR 553 : (2015) 1 SCC 365; Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik [2014] 1 SCR 120 : (2014) 2 SCC 576 – distinguished.
1014 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Sharda v. Dharmpal [2003] 3 SCR 106 : (2003) 4 SCC 493; Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram [2001] 3 SCR 729 : (2001) 5 SCC 311; Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia [2023] 4 SCR 680 : (2024) 7 SCC 773; Ashok Kumar v. Raj Gupta [2021] 6 SCR 1113 : (2022) 1 SCC 20; Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B. [1993] 3 SCR 917 : (1993) 3 SCC 418; Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women [2010] 9 SCR 457 : (2010) 8 SCC 633; K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India [2017] 10 SCR 569 : (2017) 10 SCC 1; X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) 9 SCC 433; Renubala Moharana v. Mina Mohanty (2004) 4 SCC 215 – referred to.
Bharat Kumar v. Selma Mini, 2007 (1) KLT 945; Alexander C. C v. Jacob Anthony Palakkandathi @ Amith and Anr., 2012 (2) KLT 36 – referred to.
In re H. and Others (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof) [1996] 2 WLR 8; Russell v. Russell (1924) AC 687; Preston- Jones v. Preston-Jones [1951] A.C. 391; Re Le [1968] 1 All ER 20; MS v. RS and Others [2021] Fam. 1; Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D., 1989 SCC OnLine US SC 116; Vargo v. Schwartz, 940A2d 459, 463 (Pa Super 2007); Callender v. Skiles, 591 NW2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999); In the Interest of JWT, 872 SW2d 189 (Tex. 1994). on; Hardy v. Hardy, 2011 Ark. 82; Kamp v. Dep’t of Human Services, 410 Md. 645, 980 A.2d 448 (2009); Williamson v. Williamson, 690 SE2d 257 (Ga App 2010); Ng Chian Perng v. Ng Ho Peng [1998] 2 CLJ Supp. 227; Alesiah Jumil & Chua Kin Han v. Julas Joenol [2013] 1 LNS 1213 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Halsbury's Laws of England, Children, Volume 9, 2023; Halsbury's Laws of England, Children, Volume 10, 2023; Leslie J. Harris, June Carbone, and Lee R. Teitelbaum, Family Law, 4th Edition, 2010; Mulla, The Civil Procedure Code, 20th Edition, Volume I, 2021. List of Acts Evidence Act, 1872; Constitution of India; Family Courts Act, 1984; Civil Procedure Code, 1908; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Guardianship of Infants Acts, 1886 and 1925; United Kingdom Family Law Reform Act, 1969; United Kingdom Family Law Reform Act, 1987; Uniform Parentage Act, 1973.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1015Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph List of Keywords Section 112 of Evidence Act, 1872; Legitimacy; Birth during marriage, Conclusive proof of legitimacy; Presumption of legitimacy; Paternity; Biological father; Subsistence of marriage; Extra-marital relationship; Parentage of a child; ‘Illegitimacy’; ‘Non-access’; Family Court jurisdiction; Matrimonial causes; Munsiff Court; Declaration of legitimacy; Claim on the marital relationship; Maintenance Petition revived; Principle of res judicata; Additional access; Multiple access; Child begotten; Marital relations; Rebut the presumption of legitimacy; DNA Test; Right to privacy and dignity; Balancing of interests of the parties; ‘Eminent need’ for a DNA test; Allegations of adultery; Insufficiency of evidence; Best interests of the parties; Second round of litigation; Principles of res judicata; Inherent powers; Interest of justice; Multiple proceedings; Legitimate son; Legitimacy of the child; Concurrent findings.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
413 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.05.2018 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in OPCRL No. 420 of 2015 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Romy Chacko, Sr. Adv., Anup Kumar, Ms. Shruti Singh, Ashwin Romy, Sachin Singh Dalal.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Shyam Padman, Sr. Adv., Naresh Kumar, Mukund P Unny, Piyo Harold.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Surya Kant, J.
Leave granted.
2. The instant appeal impugns the judgment dated 21.05.2018 passed by a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court (Ernakulam) (High 1016 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Court), upholding the Family Court’s order dated 09.11.2015 reviving a maintenance petition on the following grounds: (i) paternity and legitimacy are independent concepts in law; (ii) the Civil Courts did not have jurisdiction to entertain the original suit; and (iii) since only the Family Court can determine maintenance and legitimacy, the Family Court could proceed to determine paternity as incidental to the maintenance proceedings.
A. FACTS
A.1 First round of litigation
3. Since the instant appeal arises out of a long-drawn saga, during which multiple rounds of litigation occurred inter-se the parties before various fora, including this Court, it is necessary to narrate the factual events before delving into the legal issues raised before us. 3.1 It is a matter of record that the Respondent’s mother married Mr. Raju Kurian on 16.04.1989. In 1991, a daughter was born from this wedlock. Subsequently, the Respondent was born on 11.06.2001. Immediately after the Respondent’s birth, Mr. Raju Kurian’s name was entered as the ‘father’ of the Respondent in the Register of Birth maintained by the Municipal Corporation of Cochin. Owing to differences between them, in 2003, the Respondent’s mother and Mr. Raju Kurian began residing separately. Shortly thereafter, they moved a joint application for divorce, which was granted by the Family Court in 2006. The Respondent’s mother then approached the Municipal Corporation of Cochin, requesting the authorities to enter the Appellant’s name in the Register of Birth, as the father of the Respondent, in place of Mr. Raju Kurian’s name. She allegedly reasoned that such a request was being made on the basis that she had been involved in an extra-marital relationship with the Appellant, due to which the Respondent was begotten. In response, the Corporation authorities expressed that they would be able to grant such a request only if directed to do so by a court of law. 3.2 Consequently, the Respondent and his mother filed OS No. 425/2007 (Original Suit) before the First Additional Munsiff Court, Ernakulam (Munsiff Court) seeking a decree declaring the Appellant to be the Respondent’s father and a mandatory [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1017Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph injunction directing the Appellant to submit an application to include his name as the Respondent’s father in the relevant registers. Subsequently, the Respondent and his mother also moved an application seeking a direction to the Appellant to undergo a DNA test to prove his paternity.
3.3 The Munsiff Court directed the Appellant, on 03.11.2007, to undergo the paternity test. This direction was substantiated on the ground that, considering no matrimonial relationship subsisted between the Respondent’s mother and the Appellant, the presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 could not be drawn.
3.4 In the same year, the Respondent filed MC No. 224/2007 (Maintenance Petition) under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) before the Family Court, Alappuzha (Family Court) claiming maintenance from the Appellant, on the ground that he was his biological father. The Respondent filed the Maintenance Petition through his mother as he was a minor at that time. It is pertinent to note that Mr. Raju Kurian was not made a party to the Original Suit or the Maintenance Petition.
3.5 In this backdrop, having been aggrieved by the Munsiff Court’s order dated 03.11.2007, the Appellant filed WP (C) No. 37165/2007 before the High Court. On 18.03.2008, a Single Judge of the High Court: (i) disposed of the said Writ Petition;
(ii) set aside the order dated 03.11.2007; and (iii) directed the Munsiff Court to consider the matter in light of this Court’s judgment in Sharda v. Dharmpal, 1 which laid down that a court could order a paternity test only if the presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was displaced by proving non-access. The High Court further noted that it was well within the power of the court to direct a person to undergo a DNA test but that power could be exercised only if the applicant made out a strong prima facie case through sufficient material placed on record. In this regard, it noted that such an in-depth analysis had, however, not been conducted by the Munsiff Court.
1 Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003) 4 SCC 493.
1018 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 3.6 The Appellant then filed Review Petition No. 411/2008 before the High Court, contending that the correct law was laid down in Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram, 2 wherein this Court held that the results of a genuine DNA test would be insufficient to escape the conclusiveness of Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, especially when the spouses had access to each other. The Review Petition came to be decided by another Single Judge of the High Court on 03.07.2008, who allowed the same and disposed of the Writ Petition while clarifying that the court cannot permit a DNA test unless, after adducing evidence, it was convinced that the relevant stakeholders—the Respondent’s mother and Mr. Raju Kurian—had no access to each other when the Respondent was begotten.
3.7 This prompted the Respondent and his mother to prefer SLP (C) No. 20951/2008 before this Court, challenging the order dated 03.07.2008. This Court, on 14.09.2009, dismissed the same stating that no grounds to interfere were made out. 3.8 Approximately a year later, on 15.10.2009, the Munsiff Court dismissed the Original Suit with costs. The Munsiff Court held that there was no need to refer the parties to a DNA test as a valid marriage subsisted between the Respondent’s mother and Mr. Raju Kurian when the Respondent was begotten. Further, it was emphasized that they had been living as spouses under the same roof, from the date of their marriage until 2003, well after the Respondent’s birth. The Munsiff Court, thus, held that since the Respondent’s mother failed to prove non-access between herself and Mr. Raju Kurian, the Respondent would be presumed to be their legitimate son.
3.9 Thereafter on 05.02.2010, in view of the Munsiff Court’s order dated 15.10.2009, the Family Court closed the Maintenance Petition. However, the court imposed a condition permitting the revival of the Maintenance Petition if the Respondent or his mother filed an appeal or revision against the Munsiff Court’s order, and the appeal or revision thereafter favoured them. 3.10 The Respondent and his mother then preferred AS No. 150/2010 (First Appeal) before the III Additional Sub-Judge, Ernakulam 2 Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram, (2001) 5 SCC 311.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1019Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph (Sub-Judge), against the Munsiff Court’s decision dated 15.10.2009. However, the First Appeal was dismissed with costs vide the order dated 21.02.2011. The Sub-Judge based his decision on three prongs: (i) Mr. Raju Kurian would not have signed the consent letter, as the husband of the Respondent’s mother, in the hospital when the Respondent was born, if they had an estranged marital relationship; (ii) the Respondent’s mother and Mr. Raju Kurian were living together as spouses long before, during, and even after the Respondent’s birth; and (iii) the letters produced by the Respondent’s mother, where she claimed the Appellant admitted his paternity, were not proved to be written by the Appellant and thus, could not be relied upon. In this manner, the Sub-Judge held that the evidence adduced was insufficient to uproot the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. 3.11 The Respondent and his mother then filed RSA No. 973/2011 (Second Appeal) before the High Court, assailing the Sub- Judge’s order. A Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Second Appeal vide the judgment dated 28.10.2011. The Single Judge held that when the husband and wife were living under one roof, non-access could not be pleaded as they had the opportunity for a marital, sexual relationship. Further, the Single Judge noted that the conclusiveness of Section 112 could not be watered down merely because the mother was alleging paternity on someone other than her husband, especially when the husband was not a party to the proceedings. It is imperative to note that this order has not been challenged in any further proceedings since and has attained finality.
A.2 Second round of litigation 3.12 It seems that the dispute then attained quietus for some years, only to be resumed in 2015 when the Respondent filed an application before the Family Court, seeking to revive the Maintenance Petition. The reasons recorded in the said application were that the Respondent was facing various health issues and had undergone several surgeries, which he and his mother were unable to afford. Further, the Respondent claimed that he had also not been receiving any maintenance from Mr. Raju Kurian either for his medical or educational expenses. 1020 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports 3.13 On 09.11.2015, the Family Court revived the Maintenance Petition and allowed Mr. Raju Kurian to be impleaded as a party respondent. In its order, the Family Court observed that after the enactment and effectuation of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Family Court, alone, had the jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute regarding maintenance and the legitimacy of a person. It further highlighted that these matters are covered by explanation (e) and (f) of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. As a result, the Family Court held the order passed by the Munsiff Court to be devoid of jurisdiction. As a corollary thereto, it was elucidated that the Family Court was not bound by its earlier order dated 05.02.2010 as the Munsiff Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the Original Suit. Lastly, the Family Court observed that since the question in a proceeding under Section 125 of the CrPC does not concern legitimacy, the earlier orders of the Munsiff Court, the Sub-Judge, and the High Court would not impede the Family Court from determining the question of paternity.
3.14 Challenging this order of the Family Court, the Appellant filed Crl. (OP) No. 420/2015 before the High Court. In this regard, the Appellant contended that the Respondent was not entitled to institute a revival memo owing to the Family Court’s order dated 05.02.2010, imposing a condition on itself to reopen the case. Further, the Appellant contended that since the Original Suit was filed for a declaration of paternity and the order dated 28.10.2011 had attained finality, the issue in question had already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction and could not be re-agitated.
3.15 The High Court, vide the impugned judgment dated 21.05.2018, primarily determined that: (i) the legitimacy of birth was irrelevant when considering the right of the child to receive maintenance from their biological father; (ii) the presumption of legitimacy does not prevent an enquiry into the true paternity of a child;
(iii) since ‘paternity’ and ‘legitimacy’ operate in different spheres, a declaration on the legitimacy of a child by a Civil Court would not impede an enquiry into ‘paternity’ by the Family Court, for the purpose of determining maintenance; and (iv) the Civil Courts lacked jurisdiction to determine the legitimacy of the Respondent, owing to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1021Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph 3.16 Thus, aggrieved by this decision, the Appellant preferred the instant appeal.
B. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
4. Mr. Romy Chacko, Learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the Appellant, contended that the High Court erred in its decision and adduced the following submissions:
(a) Since the Respondent failed to prove non-access between the spouses when the Respondent was begotten, there is conclusive proof that the Respondent is the legitimate child of Mr. Raju Kurian. When legitimacy is established, the Respondent can claim maintenance only from his ‘legitimate’ father, not a thirdparty, whom he claims to be his biological father. Consequently, under such circumstances, the Appellant could not be ordered to undergo a DNA test.
(b) The prayer in the Original Suit was for a declaration that the Appellant is the Respondent’s father, thus, making it a suit for determining paternity. Since this issue was decided concurrently by three courts, the question pertaining to paternity could not have been reopened under the guise of ‘maintenance’ by the Family Court. In any case, the condition permitting reopening had not been fulfilled.
5. Per contra, Mr. Shyam Padman, Learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the Respondent, put forth the following submissions:
(a) It is well-settled that ‘paternity’ and ‘legitimacy’ are distinct concepts. While legitimacy can be determined through a legal presumption, paternity is a matter of science. Thus, a civil suit concerning the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 would not have any bearing on the determination of ‘paternity.’ Further, it is in the best interests of the child that the Appellant undergoes a DNA test, as the child has the right to know his real parentage and accrue the rights emanating therefrom.
(b) Paternity, as a concept, is intrinsically connected with maintenance; and maintenance can be claimed from the biological father even when the child is illegitimate. Since maintenance can only be decided by the Family Court, under 1022 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports explanation (f) of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, it is well within its jurisdiction to also determine paternity when posed with the question of maintenance.
(c) The Family Court was entitled to revive the Maintenance Petition because the condition for its revival was bad in law as legitimacy and paternity are different concepts, independent of each other. Thus, the revival of the Maintenance Petition concerning paternity, could not be determined based on a finding of legitimacy in a civil suit.
C. ISSUES
6. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions at length, the following issues arise for the consideration of this Court: i. Whether the presumption of legitimacy, if not displaced, determines paternity in law?
ii. Whether the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the Original Suit; and accordingly, whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the Maintenance Petition?
iii. Whether the second round of litigation, initiated by the Respondent, was barred by the principle of res judicata?
D. ANALYSIS
D.1 Issue No. 1: Displacing the presumption of legitimacy and permitting a DNA test
7. The issue herein is regarding the effect of the conclusive presumption of legitimacy, how it can be displaced, and under what circumstances a court may order a DNA test. To this end, the Appellant argued that the presumption of legitimacy is conclusive until it is rebutted by leading evidence reflecting non-access between the spouses when the child was begotten. Only when non-access is made out, the court may order a DNA test. The Appellant further argued that the result of such a DNA test may bastardize an innocent child and violate the right to privacy and dignity of the persons involved. An order for a DNA test, therefore, must be resorted to sparingly. In support of these contentions, the Appellant cited decisions such as [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1023Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia,3 Ashok Kumar v. Raj Gupta,4 and Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B.,5 among others.
8. Per contra, the Respondent argued that even a positive finding by a Court regarding the legitimacy of a child would not be sufficient to prove paternity for the purpose of maintenance. Further, the Respondent argued that Courts have ordered DNA tests because it is within the best interests of the child to know their biological father. In support of their contentions, the Respondent cited decisions such as Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy6 and Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women.7
9. We are of the considered view that this issue hinges on two primary prongs requiring detailed analysis: (i) the difference between legitimacy and paternity, and consequently, the circumstances under which the presumption of legitimacy is displaced to permit an enquiry into paternity; and (ii) the exercise of ‘balancing of interests’ and evaluating the eminent need for a DNA test.
D.1.1 Displacing the notion of legitimacy
10. The Respondent has vehemently argued that ‘legitimacy’ and ‘paternity’ are different concepts—the former being rooted in law while the latter is rooted in science. The High Court upheld this view and thereby, permitted the revival of the maintenance proceedings as an enquiry into ‘paternity,’ not ‘legitimacy.’
11. In this vein, we agree that scientifically and technically, a legitimate child, i.e. one born during the subsistence of a valid marriage between two persons, may not always be the biological child of the persons in the marriage. In our view, it would be possible and easy to contemplate such a situation arising, which leads us to the postulation that in a more technical sense, the terms ‘legitimacy’ and ‘paternity’ may indeed undertake different meanings.
12. The question that, however, arises is whether the law contemplates and accepts such a differentiation. To answer this, we deem it 3 Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, (2024) 7 SCC 773. 4 Ashok Kumar v. Raj Gupta, (2022) 1 SCC 20.
5 Goutam Kundu v. State of W.B., 1993 (3) SCC 418.
6 Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy, (2015) 1 SCC 365.
7 Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State Commission for Women, (2010) 8 SCC 633. 1024 [2025] 1 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports appropriate to investigate the law governing the presumption of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘paternity’ globally, followed by its analysis in India. D.1.1.1 Position in the UK
13. The presumption of legitimacy comes from the maxim, “pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant” which means, “he is the father whom the marriage indicates to be so.” Since time immemorial, English Courts upheld that where a husband and wife cohabited and no evidence of impotency was forthcoming, the child is conclusively presumed to be legitimate even though the wife is known to have been guilty of infidelity. 8 To date, the presumption that a child born in wedlock is legitimate, has held the floor. 9 Earlier, the courts held that evidence from the spouses to disprove legitimacy was inadmissible. 10 Over time, this strict rule was relaxed and the parties were permitted to rebut this presumption by claiming non-access and leading evidence accordingly.11
14. Advances in science and social transformation led to the passing of the Family Law Reform Act, 1969.12 It was later replaced by the Family Law Reform Act, 1987. 13 Initially, the presumption of legitimacy could only be rebutted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 14 However, by virtue of section 26 of the 1969 Act, the presumption could be rebutted on a simple balance of probabilities. 15 This legislation also empowered the courts to conduct paternity tests to determine the biological father of the child, 16 even without the guardian’s consent. 17
15. Any person could apply to the High Court for a declaration as to whether that person is the parent of another person.18 The court may refuse to hear the application if it considers that the determination of 8 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Children, Volume 9, 2023; Halsbury’s Laws of England, Children, Volume 10, 2023.
9 In re H. and Others (Minors) (Sexual Abuse: Standard of Proof), [1996] 2 WLR 8. 10 Russell v. Russell, (1924) AC 687.
11 In re Guardianship of Infants Acts, 1886 and 1925, AND In re S. B. An Infant., [1949] Ch. 108. 12 United Kingdom Family Law Reform Act, 1969.
13 United Kingdom Family Law Reform Act, 1987.
14 Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones [1951] A.C. 391.
15 In re H. and Others, supra note 9.
16 1987 Act, supra note 13, Section 23.
17 Re Le, [1968] 1 All ER 20.
18 1987 Act, supra note 13, Section 55A.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1025Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph the application would not be in the best interests of the child. Despite this, the Family Court has continued to uphold the rule that ‘access’ must be proved with cogent evidence, and that it is insufficient to merely show that opportunities for sexual intercourse existed.19
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