Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1113; [2025] 10 S.C.R. 131
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R Mahadevan
- Decided
- 12 Sept 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 4002/2025
- Sections
- 223, 528, 482, 120B, 218, 379, 380, 212, 219, 71
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:21 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 131 : 2025 INSC 1113 Mamman Khan v.
State of Haryana (Criminal Appeal No. 4002 of 2025)
12 September 2025 [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the orders of the trial court, as affirmed by the High Court, directing segregation of the appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused and requiring the filing of a separate charge sheet solely on the ground that the appellant is a sitting MLA, legally sustainable.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.219 to 223 – Joint trials – Segregation of trial – Permissibility – Appellant-MLA arrayed as one of the accused person along with others , in connection with large-scale communal violence in the Nuh District – Joint proceedings commenced – However, the trial court directed the police to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant and consequently, segregated his trial from that of the co-accused – Pursuant thereto, the police filed separate charge sheets against the appellant, and charges were framed – Appellant sought quashing of the order of segregation of his trial – High Court dismissed the petitions, and upheld the segregation – Sustainability:
Held: Order of the trial court directing segregation of the appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused, cannot be sustained – No allegation that the acts attributed to the appellant arise from a distinct transaction, or that a joint trial would prejudice the prosecution – On the contrary, the prosecution’s own case rests on an overarching conspiracy, and interlinked evidence – Segregation was ordered not on any legally recognized ground such as distinct facts, severable evidence, or demonstrated prejudice but solely on account of the appellant’s political office which cannot be justified – Preferential segregation militates against the equality principle enshrined in Art.14 – Only ground recorded was the delay occasioned by the * Author 132 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports non-appearance of certain co-accused – Appellant was regularly before the court – No finding recorded that a joint trial would delay proceedings or cause prejudice to the appellant – Segregation order passed suo motu by the trial court, without notice or application, violates the basic principles of procedural fairness inherent in Art.21 – Evidence against the appellant is identical to that against the co-accused – Separate trials would necessarily involve recalling the same witnesses, resulting in duplication, delay, and the risk of inconsistent findings – High Court confined itself to the discretionary language of s.223 without evaluating whether the factual circumstances justified such segregation – Thus, the segregation of the appellant’s trial, without any legally recognized justification, unsustainable in law and violative of the appellant’s right to a fair trial u/Art.21 – No person, whether a sitting MLA or an ordinary citizen can be subjected to procedural disadvantage or preferential treatment without express legal justification – While expeditious disposal of cases involving legislators is undoubtedly desirable, such administrative prioritization cannot override the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the Cr.P.C. or the constitutional mandate of equality – Segregating the appellant’s trial solely on account of his political office, in the absence of any legal or factual necessity, amounts to arbitrary classification and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process – Impugned orders passed by the trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court set aside – Direction to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant and the segregation of his trial quashed – Matter remitted to the trial court – Constitution of India – Art.14, 21. [Paras 14, 15, 16.1-24] Case Law Cited Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India [2023] 14 SCR 266 : (2024) 1 SCC 185; Nasib Singh v. State, 2021 OnLine SC 94 – held inapplicable.
R. Dinesh Kumar v. State [2015] 5 SCR 605 : (2015) 7 SCC 497; State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao [1964] 3 SCR 297 : AIR 1963 SC 1850 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 671; Chandra Bhal v. State of U.P. (1971) 3 SCC 983 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 290 – referred to. List of Acts Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India. [2025] 10 S.C.R. 133Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana List of Keywords Segregation; Filing of separate charge sheet; Sitting MLA; Joint trials; Segregation of trial; Large-scale communal violence in the Nuh District; Joint proceedings; Separate charge-sheet; Overarching conspiracy; Interlinked evidence; Expeditious disposal of criminal cases involving MPs/MLAs; Principal District Judge; Non-appearance of certain co-accused; Fair trial; Art.21 of the Constitution; Principles of procedural fairness; Separate trial. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
4002 of 2025 From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.2024 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRMM No. 61515 of 2024 With Criminal Appeal No. 4003 of 2025 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Dr. S Muralidhar, Sr. Adv., Prasanna S., Ms. Rupali Samuel, MA Karthik, Ms. Ninni Susan Thomas, Ms. Pallak Bhagat.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Deepak Thukral, A.A.G., Akshay Amritanshu, Ms. Pragya Upadhyay, Ms. Drishti Saraf, Nikhil Goyal, Ravi Vashisht.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment R. Mahadevan, J.
Leave granted in both the SLPs.
2. These appeals have been preferred against the common judgment and order dated 12.12.2024 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh 1 , whereby the High Court dismissed the 1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
134 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports appellant’s petitions bearing CRM-M-Nos. 61515 and 61516 of 2024, filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 19732 ) seeking to quash the orders dated 02.09.2024 and 28.08.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nuh 3 . By the said orders, the trial Court directed the prosecution to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant and ordered segregation of his trial from that of the co-accused in respect of:
• FIR No.149 dated 01.08.2023 registered under sections 148, 149, 153A, 379A, 395, 397, 427, 436, 506, 201, 120B, 107 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 4 , and • FIR No.150 dated 01.08.2023 registered under sections 148, 149, 153A, 379A, 395, 427, 436, 506, 201, 120B, 107 and 180 IPC, respectively, both registered at Police Station Nagina, District Nuh.
3. The factual matrix of the present cases is as follows:
3.1. The appellant is a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) from Ferozepur Jhirka Constituency in Haryana and has been arrayed as one of the accused in FIR Nos.149 and 150 both dated 01.08.2023 registered at Police Station Nagina, District Nuh, in connection with large-scale communal violence that took place in the Nuh District on 31.07.2023.
3.2. During the course of investigation, multiple individuals were named as accused, and joint proceedings commenced before the trial Court. However, by orders dated 28.08.2024 and 02.09.2024, the trial Court directed the concerned Station House Officer to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant and consequently, segregated his trial from that of the co-accused.
3.3. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the police filed separate charge sheets against the appellant, charges were framed on 25.11.2024, and the prosecution commenced evidence, with some witnesses already examined.
2 For short, “Cr.P.C”
3 For short, “the trial Court”
4 For short, “IPC”
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 135Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana
3.4. Aggrieved by the segregation of his trial, the appellant filed CRM-M -Nos.61515 and 61516 of 2024 before the High Court for quashing the aforesaid orders. However, by a common judgment dated 12.12.2024, the High Court dismissed both petitions, and upheld the segregation.
3.5. Hence, the appellant has come forward with the present appeals before this Court.
4. Assailing the impugned judgment, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant, a sitting MLA, has been falsely implicated in the FIRs concerning the communal violence in Nuh District on 31.07.2023. The investigation itself revealed that the appellant was not present at the location of the incident, and that there is no material evidence linking him to the alleged offences. Nevertheless, the relief sought herein is confined only to setting aside the segregation of his trial from that of the co-accused.
4.1. It was contended that the trial Court directed segregation of the appellant’s trial solely on the ground that he is a sitting MLA, which reasoning is arbitrary, legally untenable, and amounts to a miscarriage of justice. Section 223(d) Cr.P.C. provides that persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction shall be tried jointly. Joint trials are the rule, and separate trials are permissible only in exceptional circumstances expressly contemplated by law. In the present case, the alleged offences, including rioting and conspiracy under Section 120B IPC, arise from the same issue; hence, it is impermissible to try the alleged conspirator separately from the principal perpetrators.
4.2. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the trial Court placed reliance on the directions issued by this Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India5 , to justify the segregation.
However, those directions merely call for prioritization of trials involving MPs/MLAs for expeditious disposal and do not permit deviation from the statutory scheme, nor authorize separate charge-sheets or trials solely on the basis of accused’s political status.
5 (2024) 1 SCC 185
136 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
4.3. Reference was made to the decisions in Nasib Singh v. State6 , State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao7 , and R.
Dinesh Kumar v. State8 , which establish that when offences form part of the same transaction, a joint trial is mandatory, and that multiplicity of trials arising from the same incident must be avoided as it causes injustice, prejudice, and delay.
4.4. It was further urged that the trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing the police to file a separate charge-sheet, as the discretion to file charge-sheets lies exclusively with the investigating agency. Even when separate charge-sheets are filed, if the offences arise out of the same transaction, they must necessarily be tried jointly. Sections 218 – 223 Cr.P.C make it clear that “distinct” offences refer to unconnected or independent acts. In the present case, the alleged conspiracy links the appellant with the co-accused, making separate trials legally impermissible.
4.5. It was argued that segregation would enable the prosecution to tailor its evidence based on prior cross-examination, thereby causing serious prejudice to the appellant as well as the co-accused. It would also expose the appellant to multiple proceedings for the same transaction, in violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution (protection against double jeopardy) and the fundamental right to a fair trial under Article 21.
4.6. Finally, it was submitted that neither delay in the appearance of co-accused nor the desire for expeditious trial provides lawful justification for segregation. The Code of Criminal Procedure permits separate trials only in exceptional circumstances, such as the absconding of co-accused or the existence of distinct transactions – conditions that are absent in the present case.
4.7. On these grounds, it was prayed that the impugned orders of the trial Court and the High Court be set aside, and a direction be issued for a joint trial of the appellant along with the coaccused, in accordance with law.
6 2021 OnLine SC 94
7 AIR 1963 SC 1850
8 (2015) 7 SCC 497
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 137Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent opposed the appeals and submitted that the appellant challenges the legality of the orders dated 28.08.2024 and 02.09.2024 passed by the trial Court in Session Cases arising out of FIR Nos.150 and 149 of 2023, respectively. By these orders, the trial Court directed the Station House Officer to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant, who is a sitting MLA, and accordingly, segregated his trial from that of the co-accused. In compliance, separate charge sheets were filed against the appellant, charges were framed on 25.11.2024, and the prosecution has already commenced evidence with several witnesses having been examined.
5.1. It was contended that the segregation of the appellant’s trial was necessitated to ensure judicial efficiency, as the presence of 43 accused in FIR No.149 and 28 accused in FIR No.150 had rendered the conduct of a joint trial logistically and procedurally cumbersome. Repeated non-appearance of certain co-accused had already resulted in considerable delay.
5.2. Learned counsel submitted that the segregation was intended to prevent further delay in proceedings and, in fact, facilitates early disposal. The measure does not, in any manner, prejudice the appellant’s rights.
5.3. It was further argued that under Section 218 Cr.P.C., the general rule is that each offence shall be tried separately. While Section 223 enables joint trials, it is couched in discretionary terms and must be applied only in appropriate cases depending on the circumstances.
5.4. Reliance was placed on Nasib Singh v. State (supra), where this Court held that the test for permitting a joint trial includes consideration of whether it would prejudice the accused or cause delay in the proceedings. In the present case, the appellant failed to establish any real or specific prejudice arising out of the separate trial.
5.5. Further reliance was placed on Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay wherein, this Court directed all courts to prioritize expeditious disposal of criminal cases involving elected public representatives. The action of the trial Court is in consonance with these directions and is aimed at ensuring speedy adjudication.
138 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
5.6. It was submitted that the right to a speedy trial is an essential facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. The segregation of the appellant’s trial subserves this constitutional guarantee by enabling timely progress of the case.
5.7. On these premises, the learned counsel prayed for dismissal of the appeals and for upholding of the impugned orders directing segregation of the appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused, submitting that the same are legally sound, procedurally proper, and constitutionally justified.
6. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned senior counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent and have carefully perused the materials available on record.
6.1. On 19.12.2024, when SLP (Crl.) No. 18089 of 2024 was taken up for consideration, this Court granted an order of stay of further proceedings in S.C. No. 478 of 2024 pending before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Nuh), Haryana. Subsequently, by order dated 31.01.2025 in SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 58851 of 2024, this Court granted an order of stay of further proceedings in S.C. No. 485 / 2024.
7. The principal issue that arises for determination in these appeals is whether the orders of the trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court, directing segregation of the appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused and requiring the filing of a separate charge sheet solely on the ground that the appellant is a sitting MLA, are legally sustainable.
8. Apparently, FIR Nos.149 and 150 of 2023, were registered in the aftermath of large-scale communal violence in the Nuh district of Haryana, which resulted in serious law and order disturbances, loss of lives, and extensive damage to both public and private property. These FIRs named several individuals, including the present appellant, and alleged the commission of offences such as rioting, dacoity, mischief by fire, and criminal intimidation.
9. The prosecution case proceeds on the basis of an overarching conspiracy said to involve all the accused persons. The charge sheet reflects a consolidated investigative approach, founded upon common evidence, such as call detail records, electronic communications, video footage, witness statements, and forensic reports. It is undisputed that the prosecution relies upon largely common witnesses and interlinked evidence against all the accused. [2025] 10 S.C.R. 139Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana
10. Despite the unified nature of the allegations, the trial Court ordered segregation of the appellant’s trial on the premise that proceedings were being delayed due to the repeated non-appearance of certain co-accused. The court also noted that, since the appellant is a sitting MLA, his trial needed to be taken up on a day-to-day basis in view of the directions issued by this Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India (supra), concerning expeditious disposal of cases against legislators. Consequently, by orders dated 28.08.2024 and 02.09.2024, the trial Court directed the police to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant. Agrieved thereby, the appellant preferred Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions seeking quashing of the proceedings, which came to be dismissed by the High Court.
11. In the present appeals, the challenge has been confined to the segregation of the appellant’s trial. The appellant submits that the offences alleged against him arise out of the same transaction as those involving the co-accused, and hence, by virtue of Section 223 Cr.P.C., a joint trial ought to have been conducted. It is not the prosecution’s case that the acts attributed to the appellant are distinct or severable. According to the appellant, conducting a separate trial would result in serious prejudice to him and impair his right to a fair trial.
11.1. On the other hand, the respondent contends that segregation was necessitated by the mandate of this Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay (supra), which requires expeditious disposal of criminal cases involving elected representatives. It is further stated that the direction was purely procedural and intended to obviate delay caused by the abscondence of certain co-accused, while ensuring that the trial of the appellant proceeds in a timely manner.
12. Before addressing the question of the legal permissibility of such segregation, it would be apposite to extract the relevant portions of the trial Court’s orders dated 28.08.2024 and 02.09.2024, as affirmed by the High Court, which read as under:
Order dated 28.08.2024 “….
In the present case, one of the accused namely Sh.
Mamman Khan is MLA of Haryana. The present case is 140 [2025] 10 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports not progressing on account of absence of one accused or the other. On the other hand, as per direction issued by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the cases of MPs/MLAs are to be decided on priority basis by taking up the case on day to day basis. The case has been identified for current action plan and therefore, in the interest of justice and fitness of things, case of accused Mamman Khan is to be tried separately.
The concerned Ahlmad of this Court is directed to issue notice to SHO of Police Station Nagina today itself through Naib Court of this Court with direction to prepare and file a separate challan of accused Mamman Khan.”
Order dated 02.09.2024 “… One of the accused namely Mamman Khan is sitting MLA of Haryana and therefore, his case is to be taken up on day to day basis as per instructions issued by Hon’ble Supreme Court from time to time. The case is not proceeding further as there are large number of accused and some of them are absent and other seek adjournment on one pretext or the other.
Resultantly, notice be issued to SHO of Police Station Nagina to file separate challan of accused Mamman Khan on the next date of hearing.”
12.1. A plain reading of the above orders makes it clear that the segregation was directed solely on account of the appellant’s status as an MLA, so as to facilitate a day-to-day trial in purported compliance with the directions of this Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay (supra). Significantly, the record discloses that no notice was issued to the appellant prior to passing of the segregation order, nor was there any application filed by the prosecution seeking such a course of action. The segregation was thus ordered suo motu, without affording the appellant an opportunity of hearing.
13. The statutory scheme under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is clear. Sections 218 to 223 lay down the framework governing the [2025] 10 S.C.R. 141Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana joinder and separation of charges and trials. Section 218 embodies the general rule that each distinct offence shall be tried separately. However, the Code carves out specific exceptions to this rule in Sections 219 to 223, where joint trials are permissible in the interests of justice.
13.1. In particular, Section 223(d) provides that persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction may be charged and tried together. The legislative intent underlying these provisions is three-fold: (i)to prevent multiplicity of proceedings, (ii) to avoid the risk of conflicting judgments on the same evidence, and (iii) to promote judicial economy while ensuring fairness to the accused. For ease of reference, the relevant provisions are set out below:
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.