Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1158; [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1515
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Manmohan
- Decided
- 25 Sept 2025
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1755/2010
- Sections
- 138, 64, 530, 147, 255, 223, 143, 251, 274, 143A, 118, 139
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:18 am. Original source ↗
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[2025] 9 S.C.R. 1515 : 2025 INSC 1158 Sanjabij Tari v.
Kishore S. Borcar & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1755 of 2010)
25 September 2025 [Manmohan* and N.V. Anjaria, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The present appeal has been filed challenging the ex-parte judgment and order dated 16.04.2009 passed by the High Court acquitting the respondent no.1-accused u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and reversing the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.
Headnotes† Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Chapter XVII (Sections 138 to 148):
Held: The provisions contained in Chapter XVII provide that where any cheque drawn by a person for the discharge of any liability is returned by the bank unpaid for the reason of the insufficiency of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account on which the cheque was drawn or for the reason that it exceeds the arrangements made by the drawer of the cheque with the banker for that account, the drawer of such cheque shall be deemed to have committed an offence – In that case, the drawer, without prejudice to the other provisions of the said Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. [Para 13] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Chapter XVII (Sections 138 to 148) – Intent of:
Held: The intent behind introducing Chapter XVII is to restore the credibility of cheques as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment and to promote a culture of using cheques – Further, by criminalizing the act of issuing cheques without sufficient funds or * Author 1516 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports for other specified reasons, the law promotes financial discipline, discourages irresponsible practices and allows for a more efficient and timely resolution of disputes compared to the previous pure civil remedy which was found to involve the payee in a long-drawn out process of litigation. [Para 14] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.118 and 139 – District Courts and High Courts are not giving effect to presumptions: Held: This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that some District Courts and some High Courts are not giving effect to the presumptions incorporated in Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act and are treating the proceedings under the NI Act as another civil recovery proceedings and are directing the complainant to prove the antecedent debt or liability – This Court is of the view that such an approach is not only prolonging the trial but is also contrary to the mandate of Parliament, namely, that the drawer and the bank must honour the cheque, otherwise, trust in cheques would be irreparably damaged. [Para 21] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Keeping in view the massive backlog of cheque bouncing cases, the following directions are issued:
Held: i) In all cases filed u/s.138 of the NI Act, service of summons shall not be confined through prescribed usual modes but shall also be issued dasti i.e. summons shall be served upon the accused by the complainant in addition – The Trial Courts shall further resort to service of summons by electronic means in terms of the applicable Notifications/Rules, if any, framed under sub- Sections 1 and 2 of s.64 and under Clause (i) of Section 530 and other provisions of the BNSS, 2023 like Delhi BNSS (Service of Summons and Warrants) Rules, 2025; (ii) The complainant shall file an affidavit of service before the Court – In the event such affidavit is found to be false, the Court shall be at liberty to take appropriate action against the complainant in accordance with law;
(iii) In order to facilitate expeditious settlement of cases u/s.138 of the NI Act, the Principal District and Sessions Judge of each District Court shall create and operationalise dedicated online payment facilities through secure QR codes or UPI links – The complainant shall also be informed of such payment and upon confirmation of receipt, appropriate orders regarding release of such money and compounding/closure of proceedings u/s.147 of the NI Act and/ [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1517Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr. or s.255 of Cr.PC/278 BNSS, 2023 may be passed by the Court in accordance with law; (iv) Each and every complaint u/s.138 of the NI Act shall contain a synopsis in the format which shall be filed immediately after the index (at the top of the file) i.e. prior to the formal complaint; (v) This Court directs that there shall be no requirement to issue summons to the accused in terms of s.223 of BNSS i.e., at the pre-cognizance stage; (vi) Since the object of s.143 of the NI Act is quick disposal of the complaints u/s.138 by following the procedure prescribed for summary trial under the Code – The Trial Courts shall record cogent and sufficient reasons before converting a summary trial to summons trial – The Trial Court shall be at liberty (at the initial post cognizance stage) to ask questions, it deems appropriate, u/s.251 Cr.PC/s.274 BNSS, 2023; (vii) The Court shall record the responses to the questions in the ordersheet in the presence of the accused and his/her counsel and thereafter determine whether the case is fit to be tried summarily under Chapter XXI of the Cr.PC/Chapter XXII of the BNSS, 2023; (viii) Wherever, the Trial Court deems it appropriate, it shall use its power to order payment of interim deposit as early as possible u/s.143A of the NI Act; (ix) Since physical courtrooms create a conducive environment for direct and informal interactions encouraging early resolution, the High Courts shall ensure that after service of summons, the matters are placed before the physical Courts – Exemptions from personal appearances should be granted only when facts so warrant – It is clarified that prior to the service of summons the matters may be listed before the digital Courts; (x) Wherever cases u/s.138 of the NI Act are permitted to be heard and disposed of by evening courts, the High Courts should ensure that pecuniary limit of the cheque amount is realistic; (xi) Each District and Sessions Judge in Delhi, Mumbai and Calcutta shall maintain a dedicated dashboard reflecting the pendency and progress of cases u/s.138 of the NI Act – The dashboard shall include, inter alia, details regarding total pendency, monthly disposal rates, percentage of cases settled/compounded, average number of adjournments per case and the stage-wise breakup of pending matters – The District and Sessions Judges in aforesaid jurisdictions shall conduct monthly reviews of the functioning of Magistrates handling NI Act matters; (xii) The Chief Justices of Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta are requested to form Committee on the Administrative side to monitor pendency and to ensure expeditious disposal of s.138 of the NI Act cases. [Para 36] 1518 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Guidelines for compounding offences under the NI Act nearly fifteen years back in Damodar S. Prabhu are modified:
Held: (a) If the accused pays the cheque amount before recording of his evidence (namely defence evidence), then the Trial Court may allow compounding of the offence without imposing any cost or penalty on the accused; (b) If the accused makes the payment of the cheque amount post the recording of his evidence but prior to the pronouncement of judgment by the Trial Court, the Magistrate may allow compounding of the offence on payment of additional 5% of the cheque amount with the Legal Services Authority or such other Authority as the Court deems fit; (c) Similarly, if the payment of cheque amount is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in Revision or Appeal, such Court may compound the offence on the condition that the accused pays 7.5% of the cheque amount by way of costs; (d) Finally, if the cheque amount is tendered before this Court, the figure would increase to 10% of the cheque amount. [Para 38] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – s.138 – Respondent no.1accused was u/s.138 of N.I. Act – The High Court acquitted the respondent no.1-accused u/s.138 of the NI Act and reversing the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court – Correctness:
Held: In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by the respondent no.1-accused – This Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption u/s.118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption u/s.139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arises against the accused – It is pertinent to mention that in the present case, the respondent no.1-accused has filed no documents and/or examined any independent witness or led any evidence with regard to the financial incapacity of the appellant-complainant to advance the loans in question – Furthermore, the fact that the accused has failed to reply to the statutory notice u/s.138 of the NI Act leads to an inference that there is merit in the appellantcomplainant’s version – The High Court’s finding that the respondent no.1-accused’s defence that a signed blank cheque was issued [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1519Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr. by him so as to enable his friend/appellant-complainant to obtain a loan from a bank was sufficient to rebut the presumptions u/ ss.118 and 139 of the NI Act is unbelievable and absurd – Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court dated 16.04.2009 is set aside and the judgment as well as the orders of Trial Court and Sessions Court are restored with a direction to the respondent no.1-accused to pay Rs.7,50,000/-. [Paras 15, 22, 29, 32] Case Law Cited Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant [2022] 4 SCR 442 : (2022) 6 SCC 735; P. Mohanraj and Others v. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited [2021] 14 SCR 204 : (2021) 6 SCC 258 – relied on. Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [2010] 6 SCR 507 : (2010) 11 SCC 44; APS Forex Services Private Limited v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers and Ors. [2020] 2 SCR 811 : (2020) 12 SCC 724; Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [2019] 2 SCR 24 : (2019) 4 SCC 197; Rajaram S/o Sriramulu Naidu (Since Deceased) Through LRs. v. Maruthachalam (Since Deceased) Through LRs. [2023] 1 SCR 809 : (2023) 16 SCC 125; Southern Sales & Services and Others v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, [2008] 14 SCR 130 : (2008) 14 SCC 457; TMMTC Ltd. and Another v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. and Another [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 265: (2002) 1 SCC 234; Indian Bank Association and Others v. Union of India and Others [2014] 5 SCR 386 : (2014) 5 SCC 590; Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. [2010] 5 SCR 678 : (2010) 5 SCC 663; Re: Expeditious Trial of cases under Section 138 of NI Act 1881 [2022] 3 SCR 276 : (2021) 16 SCC 116; Chellammal & Another v. State Represented by the Inspector of Police, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 870 – referred to.
Ashok v. Fayaz Aahmad, 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 490 – approved. P.C. Hari v. Shine Varghese & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 5535; M.V. Nalinakshan v. M. Rameshan & Anr., 2009 All MR (Cri) Journal 273 – referred to.
List of Acts Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Code of Criminal Procedure; Income Tax Act, 1961; Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Probation of Offenders Act, 1958; Constitution of India. 1520 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports List of Keywords Chapter XVII (Sections 138 to 148) of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Discharge of any liability; Insufficiency of the amount of money; Credibility of cheques; Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 118 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Massive backlog of cheque bouncing cases.
Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1755 of 2010 From the Judgment and Order dated 16.04.2009 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Goa in CRLRA No. 76 of 2008 Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant:
Amarjit Singh Bedi, Ms. Surekha Raman, Srisatya Mohanty, Shreyash Kumar, Harshit Singh, M/S. K J John And Co.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ankit Yadav, T. Mahipal, Merusagar Samantaray.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Manmohan, J.
1. The present Appeal has been filed challenging the ex-parte judgment and order dated 16 th April 2009 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa acquitting the Respondent No.1-Accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘NI Act’) and reversing the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT-COMPLAINANT
2. Mr. Amarjit Singh Bedi, learned counsel for the Appellant-Complainant submitted that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction erred in upsetting the conviction of the Respondent No.1-Accused under Section 138 of the NI Act based on categorical findings of facts rendered by both the Courts below that the dishonoured cheque had [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1521Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr. been issued in favour of the Appellant-Complainant in discharge of a legally enforceable debt.
3. He contended that there was no evidence on record to establish that the Appellant-Complainant did not have the financial means to advance a friendly loan of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs) to the Respondent No.1-Accused . He emphasised that the Appellant- Complainant in his statement under oath had stated that in order to oblige his friend/Respondent No.1-Accused , the Appellant- Complainant had arranged money from his father, who was a cloth merchant having two shops and even went to the extent of parting with a portion of the loan amount which he himself had borrowed from a financial institution.
4. He pointed out that the Respondent No.1-Accused during the course of arguments on sentencing before the Trial Court had prayed for leniency on the ground that he was ready to pay the cheque amount to the Appellant-Complainant within a reasonable time.
5. He further stated that though the Appellant-Complainant filed an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.P.C.’) for recall of the impugned judgment by substantiating sufficient cause for the absence of his advocate on 16 th April 2009, yet the learned Single Judge had been pleased to dismiss the said application holding that the Court had become functus officio and it had no jurisdiction under criminal law to recall the impugned order. He submitted that the High Court erred in not exercising its inherent powers to set aside the impugned judgment which, for all legal purposes, was an ex-parte order.
6. He lastly stated that if this Court were to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and Sessions Court, the Appellant-Complainant would accept the payment of outstanding amount in instalments as directed by the Trial Court.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1-ACCUSED
7. Per contra, Mr. Ankit Yadav, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1-Accused stated that the Appellant-Complainant was being paid a salary of only Rs.2,300/- (Rupees Two Thousand and Three Hundred) per month at the relevant point of time, which was not 1522 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports even adequate to take care of his family, leave alone sufficient to advance a loan of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs). He contended that the Appellant-Complainant was a highly indebted person who did not have any source of income other than his meagre salary and therefore, he did not have the wherewithal to advance such a huge loan and that too without issuance of any kind of receipt.
8. He submitted that the accused can always rely on material and/or evidence filed by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. In support of his submission, he relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441.
9. He further submitted that whenever the accused questions the financial capacity of the complainant in support of his probable defence, despite the presumption of a legally enforceable debt under Section 139 of the NI Act, the onus shifts back to the complainant to prove his financial capacity, more particularly, when it is a case of giving loan by cash and thereafter issuance of a cheque. In support of his submission, he relied upon the judgment of this Court in APS Forex Services Private Limited vs. Shakti International Fashion Linkers and Ors., (2020) 12 SCC 724.
10. He emphasised that the defence of the Respondent No.1-Accused that a blank cheque had been given to the Appellant-Complainant to enable him to obtain a loan from the bank was more than a probable defence to rebut the presumption under the NI Act, particularly, in view of the fact that the parties were known to each other.
REASONING
SCOPE AND INTENT OF CHAPTER XVII OF NI ACT
11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that it is essential to first outline the scope and intent of Chapter XVII (Sections 138 to 148) of NI Act which has been inserted by Act 66 of 1988 w.e.f. 1 st April 1989.
12. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act 66 of 1988 states, “….to enhance the acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties in case of bouncing of cheques due to insufficiency of funds in the accounts or for the [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1523Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr. reason that it exceeds the arrangements made by the drawer, with adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawers.”
13. The provisions contained in Chapter XVII provide that where any cheque drawn by a person for the discharge of any liability is returned by the bank unpaid for the reason of the insufficiency of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account on which the cheque was drawn or for the reason that it exceeds the arrangements made by the drawer of the cheque with the banker for that account, the drawer of such cheque shall be deemed to have committed an offence. In that case, the drawer, without prejudice to the other provisions of the said Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both.
14. Consequently, this Court is of the view that the intent behind introducing Chapter XVII is to restore the credibility of cheques as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment and to promote a culture of using cheques. Further, by criminalizing the act of issuing cheques without sufficient funds or for other specified reasons, the law promotes financial discipline, discourages irresponsible practices and allows for a more efficient and timely resolution of disputes compared to the previous pure civil remedy which was found to involve the payee in a long-drawn out process of litigation.
ONCE EXECUTION OF CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS
UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE
15. In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by the Respondent No.1-Accused . This Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two Judges Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 have been set aside by a three Judges Bench in Rangappa (supra).
16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.
1524 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports
17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act, is a rebuttable presumption. However, the initial onus of proving that the cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197].
18. The judgment of this Court in APS Forex Services Private Limited (supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the Respondent No.1- Accused only says that presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable and when the same is rebutted, the onus would shift back to the complainant to prove his financial capacity, more particularly, when it is a case of giving loan by cash. This judgment nowhere states, as was sought to be contended by learned counsel for the Respondent No.1-Accused, that in cases of dishonour of cheques, in lieu of cash loans, the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act does not arise.
APPROACH OF SOME COURTS BELOW TO NOT GIVE EFFECT
TO THE PRESUMTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF NI
ACT IS CONTRARY TO MANDATE OF PARLIAMENT
19. Recently, the Kerala High Court in P.C. Hari vs. Shine Varghese & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 5535 has taken the view that a debt created by a cash transaction above Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) in violation of the provisions of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘IT Act, 1961’) is not a ‘legally enforceable debt’ unless there is a valid explanation for the same, meaning thereby that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act will not be attracted in cash transactions above Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand).
20. However, this Court is of the view that any breach of Section 269SS of the IT Act, 1961 is subject to a penalty only under Section 271D of the IT Act, 1961. Further neither Section 269SS nor 271D of the IT Act, 1961 state that any transaction in breach thereof will be illegal, invalid or statutorily void. Therefore, any violation of Section 269SS would not render the transaction unenforceable under Section 138 of the NI Act or rebut the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act because such a person, assuming him/her to be the payee/holder in due course, is liable to be visited by a penalty only as prescribed. Consequently, the view that any transaction above Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) is illegal and void and [2025] 9 S.C.R. 1525Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr. therefore does not fall within the definition of ‘legally enforceable debt’ cannot be countenanced. Accordingly, the conclusion of law in P.C. Hari (supra) is set aside.
21. This Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that some District Courts and some High Courts are not giving effect to the presumptions incorporated in Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act and are treating the proceedings under the NI Act as another civil recovery proceedings and are directing the complainant to prove the antecedent debt or liability. This Court is of the view that such an approach is not only prolonging the trial but is also contrary to the mandate of Parliament, namely, that the drawer and the bank must honour the cheque, otherwise, trust in cheques would be irreparably damaged. NO DOCUMENTS AND/OR EVIDENCE LED WITH REGARD TO
THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF THE APPELLANT
22. It is pertinent to mention that in the present case, the Respondent No.1- Accused has filed no documents and/or examined any independent witness or led any evidence with regard to the financial incapacity of the Appellant-Complainant to advance the loans in question. For instance, this Court in Rajaram S/o Sriramulu Naidu (Since Deceased) Through LRs. vs. Maruthachalam (Since Deceased) Through LRs., (2023) 16 SCC 125 has held that presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act can be rebutted by the accused examining the Income Tax Officer and bank officials of the complainant/drawee.
WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF PW-1 IS READ IN ITS ENTIRETY, IT
CANNOT BE SAID THAT THE APPELLANT-COMPLAINANT HAD
NO WHEREWITHAL TO ADVANCE LOAN
23. Most certainly, the accused can rely upon the evidence adduced by the complainant to rebut the presumption with regard to the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, yet in the present case, when the evidence of Appellant-Complainant (PW-1) is read in its entirety, like it should be, it cannot be said that the Appellant-Complainant had no wherewithal to advance any loan to the Respondent No.1- Accused .
24. In fact, the Appellant-Complainant, in his statement, has stated that as the Respondent No.1-Accused was his friend, he had advanced 1526 [2025] 9 S.C.R.Supreme Court Reports part of the loan received by him and had also taken loan from his father to advance money to the Respondent No.1-Accused .
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