Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 669; [2024] 9 S.C.R. 257
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 3 Judges: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 9 Sept 2024
- Case number
- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 2501/2024
- Sections
- 438, 437, 439, 438(4), 46, 267, 34, 438(2), 41, 41B, 167, 18A
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
Preview: first 50% of the document.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 257 : 2024 INSC 669 Dhanraj Aswani v.
Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2501 of 2024)
09 September 2024 [Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI, J.B. Pardiwala* and Manoj Misra, JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is maintainable at the instance of an accused while he is already in judicial custody in connection with his involvement in a different case.
Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.438 – Accused already in judicial custody in connection with one case, if can apply for anticipatory bail in a different case – Maintainability of such anticipatory bail applications – Divergent opinions expressed by different High Courts:
Held: An anticipatory bail application filed at the instance of an accused already in judicial custody in a different offence is maintainable – An accused is entitled to seek anticipatory bail in connection with an offence so long as he is not arrested in relation to that offence – Once he is arrested, the only remedy available to him is to apply for regular bail either u/s.437 or s.439, as the case may be – There is no express or implied restriction in the CrPC or in any other statute that prohibits the Court of Session or the High Court from entertaining and deciding an anticipatory bail application in relation to an offence, while the applicant is in custody in relation to a different offence – No restriction can be read into s.438 to preclude an accused from applying for anticipatory bail in relation to an offence while he is in custody in a different offence, as that would be against the purport of the provision and the intent of the legislature – The only restriction on the power of the court to grant anticipatory bail u/s.438 is the one prescribed u/s.438(4) and in other statutes like the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, etc. – While a person already * Author 258 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports in custody in connection with a particular offence apprehends arrest in a different offence, then, the subsequent offence is a separate offence for all practical purposes – Thus, all rights conferred by the statute on the accused as well as the investigating agency in relation to the subsequent offence are independently protected – For the purpose of interrogation/investigation in an offence, the investigating agency can seek remand of the accused whilst he is in custody in connection with a previous offence so long as no order granting anticipatory bail has been passed in relation to the subsequent offence – Under s.438, the pre-condition for a person to apply for pre-arrest bail is a “reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence” – Therefore, the only pre-condition for exercising the said right is the apprehension of the accused that he is likely to be arrested – Custody in one case does not have the effect of taking away the apprehension of arrest in a different case – Right of an accused to protect his personal liberty u/Article 21 of the Constitution of India with the aid of the provision of anticipatory bail u/s.438 cannot be defeated or thwarted without a valid procedure established by law – Such procedure should also pass the test of fairness, reasonableness and manifest non-arbitrariness u/Article 14. [Paras 60, 66] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.46 – ‘Arrest how made’– “reason to believe” – Prisoner Transit Warrant (P.T. Warrant) u/s.267 – “other proceedings” – Whether a person, while in custody for a particular offence, can have a “reason to believe” that he may be arrested in relation to some other non-bailable offence – High Court of Rajasthan in Sunil Kallani reasoned that once a person is taken in custody in relation to an offence, thereafter it is not possible to arrest him in relation to a different offence as one of the essential conditions for arrest is placing the body of the accused in custody of the police authorities by means of actual touch or confinement – As there cannot be any actual touch or confinement while a person is in custody, he cannot have a “reason to believe” that he may be arrested in relation to a different offence: Held: Such view not agreed with – There are two fundamental fallacies in the reasoning adopted by the Rajasthan High Court – First, the High Court failed to consider the possibility of arrest of the person in custody in relation to a different offence immediately after he is set free from the custody in the first offence – The [2024] 9 S.C.R. 259Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. second fallacy in the reasoning of the High Court is that there can be no arrest of an accused in relation to a different offence while he is already in custody in relation to some offence – Ways by which a person who is already in custody may be arrested, enumerated – Incorrect to hold that a person, while in custody, cannot have a “reason to believe” that he may be arrested in relation to a different offence – Though a plain reading of s.46 makes it clear that arrest involves actual touch or confinement of the body of the person sought to be arrested however, arrest can also be effected without actual touch if the person sought to be arrested submits to the custody by words or action – A lawful arrest can be made even without actually seizing or touching the body – Actions or words which successfully bring to the notice of the accused that he is under a compulsion and thereafter cause him to submit to such compulsion will also be sufficient to constitute arrest – This is in conformity with the modality of the arrest contemplated u/s.46 – Procedure followed in cases where a person already in custody is required to be arrested in relation to a different offence, explained – When a person in custody is confronted with a P.T. Warrant obtained in relation to a different offence, such a person has no choice but to submit to the custody of the police officer who has obtained the P.T. Warrant – Thus, although there is no confinement to custody by touch, yet there is submission to the custody by the accused based on the action of the police officer in showing the P.T. Warrant to the accused – Thereafter, on production of the accused before the jurisdictional Magistrate, like in the case of arrest of a free person who is not in custody, the accused can either be remanded to police or judicial custody, or he may be enlarged on bail and sent back to the custody in the first offence – s.267 can be invoked to require production of the accused before the jurisdictional Magistrate, who can thereafter remand him to the custody of the investigating agency – Such an interpretation of the provision would give true effect to the words “other proceedings” as they appear in s.267, which cannot be construed to exclude proceedings at the stage of investigation – Contrary to the view taken by the Rajasthan, Allahabad and Delhi High Courts, a person, while in custody in relation to an offence, can be arrested in relation to a different offence, either after getting released from custody in the first offence, or even while remaining in custody in the first offence. [Paras 38, 40-42, 46, 49, 51-53] 260 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Arrest – Subsequent arrest – Effect on accused – Plea of the appellant that as the object of s.438, CrPC was to prevent an accused from the humiliation of arrest, its protection would not include within its ambit a person who is already in custody: Held: Rejected – Each arrest a person faces compounds their humiliation and ignominy – Each subsequent arrest underscores a continued or escalating involvement in legal troubles that can erode the dignity of the person and their public standing – When a subsequent arrest occurs, it intensifies the emotional and social burden, amplifying the perception of their criminality and reinforcing negative judgments from society – Subsequent arrest in relation to different offences, while the individual is in custody in a particular offence, further alienates the individual from their community and adversely affects their personal integrity – Each additional arrest exacerbates the person’s shame making the cumulative impact of such legal entanglements increasingly devastating. [Para 58] Criminal Law – Procedural laws – Rights conferred under – Importance – Discussed.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.438 – Anticipatory bail – Concept – Evolution – Discussed.
Case Law Cited Narinderjit Singh Sahni v. Union of India [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 114 : (2002) 2 SCC 210 – distinguished.
Sunil Kallani v. State of Rajasthan (2021) SCC OnLine Raj 1654; Rajesh Kumar Sharma v. CBI (2022) SCC OnLine All 832; Bashir Hasan Siddiqui v. State (GNCTD) (2023) SCC OnLine Del 7544 – disapproved.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [1994] 2 SCR 375 : (1994) 3 SCC 569; Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [1980] 3 SCR 383 : (1980) 2 SCC 565; Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2020] 2 SCR 1 : (2020) 5 SCC 1; Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India [2020] 2 SCR 727 : (2020) 4 SCC 727; Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Others [2010] 15 SCR 201 : (2011) 1 SCC 694; Central Bureau of Investigation Special Investigation Cell-I New Delhi v. Anupam J. Kulkarni [1992] 3 SCR 158 : (1992) 3 SCC 141; Tejesh Suman v. State of Rajasthan (2023) SCC OnLine SC 76; State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [1961] 1 SCR 14 : AIR (1960) SC 1125; Tusharbhai Rajnikantbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat [2024] 8 SCR 235 : (2024) SCC OnLine [2024] 9 S.C.R. 261Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. SC 1897; A.R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak [1988] Suppl. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar [1952] 1 SCR 284 : (1952) 1 SCC 1 – referred to.
Alnesh Akil Somji v. State of Maharashtra (2021) SCC OnLine Bom 5276; Sanjay Kumar Sarangi v. State of Odisha (2024) SCC OnLine Ori 1334; Amir Chand v. The Crown (1949) SCC OnLine Punj 20; S. Harsimran Singh v. State of Punjab (1984) Cri LJ 253; State v. K.N. Nehru (2011) SCC OnLine Mad 1984; Roshan Beevi and others v. Joint Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu and others (1983) SCC OnLine Mad 163; C. Natesan v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (1998) SCC OnLine Mad 931; Ranjeet Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1995) Cri LJ 3505; State of Maharashtra v. Yadav Kohachade (2000) Cri LJ 959 – referred to.
Alderson v. Booth (1969) 2 All ER 271 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited Law Commission’s 48th Report (1972); Law Commission’s 41st Report; Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edition, 1979) – referred to. List of Acts Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India. List of Keywords Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Anticipatory bail; Police custody; Judicial custody; Accused already in judicial custody; Anticipatory bail in a different case; “reason to believe”; Arrest; Subsequent arrest; Custody; Regular bail; Arrest apprehended; Apprehension of arrest; Apprehension of arrest in a different case/offence; Likely to be arrested; First offence; Custody in the first offence; Different offence; Subsequent offence; Remand of the accused; Previous offence; Pre-condition for pre-arrest bail; Arrest in relation to some other non-bailable offence; Actual touch or confinement; Formal arrest; Possibility of arrest of the person in custody; Prisoner Transit Warrant; Jurisdictional Magistrate. Case Arising From CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2501 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 31.10.2023 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in ABA No. 2801 of 2023 262 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Prashant S. Kenjale, Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi, Ms. Srishty Pandey, Ashutosh Chaturvedi, Ms. Gayatri Virmani, Shubham Gavande, Advs. for the Appellant.
Siddharth Dave, Sr. Adv., Shantanu Phanse, SS Bedekar, Prastut Dalvi, Ms. Vidhi Thaker, Siddhant Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.B. Pardiwala, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following parts:
A. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT....... 4*
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
NO. 1 (ORIGINAL ACCUSED) ........................................ 7*
C. VIEWS OF DIFFERENT HIGH COURTS ON THE ISSUE
IN QUESTION ................................................................... 10* D. ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 25* i. Evolution of the concept of anticipatory bail ....... 25* ii. Whether a person, while in custody for a particular offence, can have a “reason to believe” that he may be arrested in relation to some other nonbailable offence? .................................................... 44* iii. Illustrative Examples ................................................ 63* E. CONCLUSION .............................................................. 65*
1. A short question of general public importance on which there is great divergence of judicial opinion that falls for the consideration of this Court is as under:
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 263Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. “Whether an application for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”) is maintainable at the instance of an accused while he is already in judicial custody in connection with his involvement in a different case?”
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 31.10.2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Anticipatory Bail Application No. 2801 of 2023 by which the High Court overruled the objection raised by the appellant herein (original complainant) as regards the maintainability of the anticipatory bail application filed by respondent no. 1 (original accused) in connection with CR No. 806 of 2019 registered with Pimpri Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 respectively read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) and thereby took the view that although respondent no.1 herein may already be in custody in connection with ECIR No. 10 of 2021, yet he would be entitled to pray for anticipatory bail in connection with a different case.
3. It appears from the materials on record that respondent no. 1 herein came to be arrested in connection with ECIR No. 10 of 2021.While in custody, he apprehended arrest in connection with CR No. 806 of 2019 registered against him at the instance of the appellant herein. In such circumstances, he prayed for anticipatory bail before the High Court. The appellant herein intervened in the proceedings of said anticipatory bail application and raised an objection that as respondent no. 1 herein is already in custody in connection with ECIR No. 10 of 2021, he cannot pray for anticipatory bail in connection with CR No. 806 of 2019. The objection raised by the appellant herein in his capacity as the complainant came to be overruled and the High Court proceeded to hold that although respondent no. 1 herein may be in custody in one case, yet the same would not preclude him from seeking pre-arrest bail in connection with a different case. Since the objection was overruled, the appellant is now before this Court.
A. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
4. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant canvassed the following submissions:
264 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports i. The High Court committed a serious error in taking the view that although a person might be in custody after his arrest in one case, yet such a person can apply for the grant of prearrest bail under Section 438 of the CrPC in connection with a different case.
ii. The essential part of arrest is placing the corpus (body of the person) in custody of the police authorities. The natural corollary, therefore, is that a person who is already in custody cannot have reasons to believe that he would be arrested as he already stands arrested. The pre-condition to invoke Section 438 CrPC is that the accused should have a reason to believe that he “may be arrested”. If the accused is already in custody, then he can have no reason to believe that he “may be arrested”.
iii. The salutary provision of Section 438 of the CrPC was enshrined with a view to see that the liberty of any individual concerned is not put in jeopardy on frivolous grounds at the instance of unscrupulous or irresponsible person or officers who may be in charge of the prosecution. If such is the objective behind the enactment of Section 438 of the CrPC, then for a person who is already arrested there is no question of any humiliation being caused.
iv. If an accused while being in custody in connection with one case, is granted anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC in connection with a different case, then it would not be possible for him to fulfill the requirement of the condition that may be imposed under Section 438(2)(i) of the CrPC i.e. to make himself/herself available for interrogation as and when required. In other words, a person in custody would not be able to meet or comply with the condition that may be imposed under Section 438(2)(i) of the CrPC. This being a material consideration for grant of anticipatory bail, it would be illogical to permit a person to seek anticipatory bail if he is unable to satisfy conditions that may be imposed under Section 438(2)
(i) of the CrPC.
v. If a person who is already in custody in connection with one case apprehends arrest in connection with a different case, then he is not remediless. In such circumstances, he can seek to [2024] 9 S.C.R. 265Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. surrender and pray for regular bail on the principle of “deemed custody” both in Magistrate as well as Sessions triable cases.
5. Mr. Luthra, with a view to fortify his aforesaid submissions, placed strong reliance on the following decisions:
i. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1994] 2 SCR 375, (1994)
3 SCC 569
ii. Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, [1980] 3 SCR
383, (1980) 2 SCC 565
iii. Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), [2020] 2 SCR 1,
(2020) 5 SCC 1
iv. Sunil Kallani v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 SCC OnLine Raj v. Rajesh Kumar Sharma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine All 832 vi. Tejesh Suman v. State of Rajasthan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 76 vii. Bashir Hasan Siddiqui v. State (GNCTD), (2023) SCC OnLine Del 7544 viii. Narinderjit Singh Sahni v. Union of India, [2001] Supp. 4
SCR 114, (2002) 2 SCC 210.
6. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned Senior counsel prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court be set aside.
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO. 1
(ORIGINAL ACCUSED)
7. Mr. Siddharth Dave, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the original accused, vehemently opposed the present appeal and canvassed the following submissions:
i. The legal maxim ubi jus ibi remedium i.e. where there is a right, there is a remedy, is recognised as a basic principle of jurisprudence. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan reported in (2016) 8 SCC 509 held that the right to access justice is so inalienable, that no system of governance can possibly ignore its significance, leave alone afford to deny the same to its citizens. It was 266 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports also held that the ancient Roman jurisprudential maxim ubi jus ibi remedium has contributed to the acceptance of access to justice as a basic and inalienable human right, which all civilized societies recognise and enforce.
ii. The right of an accused to apply for pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of the CrPC is intrinsically linked to his right to access the competent courts to avail his remedies under the law. A person would thus be entitled to apply for pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of the CrPC in one case, even though he may be in custody in connection with some other case.
iii. The right of an accused to protect his personal liberty within the contours of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, by applying for pre-arrest bail under Section 438 CrPC cannot be eliminated without a procedure established by law. Further, such procedure should also pass the test of fairness, reasonableness and manifest non-arbitrariness on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
iv. Under Section 438 of the CrPC, the pre-condition for a person to apply for pre-arrest bail is a “reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence”. Therefore, the only pre-condition for exercising the said right is the apprehension of the accused that he may be arrested.
v. The arrest of an accused in one case cannot foreclose his right to apply for pre-arrest bail in a different case, since there is no such stipulation in the language of Section 438 of the CrPC. The restrictions on the exercise of power to grant pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of the CrPC are prescribed under Section 438(4) of the CrPC which provides that the provisions of Section 438 shall not apply to cases involving arrest under Sections 376(3), 376AB, 376DA or 376DB respectively of the IPC. vi. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Sushila Aggarwal (supra) while considering the statutory restrictions on Section 438 of the CrPC held that where the Parliament intended to exclude or restrict the powers of the Court under Section 438 of the CrPC, it did so in categorical terms (such as Section 438(4)). The omission on the part of the legislature to restrict the right [2024] 9 S.C.R. 267Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. of any person accused of having committed a non-bailable offence to seek anticipatory bail can lead one to assume that neither a blanket restriction can be read into the text of Section 438 CrPC by this Court, nor can inflexible guidelines in the exercise of discretion be insisted as that would amount to judicial legislation.
vii. A statutory restriction on the right to apply for pre-arrest bail is also found under Sections 18 and 18A(2) respectively of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, “the Act, 1989”). The said provisions provide that Section 438 of the CrPC shall not apply to cases under the Act, 1989. That despite the statutory bar under Sections 18 and 18A(2) respectively of the Act, 1989 a three- Judge Bench of this Court in Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India reported in (2020) 4 SCC 727 held that if a complaint does not make out a prima facie case for applicability of the Act, 1989 the bar under Sections 18 and 18A(2) respectively of the said Act shall not apply. The aforesaid judgment indicates the judicial approach of adopting an interpretation in favour of personal liberty.
8. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Dave prayed that there being no merit in the appeal, the same may be dismissed.
C. VIEWS OF DIFFERENT HIGH COURTS ON THE ISSUE IN
QUESTION
9. In Sunil Kallani (supra), a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Rajasthan took the view that an application for anticipatory bail would not be maintainable at the instance of a person who is already arrested and is in police custody or judicial custody in relation to a different case. The line of reasoning adopted by the High Court in taking such a view was that a person who is already in custody cannot have a reason to believe that he would be arrested as he already stood arrested, albeit in a different case. The High Court observed that arrest means to actually touch or confine the body of the person to the custody of a police officer and an essential part of arrest is placing the corpus, that is the body of the person, in custody of the police authorities. In light of this essential requirement to constitute an arrest, a person who is already in custody cannot have a reason to believe that he may be arrested as he stood already 268 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports arrested. The High Court tried to fortify its view by relying on some of the observations made by this Court in Narinderjit Singh Sahni (supra). A few relevant observations made by the High Court are extracted hereinbelow:
“17. The Scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure does not define the word arrest. In Chapter V of Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 41 lays down when police may arrest without warrant. Section 41B lays down procedure of arrest and duties of officer. Section 46 mentions how arrest is to be made.
18. Upon reading Section 46 Cr.P.C. (supra), it is apparent that arrest would mean to actually touch or confine the body of the person to custody of the police officer. Section 167 Cr.P.C. lays down that the custody may be given to the police for the purpose of investigation (called as remand) or be sent to jail (called as judicial custody). Thus the essential part of arrest is placing the corpus, body of the person in custody of the police authorities whether of a police station or before him or in a concerned jail.
19. The natural corollary is therefore that a person who is already in custody cannot have reasons to believe that he shall be arrested as he stands already arrested. In view thereof, the precondition of bail application to be moved under Section 438 Cr.P.C. i.e. reasons to believe that he may be arrested” do not survive since a person is already arrested in another case and is in custody whether before the police or in jail.
xxx xxx xxx
23. As pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that there may be cases where a person who has already been arrested in a particular case may be faced with registering of several FIRs by the persons who do not want him to be released from jail and in the said circumstances only option available is to take anticipatory bail in other FIRs as the police would seek his arrest in all the cases. It may be subsequently registered against him for non-bailable Offences and in such an event, there would be infraction [2024] 9 S.C.R. 269Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. of his personal liberty. However this Court does not agree to the submissions noticed as above. Once the FIR has been registered in relation to an offence committed against any person by an accused he cannot claim to be protected from offences which he may have committed with other persons who have their individual right of registering an FIR against such an accused. The accused will have to face investigation and subsequent trial in relation to each and every case individually. The question whether he may be punished separately or jointly for other cases is a completely different question altogether and need not be gone into the present case.
24. However, keeping in view observations in Narinderjit Singh Sahni, (supra) and considering that the purpose of preventive arrest by a direction of the court on an application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. would be an order in vacuum. As a person is already in custody with the police this Court is of the view that such an anticipatory bail application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. would not lie and would be nothing but travesty of justice in allowing anticipatory bail to such an accused who is already in custody.
25. Examining the issue from another angle if such an application is held to be maintainable the result would be that if an accused is arrested say for an offence committed of abduction and another case is registered against him for having committed murder and third case is- registered against him for having stolen the car which was used for abduction in a different police station and the said accused is granted anticipatory bail in respect to the offence of stealing of the car or in respect to the offence of having committed murder the concerned Police Investigating Agency where FIRs have been registered would be prevented from conducting individual investigation and making recoveries as anticipatory bail once granted would continue to operate without limitation as laid down by the Apex Court in Sushila Aggarwal, (supra). The concept of. anticipatory bail, as envisaged under-Section 438 Cr.P.C. would stand frustrated. The provisions of grant of 270 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports anticipatory bail are essentially to prevent the concerned person from litigation initiated with the object of injuring and humiliating the applicant by haying him so arrested and for a person who stands already arrested, such a factor does not remain available.
26. In view of above discussion, this Court holds that the anticipatory bail would not lie and would not be maintainable if a person is already arrested and is in custody of police or judicial custody in relation to another criminal case which may be for similar offence or for different offences.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. In the case of Rajesh Kumar Sharma (supra), a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Allahabad followed the view taken by the High Court of Rajasthan referred to above.
11. In Bashir Hasan Siddiqui (supra), a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, relying on Sunil Kallani (supra) and Rajesh Kumar Sharma (supra), took a similar view that an application seeking anticipatory bail would not be maintainable at the instance of a person who apprehends arrest if such a person is already arrested and is in custody in connection with a different offence. The relevant observations made by the High Court in paragraph 6 of the said decision are extracted as under:
“6. Therefore, keeping in view the entire facts and circumstances and also taking into account the judgment passed by the Rajasthan High Court in Sunil Kallani (supra) and subsequently judgment passed by Allahabad High Court in Rajesh Kumar Sharma (supra), this Court is in consonance with the opinions of both the High Court that since the accused is in custody in another FIR, the anticipatory bail in other FIR is not maintainable. As a result, the present petition stands dismissed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In Alnesh Akil Somji v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 5276, a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay formulated the following question of law for its consideration:
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 271Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. “Whether an anticipatory bail application would be maintainable by an accused who is already arrested and is in magisterial custody in relation to another crime?”
13. The Bombay High Court also took notice of the decision of the High Court of Rajasthan in Sunil Kallani (supra). The decision of this Court in the case of Narinderjit Singh Sahni (supra) was also looked into and ultimately it was held that an accused has every right, even if he is arrested in a number of cases, to move the courts for anticipatory bail in each of the offence registered against him, irrespective of the fact that he is already in custody in relation to a different offence. The High Court was of the view that the application(s) under Section 438 of the CrPC would have to be heard and decided on merits independent of the other cases in which he is already in custody. We may refer to some of the observations made by the High Court as under:
“8. A plain reading of the provision would show that the only restriction provided is under Section 438 (4) of the Cr. PC, which says that the provision will not apply to accusations of offences which are stated in Section 438
(4) of the Cr.P.C. Similarly, certain special statutes have excluded the operation of Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. for accusation of offences punishable under those special statutes, for example Section 18A of the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 bars exercise of powers under Section 438 of the Cr.P.C.
9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sushila A Aggarwal and others (supra), while dealing with the scope of Section 438 of the Cr.P.C has followed the decision in the case of Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others Versus State of Punjab and regarding the bar or restriction on the exercise of power to grant anticipatory bail, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows:
“62. […] In this background, it is important to notice that the only bar, or restriction, imposed by Parliament upon the exercise of the power (to grant anticipatory bail) is by way of a positive restriction i.e. in the case where accused are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Section 376 (3) or Section 272 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 376-AB or Section 376-DA or Section 376-DB of the Penal Code. In other words, Parliament has now denied jurisdiction of the court (i.e. Court of Session and High Courts) from granting anticipatory bail to those accused of such offences. The amendment [Code of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 2018 introduced Section 438 (4)] reads as follows:
“438. (4) Nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on accusation of having committed an offence under sub-section (3) of Section 376 or Section 376-AB or Section 376-DA or Section 376-DB of the Indian Penal Code”.
63. Clearly, therefore, where Parliament wished to exclude or restrict the power of courts, under Section 438 of the Code, it did so in categorical terms. Parliament’s omission to restrict the right of citizens, accused of other offences from the right to seek anticipatory bail, necessarily leads one to assume that neither a blanket restriction can be read into by this Court, nor can inflexible guidelines in the exercise of discretion, be insisted upon- that would amount to judicial legislation”.
10. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court has made following observations in the case of Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others (supra):
“39. Fifthly, the provisions of Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest of the accused. The grant of “anticipatory bail” to an accused who is under arrest involves a contradiction in terms, insofar as the offence or offences for which he is arrested, are concerned. After arrest, the accused must seek his remedy under Section 437 or Section 439 of the Code, if he wants to be released on bail in respect of the offence or offences for which he is arrested”.
11. It is thus very clear, according to Hon’ble Apex Court, that anticipatory bail will not be maintainable in case a person is in custody in the same offence for which [2024] 9 S.C.R. 273Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. pre-arrest bail is sought, the restriction, if any, upon maintainability of prearrest bail will be there only if a person is in custody in that particular offence itself.
12. From the above pronouncements, two things are clear. First, there is no such bar in Cr.P.C or any statute which prohibits Session or the High Court from entertaining and deciding an anticipatory bail, when such person is already in judicial or police custody in some other offence. Second, the restriction cannot be stretched to include arrest made in any other offence as that would be against the purport of the provision.
xxx xxx xxx
14. I may point out here that the case of Narinderjit Singh Sahni and Another (supra) was in respect of maintainability of Article 32 wherein relief in the nature of Section 438 was sought. Even, the said judgment does not hold in very clear terms that a person arrested in one offence cannot seek the relief provided under Section 438 of Cr.PC in another offence merely on the ground that he stands arrested in another district offence.
15. In my considered opinion, there was no proper interpretation of Section 438 of the Cr.PC at the hands of learned Additional Sessions Judge. Accused has every right, even if he is arrested in number of cases, to move in each of offence registered against him irrespective of the fact that he is already in custody but for different offence, for the reason that the application (s) will have to be heard and decided on merits independent of another crime in which he is already in custody.
16. One cannot and must not venture, under the garb of interpretation, to substantiate its own meaning than the plain and simple particular though provided by statute. What has not been said cannot be inferred unless the provision itself gives room for speculation. If the purpose behind the intendment is discernible sans obscurity and ambiguity, there is no place for supposition.”
(Emphasis supplied)
274 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
14. In Sanjay Kumar Sarangi v. State of Odisha reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Ori 1334, a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Orissa took the view that there is no statutory bar for an accused in custody in connection with a case to pray for grant of anticipatory bail in a different case registered against him. The court, upon perusal of the relevant provisions, took the view that arrest means physical confinement of a person with or without the order of the Court. The Court noted that Section 167(2) of the CrPC, which governs ‘remand’, is applicable to a case where the accused is already arrested, and charge-sheet has not been filed. The Court observed that there is no specific provision in the CrPC which governs a situation where a person is required to be arrested/ remanded in connection with a new case when he is already in custody in connection with some other case and in such a situation, the accused can only be remanded in connection with the new case on the order of the competent court. Answering the question whether such order of remand by the court can be equated with an act of arrest, the Court held that the purpose of remand as in the case of arrest is to collect evidence during investigation, and thus both amount to one and the same thing.
15. The High Court proceeded to explain that if a new case is registered against a person already in custody in connection with one case, the police in such circumstances can either seek an order of remand from the court or arrest the accused, as and when he is released from custody in connection with the other case. The Court explained that it is only in the latter scenario that an order of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the CrPC would become effective because it is only after the accused is released from custody that he can be arrested in relation to the subsequent case. The Court said that the anticipatory bail operates at a future time. After being released from custody in the former case, if he is sought to be arrested in relation to the subsequent case, there is no reason why he should be precluded from approaching the court beforehand with the necessary protection in the form of anticipatory bail.
16. The court clarified that a person cannot be arrested if he is already in custody in connection with some case, however, his right to obtain an anticipatory bail in connection with a different case cannot be curtailed having regard to the scheme of the CrPC. The anticipatory bail, if granted, shall however be effective only if he is arrested in [2024] 9 S.C.R. 275Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. connection with the subsequent case consequent upon his release from custody in the previous case.
17. Lastly, the Court observed that there is nothing in the CrPC which takes away the right of the accused to seek his liberty or of the investigating agency to investigate the case only because the accused is in custody in a different case. The Court observed that an accused can exercise his right of moving the court for anticipatory bail just as the investigating agency can exercise its right to investigate the subsequent case by seeking remand of the accused from the court having jurisdiction over the case. Both the rights can co-exist and operate at their respective and appropriate times. The court held that if the application of the investigating agency, seeking remand of the accused whilst he is in custody in connection with the former case, is allowed, the accused can no longer pray for anticipatory bail in the subsequent case, as then he could be said to be technically in custody in connection with the subsequent case also. In such a scenario, the accused can only seek regular bail. The Court further elaborated that the grant of anticipatory bail does not clothe the accused with a licence to avoid investigation or claim any immunity therefrom.
18. We may refer to some of the relevant observations made by the learned Single Judge as under:
“13. To illustrate, a person is in custody in connection with a case and a new case is registered against him for commission of some other offence. Two recourses are available to the police in such a situation - firstly to seek an order of remand from the Court if the presence of the accused is required for investigation or secondly, to arrest him, as and when he is released from custody in connection with the previous case. It is only in the second scenario that an order of anticipatory bail can become effective because only then can he be ‘arrested’. It is trite law that the distinction between an order in case of custody bail and anticipatory bail is that the former is passed when the accused is already arrested and in custody and operates as soon as it is passed (subject to submission of bail bonds etc), while the latter operates at a future time-when the person not being in custody, is 276 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports arrested. This, according to the considered view of this Court, is the crux of the issue. To amplify, since an order granting anticipatory bail becomes effective only when the person is arrested and as it is not possible to arrest a person already in custody, it follows that when, on being released from custody in the former case, he is sought to be arrested in the new case, there is no reason why he shall be restrained from moving the Court beforehand to arm himself with necessary protection in the form of anticipatory bail to protect himself from such a situation. If such an order is passed by the Court in his favour, it shall become effective if and when he is arrested as normally happens. The only catch is, he cannot be arrested as long as he is in custody in the first-mentioned case. So, his right to obtain an order in the new case beforehand that can be effective only upon his release from the firstmentioned case cannot be denied under the scheme of the Code.
14. Another aspect must also be taken into consideration - when a person is in custody in connection with a case and a new case gets registered against him, it is, for all practical purposes a separate case altogether. This implies all rights conferred by the statute on the accused consequent upon registration of a case against him as well as the investigating agency are independently protected. There is no provision in the Code that takes away the right of the accused to seek his liberty or of the investigating agency to investigate into the case only because he is in custody in another case. As already stated, the accused can exercise his right of moving the court for anticipatory bail which would of course be effective only upon his release from the earlier case and in the event of his arrest in the subsequent case. Similarly, the right of the investigating agency to investigate/interrogate in the subsequent case can be exercised by seeking remand of the accused from the court in the subsequent case. Both these scenarios are not mutually exclusive and can operate at their respective and appropriate times. The investigating agency, if it feels [2024] 9 S.C.R. 277Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. necessary for the purpose of interrogation/investigation can seek remand of the accused whilst he is in custody in connection with the previous case and if such prayer is allowed, the accused can no longer pray for grant of anticipatory bail as then he would be technically in custody in connection with the subsequent case also.
Then, he can only seek regular or custody bail. It is also to be considered that if the prosecution has the power to register a case against a person who is in custody in connection with another case how can the accused be deprived of his right to seek protection of his liberty in such case? This would militate against the very principle underlying Article 21 of the Constitution as also Section 438 of the Code.
15. This takes the court to the reasoning adopted by the learned single judge of Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sunil Kallani (supra) that “…..the concerned Police Investigating Agency where FIRs have been registered would be prevented from conducting individual investigation and making recoveries as anticipatory bail once granted would continue to operate without limitation as laid down by the Apex Court in Sushila Aggarwal, (supra)….”
With great respect, this Court is unable to persuade itself to agree with the above-quoted reasoning in view of the fact that grant of anticipatory bail does not and cannot grant the accused a licence to avoid investigation or clothe him with any immunity there-from. In fact, sub-section (2) of Section 438 holds the answer to this question as follows:
(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including-
(i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required;
xxx xxx xxx 278 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports It is needless to mention that an order under subsection (1) can be passed only upon hearing the Public Prosecutor. Hence, the prosecution can always insist upon inclusion of such a condition by the court in the order grating anticipatory bail. And in so far as ‘recoveries’ are concerned, as already stated, it is always open to the investigating agency to pray for remand of the accused, as long as he is in custody, for such purpose and an order granting anticipatory bail has not been passed. […] xxx xxx xxx
17. From a conspectus of the analysis made hereinbefore thus, this Court holds as follows:
(i) There is no statutory bar for an accused in custody in connection with a case to pray for grant of anticipatory bail in another case registered against him;
(ii) Anticipatory bail, if granted, shall however be effective only if he is arrested in connection with the subsequent case consequent upon his release from custody in the previous case;
(iii) The investigating agency, if it feels necessary for the purpose of interrogation/investigation can seek remand of the accused whilst he is in custody in connection with the previous case and in which no order granting anticipatory bail has yet been passed. If such order granting remand is passed, it would no longer be open to the accused to seek anticipatory bail but he can seek regular bail.
18. In the cases at hand, the prosecution has not sought for nor obtained any order from the Court for remand of the petitioners in the subsequent cases registered against them. Thus, this Court holds that the Anticipatory Bail applications are maintainable...”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Thus, it appears from the aforesaid discussion that there are divergent opinions expressed by different High Courts of the country. The Rajasthan, Delhi and Allahabad High Courts have taken the view that an anticipatory bail application would not be maintainable if the [2024] 9 S.C.R. 279Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. accused is already arrested and is in custody in connection with some offence. On the other hand, the Bombay and Orissa High Courts have taken the view that even if the accused is in custody in connection with one case, anticipatory bail application at his instance in connection with a different case is maintainable.
D. ANALYSIS
i. Evolution of the concept of anticipatory bail
20. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short, “the 1898 Code”) did not contain any specific provision analogous to Section 438 of the CrPC. In Amir Chand v. The Crown reported in 1949 SCC OnLine Punj 20, the question before the Full Bench was whether Section 498 of the 1898 Code empowered the High Court or the Court of Session to grant bail to a person who had not been placed under restraint by arrest or otherwise. The Full Bench answered the reference as under:
“…The very notion of bail presupposes some form of previous restraint. Therefore, bail cannot be granted to a person who has not been arrested and for whose arrest no warrants have been issued. Section 498, Criminal Procedure Code, does not permit the High Court or the Court of Session to grant bail to anyone whose case is not covered by sections 496 and 497, Criminal Procedure Code. It follows, therefore, that bail can only be allowed to a person who has been arrested or detained without warrant or appears or is brought before a Court. Such person must be liable to arrest and must surrender himself before the question of bail can be considered. In the case of a person who is not under arrest, but for whose arrest warrants have been issued, bail can be allowed if he appears in Court and surrenders himself. No bail can be allowed to a person at liberty for whose arrest no warrants have been issued. The petitioners in the present case are, therefore, not entitled to bail. The question referred to the Full Bench is, therefore, answered in the negative.” (Emphasis supplied)
21. Under the 1898 Code, the concept of anticipatory or pre-arrest bail was absent and the need for introduction of a new provision in the 280 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports CrPC empowering the High Court and Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail was pointed out by the 41st Law Commission of India in its report dated September 24, 1969. It observed thus in para 39.9 of the said report (Volume I):
“Anticipatory bail 39.9 The suggestion for directing the release of a person on bail prior to his arrest (commonly known as “anticipatory bail”) was carefully considered by us. Though there is a conflict of judicial opinion about the power of a Court to grant anticipatory bail, the majority view is that there is no such power under the existing provisions of the Code. The necessity for granting anticipatory bail arises mainly because sometimes influential persons try to implicate their rivals in false causes for the purpose of disgracing them or for other purposes by getting detained in jail for some days. In recent times, the accentuation of political rivalry, this tendency is showing signs of steady increase. Apart from false cases, where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail, there seems no justification to require him first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail”
We recommend the acceptance of this suggestion. We are further of the view that this special power should be conferred only on the High Court and the Court of Session, and that the order should take effect at the time of arrest or thereafter.
In order to settle the details of this suggestion, the following draft of a new section is placed for consideration:
‘497-A. (1) When any person has a reasonable apprehension that he would be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section. That court may, in its discretion, direct that in the event of his arrest, he shall be released on bail.
(2) A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence against that person shall, while taking steps under Section 204(1), [2024] 9 S.C.R. 281Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. either issue summons or a bailable warrant as indicated in the direction of the court under sub-section (1).
(3) If any person in respect of whom such a direction is made is arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on an accusation of having committed that offence, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, such person shall be released on bail.’ We considered carefully the question of laying down in the statute certain conditions under which alone anticipatory bail could be granted. But we found that it may not be practicable to exhaustively enumerate those conditions; and moreover, the laying down of such conditions may be construed as prejudging (partially at any rate) the whole case. Hence we would leave it to the discretion of the court and prefer not to fetter such discretion in the statutory provision itself. Superior courts will, undoubtedly, exercise their discretion properly, and not make any observations in the order granting anticipatory bail which will have a tendency to prejudice the fair trial of the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. The suggestion made by the Law Commission was, in principle, accepted by the Central Government which introduced clause 447 in the Draft Bill of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970 with a view to confer express power on the High Court and the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail. The said clause of the draft bill was enacted with certain modifications and became Section 438 of the CrPC.
23. The Law Commission, in paragraph 31 of its 48th Report (1972), made the following comments on the aforesaid clause:
“The Bill introduces a provision for the grant of anticipatory bail. This is substantially in accordance with the recommendation made by the previous Commission. We agree that this would be a useful addition, though we must add that it is in very exceptional cases that such a power should be exercised.
282 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports We are further of the view that in order to ensure that the provision is not put to abuse at the instance of unscrupulous petitioners, the final order should be made only after notice to the Public Prosecutor. The initial order should only be an interim one. Further, the relevant section should make it clear that the direction can be issued only for reasons to be recorded, and if the court is satisfied that such a direction is necessary in the interests of justice.
It will also be convenient to provide that notice of the interim order as well as of the final orders will be given to the Superintendent of Police forthwith.”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Section 438 of the CrPC reads thus:
“Discretion for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.─(1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely:---
(i) the nature and gravity of the accusation;
(ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence;
(iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and.
(iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested, either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail:
Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim order under this sub-section or has rejected the application for [2024] 9 S.C.R. 283Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr. grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer incharge of a police station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application.
(1A) Where the Court grants an interim order under sub-section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application shall be finally heard by the Court, (1B) The presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the application and passing of final order by the Court, if on an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary in the interest of justice.
(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may think fit, including--
(i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required;
(ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;
(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court;
(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under subsection (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section.
(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, 284 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should be issued in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub-section (1).
(4) Nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on accusation of having committed an offence under sub-section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
25. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the bill for introducing Section 438 in the CrPC indicates that the legislature felt that it was imperative to evolve a device by which an alleged accused is not compelled to face ignominy and disgrace at the instance of influential people who try to implicate their rivals in false cases. The purpose behind incorporating Section 438 in the CrPC was to recognise the importance of personal liberty and freedom in a free and democratic country. A careful reading of this section reveals that the legislature was keen to ensure respect for the personal liberty of individuals by pressing in service the age-old principle that an individual is presumed to be innocent till he is found guilty by the court. [See: Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Others reported in (2011) 1 SCC 694].
26. In the context of anticipatory bail, this Court, in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre (supra), discussed the relevance and importance of personal liberty as under:
“36. All human beings are born with some unalienable rights like life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The importance of these natural rights can be found in the fact that these are fundamental for their proper existence and no other right can be enjoyed without the presence of right to life and liberty. Life bereft of liberty would be without honour and dignity and it would lose all significance and meaning and the life itself would not be worth living. That is why “liberty” is called the very quintessence of a civilised existence.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 285Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani & Anr.
Continue reading
Sign in and become a member to continue reading this judgment and every other document in the library.
Members read the full text, download where permitted, and keep notes and bookmarks.