Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 652; [2024] 9 S.C.R. 16
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra
- Decided
- 3 Sept 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 10192/2024
- Sections
- 2(30), 166, 2(19), 168(1), 168, 165, 164, 149, 159, 162, 2, 147
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[2024] 9 S.C.R. 16 : 2024 INSC 652 Vaibhav Jain v.
Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd.
Civil Appeal No. 10192/2024 03 September 2024 [J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether as a mere dealer of M/s Hindustan Motors, the appellant could be considered owner of the vehicle and as such liable, jointly and severally with M/s Hindustan Motors, to pay the compensation as directed by the Tribunal/High Court; whether clauses 3 (b) and 4 of the Dealership Agreement absolved M/s Hindustan Motors of its liability to pay compensation as an owner; whether M/s Hindustan Motors, even without preferring an appeal against the award of the Tribunal, could question its liability under the award by relying on the provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC.
Headnotes† Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Compensation – Liability of the dealer, if any – “ownership/owner” of the vehicle – Dealership Agreement between M/s Vaibhav Motors-appellant, the dealer and M/s Hindustan Motors, manufacturer of the vehicle – Accidental death when the vehicle was taken out for a test-drive by the employees of M/s Hindustan Motors from the dealership of the appellant – Prior to the accident, if M/s Hindustan Motors had sold the offending vehicle to the appellant – If not, whether the dealer would be liable for the compensation, jointly and severally with M/s Hindustan Motors:
Held: ‘owner’ of a vehicle is not limited to the categories specified in s. 2(30) of the 1988 Act – If the context so requires, even a person at whose command or control the vehicle is, could be treated as its owner for the purposes of fixing tortious liability for payment of compensation – There is no evidence that the vehicle was sold to the appellant-dealer – At the time of accident only two persons were present in the vehicle (the driver and the deceased) both of whom were employees of M/s Hindustan Motors and had taken the vehicle from the appellant-dealer for the test drive – * Author [2024] 9 S.C.R. 17Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd. Dealer had no authority to deny them the permission to take the vehicle for the test drive more so, when they were representatives of the owner of the vehicle, i.e. M/s Hindustan Motors – At the time of accident the vehicle was not only under the ownership of M/s Hindustan Motors but also under its control and command through its employees – Therefore, the appellant, being just a dealer of M/s Hindustan Motors was not liable for compensation as an owner of the vehicle – At the time of accident, the vehicle was being driven by an employee of M/s Hindustan Motors, thus, apart from the driver, M/s Hindustan Motors alone was liable for the compensation awarded. [Paras 19, 20, 23] Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Compensation – Dealership Agreement between M/s Vaibhav Motors-appellant, the dealer and M/s Hindustan Motors, manufacturer of the vehicle – M/s Hindustan Motors was held jointly and severally liable to pay compensation – It contended that Clauses 3 (b) and 4 the Agreement shifted the tortious liability to the appellant-dealer and it was not liable for payment of compensation:
Held: Rejected – Clauses 3(b) and 4 in the Agreement limited the company’s liability in respect of any defect in the motor vehicle to the company’s obligations under the warranty clause – The use of the words “and the company will have no other liability and all liabilities other than one under warranty as aforesaid shall be to the account of the Dealer”, in absence of specific exclusion of tortious liability arising from use of such vehicle, cannot absolve the owner of the motor vehicle of its liability under the Motor Vehicles Act and shift it on to the dealer when the vehicle at the time of accident was under the control and command of the owner i.e. M/s Hindustan Motors through its own employees. [Para 27] Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order 41, Rule 33 – Tribunal held M/s Hindustan Motors jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation – However, no appeal was filed by M/s Hindustan Motors against the award of the Tribunal – It relied upon Order 41, Rule 33 to challenge that portion of the award which made it jointly and severally liable:
Held: For exercise of the power under Rule 33 of Order 41 the overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice – One of the limitations on exercise of the power is that part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against, or objected to, by a party and which that party has permitted to 18 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party – In the instant case, the Tribunal returned a finding on that M/s Hindustan Motors had provided no evidence to show that the vehicle manufactured and owned by it was sold by it to the dealer – Admittedly, its own employees/officers were in control of the vehicle at the time of accident and, therefore, M/s Hindustan Motors was held jointly and severally liable for the compensation awarded – This part of the award operated against it and was backed by a finding of ownership – M/s Hindustan Motors allowed it to attain finality by not challenging the same through an appeal or cross-objection – Therefore, it cannot be allowed to question the same now. [Para 32] Case Law Cited M/s Tata Motors Limited v. Antonio Paulo Vaz and Anr. [2021] 1 SCR 625 : (2021) 18 SCC 545; Bihar Supply Syndicate v. Asiatic Navigation & Ors. [1993] 2 SCR 425 : (1993) 2 SCC 639; Sri Chandre Prabhuji Jain Temple & Ors. v. Harikrishna & Anr. [1974] 1 SCR 442 : (1973) 2 SCC 665 – referred to.
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Kailash Nath Kothari & Ors. [1997] Suppl. 3 SCR 724 : (1997) 7 SCC 481; Godavari Finance Company v. Degala Satyanarayanamma & Ors. [2008] 6 SCR 231 : (2008) 5 SCC 107; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi & Ors. [2007] 13 SCR 134 : (2008) 1 SCC 414; Guru Govekar v. Filomena F. Lobo [1988] Suppl. 1 SCR 170 : (1988) 3 SCC 1; Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors. [2004] Suppl. 1 SCR 418 : (2004) 5 SCC 409; Banarasi & Ors. v. Ram Phal [2003] 2 SCR 22 : (2003) 9 SCC 606 – relied on.
List of Acts Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. List of Keywords Accidental death; Offending vehicle; Compensation; Liability to pay compensation; Liability of the dealer; Jointly and severally liable to pay compensation; “owner” of the vehicle; At the time of accident; Dealership Agreement; Dealer; Dealership; Manufacturer of the vehicle; Test-drive; Death during test-drive; In control or command of the vehicle; In constructive possession of the vehicle; Employees of owner of the vehicle; Tortious liability; Finding achieved finality; Appeal; Cross-objection.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 19Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd. Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10192 of 2024 From the Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2017 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in MA No. 1306 of 2007 Appearances for Parties Arup Banerjee, Amit Poddar, Priyanshu Raj, R. K. Dey, Rajiv Agnihotri, Sanjeev Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Purti Gupta, Ms. Henna George, Advs. for the Respondent. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Manoj Misra, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal impugns the judgment and order of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur 1 dated 15.11.2017, whereby Miscellaneous Appeal (Civil) No. 1306 of 2007 filed by the appellant was dismissed and Miscellaneous Appeal (Civil) No. 1147/2017 filed by the claimant(s) was allowed thereby enhancing the compensation already awarded to them.
3. At the outset, we would like to put on record that the Special Leave Petition (SLP) against the impugned order was filed by impleading six respondents. Respondents 1 to 4 (R-1 to R-4) were heirs and legal representatives of the deceased Pranay Kumar Goswami on whose accidental death the claim arose. Respondent no. 5 (R-5), namely, Shubhashish Pal, was the person who drove the vehicle at the time of accident; and Respondent no.6 (R-6), namely, M/s Hindustan Motors, was the manufacturer of the vehicle. However, on 23.10.2018, this Court issued notice only to the manufacturer (R- 6) (i.e., M/s Hindustan Motors) and the SLP was dismissed qua R-1 to R-5 by observing that the question raised in the matter is about the liability of the dealer (i.e., the appellant). Therefore, in our view, the impugned award has attained finality insofar as the rights of the 1 High Court 20 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports claimant-respondents are concerned. In consequence, it appears, the Registry has shown M/s Hindustan Motors as the sole respondent though, initially, there were six respondents. Be that as it may to have a clear understanding of the matter, we shall describe the parties as they were described in the SLP at the time of its presentation.
FACTUAL MATRIX
4. A claim petition for death compensation was filed before the Tribunal by claimant-respondents (R-1 to R-4) (i.e., legal heirs of the deceased who died in the accident), under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, 2 against driver of the offending vehicle (R- 5); M/s. Hindustan Motors Private Limited (R-6) (i.e., manufacturer of the vehicle); and Vaibhav Jain (i.e., Proprietor of M/s Vaibhav Motors - the dealer of R-6) (the appellant herein). The deceased was R-6’s Territory Manager whereas the driver of the vehicle was R-6’s Service Engineer. Thus, the driver and the deceased were employees of R-6 (i.e., M/s Hindustan Motors). The accident took place when the vehicle was taken out for a test drive from the dealership of the appellant.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, five issues were framed by the Tribunal. Out of those five, the issue relevant for the purposes of this appeal is:
Whether prior to the accident M/s. Hindustan Motors had sold the offending vehicle to M/s. Vaibhav Motors (i.e., the dealer)? If not, whether the dealer can be held liable for the compensation, jointly and severally, with M/s. Hindustan Motors?
6. As regards issue of ownership of the vehicle, the Tribunal held that on the day of accident, M/s. Hindustan Motors was the owner of the vehicle though Vaibhav Motors was in possession of the vehicle as its dealer. Based on that, the Tribunal held M/s. Hindustan Motors as well as M/s. Vaibhav Motors (the appellant) jointly and severally liable for the compensation awarded.
7. Aggrieved by quantum of the compensation awarded, the claimants (R-1 to R-4) preferred Miscellaneous Appeal (Civil) No. 1147/2017 before the High Court; whereas vide Miscellaneous Appeal (Civil) 2 M.V. Act [2024] 9 S.C.R. 21Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd. No. 1306/2007, the dealer (i.e., the appellant herein) questioned the award to the extent it made him jointly and severally liable for payment of the compensation.
8. Both the aforesaid appeals were heard simultaneously and disposed of by the impugned order. The claimants’ appeal was allowed, and the compensation was enhanced. However, the appellant’s appeal was dismissed.
9. We have heard Shri Arup Banerjee for the appellant and Ms. Purti Gupta for M/s Hindustan Motors; and have also perused the materials on record.
Submissions on behalf of the appellant
10. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted:
(i) On the date of accident, the owner of the offending vehicle was its manufacturer M/s. Hindustan Motors (R-6) in whose name the vehicle was temporarily registered and there was no evidence that the vehicle was transferred to the appellant.
(ii) The driver of the vehicle and the deceased were both employees of M/s Hindustan Motors and they took the vehicle from the dealership for a test drive, therefore, the vehicle, at the time of accident, was in the control and possession of M/s Hindustan Motors through its employees.
(iii) The liability for compensation is of the owner of the vehicle including the driver. Section 2(30) of the M.V. Act defines the “owner” as a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.
(iv) The Dealership Agreement between the appellant and M/s. Hindustan Motors is neither an agreement of hire-purchase nor of lease or hypothecation, therefore, even if the dealer is taken to be in constructive possession of the vehicle, the dealer would not be its owner within the meaning of Section 2(30) of the M.V. Act.
22 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
(v) Clauses 3 (b) and 4 of the Dealership Agreement, relied to fasten liability on the appellant, are in respect of defects in the vehicle and not in respect of any claim for compensation arising from an accident involving the vehicle. The concept of possessory owner as obtaining under section 2(19) 3 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is no longer available under the M.V. Act, 1988 since the definition of owner has undergone a sea change.
(vi) The judgment of this Court in “Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Kailash Nath Kothari & Ors.” 4 was based on the definition of owner as obtaining under the old Act hence it would not be of any help to decide ownership of a vehicle under the new M.V. Act, 1988.
(vii) Once it is established that appellant is neither owner nor driver of the vehicle, it cannot be made liable for the compensation. Submissions on behalf of M/s Hindustan Motors (R-6)
11. Per contra, learned counsel for M/s Hindustan Motors submitted:
(i) M/s. Hindustan Motors had sold the vehicle to the appellant vide challan cum invoice No. 20302564 for an amount of Rs. 7,73,475/. Pursuant thereto, the car bearing temporary registration No. CG04RPRTC-0478 was delivered to the appellant on principal-to-principal basis. As the sale stood complete in all respects, the appellant was owner of the vehicle on the date of accident. (To buttress the above submission, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in “M/s. Tata Motors Limited vs. Antonio Paulo Vaz and Anr.” 5)
(ii) Assuming that the deceased as well the driver was an employee of M/s Hindustan Motors, once the vehicle was sold and delivered to the dealer, the driver and the dealer alone would be liable for compensation. More so, because clause 3(b) of the Dealership Agreement absolved M/s Hindustan Motors of its liability by providing as follows:
3 “owner” means, where the person, in possession of a motor vehicle is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.
4 [1997] Suppl. 3 SCR 724 : (1997) 7 SCC 481 5 [2021] 1 SCR 625 : (2021) 18 SCC 545 [2024] 9 S.C.R. 23Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd. “3(b) After the motor vehicles are dispatched /delivered the Company’s liability in respect of any defect in the motor vehicle will be limited to the Company’s obligations under the warranty clause and the Company will have no other liability and all liability other than the one under warranty as aforesaid shall be to the account of the Dealer.”
(Emphasis supplied)
(iii) The dealer being the possessory owner was rightly held liable in the light of the decision of this Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra).
(iv) Even if M/s. Hindustan Motors did not file an appeal against the impugned award, this Court can absolve M/s. Hindustan Motors of its liability by modifying the award in exercise of its power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (for short CPC) as expounded by this Court in “Bihar Supply Syndicate vs. Asiatic Navigation & Ors.” 6 and “Sri Chandre Prabhuji Jain Temple & Ors. vs. Harikrishna & Anr. 7
ISSUES
12. Having noticed the rival submissions, in our view, following issues fall for our consideration: -
(i) Whether, as a mere dealer of M/s Hindustan Motors, the appellant could be considered owner of the vehicle and as such liable, jointly and severally with M/s Hindustan Motors, to pay the compensation as directed by the Tribunal/ High Court?
(ii) Whether clauses 3(b) and 4 of the Dealership Agreement absolved M/s Hindustan Motors of its liability to pay compensation as an owner?
(iii) Whether M/s Hindustan Motors, even without preferring an appeal against the award of the Tribunal, could question its liability under the award by relying on the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC?
6 [1993] 2 SCR 425 : (1993) 2 SCC 639 7 [1974] 1 SCR 442 : (1973) 2 SCC 665 24 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Issue No.(i)
13. Before we delve into the afore-stated issues, we must have a look at the concept of ‘ownership’ of a vehicle as obtaining under the M.V. Act for fixing liability in respect of compensation. Section 166 8 of the M.V. Act enumerates the persons who may file an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal whereas Section 168(1) 9 of the M.V. Act speaks about the award of the Tribunal. Interestingly, Section 166, though specifies the persons who may file an application for compensation, omits to specify person(s) against whom the application is to be filed. However, sub-section (1) of Section 168 by providing that the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, gives sufficient indication on whom the liability for compensation would fall.
8 Section 166. Application for compensation. – (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made –
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property; or
(c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(d) by any agent duly authorized by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be, Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.
Provided further that where a person accepts compensation under section 164 in accordance with the procedure provided under section 149, his claims petition before the claims tribunal shall lapse.
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the claims tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the claims tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contains such particulars as may be prescribed.
(3) No application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident.
(4) The claims tribunal shall treat any report of accident forwarded to it under section 159 as an application for compensation under this Act.
(5) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, the right of a person to claim compensation for injury in an accident shall, upon the death of the person injured, survive to his legal representatives, irrespective of whether the cause of death is relatable to or had any nexus with the injury or not.
9 Section 168.- Award of the Claims Tribunal. – (1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 166, the claims tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties including the insurer an opportunity of being heard, hold and inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the claims tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:..
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 25Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors Pvt. Ltd.
14. In Godavari Finance Company v. Degala Satyanarayanamma & Ors.10 a question arose whether a financier would be an owner of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(30) 11 of the M. V. Act, 1988. In that case, the accident took place on 29.5.1995 and, admittedly, the vehicle was not in control of the financier though its name was entered in the registration book of the vehicle. The extract of the registration book, however, revealed that the vehicle was registered in the name of fourth respondent therein (i.e., not the financier) and that the hire-purchase agreement with the financier had also been cancelled on 10.11.1995. In that context, while holding that financier was not liable, interpreting the definition of ‘owner’, as provided in Section 2(30), this Court observed:
“12. Section 2 of the Act provides for interpretation of various terms enumerated therein. It starts with the phrase unless the context otherwise requires. The definition of owner is a comprehensive one. The interpretation clause itself states that the vehicle which is the subject matter of a hire purchase agreement, the person in possession of vehicle under that agreement shall be the owner. Thus, the name of financier in the registration certificate would not be decisive for determination as to who was the owner of the vehicle. We are not unmindful of the fact that ordinarily the person in whose name the registration certificate stands should be presumed to be the owner, but such a presumption can be drawn only in the absence of any other material brought on record or unless the context otherwise requires.
13. In case of a motor vehicle which is subjected to a hire purchase agreement, the financier cannot ordinarily be treated to be the owner. The person who is in possession of the vehicle, and not the financier being the owner would be liable to pay damages for the motor accident.
10 [2008] 6 SCR 231 : (2008) 5 SCC 107 11 Section 2. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, --
(30) “owner” means the person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and while such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.
26 [2024] 9 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
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