A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 640; [2024] 8 S.C.R. 1002
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Hima Kohli, Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah
- Decided
- 29 Aug 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 9975/2024
- Sections
- 58, 138, 116A, 3, 114, 17(1), 59, 17
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1002 : 2024 INSC 640 A.B. Govardhan v.
P. Ragothaman (Civil Appeal No(s). 9975-9976 of 2024)
29 August 2024 [Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.] Issue for Consideration Whether the respondent-defendant by way of the agreement agreed to create equitable mortgage by depositing the title deeds for the loan obtained by him from the appellant-plaintiff; whether there was redemption of the mortgage; whether the Single Judge rightly held the agreement to be a mortgage in view of Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Headnotes† Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.58 – Mortgage – Loan obtained by the respondent-defendant from the appellantplaintiff – Under the agreement in question, the respondent produced title document of his property as security towards debt and agreed to register the Sale Deed as and when demanded – However, later neither the respondent executed the Sale Deed nor paid the balance sum – Agreement, if was a mortgage – Whether the respondent by way of the agreement created a equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds: Held: Yes – There was no redemption of this mortgage – Division Bench erred in holding that the plaint averments did not conclude that there was a valid mortgage entitling the appellant-plaintiff to sue for a mortgage decree – Single Judge correctly held the agreement to be a mortgage in view of s.58(f) of the 1882 Act – Respondent admitted execution of the agreement (Exhibit P-1) however, claimed coercion but led no evidence to support this plea – Further, the agreement only recorded what had happened and did not create/extinguish rights/liabilities and therefore covered by para 14.3 of Narvir Singh and did not require registration – Impugned orders set aside – Judgment of the Single Judge restored with modification. [Paras 22, 29, 33] Pleadings – Evidence – Every fact pleaded has to be substantiated:
* Author [2024] 8 S.C.R. 1003A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman Held: For every pleaded fact, there has to be evidence, oral or documentary, to substantiate the same – A bald averment or mere statement by a defendant bereft of evidentiary material to back up such averment/statement takes such defendant’s case nowhere. [Para 24] Delay – Condonation – Liberal approach – Discussed.
Case Law Cited State of Haryana v Narvir Singh [2013] 9 SCR 949 : (2014) 1 SCC 105 – relied on.
Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v Ashutosh Agnihotri [2011] 1 SCR 796 : (2011) 2 SCC 532; Syndicate Bank v Estate Officer & Manager, APIIC Ltd. [2007] 9 SCR 619 : (2007) 8 SCC 361; Syndicate Bank v Estate Officer and Manager (Recoveries), Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited (2021) 3 SCC 736; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji [1987] 2 SCR 387 : (1987) 2 SCC 107; Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [2013] 9 SCR 782 : (2013) 12 SCC 649; N L Abhyankar v Union of India (1995) 1 MhLJ 503; M/s Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited v District Board, Bhojpur [1992] 2 SCR 155 : (1992) 2 SCC 598; Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v Shah Hyder Beig [1999] Supp. 5 SCR 197 : (2000) 2 SCC 48; Mool Chandra v Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878 – referred to.
List of Acts Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
List of Keywords Mortgage; Mortgage deed; Equitable mortgage by depositing title deeds; Loan; Redemption of the mortgage; Mortgage decree; Promissory notes; Registration; Delay condonation; Liberal approach; Pleadings; Evidence.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 9975-9976 of From the Judgment and Order dated 12.07.2018 and 22.02.2017 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CMP No. 10107 of 2017 and OSA No. 189 of 2011 respectively 1004 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Narendra Kumar, V. Balaji, Atul Sharma, Asaithambi MSM, R. Mohan, A. Krishna Kumar, C. Kannan, Rakesh K. Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
V Prabhakar, Sr. Adv., S. Rajappa, Ms. Jyoti Singh, R Gowrishankar, N J Ramchandar, Ms. Jyoti Parasher, Rakesh Ranjan, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
Heard Mr. Narendra Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned Senior counsel for the respondent.
2. Leave granted. The pending applications shall be dealt with in the final pages of this judgment.
3. The present appeals germinate from the:
3.1. Final Judgment and Order dated 22.02.2017 (hereinafter referred to as the “First Impugned Order”)1 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in Original Side Appeal 2 No.189 of 2011, whereby the appeal filed by the respondent was allowed and Judgment dated 01.04.2010 passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in Civil Suit No.701 of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the “suit”) was set aside.
3.2. Order dated 12.07.2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “Second Impugned Order”) passed by the same Division Bench, whereby Civil Miscellaneous Petition 3 No.10107 of 2017 in OSA No.189 of 2011 filed by the appellant seeking to “set aside” the First Impugned Order and restore the main appeal for fresh hearing, was dismissed.
1 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 11918 | (2017) 3 CTC 777 | (2017) 3 Mad LJ 522 | (2017) 4 LW 421. 2 Hereinafter abbreviated to “OSA”.
3 Hereinafter abbreviated to “CMP”.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1005A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman
BRIEF FACTS:
4. The respondent (defendant in the suit) and his wife are engaged in business of building materials. As per the appellant (plaintiff in the suit), the respondent approached him in February, 1995 seeking a loan for his business. The appellant advanced a loan of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs) to the respondent on the security of his properties.
5. Since the respondent could not pay Stamp Duty on the Mortgage Deed, it was agreed between the parties that the said sum be split into two registered mortgages and the balance in four promissory notes. Accordingly, the respondent executed the following: i) Mortgage Deed dated 16.03.1995 for Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) agreeing to repay the same together with interest at 36% per annum;4 ii) Mortgage Deed dated 17.04.1995 for Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) agreeing to repay the same together with interest at 36% p.a., and;
iii) Four promissory notes for the balance amount of Rs.8,50,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs Fifty Thousand).
6. Besides the two mortgages supra, the respondent borrowed the remaining Rs.8,50,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs Fifty Thousand) in four promissory notes on different dates. Since there was default in payment of interest, the appellant demanded repayment of the amount due under the four promissory notes. The respondent thereupon, in various panchayats, promised to repay the amounts. Ultimately, in the panchayat dated 24.06.2000, the respondent produced title document of his property as security towards debt under the four promissory notes, which has been noted in the Agreement dated 24.06.2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “Agreement”). This Agreement, in essence, is the root of the instant lis.
7. The Agreement notes that the respondent owed a total amount of Rs.11,00,000/- (Rupees Eleven Lakhs) to the appellant and in settlement thereof, the respondent handed over the title deeds pertaining to the property situated at No.33, Avvai Thirunagar, Chennai-600111, admeasuring 1300 square feet of land together with 4 Hereinafter abbreviated to “p.a.”.
1006 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 700 square feet building (hereinafter referred to as the “schedule property”), which was valued at Rs.9,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakhs). Per the Agreement, the respondent agreed to register the Sale Deed as and when demanded. Further, for re-paying the balance sum of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs), it was agreed that the respondent will redeem the mortgaged property from the appellant and re-mortgage it elsewhere.
8. After the Agreement was entered into between the parties, the promissory notes were returned which were torn-out in the panchayat. Thereafter, the respondent neither executed a Sale Deed nor paid the balance sum of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs). As a result, the appellant-plaintiff, filed the suit before the High Court, praying for: “(I) granting a usual preliminary mortgage decree of the Schedule mentioned property against the defendant for the recovery of Rs.23,96,000/- together with interest at 36% p.a. on Rs.11,00,000/- till the date of realization; And pass a final decree thereafter for sale of the Mortgaged property;
(II) for costs of this suit; and for such other equitable reliefs as may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and render justice.”
(sic)
9. The Single Judge, after perusing the evidence on record and hearing the parties, passed judgment dated 01.04.2010 holding that the respondent-defendant had agreed to “create equitable mortgage by depositing the title deeds”. Finding thus, the Single Judge decreed the suit. Aggrieved, the respondent filed an intra-court appeal being OSA No.189 of 2011 along with Miscellaneous Petition 5 No.1 of 2011, which was an application seeking condonation of delay of 176 days. The appellant through his advocate, Mr. V. Manohar received notice and filed a counter-affidavit opposing the said condonation of delay application. On 18.04.2011, the Division Bench was pleased to condone the delay, subject to payment of cost of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand) to the appellant.
5 Hereinafter abbreviated to “MP”.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1007A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman
10. The Division Bench vide the First Impugned Order allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant had failed to prove that there was a mortgage executed by the respondent. It is to be noted that none appeared for the appellant in the appeal. Subsequently, the appellant filed CMP No.10107 of 2017 in OSA No.189 of 2011, praying therein to “set aside” the First Impugned Order and for restoration of the main appeal for fresh hearing. The appellant contended that his erstwhile counsel (Mr. V. Manohar) was authorized only to appear in the MP filed to condone the delay [MP No.1 of 2011] and that there was no notice issued to him after registering of the appeal. The Division Bench vide the Second Impugned Order dismissed the CMP.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT-PLAINTIFF:
11. At the outset, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Division Bench of the High Court gravely erred in holding that the plaint averments were not sufficient to conclude that there was a valid mortgage entitling him to sue for a mortgage decree. It was submitted that the plaint, read as a whole, alongwith the Agreement, the Proof Affidavits and evidence of PW-1/appellant and DW1/respondent clearly evince the fact that a loan was secured by the respondent by mortgaging the schedule property. The amount in the Agreement pertains to loan transactions for which the mortgage was created by the Respondent. It was submitted that in such circumstances, the findings in the First Impugned Order are highly erroneous.
12. It was submitted by learned counsel that the Single Judge has rightly arrived at the conclusion that the present case is one where the respondent agreed to create a mortgage by depositing the title deed. There was an actionable debt and the respondent had fully intended that the deed ought to be the security for the debt. The Single Judge had also noted that the respondent in his evidence as DW1, had agreed to deposit the title deed to create an “equitable mortgage” for the loan amount obtained by him from the appellant. Thus, the Single Judge had rightly decreed the appellant’s suit and passed preliminary decree of mortgage.
13. It was further submitted that the Division Bench in the First Impugned Order had erred in holding that there was no stipulation to pay interest in the Agreement and that therefore the rate of interest as granted by the Single Judge could not have been so granted. It was submitted that various loans were advanced by the appellant to the 1008 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports respondent categorically stipulating interest at the rate of 36% p.a. on repayment. Once this contractual rate of interest was agreed upon by the parties, there was no scope for the Division Bench to state that there was no stipulation to pay interest in the Agreement. The Agreement had to be read in conjunction with various promissory notes and documents evidencing the mortgage and repayment of the loan with interest. Learned counsel contended that the Division Bench erred in holding that there was no prayer for grant of a personal decree against the respondent. It was submitted that the prayer clause of the plaint would show to the contrary.
14. On the Second Impugned Order, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Division Bench went wrong in not appreciating that the appellant had never authorized his counsel to represent him in the OSA and his vakalatnama was confined to the MP filed by the respondent seeking condonation of delay of 176 days. The MP was allowed by the Division Bench vide order dated 18.04.2011. Thereafter, the appellant, claims learned counsel, was not served with any notice in the OSA. The appellant submits that he was neither informed by his counsel, Mr. V. Manohar or by the Registry of the High Court about the status of the appeal.
15. It was further submitted that the Division Bench gravely erred in holding that the vakalatnama was given to Mr. V. Manohar for appearing in the MP for condonation of delay, the main appeal as also this Court. It was submitted that Mr. V. Manohar, counsel, was practicing only in the High Court. There was no question of the appellant authorizing any counsel for taking up the case in this Court as and when a case would come up. It was urged that a blanket printed statement on a vakalatnama can never constitute the intention of a litigant authorizing his/her/their counsel to represent the litigant in question in all courts and all proceedings.
16. Learned counsel contended that the appellant’s advocate Mr. Sukumar, who was appearing for the appellant in the Court at Tiruvannamalai, called the appellant and informed him that a judgment showing the appellant’s name was published in one of the law reports under the citation 2017 (3) MLJ 521 and it also showed that he went unrepresented therein. The appellant categorically submits that it was only then that the appellant came to know that the OSA arising from the suit had been decided against him ex-parte. Prayer was made to allow the appeals.
[2024] 8 S.C.R. 1009A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman
SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT-DEFENDANT:
17. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that there is no merit in the present appeals and the impugned orders do not call for any interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”). It was submitted that the Agreement does not refer to any mortgage having been created, since the recitals therein make it clear that the Agreement was to sell the schedule property to the appellant, and for the said purpose alone, the title deed of the property was handed over to the appellant. It was submitted that when the very genesis of the suit is the Agreement and the Agreement per se does not disclose the creation of any mortgage, a suit for foreclosure cannot be maintained and the Division Bench had rightly held so. The findings in the First Impugned Order that no mortgage has been created, stands justified in view of the contents of the Agreement.
18. Next, it was advanced that the plaint claims that Rs.23,96,000/- (Rupees Twenty Three Lakhs Ninety Six Thousand) was due as per the Agreement by including interest @ 36% p.a. till the date of institution of the suit. It was submitted that no particulars have been set forth in the plaint as to how this amount of Rs.23,96,000/- (Rupees Twenty Three Lakhs Ninety Six Thousand) was arrived at. While the cause of action pleaded in the suit makes reference only to the Agreement, the appellant makes a claim in respect of the mortgages dated 16.03.1995 and 17.04.1995, while also reserving the right to take separate action. Thus, it was submitted that the appellant has not put forth any specific case but has attempted to intermingle the mortgages and/or promissory notes with the Agreement. It was submitted that the mortgages dated 16.03.1995 and 17.04.1995 as also the promissory notes have been merged to arrive at the figure of Rs.11,00,000/- (Rupees Eleven Lakhs), which is being claimed as due from the respondent. It was further submitted that the promissory notes have not been exhibited in the suit.
19. Learned Senior counsel also pointed out that in respect of the two mortgages dated 16.03.1995 and 17.04.1995, the High Court in Second Appeal 6 No.1235 of 2014 (which emanated from a suit for redemption filed by the respondent) passed an interim order 6 Hereinafter abbreviated to “SA”.
1010 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports dated 25.08.2022, directing the respondent to pay the appellant a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs), being the principal and interest on both the mortgages. Subsequently, the High Court, by way of its final order dated 24.01.2023 in the said SA, noted the payments made by the respondent to the appellant, the return of the original Mortgage Deeds and also the cancellation of the mortgages. Thus, as the decree in the redemption suit had been complied with, it dismissed the second appeal as having become infructuous. Payment had been made and, after receiving the same, the appellant had returned the original title deeds to the respondent in respect of the property which was the subject-matter of the two mortgages dated 16.03.1995 and 17.04.1995.
20. It was further submitted that in the criminal case filed by the appellant against the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, this Court dismissed Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.994 of 2019,7 confirming the acquittal of the respondent. As regards the Second Impugned Order, it was submitted that the facts recorded therein speak for themselves and the appellant did not deserve any indulgence. Based on the above pleas, the respondent has sought dismissal of the instant appeals.
ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
21. Having given our anxious thought to the lis, we find that the Orders impugned need interference.
22. In our view, the Single Judge had appreciated the bundle of facts in the correct perspective, that is, the respondent had, by way of the Agreement, created a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. There was no redemption of this mortgage. The Division Bench fell in error in concluding that “The plaint averments are self-contradictory, vague and does not make out a clear case of mortgage.” (sic). Moreover, the plea of the respondent that the mortgage was redeemed is factually 7 Order dated 28.08.2023 reads as below:
“Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
After having perused the evidence of the petitioner- complainant, we are satisfied that the acquittal of the respondent is a possible conclusion, which could have been recorded by the High Court. Though, something can be said about the manner in which the findings have been recorded by the High Court, we are recording our findings after having perused the evidence of the complainant. Hence, we concur with the ultimate order of the High Court and accordingly, the special leave petition stands dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.” [2024] 8 S.C.R. 1011A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman incorrect. Another point not noted by the Division Bench is that the mortgage which took care of the return of Rs.8,50,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs Fifty Thousand), was never redeemed and initially, only re the two previous mortgages, the principal amount of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Thousand) was returned, without the agreed interest. As noted above, subsequent to the passing of the Impugned Orders, in SA No.1235 of 2014, interim Order dated 25.08.2022 had directed the respondent to pay the appellant a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs), being the principal and interest on both the mortgages. This stood complied with and the SA was dismissed as having become infructuous on 24.01.2023.
23. However, the Agreement envisaged property worth Rs.9,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakhs) out of the total claimed due of Rs. 11,00,000/- (Rupees Eleven Lakhs), being registered in favour of the appellant or his nominee. The Agreement also stipulated that after redeeming the earlier/previous mortgages, the respondent would re-mortgage for the purpose of raising Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs). Thereafter, the said sum of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) would be paid to the appellant. The said condition was not followed through i.e., no Sale Deed was executed and registered, nor was the sum of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) paid. We are of the view that in such a case, it was well-within the competence of the appellant to move the Court, which he did by instituting the suit.
24. Another factor is that the appellant was not heard in the appeal, as recorded in the First Impugned Order itself. Undoubtedly, in the face of non-appearance by the appellant before it, the Division Bench was free to proceed with final hearing of the appeal, as it did. However, what seems to have transpired is that in the absence of the appellant, what was averred by the respondent in the appeal was accepted as correct by the Division Bench. Fact remained that the respondent admitted to having executed Exhibit P-1 (the Agreement) and that the signature(s) thereon were his, in the Proof Affidavit dated 01.03.2010 as also cross-examination dated 08.03.2010. No doubt, he (respondent) has denied its voluntary execution and contended that it was under coercion and threat, but no evidence was brought or led by him to support this plea. The Division Bench opined, correctly, that “It is true that there was no supporting evidence adduced by him to show as to how he was threatened and forced to execute Ex.P1.” Pausing here, we may emphasise that for every fact 1012 [2024] 8 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports which is pleaded, there has to be evidence, either oral or documentary, to substantiate the same. A bald averment or mere statement by a defendant bereft of evidentiary material to back up such averment/ statement takes such defendant’s case nowhere. While deciding a statutory appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 against an order of the Gauhati High Court rejecting an Election Petition, this Court in Kalyan Kumar Gogoi v Ashutosh Agnihotri (2011) 2 SCC 532 commented that the term ‘evidence’ is used colloquially in different senses:
“33. The word “evidence” is used in common parlance in three different senses: (a) as equivalent to relevant, (b) as equivalent to proof, and (c) as equivalent to the material, on the basis of which courts come to a conclusion about the existence or non-existence of disputed facts. Though, in the definition of the word “evidence” given in Section 3 of the Evidence Act one finds only oral and documentary evidence, this word is also used in phrases such as best evidence, circumstantial evidence, corroborative evidence, derivative evidence, direct evidence, documentary evidence, hearsay evidence, indirect evidence, oral evidence, original evidence, presumptive evidence, primary evidence, real evidence, secondary evidence, substantive evidence, testimonial evidence, etc.”
(emphasis supplied)
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