Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 491; [2024] 7 S.C.R. 396
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 2 Judges: Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice Jj.]
- Decided
- 9 Jul 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 6782/2013
- Sections
- 19, 91, 92, 17(2), 3(1), 3, 154, 54, 16, 50(1), 49, 45
Not a certified copy. Text extracted from the judgment PDF published by the Supreme Court of India. Verify against the certified copy before relying on it. Source: Supreme Court of India, via the Indian Supreme Court Judgments dataset by Dattam Labs (CC-BY-4.0). Retrieved 17 Nov 2026, 12:22 am. Original source ↗
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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 396 : 2024 INSC 491 Maharaj Singh & Ors.
v.
Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 6782 of 2013)
09 July 2024 [Abhay S. Oka* and Sanjay Karol,JJ.] Issue for Consideration Can the contention that the suit agreement was sham and bogus and not intended to be acted upon be allowed to be raised notwithstanding Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act; Was the suit agreement sham and bogus and not intended to be acted upon; Were the second to fourth defendants bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the suit agreement; Whether, in view of the decision of Supreme Court in B. Vijaya Bharathi, the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree of specific performance in the absence of any prayer for cancellation of the two subsequent sale deeds; Do the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act create a bar on the execution of the sale deed in terms of the suit agreement; Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree of specific performance. Headnotes† Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.19(b) – Relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title – Defendantssubsequent purchasers claimed under the sale deeds executed after the execution of the suit agreement, if can be subjected to decree of specific performance – Plea of the defendants that in view of the decision in B. Vijaya Bharathi case, plaintiffs not entitled to decree of specific performance in the absence of prayer for cancellation of the subsequent sale deeds: Held: In two Judges bench decision in B. Vijaya Bharathi, the attention of the Bench was not invited to binding precedent of larger bench in Lala Durga Prasad & Ors. – Hence, the decision in the case of B. Vijaya Bharathi is not a binding precedent and there was no requirement to make a prayer in the plaint for cancellation or setting aside the subsequent sale deeds – Furthermore, in view of s.19(b), the defendants claiming under the sale deeds executed after the execution of the suit agreement can be subjected to a decree of specific performance as the suit agreement can be * Author [2024] 7 S.C.R. 397Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. enforced specifically against such defendants unless they are bona-fide purchasers without the notice of the original contract – When, the defendants-subsequent purchasers fail to prove that they entered into the sale deed in good faith and without notice of the suit agreement, in view of s.19(b), a decree for specific performance can be passed against such defendants – Therefore, in such a case where s.19(b) is applicable, under the decree of specific performance, the subsequent purchasers can be directed to execute the sale deed along with the original vendor – There is no necessity to pray for the cancellation of the subsequent sale deeds – There are concurrent findings of the three Courts on the issue of the readiness and willingness shown by the first plaintiff – No reason to disturb the said findings – However, as the second plaintiff was not interested in getting the specific performance, the decree ought to have been restricted to the undivided one-half share in the suit property in favour of only the first plaintiff – Impugned decree modified. [Paras 15, 16, 19-21] Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.91, 92:
Held: s.91 excludes oral evidence of the terms of the written document by requiring those terms to be proved by the document itself – s.92 excludes oral evidence for contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting to such terms – These sections do not prevent parties from adducing evidence on the issue of whether the parties to the documents had agreed to contract on the terms set forth in the document – In the present case, the contention that the deceasedfirst defendant was addicted to vices was never raised in the written statements and the same has come by way of an afterthought in the evidence of the mother of the first defendant – Moreover, the stand of the defendants in their written statement is that the suit agreement was forged – Therefore, on facts, the contention that the suit agreement was got executed from the first defendant with the object to deter him from selling the suit property to meet the demands of his bad lifestyle cannot be accepted – Hence, the suit agreement cannot be held as bogus or sham. [Para 12] Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 – Registration Act, 1908 – s.17(2)(v) – Transfer of property Act, 1882 – s.3(1) – Defendants-subsequent purchasers claimed under the sale deeds executed after the execution of the suit agreement – Whether they were bona-fide purchasers who paid consideration in good faith without the notice of the suit agreement:
398 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Held: No – Under the 1976 Amendment Act, clause (v) of S.17(2) of the Registration Act 1908 was amended making an agreement for the sale of immovable property, a compulsorily registerable document in the State – In view of explanation 1 to s.3 of the TP Act, the second to fourth defendants shall be deemed to have knowledge of the suit agreement, which was duly registered – It cannot be said that they had no knowledge of the suit agreement in view of the constructive notice or they paid money in good faith to the first Defendant – Therefore, the second to fourth defendants were not bona-fide purchasers who paid consideration in good faith without the notice of the suit agreement. [Para 13] Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaption and Modification order, 2001) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003 – s.154-B(1) – Transfer of property Act, 1882 – s.54 – s.154-B(1), if created a bar on the execution of the sale deed in terms of the suit agreement: Held: s.154-B(1) prohibits the sale or transfer of agricultural lands to a person who is not an agriculturalist – In view of s.54 of the TP Act, an agreement for sale does not transfer the property subject matter of the agreement to the purchaser – It does not create any interest in the property subject matter of the agreement – Therefore, the embargo created by sub-section (1) of s.154-B will apply only to the execution of the sale deed and not to the execution of the agreement for sale. [Para 17] Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaption and Modification order, 2001) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003 – s.154-B(2)(h) – Whether the vendor and the persons claiming through him can be directed to apply for permission in accordance with s.154-B(2)(h) to sell and whether a decree for execution of the sale deed can be made contingent upon the grant of permission to sell: Held: s.154-B(2)(h) permits the sale of agricultural land to a nonagriculturalist with the permission of the State Government for the purposes specified in clause (i) to (v) of clause (h) – In the present case, defendants shall join the first plaintiff in applying to the State Government/Competent Authority for the grant of permission u/s.154-B(2)(h) to sell the one half-undivided share in the suit land to the first plaintiff – It shall be the obligation of the defendants to apply for the permission and to do all such things which are necessary to get the permission – Further directions issued. [Paras 17, 21] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 399Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. Case Law Cited B.Vijaya Bharathi v. P. Savitri & Ors. [2017] 7 SCR 746 : (2018) 11 SCC 761 – not a binding precedent.
Lala Durga Prasad & Ors. v. Lala Deep Chand & Ors. [1954] 1 SCR 360 : (1953) 2 SCC 509 – relied on.
Tyagaraja Mudaliyar and Anr. v. Vedathanni ILR (1936) 59 Mad 446 : (1935) SCC OnLine PC 68; Krishnabai Bhritar Ganpatrao Deshmukh v. Appasaheb Tuljaramarao Nimbalkar & Ors. [1980] 1 SCR 161 : (1979) 4 SCC 60; Rojasara Ramjibhai Dahyabhai v. Jani Narottamdas Lallubhai and Another [1986] 2 SCR 447 : (1986) 3 SCC 300 – referred to.
List of Acts Specific Relief Act, 1963; Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaption and Modification order, 2001) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003; Evidence Act, 1872; Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act 1976; Registration Act, 1908; Transfer of Property Act, 1882. List of Keywords Specific performance; Suit for specific performance; Decree of specific performance; Suit agreement; Sale deed; Agreement for sale; Subsequent purchasers; Subsequent sale deeds; Absence of prayer for cancellation or setting aside of the subsequent sale deeds in the plaint; Bona-fide purchasers; Bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the suit agreement; Defendants not bonafide purchasers; Consideration not paid in good faith; Notice of the suit agreement; Knowledge of suit agreement; Constructive notice; Suit agreement not sham and bogus; Sale deeds executed after the execution of the suit agreement; Original vendor; Subsequent purchasers to execute the sale deed along with original vendor; Readiness and willingness; Sale of agricultural land to a nonagriculturalist; Binding precedent; Binding precedent of larger bench.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6782 of 2013 From the Judgment and Order dated 21.04.2010 of the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in SA No. 206 of 2001 (old No. 42 of 1994) 400 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Appearances for Parties Ashok Kumar Sharma, Sr. Adv., Vanshdeep Dalmia, Ms. Anisha Jain, Advs. for the Appellants.
Sumit Kumar, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Krishnam Mishra, Param Kumar Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Abhay S. Oka, J.
1. This appeal is at the instance of the original third, second, and fourth defendants. The first and second respondents are the original plaintiffs. The third respondent is the mother of the deceased original first defendant. For convenience, we are referring to the parties according to their status in the suit.
FACTUAL ASPECT
2. Reference to a few factual aspects will be necessary. The first defendant executed a registered agreement for sale dated 7 th December 1981 by which he agreed to sell his Bhumidhari land measuring 2.90 acres of Khasra no. 48 (for short, ‘the suit property’) at village-Jauniwala, Tehsil-Kashipur, District-Nainital in favour of the plaintiffs for the consideration of Rs. 20,300/-. There was a recital in the registered agreement dated 7 th December 1981 (for short, ‘the suit agreement’) that the first defendant had received a sum of Rs. 7,000/- as advance and the balance consideration was payable at the time of execution of the sale deed. The first defendant agreed to execute the sale deed within three years from the date of the suit agreement. According to the plaintiffs’ case, requests were made orally and by sending notices to the first defendant to execute the sale deed. It is pleaded in the plaint that the first defendant refused to accept notices.
3. On 6 th September 1983, the first defendant sold 1.60 acres out of the suit property to the second and third defendants by a registered sale deed. By another sale deed dated 12th December 1983, the first defendant sold the remaining part of the suit property to the second to fourth defendants. We must note that the suit was filed on 17 th December 1983, and the averments regarding the subsequent alienations were incorporated by the amendment made to the plaint [2024] 7 S.C.R. 401Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. in terms of the order dated 28 th July 1984. The case made out in the plaint is that the subsequent sale deeds are collusive. The prayer in the suit was for specific performance of the suit agreement with a direction to the defendants to hand over possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs and to execute a sale deed in respect of the suit property in their favour.
4. The defendants, including the legal representative (Smt. Bhagwati Devi) of the original first defendant, filed separate written statements. In the written statement filed by the legal representative of the first defendant, it was contended that the suit agreement was fictitious. In the written statement filed by the second and third defendants, it was pleaded that the suit agreement is a forged document which was never to be acted upon. It is pointed out that the first plaintiff - Karan Singh, and the first defendant were relatives. The plaintiffs never paid any money to the first defendant.
5. The first plaintiff was examined as a witness. The second plaintiff, Murari Singh, did not support the first plaintiff. He deposed in favour of the defendants. He stated on oath that the suit agreement was made only to ensure that the first defendant did not alienate the suit land. He stated that the first defendant was his relative. He stated that the first plaintiff was related to him and was a well-known person. The first plaintiff’s name was included as the purchaser in the suit agreement to deter the first defendant. He stated that he and the first plaintiff never demanded execution of the sale deed from the first defendant. The second plaintiff proceeded to state that he had not filed the suit, and the signature shown to him on the vakalatnama was of someone else. Subsequently, the second plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that the first defendant had several bad habits and, therefore, there was an apprehension that he would sell the suit property.
FINDINGS OF THE COURTS
6. The Trial Court held that the execution of the suit agreement was proved. Relying upon Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the Evidence Act’), the learned Trial Judge held that evidence contrary to the contents of the suit agreement could not be adduced and was not admissible in evidence. The learned Trial Judge held that in view of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976, which came into force 402 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports on 31st December 1976, an agreement for sale was compulsorily registrable in the State at the relevant time. Therefore, the learned Trial Judge held that in view of the explanation to Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, ‘the TP Act’), the second to fourth defendants shall be deemed to have a notice of the execution of the suit agreement. The learned Judge held that it was a duty of the second to fourth defendants to take a search in the office of the Sub-Registrar to ascertain whether there was any prior transfer. Therefore, the learned Trial judge held that the second to fourth defendants could not be held to be bona fide purchasers for value received. The finding on the issue of readiness and willingness was also recorded in favour of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the Trial Court passed a decree for the specific performance, directing all the defendants to execute the sale deed and deliver possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs. In an appeal preferred by the second to fourth defendants, the Additional District Judge, Nainital, confirmed all the findings of the Trial Court. The Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal. A second appeal was preferred by the second to fourth respondents. The second appeal has been dismissed by the impugned judgment.
ORDERS OF THIS COURT
7. On 26 th October 2010, this Court issued notice. The order of this Court reads thus:
“Mr. K.B. Sinha, senior advocate appearing for the petitioners submits that after coming into force of the Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaptation and Modification Order, 2001) (Amendment) Act, 2003, the sale of the suit land in terms of the decrees of the Court would be violative of the provisions of the Act because the plaintiff is not an agriculturist.
Issue notice.
In the meanwhile, there shall be stay of operation of the impugned decree.”
On 12 th August 2013, leave was granted. This Court granted a stay to the operation of the impugned decrees on 26 th October 2010. [2024] 7 S.C.R. 403Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.
SUBMISSIONS
8. The learned senior counsel appearing for the second to fourth defendants submitted that the three Courts refused to consider the submission that the suit agreement was sham and bogus. By pointing out Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, he urged that the provisions did not prevent the defendants from leading evidence to show that the suit agreement was bogus or sham. He relied on the Privy Council’s decision in the case of Tyagaraja Mudaliyar and Anr. v. Vedathanni 1. He submitted that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act do not exclude evidence on the question of whether the parties had agreed to contract on the terms set forth in the document. He also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Krishnabai Bhritar Ganpatrao Deshmukh v. Appasaheb Tuljaramarao Nimbalkar & Ors. 2 . He submitted that it was brought on record in the depositions of the second plaintiff who was the uncle of the first defendant, and Bhagwati Devi, the mother of the first defendant, that the first defendant had many vices. Bhagwati Devi was apprehensive that the first defendant would sell the property to fund his bad lifestyle. The second plaintiff, Murari Singh, was her brother; therefore, she approached Murari Singh to prevent the first defendant from selling the suit property. The second plaintiff, Murari Singh, brought his friend, the first plaintiff. Thereafter, the suit agreement was executed to deter the first defendant from selling the property. He submitted the specific contention that the suit agreement was a sham document which was not to be acted upon has been brushed aside by the three Courts.
9. He submitted that the first plaintiff filed the suit within a few days after the first defendant executed a sale deed on 12th December 1983 in favour of the second to fourth defendants. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the second to fourth defendants are bona-fide purchasers as the suit agreement is sham and bogus. He submitted that the defence that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their part of the suit agreement is also available to the defendants claiming to be subsequent purchasers through the vendor. The learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of 1 ILR (1936) 59 Mad 446 : 1935 SCC OnLine PC 68 2 [1980] 1 SCR 161 : (1979) 4 SCC 60 404 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports this Court in the case of B. Vijaya Bharathi v. P. Savitri & Ors.3 , and submitted that the plaintiffs are disentitled to relief of specific performance as they have not prayed in the plaint for setting aside or cancelling the subsequent sale deeds. Learned senior counsel also relied upon Section 154-B of the Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaption and Modification order, 2001) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003 (for short, ‘the Zamindari Abolition Act”). He submitted that as the 1 st plaintiff is not an agriculturist within the meaning of Section 3(a) thereof, in view of Section 154-B, a sale deed cannot be executed in terms of the suit agreement. He also pointed out that the legal representatives of the first respondent (first Plaintiff) have not chosen to contest the appeal despite service of notice. Therefore, they are not interested in contesting the appeal.
QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
10. After having considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, we find that the following questions arise:
a) Can the contention that the suit agreement was sham and bogus and not intended to be acted upon be allowed to be raised notwithstanding Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act? b) Was the suit agreement sham and bogus and not intended to be acted upon?
c) Were the second to fourth defendants bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the suit agreement?
d) Whether, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of B. Vijaya Bharathi 3, the plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree of specific performance in the absence of any prayer for cancellation of the two subsequent sale deeds?
e) Do the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act create a bar on the execution of the sale deed in terms of the suit agreement? f) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of specific performance?
3 [2017] 7 SCR 746 : (2018) 11 SCC 761 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 405Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. FIRST TWO QUESTIONS – (a) AND (b)
11. Now, we come to the first two questions. Right from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Tyagaraja Mudaliyar 1 the law is well settled. Section 91 of the Evidence Act excludes oral evidence of the terms of the written document by requiring those terms to be proved by the document itself. Section 92 excludes oral evidence for contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting to such terms. These two sections do not prevent parties from adducing evidence on the issue of whether the parties to the documents had agreed to contract on the terms set forth in the document.
12. Coming to the facts of the case, firstly, we must refer to the pleadings of the legal representative of the first defendant. In paragraph 11 of her written statement, she raised the following contention: “…………………………………………………
11. That the real facts are that plaintiff Murari Singh is the brother of answering respondent and Karan Singh is his friend. So, under fear and making the pressure on Preetam Singh, a fictitious agreement was prepared by plaintiff Murari Singh without any consideration in order to deter late Preetam Singh, so that the should not sale the land. Neither this agreement was acted upon nor was disclosed any time. The said amount for consideration, written in the agreement, is shown at very low price from the market price.
…………………………………………………”
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