Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/S Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 554; [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1549
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- 9 Judges: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Justice Abhay S. Oka, Justice B.V. Nagarathna, Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, Justice Augustine George Masih, Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
- Decided
- 25 Jul 2024
- Case number
- CIVIL APPEAL No. 4056/1999
- Sections
- 9, 15(1), 2, 25, 20(2), 316, 89, 9(3), 18, 45A, 129A, 100
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[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1549 : 2024 INSC 554 Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr.
v.
M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 4056-4064 of 1999)
25 July 2024 [Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud,* CJI, Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, B.V. Nagarathna,* J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.] Issue for Consideration The questions which arose for determination are as to what is the true nature of royalty determined u/s.9 r/w s.15(1) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957; whether royalty is in the nature of tax; what is the scope of Entry 50 List II Seventh Schedule; what is the ambit of the limitations imposable by Parliament in exercise of its legislative powers under Entry 54 List I; does s.9, or any other provision of the MMDR Act, contain any limitation with respect to the field in Entry 50 List II; whether the expression “subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development” in Entry 50 List II pro tanto subjects the entry to Entry 54 List I, which is a non-taxing general entry; whether there is any departure from the general scheme of distribution of legislative powers as enunciated in M P V Sundararamier’s case; what is the scope of Entry 49 List II and whether it covers a tax which involves a measure based on the value of the produce of land; would the constitutional position be any different qua mining land on account of Entry 50 List II r/w Entry 54 List I; and whether Entry 50 List II is a specific entry in relation to Entry 49 List II, and would thus, subtract mining land from the scope of Entry 49 List II.
Headnotes† Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – s.9 read with s.15(1) – Royalties in respect of mining leases – Nature of royalty determined u/s.9/15(1) – Royalty, if in the nature of tax:
* Author Ed. Note: Hon’ble Dr. Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India pronounced the judgment on behalf of himself, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Abhay S. Oka, Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Augustine George Masih. Hon’ble Mrs. Justice B.V. Nagarathna pronounced a separate judgment.
1550 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Royalty is not a tax – Royalty is a contractual consideration paid by the mining lessee to the lessor for enjoyment of mineral rights – Liability to pay royalty arises out of the contractual conditions of the mining lease – Payments made to the Government cannot be deemed to be a tax merely because the statute provides for their recovery as arrears. [Para 342a] – Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) (Dissenting) Royalty determined u/s.9 r/w s.15(1) is in the nature of a tax or an exaction coming within the scope and ambit of Art.366(28) which defines taxation to include the imposition of any tax or impost, whether general or local or special and the word “tax” is to be construed accordingly – It is not merely a contractual payment but a statutory levy u/s.9 – Liability to pay royalty does not arise purely out of the contractual conditions of a binding lease – Payment of royalty to the Government is a tax in view of Entry 50 List II being subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law in the context of Entry 54 List I read with s.2 of the MMDR Act – Constitution of India – Art.366(28), Entry 54 List I, Entry 50 List II. [Paras 40a, 41a] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – s.9 – Royalties in respect of mining leases – Constitution of India – Entry 50 List II Seventh Schedule – Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development – Scope of Entry 50 List II – Ambit of the limitations imposable by Parliament in exercise of its legislative powers under Entry 54 List I – s.9, or any other provision of the MMDR Act, if contains any limitation with respect to the field in Entry 50 List II:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Legislative power to tax mineral rights vests with the State legislatures – Parliament does not have legislative competence to tax mineral rights under Entry 54 List I, it being a general entry – Since the power to tax mineral rights is enumerated in Entry 50 List II, Parliament cannot use its residuary powers with respect to that subject-matter – Entry 50 List II envisages that Parliament can impose “any limitations” on [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1551Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
the legislative field created by that entry under a law relating to mineral development – MMDR Act as it stands has not imposed any limitations as envisaged in Entry 50 List II – Entry 54 List I, Entry 50 List II Seventh Schedule. [Para 342b, c] – Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) (Dissenting) – Entry 50 List II dealing with taxes on mineral rights, is subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development – Use of the word “any” means the limitation could be in any form which can be imposed only by the Parliament by law relating to mineral development – Use of the expression ‘any limitations’ must be given the widest possible meaning to include a limitation in the form of ss.9 and 9A, 25 or any other provision of the MMDR Act and Rules made thereunder which act as a limitation to Entry 50 List II – Scope of the expression “any limitations” under Entry 50 List II is wide enough to include the imposition of restriction, conditions, principles as well as a prohibition by Parliament by law relating to mineral development – Thus, in view of the declaration u/s.2 of the MMDR Act made in terms of Entry 54 List I and to the extent of the provisions of the said Act, the State legislature is denuded of its powers under Enry 50 List. [Paras 40b, 41d, e] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – s.9 – Royalties in respect of mining leases – Constitution of India – Entry 50 List II Seventh Schedule – Expression “subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development” in Entry 50 List II, if pro tanto subjects the Entry to Entry 54 List I, which is a non-taxing general Entry – If there is any departure from the general scheme of distribution of legislative powers as enunciated in MPV Sundararamier’s case:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) – Legislative power to tax mineral rights vests with the State legislatures – Parliament does not have legislative competence to tax mineral rights under Entry 54 List I, it being a general entry – Since the power to tax mineral rights is enumerated in Entry 50 List II, Parliament cannot use its residuary powers with respect to that subject-matter – Entry 50 List II does not constitute an exception to the position of law laid down in M P V Sundararamier’s case. [Para 342b, c, d] – Held: (per B.V. 1552 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Nagarathna, J.) (Dissenting) Expression “subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development” in Entry 50 List II pro tanto subjects the Entry to Entry 54 List I – Use of the expression “any limitations” would mean that the taxing Entry would be subject to a non-taxing or general Entry such as in Entry 54 List I which could also be termed as a regulatory Entry – Thus, there is a departure from the general scheme of distribution of legislative powers as enumerated in MPV Sundararamier’s case insofar as Entry 50 List II read with Entry 54 List I is concerned which is unique to Entry 50 List II – This is having regard to the significance of Entry 54 List I which also overrides Entry 23 List II – Entry 50 List II is an exception to the position of law laid down in MPV Sundararamier’s case. [Paras 40c, 41b] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – ss.9, 2 – Royalties in respect of mining leases – Constitution of India – Entry 49 List II Seventh Schedule – Scope of Entry 49 List II – Entry 49 List II, if covers tax involving a measure based on the value of the produce of land – Constitutional position, if different qua mining land on account of Entry 50 List II read with Entry 54 List I:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) State legislatures have legislative competence u/Art.246 read with Entry 49 List II to tax lands which comprise of mines and quarries – Mineral-bearing land falls within the description of “lands” under Entry 49 List II – Yield of mineral bearing land, in terms of the quantity of mineral produced or the royalty, can be used as a measure to tax the land under Entry 49 List II – Decision in Goodricke’s case clarified to this extent [Para 342 e, f] – Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) (Dissenting) Entry 49 List II deals with taxation of lands and buildings – It does not cover taxes on mineral bearing lands – Constitutional position is different qua mineral bearing lands on account of Entry 50 List II read with Entry 54 List I and s.2 of the MMDR Act – Thus, any imposition on the basis of royalty by a State Legislature or involving royalty as a measure of the value of the minerals extracted from the land is impermissible – State legislatures have legislative competence under Art.246 read with Entry 49 List II to tax lands and buildings but not lands which comprise of mines and quarries or have mineral [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1553Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
deposits as mineral bearing lands do not fall within the description of lands (under Entry 49 List II) – Similarly, States can tax such mineral bearing lands which are not covered within the scope of MMDR Act-minor minerals, under Entry 50 List II and not under Entry 49 List II as tax on exercise of mineral rights – Thus, mineral bearing lands cannot be taxed under Entry 49 List II – Further, the yield of mineral bearing lands, in terms of quantity of mineral produced or royalty paid cannot also be used as a measure to tax such lands under Entry 49 List II – Decision in Goodricke’s case does not require any clarification – Entry 50 List II read with Entry 54 List I Seventh Schedule. [Paras 40d, 41f, g] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – ss.9, 2 – Constitution of India – Entry 49 List II, Entry 50 List II Seventh Schedule – Entry 50 List II, if a specific Entry in relation to Entry 49 List II, and would consequently subtract mining land from the scope of Entry 49 List II:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Entries 49 and 50 of List II deal with distinct subject matters and operate in different fields – Mineral value or mineral produce can be used as a measure to impose a tax on lands under Entry 49 List II – “Limitations” imposed by Parliament in a law relating to mineral development with respect to Entry 50 List II do not operate on Entry 49 List II because there is no specific stipulation under the Constitution to that effect. [Para 342g, h] – Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) (Dissenting) Entry 50 List II is a specific Entry in relation to Entry 49 List II and would consequently subtract mining lands from the scope of Entry 49 List II, having regard to Entry 50 List II to be read with Entry 54 List I and s.2 of the MMDR Act. [Para 40e] Mines and Minerals – Royalty, in the nature of tax or not – Divergence between India Cement’s case and Kesoram’s case – India Cement’s case held that royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the State legislature because s.9 of the Central Act covers the field and the State legislature is denuded of its competence under Entry 23 List II whereas Kesoram’s case held that royalty is not a tax, but a payment made to the owner of land who may be a person and may not necessarily be the State: 1554 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) – Kesoram held that India Cement’s case was caused by “an apparent typographical error or inadvertent error” and should not be understood as a correct declaration of law – Kesoram’s case also expressed its disagreement with Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills’s case to the extent it had held that there was no “typographical error” in India Cement’s case – Kesoram’s case concurred with India Cement’s case on the aspect that cess on royalty is beyond the legislative competence of the State legislatures – Divergence on the point of law between India Cement’s case and Kesoram’s case is apparent and pertains to whether or not royalty is a tax – Thus, the royalty does not meet the characteristic requirements of a tax. [Paras 117, 121, 122] – Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) Majority decision in Kesoram is a serious departure from the law laid down by the seven-judge Bench in India Cement which was wholly unwarranted and thus, the said majority judgment is liable to be overruled and is overruled to the extent of holding that royalty is not a tax – India Cement was correctly decided wherein it was held that royalty is in the nature of tax. [Paras 42 (ii), 1.1] Constitution of India – Legislative entries – Interpretation – Entries 49 and 50 List II in the context of mineral bearing lands – Interplay of:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Entries 49 and 50 of List II deal with distinct subject matters – Both the entries operate in different fields without any overlap – Nature of taxes under the entries are distinct – Fact that mineral value or mineral produced is used as a measure under Entry 50 List II does not preclude the legislature from using the same measure for taxing mineral bearing land under Entry 49 List II – Doctrine of generalia specialibus non derogant has no application because Entries 49 and 50 List II operate in different fields – Though Parliament can limit the taxing field entrusted to the State under Entry 50 List II through a law relating to mineral development, the limitation operates on the field of taxing mineral rights – Such a limitation cannot operate on Entry 49 List II because there is no specific stipulation under the Constitution to [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1555Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
that effect – Constitution envisages the imposition of limitations by Parliament on the legislative field of the state of taxes on mineral rights, and not taxes on lands. [Para 339] – Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) (Dissenting) Entry 49 List II is of the widest amplitude – Mineral value or mineral produce cannot be used as a measure to tax mineral bearing land under Entry 49 List II, also, the word “lands” under Entry 49 List II cannot include mineral bearing land as well – This would amount to “double taxation”, one, by the State Legislature on the mineral bearing land under Entry 49 List II and again for conducting a mining operation which is for exercise of a mineral right u/s.9 of MMDR Act, which is Parliamentary law also paid to the State Government – This is impermissible having regard to the constitutional intent and scheme of Entries in the Lists – Thus, royalty cannot also be a measure to impose tax on mineral bearing land – State Legislature using royalty on mineral produce as a measure to impose a cess under Entry 49 List II on mineral bearing land would overlap Entry 50 List II, because minerals are extracted by virtue of mining activity which is in exercise of mineral right and taxes on mineral rights are envisaged under Entry 50 List II subject to any limitation imposed by Parliament – Thus, Entry 50 List II would have to be viewed distinctly from Entry 49 List II – If so viewed, it becomes subject to Parliamentary law in the form of MMDR Act and the rules made thereunder which would be a limitation on the power of State to tax under Entry 50 List II – Hence to get over the rigour of Entry 50 List II, States cannot resort to Entry 49 List II. [Paras 33, 34] Mines and Minerals – Dead rent – Explanation:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Dead rent acts as a deterrent against a leaseholder cornering a mining lease and keeping the mineral resources idle – Similar to royalty, dead rent is also a statutory imposition and an integral part of the mining lease, but it generally does not serve as a consideration for the removal or consumption of minerals – Dead rent is determined on the basis of the area of land covered by the lease – Imposition of dead rent ensures that the proprietor obtains a fixed rent from the lessee even if the mine remains unworked – Thus, dead rent is not in addition to royalty but an alternative – Principles applicable to royalty apply to dead rent because dead rent is imposed in the exercise 1556 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of the proprietary right (and not a sovereign right) by the lessor to ensure that the lessee works the mine, and does not keep it idle, and in a situation where the lessee keeps the mine idle, it ensures a constant flow of income to the proprietor; the liability to pay dead rent flows from the terms of the mining lease; dead rent is an alternate to royalty; if the rates of royalty are higher than dead rent, the lessee is required to pay the former and not the latter; and the Central Government prescribes the dead rent not in the exercise of its sovereign right, but as a regulatory measure to ensure uniformity of rates. [Paras 99, 129] – Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) Entry 49 List II does not apply to mineral bearing lands as such lands are taxed in the form of royalty or dead rent in the context of exercise of mineral rights – Exercise of mineral rights is the basis for payment of royalty or dead rent – Insofar as extraction of minerals is concerned, being an exercise of a mineral right, royalty is payable by a holder of a mining lease and when no mining activity is carried on, dead rent is payable by such a person. [Paras 33, 41] Constitution of India – Federalism – Explanation – Distinctive elements:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Federalism is one of the basic features of the Constitution which embodies a division of powers between the units of the federation-the Union and the States – Indian federalism is defined as asymmetric because it tilts towards the Centre, producing a strong Central Government – Yet, it has not necessarily resulted in weak State governments – Indian States are sovereigns within the legislative competence assigned to them – Delicate balance of power is secured by constitutional courts by interpreting the scheme of distribution of powers – In a federal form of government, each federal unit should be able to perform its core constitutional functions with a certain degree of independence – Constitution has to be interpreted in a manner which does not dilute the federal character of our constitutional scheme – Effort of the constitutional court should be to ensure that State legislatures are not subordinated to the Union in the areas exclusively reserved for them. [Paras 48, 49] – Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) India’s postcolonial Constitution introduced [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1557Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
a new approach to federalism which has departed from the principle that federal and regional governments should each have independence in their own sphere of authority – Distinctive elements of Indian federalism were shaped at their foundations by the desire to boost industrial development and lay the foundation for a national welfare state in a post-colonial future by preventing the consolidation of ‘‘race to the bottom’’ dynamics arising from unregulated inter-provincial economic competition – Distinctive element of Indian federalism is the combination of a strong Centre and a substantial sphere of shared Centre-State jurisdiction – Desirable balance between Central and the State Governments has to be viewed in the context of the country continuing to confront the need to promote economic growth while upholding and expanding social rights. [Paras 36, 36.3, 36.4] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1957 – s.9 – Royalty – Royalty, in nature of tax or not: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Royalty is not a tax – It is a consideration paid by a mining lessee to the lessor for enjoyment of mineral rights and to compensate for the loss of value of minerals suffered by the owner of the minerals – Liability to pay royalty arises out of the contractual conditions of the mining lease – s.9 statutorily regulates the right of a lessor to receive consideration in the form of royalty from the lessee for removing or carrying away minerals from the leased area – Rates of royalty prescribed u/s.9 does not make it a “compulsory exaction by public authority for public purposes” – s.25 allows recovery of royalty due to the Government under the MMDR Act or “under the terms of the contract” as arrears of land does not make royalty “an impost enforceable by law” – Furthermore, there is difference between royalty and a tax – Proprietor charges royalty as a consideration for parting with the right to win minerals, while a tax is an imposition of a sovereign, royalty is paid in consideration of doing a particular action, that is, extracting minerals from the soil, while tax is generally levied with respect to a taxable event determined by law, and royalty generally flows from the lease deed as compared to tax which is imposed by authority of law – Since royalty is a consideration paid by the lessee to the lessor under a mining lease, it cannot be termed as an impost – Furthermore, 1558 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports both royalty and dead rent do not fulfil the characteristics of tax or impost – Thus, observation in India Cement’s case that royalty is a tax is incorrect. [Paras 327, 123-130] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1957 – s.9 – Royalties in respect of mining leases – Purpose of s.9:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) s.9 sought to remedy the disparity of royalty rates across India – Rates of royalty were primarily governed by the terms of lease prior to the enactment of the MMDR Act – Once a mining lease was entered into between a lessor and lessee, the rates of royalty would remain static during the subsistence of the lease – s.9 has enabled the Central Government to examine the rates of royalty in respect of all minerals and modulate them periodically after taking into consideration various factors, including the uniformity of mineral prices – Primary reason for empowering the Central Government to fix the rate of royalty could be traced to the Industrial Policy Resolution which underscored the active and predominant role of the State in organizing and utilizing mineral resources – State Governments were not empowered to determine royalty in order to maintain a uniform regime of royalty across India – This was intended to promote domestic industry and maintain competitive commodity prices in the international market. [Paras 77, 78] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Meaning of “royalty” – Explanation – Essential characteristics: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Royalty is generally understood as compensation paid for rights and privileges enjoyed by the grantee – It has its genesis in the agreement entered into between the grantor and grantee – Royalty is a payment made by the lessee to the lessor or proprietor of the minerals for the removal of minerals – Royalty also serves to compensate the lessor for the degradation of the value of the mine because of the extraction of minerals – Essential characteristics of royalty are that-it is a consideration or payment made to the proprietor of minerals, either government or [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1559Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
private person, it flows from a statutory agreement (mining lease) between lessor and lessee, it represents a return for the grant of privilege (to lessee) of removing or consuming the minerals, and it is generally determined on basis of the quantity of the minerals removed. [Paras 94, 96, 98] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1957 – s.9 – Royalty – Nature of – Calculation of royalty: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Royalty is not a tax but a statutory consideration payable by the lessee to the lessor for the exercise of mineral rights – Specification of rates of royalty with respect to major minerals under the MMDR Act limits the powers of the State Government in terms of Entry 54 List I read with Entry 23 List II – Royalty is payable u/s.9 on the removal or consumption of minerals by the lessee in the leased area – Thus, essentially royalty is payable on the dispatch of minerals from the leased area – Rates of royalty are generally calculated on per tonnage basis or ad valorem basis on the basis of the formula laid down – Royalty is calculated on the basis of the quantity of minerals extracted or removed – Yield from mineral bearing land is nothing but the quantity of mineral produced – Royalty is per se not the yield from a mineral bearing land, but the yield (mineral produced) is the important factor in determination of the rate of royalty – Moreover, royalty can be considered as an income if it is paid to a private landowner – In case minerals are vested in the State, royalty is paid to the State Government, and hence assumes the form of non-tax revenues – Thus, royalty is relatable to the yield of the mineral-bearing land as well as the income in case the minerals vest in a private person. [Paras 87, 327-332] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1957 – s.9 – If serve as a limitation on the taxing powers of State under Entry 50 List II – Expression ‘any limitation’ under Entry 50 List II, if can be extended to prohibition: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Scheme of the MMDR Act does not in itself serve as a 1560 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports limitation on the field of taxation under Entry 50 List II – MMDR Act empowers the Central Government to specify the rates of royalty u/s.9 r/w Second Schedule – Since royalty payable u/s.9 is not a tax on mineral rights, any limitation on the enhancement of the rates of royalty is not the imposition of a tax under Entry 50 List II – ss.9, 9A, 9B, and 9C do not impose any limitations on the powers of State to tax mineral rights under Entry 50 List II – Under Entry 50 List II, phrase “any limitations” is specifically used – Framers of the Constitution intended to empower Parliament to impose “all” and “every” possible limitation on the taxing powers of the State in the interests of mineral development, which include even “prohibition” – Thus, the expression ‘any limitations’ include the power to prohibit the States from taxing mineral rights – Overall scheme of Art. 246 r/w Entry 54 List I and Entry 50 List II makes it clear that Parliament, in the interests of mineral development, can impose “any limitations” – Purport of expression “any limitations” is wide enough to include the imposition of restrictions, conditions, principles, as well as prohibition – Constitution of India – Entry 50 List II. [Paras 229, 231, 244, 245] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Mineral-bearing land – Measure to tax – Minerals produced, if a measure to tax mineral bearing land:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Tax on lands and buildings under Entry 49 List II is often measured with respect to the income derived from the land or building sought to be taxed – Measure for taxing land may bear a reasonable relationship to the actual or potential productivity of land – Measures such as annual value or market value provide a proximate basis to measure the income derived from land – If the State legislature utilizes the income derived from the land as a measure to quantify a tax on land, it does not trench upon the legislative domain of Union to tax income – Income merely serves as the measure to calculate the levy of taxes on land – MMDR Act does not serve as a limitation on the legislative competence of the States to tax mineral rights under Entry 50 List II, including the power to levy taxes on mineral-bearing lands under Entry 49 List II – Mineral value or mineral produce could be used as a measure of the tax on land under Entry 49 List II – Entry 50 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1561Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
List II pertains to taxes on mineral rights would not preclude the State legislature to use the measure of mineral value or mineral produce under Entry 49 List II – State legislature has legislative discretion to determine the appropriate measure for the purposes of quantifying taxes, so long as there is a reasonable nexus between the measure and the nature of the tax – Measure does not determine the nature of the tax – Lands under Entry 49 List II includes mineral bearing land – Mineral produce is the yield from a mineral bearing land – Since royalty is determined on the basis of the mineral produce, royalty can also be used as a measure to determine the tax on royalty – Fact that the State legislature uses mineral produce or royalty as a measure does not overlap with Entry 50 List II. [Paras 291, 294, 302, 341] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1957 – Mineral bearing land – Decoupling of minerals from land – When:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Minerals are decoupled from land only upon the exercise of mineral rights by the lessee – Although the title to minerals vests in the State Government, the mining lease transfers the interest in the mineral from the State Government to the mining lessee – During the whole process, minerals continue to remain embedded in the earth, either over or above – Thus, there is no decoupling of minerals from land – When a mining lease is granted, the lease holder necessarily has to occupy the surface rights of the area specified in the lease – Leaseholder has rights to both the minerals and surface during the subsistence of the mining lease – It cannot be said that the mineral rights are transferred from the State to the mining lessee only upon the extraction of minerals – Once the lease deed is signed, the interest in the minerals is transferred from the State Government (in case the minerals vest in the State Government) to the lessee – Interest of the lessee in the minerals continues until the determination of the lease deed – It is only upon the exercise of mineral rights by the lessee, that is removal or consumption of minerals, that the lessee is required to pay royalty – Thus, the transfer of interest in the minerals is distinct from the exercise of the mineral rights. [Paras 323, 324] 1562 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – ss.2, 4, 9, 9A, 9B, 9C, 13, 15, 25 – Royalty under the MMDR Act – Explained. (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) [Paras 62-74] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Mines and Minerals – Contours of a mining lease – Explanation: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Expressions ‘lease’ and ‘licence’ have been used in the context of mining operations in the Constitution and in the MMRD Act – “Mining lease” is defined under the MMDR Act to mean a lease granted for the purpose of undertaking mining operations and includes a sub-lease granted for such purpose – Expression “mining operations” has been defined to mean any operations undertaken for the purpose of winning any mineral – Expression “winning” means getting or extracting minerals from the mines – Under a lease deed for mining operations, the owner transfers the interest in the minerals to the lessee in lieu of the payment of rent, which usually takes the form of royalty – Under the MMDR Act, a “prospecting licence” is granted for the purpose of undertaking prospecting operations for the purpose of exploring, locating, or proving a mineral deposit – Under a prospecting licence, the licensee does not get an interest in the land or in the minerals contained therein – Licensee is only allowed to carry away a limited quantity of minerals after payment of specified royalty. [Paras 86, 87] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 – Nature of a mining lease under the MMDR Act and Mineral Concession Rules:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) MMDR Act and the Mineral Concession Rules detail the procedure for the grant of mining leases in three situations-where the minerals vest in the government, where the minerals vest in a person other than the government, and where the minerals vest partly in the government and partly in a private person – Right of proprietors to grant leases and receive royalty stems from the [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1563Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
proprietary interest in the immovable property including the minerals – MMDR Act regulates the exercise of the proprietary rights in the minerals in the larger public interest – Statute specifies the terms of the lease, but the lease deed is ultimately entered between the State Government (or the private person, as the case may be) and the lessee – Similarly, the rates of royalty are fixed by the Central Government u/s. 9, but royalty is received by the mining lessor, that is the State Government or a private person. [Paras 89, 93] Constitution of India – Federalism – Fiscal federalism, in the context of mineral resources:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Basic features of fiscal federalism is that both the Union government and the State governments ought to have adequate fiscal resources to discharge their constitutional responsibilities – List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule contain various subjectmatters under which Parliament and the State legislatures can respectively levy taxes – Purpose of such a distribution is to entrust adequate fiscal powers with the legislatures to raise revenues to meet the growing fiscal expenditures and rein in the fiscal deficit – Legislatures can formulate the principles underlying any taxing legislation, define the taxing event or the charge of tax as well the mode and manner of its implementation – As regards fiscal federalism in the context of mineral resources, not all states are equally endowed with mineral resources – Few States have greater reserves of mineral resources, resultantly, the contribution of the mining sector in the state domestic product is higher – Despite the abundance of mineral wealth, many of these states lag economically and suffer from, “resource curse” – Taxation is among the important sources of revenue for these States, impacting on their ability to deliver welfare schemes and services to the people – Fiscal federalism entails that the power of the States to levy taxes within the legislative domain carved out to them and subject to the limitations laid down by the Constitution must be secured from unconstitutional interference by Parliament. [Paras 51-54] Constitution of India – Arts.366(28), 265 – Expression ‘tax’ – Explanation – Essential characteristics of tax:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, 1564 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Taxes are monetary burdens or charges imposed by legislative power upon persons, or property to raise revenues to fund public expenditure – Objects to be taxed can be taxed by the legislature according to the exigencies of its needs so long as they happen to be within the legislative competence of the legislature – Although the power of taxation is pervasive and an incidence of sovereignty, it is subject to welldefined constitutional limitations – Tax is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority, it is imposed under statutory power without the consent of the tax payer, the demand is enforceable by law, it is an imposition made for public purposes to meet the general expenses of the state without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax, and it is part of the common burden – Art. 366(28) defines “taxation” to include “the imposition of any tax or impost, whether general or local or special” – Expression “tax” u/Art.265 includes every kind of impost in the form of a compulsory exaction – Liability arising out of contract cannot be termed as an impost or tax – Consideration paid under a contract to the State Government for acquiring exclusive privileges and rights with respect to a particular activity cannot be termed as an “impost” or “tax” u/Art. 366(28) – Government may demand payments in the nature of a price or consideration for parting with its exclusive privilege to carry on activities of a particular description which is neither a tax nor a fee. [Paras 102, 104, 105, 108, 109] Constitution of India – Entry 23 List II and Entry 54 List I – Interrelationship between – “Regulation of mines” and “mineral development” – Meaning and explanation of:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) As regards, inter-relationship between Entry 54 List I and Entry 23 List II the State legislatures possess plenary legislative power in respect of regulation of mines and mineral development under Entry 23 List II; Entry 23 List II is, however, subject to the operation of Entry 54 List I; field under Entry 23 List II is subordinated to the extent to which Parliament has brought under its control the regulation of mines and development of minerals under the MMDR Act; expression of the legislative intention to cover a particular field [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1565Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
relating to mines and mineral development excludes or denudes the legislative powers of the State with respect to that particular field; and Parliamentary intention to cover a particular field relating to the regulation of mines and mineral development and the extent to which control of the Union is regarded to be in the public interest has to be ascertained from the language of the statute – Entry 54 List I and Entry 23 List II are general or regulatory entries dealing with the same subject matter, namely of “regulation of mines and mineral development” – By making Entry 23 List II subordinate to Entry 54 List I, Constitution tilts the balance of legislative powers with respect to the regulation of mines and mineral development in favor of the Union – Expression “regulation of mines” mean the management of both the process of extracting minerals as well the place where such minerals will be extracted from sub-surface levels – MMDR Act gives shape and meaning to the expression “regulation of mines and mineral development” through its provisions and the rules – Entry 54 List I and Entry 23 List II do not use the expression “minerals” simpliciter – Entries use the term “mineral development” – As a concept, mineral development is a term of wide import – It encompasses exploitation of minerals, reduction of wastage in the beneficiation process, regulation of mining activities for ecological and environmental factors and equitable distribution of mineral resources and mining leases – Expression “mineral development” has been understood under the MMDR Act in a comprehensive manner, to include all activities and transactions relating to the working of mines, extracting of minerals, their storage and disposal, as well as the conservation of the environment. [Paras 132, 137, 138, 140, 141, 163] Constitution of India – Entry 50 List II and Entry 54 List I – Inter-relationship between:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Entry 50 List II has two elements, the legislative field governing taxes on mineral rights is given exclusively to the states and the field given to the states is subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development – Entry 50 List II is a taxing entry – Limitations on the field created by Entry 50 List II is however, contemplated to be created by a law which relates to mineral development – Legislative competence of Parliament to enact a “law relating to mineral development” can 1566 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports be traced to Entry 54 List I, a general entry – Thus, the taxing powers of the state with respect to mineral rights under Entry 50 List II can be restricted by Parliament by its regulatory power under Entry 54 List I. [Para 165] Constitution of India – Entry 50 List II – Expression “mineral rights” – Meaning of – Taxes on mineral rights:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Constitution does not define “mineral rights” – Though the expression “mineral rights” is used in Entry 50 List II, it does not find mention in any of the other related legislative entries Entry 54 List I and Entry 23 List II – Expression has to be given its ordinary and natural meaning by adopting an interpretative approach which eschews rigidity – Mineral rights are inextricably connected to property – Any understanding of “mineral rights” must be prefaced on an understanding of the basics of property law – Right to minerals entails the right to monetize mineral resources by either consuming them or selling them to third parties – Expression “mineral rights” under Entry 50 List II envisages a bundle of rights associated with the ownership of minerals, including rights which can be transferred to lessee through a mining lease – Usually, the right to mine includes excavation of minerals and removal or consumption of the extracted minerals – Expression “mineral rights” must be construed in this spirit to ensure that the taxing powers of the State under Entry 50 List II are not unnecessarily curtailed – Breadth and scope of mineral rights has also been recognized under the MMDR Act – As regards, the “taxes on mineral rights”, it is the subject matter of Entry 50 List II – Taxable event under Entry 50 List II would relate to exercise of mineral rights – Right to receive royalty is an integral part of the mineral rights of the lessor – However, royalty is not a tax – Thus, royalty would not be comprehended within the meaning of the expression “taxes on mineral rights” – Scope of taxes on mineral rights includes taxes on the right to extract minerals, aspects relating to the exercise of mineral rights such as working the mines and dispatching minerals from the leased area – However, the legislature has to ensure that the exercise of the taxing powers relatable to the field under Entry 50 List II does not foray into a duty of excise or a tax on the sale of minerals. [Paras 170, 172, 175, 178, 179, 185, 187, 188] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1567Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Constitution of India – Entry 50 List II – Limitations on the taxing power of the State under Entry 50 List II – Entry 50 List II, if constitutes an exception to the Sundararamier principle: Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Entry 50 List II is unique because though it is a taxing entry, it is made subject to “any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development” – Thus, the taxing power of the state is capable of being controlled by a non-fiscal enactment by Parliament relating to the development of minerals – This seems to recognize that a fiscal imposition in the nature of a tax on mineral rights by a state may impact on the development of minerals – Position enunciated in Sundararamier’s case is that the field of taxation is distinct from the general subjects of legislation in the Union and State lists of the Seventh Schedule – While Entry 50 List II is sui generis, it does not constitute an exception to the Sundararamier’s principle – Entry 50 List II is subordinated only to the extent of any limitations that may be imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development – Unless Parliament imposes a limitation, the plenary power of the state legislature to levy taxes on mineral rights is unaffected – Question of an overlap between the taxing entry and general entry does not arise because Parliament cannot impose taxes on minerals under Entry 54 List I – There is no direct conflict between the taxing powers of the States under Entry 50 List II and regulatory powers of the Union. [Paras 190, 192, 205, 207] Constitution of India – Taxing powers of the states – Limitations imposed by Parliament – Nature of – Determination:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) There is a distinction between the nature of the restraints imposable by Parliament on the legislative field of the states to regulate mines and development of minerals, the Parliamentary restraints contemplated on the taxing power of the states over mineral rights – In relation to the former, distinction emerges from the language of Entry 54 List I and Entry 23 List II and as regards the latter, it is Entry 1568 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 50 List II – Relationship between Entry 23 List II and Entry 54 List I is that the latter results in a denudation of the legislative field of the states to the extent envisaged by Parliament by law – Expression ‘extent’ leaves it entirely to Parliament to determine whether the extent of the control by the Union is to be total or partial – Denudation of the legislative field of the states follows such a declaration by Parliament and the extent would be determined by the MMDR Act enacted by Parliament – Entry 50 List II gives the legislative field of taxing mineral rights to the states however, subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development – Entry 50 List II does not result in the field of taxing mineral rights being conferred on Parliament, because there is no specific entry in List I giving the field of taxing mineral rights to the Union – Field of taxing mineral rights is exclusive to the states and continues to remain with them but subject to limitations imposed by Parliamentary law relating to mineral development – Parliament can determine as to how the taxing power of the states over mineral rights should be limited in order to ensure that it does not impede or retard mineral development – If Parliament does so and indicates the nature of the limitations, states are bound to abide by them while exercising the taxing power over mineral rights. [Paras 208, 210, 211] Constitution of India – Entry 50 List II – Expression ‘any limitations’ – Construction of:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Use of the expression “any” before “limitations” under Entry 50 of List II indicates that the scope of the limitations is expansive and includes “all” or “every” limitation that could be imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development – Expression “any” has to be construed in its context, taking into consideration the scheme, purpose, and subject matter of the enactment, or the scheme of distribution of legislative powers under the Constitution – Expression “any limitations” is indicative of the fact that Parliament has been provided with ample legislative freedom to conceive limitations or restrictions on the legislative powers of the State to tax minerals. [Para 233] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1569Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Constitution of India – Taxes on mineral rights on mineral development – Impact of:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Uniformity of prices of mineral commodities ensures the objective of mineral development as envisaged under the MMDR Act – Levy of a tax on mineral rights by the State legislatures may lead to an increase in the prices of the mineral commodity in India – An increase in the rate of tax on a particular commodity cannot per se be said to impede free trade and commerce in that commodity – To counteract any adverse impact on the development of minerals in India that the Constitution has empowered Parliament under Entry 50 List II to impose limitations on the basis of which the State legislature can tax mineral rights – Parliament has the responsibility to ensure that there is no adverse effect on development of mineral rights – Legislative powers granted to the State legislatures cannot be whittled down impliedly based on the presumption that all taxes on mineral rights imposed by the State will have adverse economic consequences on mineral development – States have a constitutional and sovereign authority to exercise their taxing powers, within the bounds of the Constitution, to raise adequate revenues for the welfare of the people. [Paras 248, 249] Constitution of India – Entry 49 List II – Taxes on lands and buildings – Principles governing ‘taxes on lands and buildings’ under Entry 49 List II – Explanation – State legislatures, if competent to levy a tax on mineral-bearing land as a unit under Entry 49 of List II:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Entry 49 List II contemplates levy of tax on land as a unit, irrespective of the use to which it is put – Thus, the State legislature is competent while designing the levy under Entry 49 List II to tax lands which comprise of mines and quarries – Mineralbearing land also falls within the description of “lands” under Entry 49 List II – State legislature has wide discretion to classify lands and levy taxes on them under Entry 49 List II – Subject of taxation 1570 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports in Entry 49 List II is land as a unit – Subject of tax in Entry 50 List II is the mineral rights – There is a distinction between the two legislative entries – Legislative competence of the States to tax lands under Entry 49 List II will not be affected by the MMDR Act. [Paras 275, 278-280] Constitution of India – Arts.245, 246, 265 – Scheme of distribution of legislative powers between the Parliament and the State Legislature and constitutional limitations – Stated. (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) [Paras 29-37] Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule – Legislative entries – Interpretation of – Stated. (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) [Paras 38, 40-47] Doctrines/Principles – Public trust doctrine – Natural resources and the public trust doctrine:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Public trust doctrine is founded on the principle that certain resources are nature’s bounty which ought to be reserved for the whole populace, for the present and for the future – State holds all natural resources, including minerals, as a trustee of the public and must deal with them in a manner consistent with the nature of such a trust – Central Government or State Government may not always be the owner of the underlying minerals – Constitution has entrusted the Union and the States with the responsibility to regulate mines and mineral development in consonance with the principles of the public trust doctrine and sustainable development of mineral resources – Entrustment to the State being subject to the power of Parliament to regulate the domain – Under the MMDR Act, the Central Government, acting as a public trustee of minerals, regulates prospecting and mining operations in public interest. [Paras 55, 57-60] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1571Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Tax/Taxation – Nature of – True test – Measure of tax and levy of tax – Nexus between:
Held: (per Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI) (for himself and for Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S Oka, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma and Augustine George Masih, JJ.) Among its elements tax has to provide for the charge of tax, the incidence of tax, the measure of the tax and would contain provisions in the nature of the machinery for assessment and recovery – Measure of tax is not a true test of the nature of tax – Standard adopted as a measure of tax may be a relevant consideration in determining the nature of tax, but is not conclusive – Nexus between the measure and levy of tax need not be “direct and immediate” – Nexus has to be “reasonable” and must have some relationship with the nature of levy – Reasonability of the nexus would largely depend upon the nature of the tax and the means available with the legislature to design the measure of the tax – Since the measure of the levy is a matter of legislative policy and convenience, the reasonability of the nexus between the measure and tax has to be determined by the courts on a case-to-case basis. [Paras 283, 286, 290] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 – Object and scope of – MMDR Act vis-a-vis Entry 50 List II: Held: (per B. V. Nagarathna, J.) MMDR Act contemplates all manner of levies, charges, impost or demands that could be provided for having a nexus with mineral rights – Thus, the Act itself has to be construed as a limitation on the power of the States to demand or impose levies to the extent to which is stated in the Act – Though, Entry 50 List II is a taxing Entry, it would be subject to the limitations enacted by the Parliament by law under Entry 54 List I – States cannot impose levies under Entry 50 List II over and above the amount of royalty received by them under the MMDR Act – Entry 50 List II is sui generis because it is the only legislative Entry which limits the taxing powers of the State legislatures by reference to a general law – Thus, expression “mineral development” found in Entry 50 List II has to be traced to the entire architecture of the MMDR Act which serves as limitation of taxing power of the State legislature under Entry 50 List II – To read it otherwise would lead to destruction of the federal balance – Further, tax on mineral right would also include royalty as envisaged u/s.9 and other Sections of the MMDR Act and every holder of mining lease is bound to pay royalty irrespective of the owner of the mineral bearing land, 1572 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports in terms of s.9 read with Second Schedule to the said Act – Thus, royalty is in the nature of a tax on mineral rights – Also the MMDR Act and the Rules made thereunder is a complete Code on the regulation of mineral development – State legislature cannot, on the basis of royalty paid, levy any other tax, cess or surcharge on cess – States can only levy tax on sale of mineral as per Entry 54 List II which is not a tax on mineral rights – Moreover, Entry 50 List II is a recognition of parliamentary superiority via imposition of a limitation. [Paras 39, 39.1] Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1957 – ss.2, 9, 9A – India Cement’s case holding that royalty is a tax – Effect of overruling India Cement:
Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) If royalty is not held to be a tax and the same being covered under the provisions of the MMDR Act, it would imply that despite Entry 54 List I and ss.2, 9, 9A and other provisions, taxes on mineral rights could be imposed by States over and above payment of royalty on a holder of a mining lease – Limitation that Parliament has made by law on the taxing power of a State explicitly stated in Entry 50 List II would be given a go by and the States could pass laws imposing taxes, cesses, surcharge on cess, etc. on the basis of royalty which is in addition to payment of royalty – Such levies could also be imposed under Entry 49 List II thereby making Entry 50 List II redundant which is not acceptable – There would be unhealthy competition between the States to derive additional revenue and consequently, the steep, uncoordinated and uneven increase in cost of minerals, subjecting the national market being exploited for arbitrage – Overall economy of the country would be affected adversely – This would lead to breakdown of the federal system envisaged under the Constitution in the context of mineral development and mineral rights – Overruling the judgment in India Cement would mean that all judgments akin to India Cement’s case whether prior to or subsequent thereto, stand overruled irrespective of whether they are of High Courts or this Court – Thus, all States would once again start levying taxes on mineral rights under Entry 49 List II, thereby bypassing Entry 50 List II so as to not be bound by any limitation that Parliament had imposed by law on power of the States to levy taxes on mineral rights – Parliament would have to again step in to bring about uniformity in the prices of minerals and in the interest of mineral development so as to curb the States from imposing levies, taxes on mineral rights. [Paras 35.2, 35.3] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1573Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Precedent – Typographical error in a judgment of a larger Bench – If can be questioned by smaller Benches on the basis thereof:
Held: (per B.V. Nagarathna, J.) Judgments of larger Benches cannot be questioned by smaller Benches on the basis of an imagined “typographical error” – Entire judgment must be read and understood including its under currents before negating it for what it stands – Judgment of a Court of law is not a piece of legislation but one pregnant with reasoning and it becomes the duty of a succeeding Bench considering a precedent to be cautious in opining something contrary on the premise of a “typographical error” in a judgment of a larger Bench by failing to understand the import of the reasoning – Opinion of the majority in the Kesoram’s case is per incuriam as it failed to follow the dictum in India Cement on the basis of a “typographical error” where there was none. [Para 27] Case Law Cited In the judgment of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI:
State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. [2004] 1 SCR 564 : (2004) 10 SCC 201 – affirmed.
Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1994] Supp. 6 SCR 120 : (1995) Supp 1 SCC 707 – clarified.
M P V Sundararamier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1958] 1 SCR 1422 – explained.
India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu [1989] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (1990) 1 SCC 12; Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1991] 2 SCR 105 : (1991) Supp 1 SCC 430; Federation of Mining Associations of Rajasthan v. State of Rajasthan (1992) Supp 2 SCC 239; State of M P v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd. [1995] 1 SCR 756 : (1995) Supp 1 SCC 642; Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 44 : (2001) 1 SCC 91; State of Orissa v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. [1995] 3 SCR 639 : (1995) Supp 2 SCC 686; P Kannadasan v. State of Tamil Nadu [1996] Supp. 4 SCR 92 : (1996) 5 SCC 670 – overruled. Banarsi Dass Chadha v. Lt Governor, Delhi Administration [1979] 1 SCR 271 : (1978) 4 SCC 11; V P Pithupitchai v. Special Secretary to the Government of TN [2003] 3 SCR 1045 : (2003) 9 SCC 534; Jindal Stainless Steel v. State of Haryana [2016] 10 SCR 1 : (2017) 1574 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 12 SCC 1; State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights [2010] 2 SCR 979 : (2010) 3 SCC 571; State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. [2012] 4 SCR 448 : (2012) 7 SCC 106; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State of Bihar [1983] 3 SCR 130 : (1983) 4 SCC 45; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1962] Supp 3 SCR 1; Ujagar Prints (II) v. Union of India [1989] 1 SCR 344 : (1989) 3 SCC 488; Ch Tika Ramji v. State of U P [1956] 1 SCR 393 : (1956) SCC OnLine SC 9; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah [2008] 12 SCR 1083; Kishori Shetty v. The King (1949-50) 11 FCR 650; Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority [2011] 1 SCR 453 : (2011) 3 SCC 139; Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 585 : (1997) 5 SCC 536; R M D Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India [1957] 1 SCR 930 : (1957) SCC OnLine SC 11; R Abdul Quader & Co. v. STO [1964] 6 SCR 867; In Re. Sea Customs Act, s. 20(2) [1964] 3 SCR 787; Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. State of UP [2005] 1 SCR 732 : (2005) 2 SCC 515; Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City [1955] 1 SCR 829 : (1954) 3 SCC 623; Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail [1955] 1 SCR 1284; Elel Hotels & Investments Ltd. v. Union of India [1989] 2 SCR 880 : (1989) 3 SCC 698; State of Rajasthan v. G Chawla [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 904 : (1958) SCC OnLine SC 33; United Provinces v Atiqa Begum (1940) 2 FCR 110; Express Hotels (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [1989] 2 SCR 893 : (1989) 3 SCC 677; Sardar Baldev Singh v. CIT [1961] 1 SCR 482 : (1960) SCC OnLine SC 147; A L S P P L Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan (1940) 2 FCR 188; A S Krishna v. State of Madras [1957] SCR 399; K C Gajapathi Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa [1954] 1 SCR 1 : (1953) 2 SCC 178; South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue [1964] 4 SCR 280; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [1952] 1 SCR 889 : (1952) 1 SCC 528; S R Bommai v. Union of India [1994] 2 SCR 644 : (1994) 3 SCC 1; Dr Indramani Pyarelal Gupta v. W R Natu [1963] 1 SCR 721; Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Private Limited [2022] 9 SCR 300 : (2022) 10 SCC 700; Khazan Chand v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [1984] 2 SCR 858 : (1984) 2 SCC 456; M C Mehta v. Kamal Nath [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 12 : (1997) 1 SCC 388; M C Mehta v. Union of India (2009) 6 SCC 142; T N Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 552 : (2006) 1 SCC 1; Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1575Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
[2012] 3 SCR 147 : (2012) 3 SCC 1; Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. v. Reliance Industries [2010] 5 SCR 704 : (2010) 7 SCC 1; Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd. v. Minguel Martins [2009] 3 SCR 1 : (2009) 3 SCC 571; Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 [2012] 9 SCR 311 : (2012) 10 SCC 1; State of Rajasthan v. Gotan Lime Stone Khanji Udyog (P) Ltd. [2016] 1 SCR 216 : (2016) 4 SCC 469; Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment & Forests [2013] 6 SCR 881 : (2013) 6 SCC 476; Pradeep S Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka [2021] 11 SCR 985 : (2021) 19 SCC 62; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay [2014] 9 SCR 1063 : (2014) 9 SCC 772; State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan [1988] 3 SCR 1015 : (1988) 3 SCC 416; National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. v. State of M P [2004] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (2004) 6 SCC 281; Tata Steel Ltd. v. Union of India [2015] 6 SCR 29 : (2015) 6 SCC 193; D K Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat [1986] 1 SCR 479 : (1986) Supp SCC 20; Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India [2017] 12 SCR 724 : (2017) 16 SCC 186; K P Varghese v. ITO [1982] 1 SCR 629 : (1981) 4 SCC 173; Gujarat Pottery Works v. B P Sood, Controller of Mining Leases for India [1967] 1 SCR 695; State of Punjab v. British India Corporation [1964] 2 SCR 114; Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R N Kapoor [1960] 1 SCR 368; State of Karnataka v. Subhash Rukmayya Guttedar (1993) Supp 3 SCC 290; Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur jiu v. Dar Dass Dey (1979) 3 SCC 106; Mangal Amusement Park Private Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2012] 10 SCR 388 : (2012) 11 SCC 713; Bhagwan Dass v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1976] 3 SCR 869 : (1976) 3 SCC 784; State of Meghalaya v. All Dimasa Students Union [2019] 8 SCR 297 : (2019) 8 SCC 177; Inderjeet Singh Sial v. Karam Chand Thapar [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 53 : (1995) 6 SCC 166; H R S Murthy v. Collector of Chittoor [1964] 6 SCR 666; Bherulal v. State of Rajasthan (1956) SCC OnLine Raj 9; Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab [1992] 2 SCR 13 : (1992) 2 SCC 411; Dena Bank v. Bhikabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co. [2000] 3 SCR 509 : (2000) 5 SCC 694; Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowment, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirta Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954] 1 SCR 1005 : (1954) 1 SCC 412; CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd. [2009] 8 SCR 983 : (2009) 10 SCC 755; Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa [1954] 1 SCR 1046 : (1954) 1 SCC 455; D G Gose and Co. (Agents) (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala [1980] 1 SCR 804 : (1980) 2 SCC 410; Indian Banks’ Association v. Devkala 1576 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Consultancy Service [2004] Supp. 1 SCR 225 : (2004) 11 SCC 1; CCE v. Chhata Sugar Co. Ltd. [2004] 2 SCR 790 : (2004) 3 SCC 466; State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries [2003] Supp. 5 SCR 930 : (2004) 11 SCC 26; Har Shankar v. Excise and Taxation Commissioner [1975] 3 SCR 254 : (1975) 1 SCC 737; State Bank of India v. Jage Ram [1980] 3 SCR 746 : (1980) 3 SCC 599; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Anabeshahi Wine and Distilleries Pvt Ltd. (1988) 2 SCC 25; Laddu Mal v. State of Bihar (1965) SCC OnLine Pat 30; Laxminarayana Mining Co. v. Taluk Development Board (1972) SCC OnLine Kar 80; Dr. Shanti Swaroop Sharma v. State of Punjab, AIR 1969 Punj and Har 79; Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1979) SCC OnLine Guj 23; Laxmi Narayan Agarwalla v. State of Orissa (1983) SCC OnLine Ori 16; Raojibhai Jivabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 406 : (1989) Supp 2 SCC 744; Quarry Owners Association v. State of Bihar [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 211 : (2000) 8 SCC 655; State of H P v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 684 : (2005) 6 SCC 499; Indsil Hydro Power & Manganese Ltd. v. State of Kerala [2019] 10 SCR 647 : (2021) 10 SCC 165; Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana [1989] Supp. 1 SCR 510 : (1990) 2 SCC 71; K Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu [1985] 2 SCR 1028 : (1985) 2 SCC 116; State of Tamil Nadu v. Hindu Stone [1981] 2 SCR 742 : (1981) 2 SCC 205; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh [1989] 1 SCR 176 : (1989) 2 SCC 505; Talcher Municipality v. Talcher Regulated Market Committee [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 167 : (2004) 6 SCC 178; Union of India v. Asian Food Industries Ltd. [2006] Supp. 8 SCR 485 : (2006) 13 SCC 542; UP Coop. Cane Unions Federations v. West UP Sugar Mills Association [2004] Supp. 2 SCR 238 : (2004) 5 SCC 430; Balmer Lawrie & Company Limited v. Partha Sarathi Sen Roy [2013] 4 SCR 1018 : (2013) 8 SCC 345; Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu [2014] 1 SCR 308 : (2014) 5 SCC 75; Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu [1994] 1 SCR 579 : (1994) 2 SCC 691; Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [1996] Supp. 3 SCR 808 : (1996) 9 SCC 709; Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1961] 2 SCR 537; State of Orissa v. M A Tulloch [1964] 4 SCR 461; Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar [1970] 2 SCR 100 : (1969) 3 SCC 838; Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1990] 3 SCR 744 : (1990) 4 SCC 557; State of Assam v. Om Prakash Mehta [1973] 3 SCR 169 : (1973) 1 SCC 584; Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1577Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [2010] 11 SCR 240 : (2010) 13 SCC 1; Sayyed Ratanbhai Sayeed v. Shirdi Nagar Panchayat [2016] 11 SCR 476 : (2016) 4 SCC 631; Meerut Development Authority v. Association of Management Studies [2009] 6 SCR 663 : (2009) 6 SCC 171; Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1980] 3 SCR 331 : (1980) 4 SCC 136; Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Association v. State of Rajasthan [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 72 : (1994) Supp 1 SCC 413; Thressiamma Jacob v. Geologist, Department of Mining & Geology [2013] 7 SCR 863 : (2013) 9 SCC 725; State of West Bengal v. Union of India [1964] 1 SCR 371; Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1988) SCC OnLine Guj 13; Kumar Ramessur Malia v. Ram Nath Bhattacharjee (1905) SCC OnLine Cal 55; Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India [2003] Supp. 5 SCR 152 : (2003) 11 SCC 146; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. CST [1985] 3 SCR 985 : (1985) Supp SCC 205; Mathuram Agrawal v. State of M P [1999] Supp. 4 SCR 195 : (1999) 8 SCC 667; State of Karnataka v. Drive-In Enterprise [2001] 2 SCR 378 : (2001) 4 SCC 60; Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. v. Union of India [1962] Supp 2 SCR 1; Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [1975] 3 SCR 220 : (1975) 2 SCC 175; International Tourist Corporation v. State of Haryana [1981] 2 SCR 364 : (1981) 2 SCC 318; Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna (1942) 4 FCR 90; All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India [2007] 9 SCR 147 : (2007) 7 SCC 527; Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India [1989] 2 SCR 918 : (1989) 3 SCC 634; State of Karnataka v. State of Meghalaya [2022] 18 SCR 516 : (2023) 4 SCC 416; State of Mysore v. D Cawasji and Co [1971] 2 SCR 799 : (1970) 3 SCC 710; Umeg Singh v. State of Bombay [1955] 2 SCR 164; Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India [2018] 4 SCR 1 : (2018) 7 SCC 1; In re Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State legislature, Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 [1965] 1 SCR 413; Firm Bansidhar Premsukhdas v. State of Rajasthan [1966] Supp 1 SCR 81; Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [1973] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1973) 4 SCC 225; I R Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu [2007] 1 SCR 706 : (2007) 2 SCC 1; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan [1997] Supp. 3 SCR 404 : (1997) 6 SCC 241; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India [2023] 9 SCR 1 : (2023) 6 SCC 161; LDA v. M K Gupta [1993] Supp. 3 SCR 615 : (1994) 1 SCC 243; Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement [2010] 4 SCR 608 : (2010) 4 SCC 1578 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 772; Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India [2023] 1 SCR 1 : (2023) 3 SCC 1; State of Assam v. Labanya Probha Devi [1967] 3 SCR 611; Sharma Transport v. Government of AP [2001] Supp. 5 SCR 390 : (2002) 2 SCC 188; Vrajilal Manilal & Co. v. State of M P [1986] 2 SCR 98 : (1986) Supp SCC 201; State of Kerala v. A B Abdul Kadir [1970] 1 SCR 700 : (1969) 2 SCC 363; Durga Prasad Singh v. Braja Nath Bose (1912) SCC Online PC 9; Secretary of State for India in Council v. Srinivasa Chariar (1920) SCC OnLine PC 89; State of A P v. Duvvuru Balarami Reddy [1963] 1 SCR 173 : (1962) SCC OnLine SC 182; Gopalan v. State of Madras (1958) 2 MLJ 117; Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. State of TN [2013] 17 SCR 529 : (2014) 2 SCC 279; Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U P [1967] 1 SCR 373 : (1966) SCC OnLine SC 89; State of Haryana v. Chanan Mal [1976] 3 SCR 688 : (1977) 1 SCC 340; Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1963] 1 SCR 220; Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee v. Local Board of Barpeta [1965] 3 SCR 47; Government of A P v. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. [1975] Supp. 1 SCR 394 : (1975) 2 SCC 274; Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. GTL Infrastructure Ltd. [2016] 11 SCR 172 : (2017) 3 SCC 545; Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corp [2021] 12 SCR 210 : (2021) 20 SCC 657; Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. WTO (1968) 69 ITR 897; Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D H Nazareth [1971] 1 SCR 195 : (1970) 1 SCC 749; Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. [1970] 1 SCR 268 : (1969) 2 SCC 55; Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality [1970] 1 SCR 388 : (1969) 2 SCC 283; Union of India v. H S Dhillon [1972] 2 SCR 33 : (1971) 2 SCC 779; East India Tobacco Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1963] 1 SCR 404 : (1962) SCC OnLine SC 145; Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U P [1973] 2 SCR 502 : (1973) 1 SCC 216; Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [1964] 5 SCR 975; Union of India v. A Sanyasi Rao [1996] 2 SCR 570 : (1996) 3 SCC 465; R K Garg v. Union of India [1982] 1 SCR 947 : (1981) 4 SCC 675; Spencer & Co. v. State of Mysore [1971] Supp. 1 SCR 502 : (1971) 2 SCC 217; K T Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala [1961] 3 SCR 77 : (1960) SCC OnLine SC 7; Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer Kasargod [1963] 3 SCR 809 : (1962) SCC OnLine SC 15; Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Special Area Development Authority [1982] 2 SCR 1 : (1982) 1 SCC 125; Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar [1964] 1 SCR 897 : (1963) SCC OnLine SC 31; S Kodar v. State of Kerala [1975] 1 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1579Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
SCR 121 : (1974) 4 SCC 422; Shaktikumar M Sancheti v. State of Maharashtra [1994] Supp. 6 SCR 98 : (1995) 1 SCC 351; Sainik Motors, Jodhpur v. State of Rajasthan [1962] 1 SCR 517; Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy v. The Province of Bombay (1942) SCC OnLine Bom 30; B Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry [1967] 2 SCR 650 : (1967) SCC OnLine SC 29; R R Engineering Co. v. Zilla Parishad, Bareilly [1980] 3 SCR 1 : (1980) 3 SCC 380; Ralla Ram v. The Province of East Punjab (1948) SCC OnLine FC 9; Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. [1984] 1 SCR 347 : (1984) 1 SCC 467; CCE v. Grasim Industries Ltd. [2018] 6 SCR 1099 : (2018) 7 SCC 233; Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner [1964] 2 SCR 608 : (1963) SCC OnLine SC 57; State of Kerala v. Haji K Kutty Naha [1969] 1 SCR 645; New Manek Chowk Spg. & Wvg. Mills v. Ahmedabad Municipality [1967] 2 SCR 679 : (1967) SCC OnLine SC 116; Buxa Dooars Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1989] 3 SCR 293 : (1989) 3 SCC 211; Kaviraj Basudevanand v. Mahant Harihar Gir [1975] 1 SCR 590 : (1974) 2 SCC 514; Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [1962] 1 SCR 44 : AIR 1961 SC 954; Union of India v. Pramod Gupta [2005] Supp. 3 SCR 48 : (2005) 12 SCC 1; State of Bihar v. Indian Aluminium Company [1997] Supp. 4 SCR 222 : (1997) 8 SCC 360; P M Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 155 : (1989) Supp 1 SCC 696 – referred to.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316; Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board, 60 CLR 263; Lord Provost and Magistrates of Glasgow v. Faire (1888) [L.R] 13 App. Cas. 657; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 US 393 (1922); Assessment Committee of the Metropolitan Borough of Poplar v. Roberts [1922] 2 AC 93 – referred to.
In the judgment of B.V. Nagarathna, J.
District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Company [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 147 : (2001) 7 SCC 358 – correct law.
India Cement Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu [1989] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (1990) 1 SCC 12 : AIR 1990 SC 85; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd. [1995] 1 SCR 756 : (1995) Supp 1 SCC 642; Orissa Cement Limited v. State of Orissa [1991] 2 SCR 105 : (1991) Supp 1 SCC 430; Saurashtra Cement & Chemicals 1580 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 44 : (2001) 1 SCC 91; State of Orissa v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. [1995] 3 SCR 639 : (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 686; P. Kannadasan v. State of Tamil Nadu [1996] Supp. 4 SCR 92 : (1996) 5 SCC 670 – correct law excluding to the extent overruled in Tata Iron and Steel’s case. State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Limited [2004] 1 SCR 564 : (2004) 10 SCC 201 – overruled to the extent that royalty is not a tax.
Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of West Bengal [1994] Supp. 6 SCR 120 : (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 707; MPV Sundararamier v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1958] 1 SCR 1422 : AIR 1958 SC 468 – held inapplicable.
Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India [2011] 4 SCR 19 : (2011) 4 SCC 450; Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1961] 2 SCR 537; State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch [1964] 4 SCR 461; Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar [1970] 2 SCR 100 : (1969) 3 SCC 838; State of Karnataka v. State of Meghalaya [2022] 18 SCR 516 : (2023) 4 SCC 416; Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce, Khulna, AIR 1947 P.C. 60; State of Bombay v. FN Balsara [1951] 1 SCR 682 : AIR 1951 SC 318; United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, AIR 1941 FC 16; Calcutta Gas Company v. State of West Bengal [1962] Supp 3 SCR 1 : AIR 1962 SC 1044; RMDC v. Union of India [1957] 1 SCR 930 : AIR 1957 SC 628; Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1985] 3 SCR 985 : (1985) Supp SCC 205; HRS Murthy v. Collector of Chittoor [1964] 6 SCR 666 : AIR 1965 SC 177; Guruswamy & Co. v. State of Mysore [1967] 1 SCR 548 : AIR 1967 SC 1512; M/s Laxminarayana Mining Co., Bangalore v. Taluk Development Board, AIR 1972 Mys 299; Laddu Mal v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Pat 491; Bherulal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1956 Rajasthan 161; Dr. Shanti Saroop v. State of Punjab, AIR 1969 P & H 79; Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd. Ranavav v. Union of India, AIR 1979 Guj 180; Laxmi Narayan Agarwalla v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 Ori 210; Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema [1965] 2 SCR 477 : AIR 1965 SC 1107; State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Company Limited [1985] 3 SCR 26 : (1985) Supp. SCC 280; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Naik [1987] 1 SCR 91 : (1986) Supp SCC 510; Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P. [1963] 1 SCR 220; New Manek Chowk Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad [1967] 2 SCR 679; Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1581Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Tax Officer, Calcutta [1969] 1 SCR 108; Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax v. The Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. [1970] 1 SCR 268; Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D.H. Nazareth [1971] 1 SCR 195; Union of India v. Harbhajan Singh Dhillon [1972] 2 SCR 33 : (1971) 2 SCC 779 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited In the judgment of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI Ramanatha Aiyar Advanced Law Lexicon (Volume 3) 3543, 2789, 4778, 3254; Ligia Norohna et al, ‘Resource Federalism in India: The Case of Minerals’ (2009) 44(8) Economic and Political Weekly 51, 52; Debates in the House of Commons on the Government of India Act 1919 (3rd December 1919); Government of India Bill, Seventh Schedule (Legislative Lists) Hansard (Volume 301) (13 May 1935); H M Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Volume 3 (4th edn.) [22.6] 2306, 2468; Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 11 (25 November 1949); Dr. B R Ambedkar, CAD Volume 7 (4 November 1948); Granville Austin, Cornerstone of a Nation (OUP, 1966) 187; Wallace E Oates, ‘An Essay on Fiscal Federalism’ (1999) 37(3) Journal of Economic Literature 1120, 1121; Dr. B R Ambedkar, The Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India: A Study in the Provincial Decentralization of Imperial Finance’ (1923) 152-171; ‘State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2023-2024, Revenue Dynamics and Fiscal Capacity of Indian States’ Reserve Bank of India (December 2023) 28; Ligia Noronha, et al, ‘Resource Federalism in India: The Case of Minerals’ (2009) 44(8) Economic and Political Weekly 51, 53; Economic Survey 2016-2017, Ministry of Finance, Government of India (January 2017) 292; Joseph L Sax, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’ (1970) Michigan Law Review 471, 484; Mr K D Malviya, Lok Sabha Debates, Volume X (9th December to 21st December 1957) 7123; Mr J R Mehta, Lok Sabha Debates, Volume X (9th December to 21st December 1957) 7111; Lok Sabha Debates, Volume VIII (11th November to 22nd November, 1957, Third Session) 395, 463; J U Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industry (Routledge, 1966); Royal Commission on Mining Royalties, Final Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Subject of Mining Royalties (1893) 4; W R Sorley, ‘Mining Royalties and their Effect on the Iron and Coal Trades’ (1889) 52(1) Journal of Royal Statistical Society 60, 66; Government of India, Ministry of Mines, ‘Mineral Royalties’ 27 (January 2011); Thomas Cooley, 1582 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports The Law of Taxation (4th edn, 1924) 149, 74; Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume IX, 898 (31st August 1949), (2nd September 1949); Lloyd George, ‘The Budget, The Land and The People: The New Land Value Taxes Explained and Illustrated’ (2nd edn, 1909) 48, 51; Royal Commission on Mining Royalties, Final Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the subject of mining royalties (1893) 14; Mr. Lloyd George (Hansard, Volume 11) 28 September 1909; Hansard, Volume 11, 22 September 1909; Hansard, Volume 35, 5 March 1912; Jeremy Waldron, ‘What is Private Property?’ (1985) 5(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 313, 327; James Y Stern, ‘The Essential Structure of Property Law’ (2017) 115(7) Michigan Law Review 1167, 1176; Black’s Law Dictionary (6th edn,1990) 995; Corpus Juris Secundum (Volume 58) 15; Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9 (1 September 1949); Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property (9th edn, Sweet and Maxwell); S Sundararaja Iyengar, Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency (1921) 25, 120, 151; B Shiva Rao, ‘The Framing of India’s Constitution: A Study’ (1966, Volume 3) 181, 269, 502; Peter Brown and Patrick Bond, ‘Rating Valuation: Principles and Practice) (3rd edn, Elsevier) 13 – referred to.
In the judgment of B.V. Nagarathna, J.
“Building a National Economy : Origins of Centralized Federalism in India” by Louise Tillin published by the Oxford University Press in 2021; M.P. Jain, Nehru and the Indian Federalism, Journal of the Indian law Institute, Vol.19, No.4, 1977, p.408 – referred to. List of Websites In the judgment of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI:
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, State-wise date on per capita income’ (24 July 2023) <https://www.pib.gov.in/ PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1942055> – referred to.
List of Acts In the judgment of Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, CJI:
Constitution of India; Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957; Bihar Coal Mining Area Development Authority (Amendment) Act 1992; Bihar Mineral Area Development Authority (Land Use Tax) Rules 1994; Bihar Coal Mining Area Development [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1583Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Authority Act 1986; Government of India Act 1915-19; Government of India Act 1935; Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956; Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1948; Mineral Concession Rules 1960; Mineral Concession Rules 1948; General Clauses Act 1897; Transfer of Property Act 1882; Registration Act 1908; Indian Easements Act 1882; Income Tax Act 1961; Sea Customs Act; Essential Commodities Act; Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1964; Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1964; Madras Panchayat Act 1958; Working Conditions Code 2020; Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act 2002; Mineral Conservation and Development Rules 2017; Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act 1952; Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951; Finance Act 1910; Gujarat Mineral Rights Tax Act 1985; Mineral (Auction) Rules 2015; Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation XXV of 1802; Petroleum Act 1998; Coal Act 1938; Madras Mining Manual of 1929; Waste Land Rules; Madras Forest Act 1882; Mineral Concession Rules 1949; Maharashtra Land Revenue Code 1966; Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950; Maharashtra Personal Inams Abolition Act 1953; Maharashtra Abolition of Subsisting Proprietary Rights to Mine and Minerals in Certain Lands Act 1985; Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act 1973; UP Large Land Holdings Tax Act 1957; Wealth Tax Act 1957; Kerala Building Tax Act 1975; Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1973; Punjab Urban Immoveable Property Tax Act 1940; Kerala Buildings Act 1961; Orissa Cess Act 1962; Orissa Rural Employment, Education and Production Act 1992; West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act 1976; Tea Act 1953; West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act 1989; Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944; Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013; Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act 1957; Gujarat Land Revenue Code 1879; Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959; Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code 1959; Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue Code 1968; Madras Urban Land Tax Act 1966; Non-Domestic Rating (Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 1989.
In the judgment of B.V. Nagarathna, J.
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957; Constitution of India; Government of India Act, 1919; Government of India Act, 1935; Mineral Concession Rules, 1960; Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act, 1952; Orissa Mining Areas 1584 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Development Act Rules, 1955; Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1948; Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950; Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964; Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1964; Madras District Boards Act, 1920; Madras Panchayats Act, 1958; Madras Act, 1964; Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1964; Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1984; Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959; Orissa Rural Employment, Education and Production Act, 1992; West Bengal Taxation Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1989; Cess Act, 1880; West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976; Uttar Pradesh Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986; Shakti Nagar Special Area Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997; Cess and Other Taxes on Minerals (Validation) Act, 1992. List of Keywords Mines and Minerals; Royalty; Royalties in respect of mining leases; Royalty, in nature of tax; Royalty is not a tax; Contractual consideration; Mining lessee; Mineral rights; Contractual conditions; Tax; Recovery as arrears; Imposition of tax or impost; Contractual payment; Statutory levy; Entry 50 List II Seventh Schedule; Taxes on mineral rights; Mineral development; Limitations imposable by Parliament; Legislative powers under Entry 54 List I; Legislative competence to tax mineral rights; Residuary powers; Any limitations; Denude or limit; Non-taxing general Entry; Distribution of legislative powers; MPV Sundararamier’s case; Subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development; Regulatory Entry; Description of “lands” under Entry 49 List II; Yield of mineral bearing land; Quantity of mineral produced; Measure to tax; Minor minerals; Subtract mining land; Mineral value or mineral produce; India Cement’s case; Kesoram’s case; Cess on royalty; Typographical error or inadvertent error; Characteristic requirements of tax; Doctrine of generalia specialibus non derogant; Federalism; Indian federalism; Balance of power; Distribution of powers; Postcolonial Constitution; National welfare state; Unregulated inter-provincial economic competition; Centre-State jurisdiction; Economic growth; Uniformity in mineral prices; Compulsory exaction by public authority for public purposes; Exclusive privileges; Doctrine of pith and substance; Transgresses its legislative competence; Colourable legislation; Vice of unconstitutionality; Potential overlaps or conflicts between and among entries in three Lists; Terminologies [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1585Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
“other than”, “not including”, “subject to”; “Declared by or under law”; “Declared by Parliament by law”; “Imposed by Parliament by law”; Fiscal federalism; Imbalance between resources; Intergovernmental distribution and grants; Fiscal powers; Fiscal expenditures; Fiscal deficit; Heterogenous distribution of legislative powers; Resource curse; Public trust doctrine; Sustainable development of mineral resources; Public trustee of minerals; Prospecting and mining operations; Disparity of royalty; Industrial Policy Resolution; ‘Lease’ and ‘licence’; Immoveable property; “Mining lease”; “Mining operations”; “Winning”; Getting or extracting minerals from the mines; “Prospecting licence”; Exploring, locating, or proving a mineral deposit; Proprietary rights in the minerals; Rates of royalty; Essential characteristics of royalty; Royalty a statutory consideration; Royalty calculated on per tonnage basis or ad valorem basis; Quantity of mineral removed or dispatched; Indian Bureau of Mines; Non-tax revenues; Dead rent; Proprietary right; Sovereign right; Monetary burdens or charges; “Regulation of mines”; Plenary legislative power; Taxing entry; Regulatory power; Non-fiscal enactment by Parliament; Overlap between the taxing entry and general entry; Principle of federal supremacy; Regulation of mines; Decoupling of minerals from land; Sarkaria Commission Report; Principles of Union Supremacy; Destruction of the federal balance; Recognition of parliamentary superiority; Typographical error; Precedent; Per incuriam.
Case Arising From CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4056-4064 of 1999 From the Judgment and Order dated 22.03.1999 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench, Ranchi in C.W.J.C. No. 1885/94 (R), 178/94 (R), 2251/94 (R), 2252/94 (R), 1783/9 (R), 2591 (R), 3113/93 (R), 269/9 (R) and 268/94 (R)
With Civil Appeal No. 7937 of 2019, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 512 of 2018, Civil Appeal Nos. 7938 and 7936 of 2019, Civil Appeal No. 6221 of 2008, Civil Appeal No. 5250 of 2019, Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 729 and 1029 of 2019, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 16028 of 2021, Civil Appeal No. 4286 of 2023, Civil Appeal No. 5682 of 2007, Civil Appeal No.1295 of 2008, Civil Appeal Nos. 874, 8269-8271, 8268, 8267, 6135, 1586 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports 8272 and 9458 of 2013, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18600 of 2013, Civil Appeal No.4332 of 2013, Civil Appeal No.5329 of 2002, Civil Appeal No.4993 of 2006, Civil Appeal Nos.8273 and 8274 of 2013, Civil Appeal No.3869 of 2014, Civil Appeal No.2632 of 2013, Civil Appeal No.14685 of 2015, Civil Appeal No.6784 of 2014, Writ Petition (Civil) No.376 of 2015, Civil Appeal No.10082 of 2016, Civil Appeal Nos.886, 4588 and 205 of 2017, Civil Appeal Nos.5728-5729 of 2018, Civil Appeal Nos.4722-4724 of 1999, Civil Appeal Nos.5333, 5335-5336 and 5332 of 2002, Civil Appeal No.1352 of 2005, Civil Appeal No.1883 of 2006, Transfer Petition (Civil) No.722 of 2006, Civil Appeal Nos.4745, 4990, 5599 and 5649 of 2006, Civil Appeal Nos.378, 665 and 1180 of 2007, Transfer Petition (Civil) No.481 of 2007, Transfer Petition (Civil) No.906 of 2007, Civil Appeal No.3401, 3400 and 3402 of 2008, Civil Appeal No.8311 of 2011, Civil Appeal No.4293 of 2012, Civil Appeal No.2055 of 2009, Transfer Petition (Civil) No.951 of 2006, Civil Appeal Nos.4991 and 4992 of 2006, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.763 of 2007, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.15900 of 2007, Civil Appeal No.3403 of 2008, Civil Appeal No.98 of 2009, Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos.613 and 626 of 2009, Civil Appeal Nos.4479 and 4478 of 2010, Civil Appeal No.3643 of 2011, Civil Appeal Nos.4710-4721 of 1999, Civil Appeal No.2174 of 2009, Civil Appeal Nos.6497, 6498, 6137 and 7397 of 2008, Civil Appeal No.96 of 2009, Civil Appeal No.6499 of 2008, Civil Appeal No.97 of 2009 and Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.26160 of 2008 Appearances for Parties R. Venkataramani, AG, Tushar Mehta, SG, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, K.M. Nataraj, ASGs, Nalin Kohli, Sr. AAG, Tapesh Kumar Singh, Nachiketa Joshi, Amit Anand Tiwari, Mrs. Nilofar Khan, Shiv Mangal Sharma, Avdhesh Kumar Singh, Atul Jha, K. Parameshwar, AAGs, V.V.M.B.N.S. Pattabhiram, Vikrant Singh Bais, Ravi Sharma, DAGs, Rakesh Dwivedi, Arvind P. Datar, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Darius J. Khambata, Sujit Ghosh, Ashok Grover, S.K. Bagaria, Kailash Vasdev, Ajit Kumar Sinha, Ravi Shankar Jaiswal, Ravi Jaiswal, Rupesh Kumar, Harish N. Salve, Ciccu Mukhopadhaya, Indrajit Mahanty, Gopal Jain S. Niranjan Reddy, S.P. Singh, Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Advs., Ms. Sansriti Pathak, Eklavya Dwivedi, Sukant Vikram, Aditya Pratap Singh, Prashant Bhardwaj, Ayush Agrawal, Mohit Paul, Vikrant Singh Bloria, Sushant Tomar, Ms. Rangoli Seth, Ms. Sanjleena Lal, Gaurav [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1587Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Juneja, Aakash Bajaj, Ms. Monika Singh, Avirat Kumar, Muskan Narang, Sanjeev K. Kapoor, M/s. Khaitan & Co., Naveen Kumar, Abhimanyu Bhandari, Ms. Roohe Hina Dua, Ms. Stuti Bisht, Arav Pandit, Nitesh Bhandari, Harshit Khanduja, Ms. Rashmi Priya, Ms. Dhanakshi Gandhi, Prabhat Kumar Rai, Shourajeet Chakravarty, Sahib Kochhar, Ms. Aprajita Bhardwaj, Randeep Sachdeva, Ms. Shreya Arora, Utkarsh Chandra, Ms. Anchal Kushwaha, Syed Shahid Hussain Rizvi, Zeeshan Rizvi, Gagan Gupta, Ram Lal Roy, Shiv Singh Yadav, Mahesh Agarwal, Ninad Laud, Anshuman Srivastava, Ankur Saigal, Chirag Nayak, Rishi Agrawala, Rajesh Kumar, M.S. Ananth, Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Zubin Dash, Himanshu Saraswat, E.C. Agrawala, Dhananjay Mishra, Gokula Krishnan T, Siddharth Seem, Amit Bhandari, Ms. Ananyaa Mazumdar, Ms. Mannat Waraich, Ashray Behura, P.S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Mrs. Shally Bhasin, Ms. Anne Mathew, Bharat Sood, Ms. Miranda Solaman, Prateek Gupta, Surender Kumar Gupta, Ms. Muskan Gupta, Prashant Rawat, Ms. Priya Mishra, Siddhartha Sinha, Mrs. Sheela Goel, Ujjwal A. Rana, Himanshu Mehta, M/s. Gagrat & Co., K.V. Mohan, K.V. Balakrishnan, R.K. Raghavan, Praveen Kumar, Kumar Ajit Singh, Ms. Sunaina Kumar, Karuppaiah Meyyappan, Abhishek Kalaiyarasan, Shailendra Swarup, Ms. Bindu Saxena, Ms. Aparajita Swarup, Dhruv C Saxena, Umrao Singh Rawat, Ms. Shagun Sabharwal, Ms. Aashtha Bhardwaj, Pallav Mongia, Sarad Kumar Singhania, Uddyam Mukherjee, Swapnil Pattanayak, Ms. Manisha Chava, Agnibha Chatterjee, Ms. Shagun Thakur, Ms. Bln Shivani, Abhijeet Singh, Rustam Singh Chauhan, Ms. Sthavi Asthana, Ashwin Joseph, Ms. Poornima Singh, Annirudh Singh, Ms. Shreya Jain, Sumit Teterrwal, Mrinmay Bhattmewara, Ms. Samprati Bhattmewara, Vivek Gupta, Amit Singh, Rajvir Singh Bhati, Ankit Verma, Krishna Kant Dubey, Rajeev Ranjan, Varun Chugh, Adarsh Kumar Pandey, Arun Kanwa, Vignesh Singh, Divyansh Rai, Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, D.D. Thanvi, H.D. Thanvi, Nikhil Kumar Singh, Achal Singh Bule, Rishi Matoliya, Mrs. Prabha Swami, Nikhil Swami, Ms. Divya Swami, Mrs. Kirti Renu Mishra, Mrs. Apurva Upmanyu, Gp. Capt. Karan Singh Bhati, Hemendra Sharma, Ms. Chitrangda Rastravara, Aishwary Mishra, Dhananjai Shekhwat, Shiv Autar Singh Sengar, Anirudh Singh, Dashrath Singh, Ms. Gunjan Negi, Yogeshwar Krishna, Ms. Anjali Sexena, Ms. Gagandeep, Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay, Pawan R Upadhyay, Sarvjit Pratap Singh, Ashwarya Sinha, Ms. Priyanka 1588 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Sinha, Ms. Nandini Sen Mukherjee, Suyash Mohan Guru, T.G. Narayanan Nair, Ms. Swathi H Prasad, Ms. Samyuktha H Nair, Sunil Kumar Jain, S.K. Verma, Kunal Verma, Abhishek Sharma, Milind Kumar, Ms. Ruby Singh Ahuja, Saurav Agarwal, Saurajay Nanda, Anshuman Chowdhury, Ms. Kavya Pahwa, Shivam Chowdhury, Rajat Chhabra, Ms. Saloni Paliwal, Aman Sahani, Ms. Manjeet Kirpal, Guntur Prabhakar, Ms. Prerna Singh, Guntur Pramod Kumar, Mrs. Yugandhara Pawar Jha, Ms. Lavanya Dhawan, Shivraj Sanjeev Pawar, Ritik Gupta, Shantanu Sagar, Prabhat Ranjan Raj, Anil Kumar, Gunjesh Ranjan, Shashwat Anand, Mrs. Divya Mishra, Vaibhav Jain, Akshay Singh, Ms. Pragya Singh, Shantwanu Singh, Ashok Kumar Singh, P.V. Yogeswaran, M/s. Lawyer’s Knit & Co., Debesh Panda, Ms. Amrita Panda, Udbhav Gady, Sri Aditya Kumar, Rahul Unnikrishnan, Ms. M. Jannani, V.D. Verma, Kanishk Aggrawal, Ojaswa Pathak, Ms. Sumita Hazarika, Neeraj Kumar Gupta, Rahul Kumar Verma, Akshay, Kaushik Choudhury, Ms. Anusha Agarwal, Shaantanu Jain, Deepanshu Jain, Achintya Kumar Sinha, Manish Jain, Ms. Rashika Swarup, Sachin Sharma, Ms. Kanika Kalaiyarasan, Saksham Garg, Jyotirmoy Chatterjee, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Raman Chitwan Singh, Ms. Pankhuri Srivastav, Ms. Shreya Mathur, Ms. Neelam Sharma, Jatinder K. Bhatia, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Shailesh Madiyal, K. Parameshwaran, Siddhartha Dharmadhikari, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Chitvan Singhal, Raman Yadav, Kartikay Aggarwal, Ms. Ameya Vikrama Thanvi, Kanu Agrawal, Raghav Sharma, Karan Lahiri, Mukesh Kumar Singh, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Ajay Aggarwal, Adarsh Aggarwal, Rajan Narain, Sunny Choudhary, Abhimanyu Singh, Padmesh Mishra, Sandeep Sharma, Karan Bishnoi, Ms. Ruchira Goel, Abhishek Gupta, Sabarish Subramanian, Ms. Devyani Gupta, C. Kranthi Kumar, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Ms. Tanvi Anand, Ms. Saushriya Havelia A, Naman Dwivedi, Danish Saifi, Aman Prasad, Ms. Arjoo Rawat, Khushi Mohammed, Joydeep Mukherjee, Mohd Yusuf, Mohit Gaurav, Anjum Parvez, Ms. Nilofar Khan, G.N. Reddy, T. Harish Kumar, Sandeep Kumar Jha, Ankit Roy, Nimisha Menon, Anshul Malik, Sarthak Sharma, Ayuushman Arora, Shuvodeep Roy, Kedar Nath Tripathy, Mishra Saurabh, Sunil Roy, Ms. Ritika Gambhir Kohli, Omar Ahmad, Vikram Shah, Tuhin Dey, Ms. Chetna N. Rai, Nikhil Kohli, Satyajit Mahanty, P Vamshi Rao, Abhishek Choudhury, Madhusudan Jena, Soubhagya Ranjan Pati, Aashish Saini, Ms. Prakshi Narang, Vanshdeep Dalmia, Ms. [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1589Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Natasha Dalmia, Ms. Kritika Khurana, Kushank Garg, Ms. Shrishti Jeswani, Arjun Garg, M/s. ARS Associates, Ambhoj Kumar Sinha, Priyadarshi Kumar, V.K. Verma, Ms. Ankita Sharma, Arjun Singh, Vishnu Thulasi Menon, Ms. Nandini Gore, Mrs. Manik Karanjawala, Indrajit Sinha, Ms. Sonia Nigam, Ms. Tahira Karanjawala, Akhil Abraham Roy, Rajat Dasgupta, Ms. Manvi Rastogi, Ms. Suvarna Kashyap, Vinayak Sharma, Prashant Singh, Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Piyush Yadav, Anjani Kumar Rai, S.S. Shroff, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Ashiwan Mishra, Kamlendra Mishra, Ms. Devina Sehgal, Gaurav Kejriwal, Gitanshu Rustogi, Anmoldeep Singh, Ramendra Mohan Patnaik, Santosh Krishnan, Girish Chowdhary, Siddhant Buxy, Ms. Sonam Anand, Shaik Mohammed Haneef, Ms. Akhila Palem, Sahil Raveen, R. Krishnaamorthi, Abhisth Kumar, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, Saurabh Singh, Vaibhav Misra, Ms. Punam Kumari, Rohit K. Singh, Sanjeev Kumar Singh, Pritam Bishwas, Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, Nishant Sharma, Rakesh K. Sharma, Harsh Parashar, Ms. Manjula Gupta, Ms. Pragati Neekhra, Aditya Bhanu Neekhra, Aniket Patel, Prem Sunder Jha, Akshat Sharma, Rutwik Panda, Ms. Nikhar Berry, Ms. Anshu Malik, Rajiv Shanker Dvivedi, Ms. Tulika Mukherjee, Ms. Ekta Bharati, Beenu Sharma, Zain A. Khan, Venkat Narayan, Ms. Sheenu Chauhan, Sanjeev Malhotra, Gaurav Jain, Ms. Abha Jain, Ms. Kavya Jhawar, Pawanshree Agarwal, Ms. Sneha Kalita, Abhinav Hansaria, Ms. Nandini Rai, Parijat Kishore, Praveen Swarup, Ameet Siingh, Ms. Pareena Swarup, Ravi Kumar, Devesh Maurya, K.P. Singh, Ms. Payal Swarup, Rohit Singh Lodhi, Nithin Chowdary Pavuluri, Gopal Prasad, Shibashish Misra, Manish Kumar Saran, Ms. Anuradha Dutt, Ms. Fereshte D. Sethna, Ms. Suman Yadav, Ms. Priyanka M.P., Haaris Fazili, Kunal Dutt, Yash Mittal, Ms. B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, Kartik Seth, Ms. Shriya Gilhotra, Prashanth R Dixit, Abhishek Kandwal, Mahesh Bhati, Saurabh Chaturvedi, M/s. Chambers of Kartik Seth, K.R. Sasiprabhu, Jaydeep Patel, Vishnu Sharma A.S., S. Mahesh Sahasranaman, Ms. Shilpa Balani, Tushar Bhardwaj, Kumar Visalaksh, Udit Jain, Archit Gupta, Abhishek Vikas, Himanshu Sinha, Samyak Jai, M/s. Trilegal, Rajat Mittal, Sudipta Bhattacharjee, Onkar Sharma, Suprateek Neogi, Vivek Sharma, Anand Varma, Ms. Apoorva Pandey, Ms. Adyasha Nanda, Akshat Shrivastava, M.K.S. Menon, Ms. Usha Nandini V., Biju P. Raman, Shashank Menon, Amit Mital, John Thomas Arakal, Advs. for the appearing parties. 1590 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI Table of Contents** A. Background......................................................................... 9 B. Issues................................................................................... 13 C. Submissions....................................................................... 14 i. Submissions of the petitioners.................................. 14 ii. Submissions of the respondents.............................. 18 D. Distribution of legislative fields relating to mines and minerals............................................................................... 24 E. Underlying constitutional philosophy............................... 29 i. Scheme of distribution of legislative powers and constitutional limitations........................................... 29 ii. Interpretation of legislative entries........................... 35 iii. Fiscal Federalism........................................................ 41 iv. Natural resources and the public trust doctrine...... 45 F. Whether royalty is tax....................................................... 48 i. Royalty under the MMDR Act.................................... 48 ii. Purpose of Section 9 of the MMDR Act...................... 54 iii. Contours of a mining lease........................................ 56 a. Lease and license...................................................... 56 b. The nature of a mining lease under the MMDR Act and the Mineral Concession Rules 1960.................. 61 iv. Meaning of “royalty”.................................................. 65 v. Characteristics of Tax................................................ 68 vi. Royalty is not in the nature of tax............................. 73 a. Prelude to India Cement........................................... 73 b. Divergence between India Cement and Kesoram.... 76 c. Royalty is not a tax.................................................... 80 ** Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1591Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
G. Inter-relationship between Entry 23 of List II and Entry 54 of List I............................................................................ 84 i. Meaning of “regulation of mines” and “mineral development”............................................................... 84 ii. Analysis of Hingir-Rampur, M A Tulloch, and Baijnath Kedia.............................................................................. 90 iii. Examination of the “extent” of the MMDR Act.......... 98 H. Inter-relationship between Entry 50 of List II and Entry 54 of List I............................................................................ 104 i. Taxes on mineral rights............................................... 106 a. Mineral rights duty..................................................... 106 b. Meaning of the expression “mineral rights”.............. 107 c. Taxes on mineral rights........................................... 113 ii. The limitations on the taxing power of the State under Entry 50 of List II.............................................. a. Entry 50 of List II does not constitute an exception to the Sundararamier principle................................. b. Nature of “any limitation”........................................... 124 c. Scheme of the MMDR Act does not serve as “any limitation”................................................................... 129 d. Section 9 does not serve as a limitation on the taxing powers of State.............................................. e. “Any limitation” can extend to prohibition................... 135 f. Impact of taxes on mineral rights on mineral development.............................................................. I. Scope of Entry 49............................................................... 146 i. Land System in India................................................... 146 ii. Tax on land and buildings........................................... 157 a. Principles governing ‘taxes on lands and buildings’...... 158 a. States can impose tax on mineral bearing land.......... 162 iii. Measure of tax.............................................................. 166 a. Taxing mineral-bearing land...................................... 170 b. Goodricke.................................................................. 176 iv. Measure of tax on mineral-bearing land................... 180 a. Decoupling of minerals from land.............................. 180 b. Minerals as measure of tax on land......................... 188 J. Conclusions......................................................................... 198 1592 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports A. Background
1. The present batch of appeals bears on the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States on the taxation of mineral rights. The legislative entry which lies at the core of the present reference is Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The entry deals with taxes on mineral rights subject to “any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.” Regulation of mines and mineral development is enumerated under both the Union List (Entry 54 of List I) and the State List (Entry 23 of List II) of the Seventh Schedule. The entrustment of the subject to the State legislatures under Entry 23 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 54 of List I.
2. Parliament enacted the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 1 in exercise of its legislative powers under Article 246 of the Constitution. The subject which the legislation predominantly covers is relatable to Entry 54 of List I. The MMDR Act is a comprehensive code for the regulation of mines and development of minerals. Section 9 provides that the holder of a mining lease shall pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed from the leased area at the specified rates. In India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2 a seven-Judge Bench of this Court held that royalty is tax and the state legislatures lack competence to levy taxes on mineral rights because the subjectmatter is covered by the MMDR Act. The Court also held that royalty cannot be used by the State legislature as a measure of tax on mineral-bearing lands under Entry 49 of List II. Later in time, in State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd.3 a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the decision in India Cement (supra) stemmed from an inadvertent error and clarified that royalty is not a tax.
3. In the aftermath of India Cement (supra) and Kesoram (supra), State legislatures exercised their legislative powers to impose taxes on mineral-bearing land in pursuance of Entry 49 of List II by applying 1 “MMDR Act”
2 [1989] Supp. 1 SCR 692 : (1990) 1 SCC 12 [34] 3 [2004] 1 SCR 564 : (2004) 10 SCC 201 [71] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1593Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
the mineral value or royalty as the measure of the tax.4 States such as Rajasthan5 and Uttar Pradesh6 also sought to impose environment and health cess and fees for transporting coal and coal-dust collected from mines. The constitutional validity of these levies was challenged before the High Courts on the ground that they were beyond the legislative competence of the State legislatures. The levies were also assailed on the ground that they were in violation of the law laid down in India Cement (supra).
4. One such matter is Civil Appeal No. 4056-64 of 1999, where the petitioners initially filed writ petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Patna challenging the validity of the Bihar Coal Mining Area Development Authority (Amendment) Act 1992 and the Bihar Mineral Area Development Authority (Land Use Tax) Rules 1994, which levied tax 7 on land being used for mining. Relying on India Cement (supra), the High Court allowed the petition by holding that the tax was not within the scope of Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The correctness of the High Court’s decision was assailed before this Court. On 30 March 2011, a Bench of three Judges noticed the divergence between India Cement (supra) and Kesoram (supra) and referred the following questions to a Bench of nine Judges to provide a decisive ruling:
a. Whether ‘royalty’ determined under Sections 9/15(3) of the MMDR Act is in the nature of tax;
b. Can the State Legislature while levying a tax on land under Entry 49 List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution adopt a measure of tax based on the value of the produce of land? If yes, 4 Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India, Civil Appeal No. 4056-64 of 1999; Sanghi Infrastructures MP Ltd. v. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No. 512 of 2018. 5 Ambuja Cement v. State of Rajasthan, Diary No. 21291 of 2023; Wolkem Industries v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Appeal No. 8273 of 2013; Wonder Cement Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, Civil Appeal No. 4588 of 2017. 6 Kanoria Chemicals v. State of UP, Civil Appeal No. 1295 of 2008; Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. State of UP, Civil Appeal No. 3869 of 2014.
7 Section 89, Bihar Coal Mining Area Development Authority Act 1986. [It reads: Levy of Tax on Use of Land for Other Than Agricultural and Residential Purposes –
(1) The Authority shall subject to the provisions of this Act and Rules framed thereunder levy tax, by notification published in the Official Gazette on land being by any person, group of persons, company, the Central Government or the State Government, Local or Corporate Body for mining, commercial or industrial purposes with the prior approval of the State Government. Provided that the tax so levied shall not exceed Rupees 1.50 per square meter annually for any such land but such tax shall not be levied on land which is subject to Holding Tax.
(2) The State Government shall, out of the tax so levied and collected, determine the amount to be deposited into the consolidated Fund of the State Government from time to time.”] 1594 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports then would the constitutional position be any different insofar as the tax on land is imposed on mining land on account of Entry 50 List II and its interrelation with Entry 54 List I?
c. What is the meaning of the expression “Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development” within the meaning of Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India? Does the MMDR Act contain any provision which operates as a limitation on the field of legislation prescribed in Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India? In particular, whether Section 9 of the MMDR Act denudes or limits the scope of Entry 50 of List II?
d. What is the true nature of royalty/ dead rent payable on minerals produced/ mined/ extracted from mines?
e. Whether the majority decision in Kesoram (supra) could be read as departing from the law laid down in India Cement (supra)? f. Whether “taxes on lands and buildings” in Entry 49 List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution contemplate a tax levied directly on the land as a unit having definite relationship with the land?
g. What is the scope of the expression “taxes on mineral rights” in Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution? h. Whether the expression “subject to any limitation imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development” in Entry 50 of List II refers to the subject matter in Entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution;
i. Whether Entry 50 of List II read with Entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution constitute an exception to the general scheme of Entries relating to taxation being distinct from other Entries in all the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as enunciated in M P V Sundararamier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh;8 8 [1958] 1 SCR 1422 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1595Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
j. Whether in view of the declaration under Section 2 of the MMDR Act made in terms of Entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and the provisions of the said Act, the State legislature is denuded of its power under Entry 23 of List II and/ or Entry 50 of List II; and k. What is the effect of the expression “subject to any limitation imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development” on the taxing power of the State legislature in Entry 50 of List II, particularly in view of its uniqueness in the sense that it is the only entry in all the entries in three Lists (Lists I, II, and III) where the taxing power of the State legislature has been subjected to “any limitation imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.”
B. Issues
5. During the course of the hearing, 9 counsel for the petitioners and respondents agreed that the main questions that fall for determination by this Court could be reframed in the following terms: a. What is the true nature of royalty determined under Section 9 read with Section 15(1) of the MMDR Act? Whether royalty is in the nature of tax;
b. What is the scope of Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule? What is the ambit of the limitations imposable by Parliament in exercise of its legislative powers under Entry 54 of List I? Does Section 9, or any other provision of the MMDR Act, contain any limitation with respect to the field in Entry 50 of List II? c. Whether the expression “subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development” in Entry 50 of List II pro tanto subjects the entry to Entry 54 of List I, which is a non-taxing general entry? Consequently, is there any departure from the general scheme of distribution of legislative powers as enunciated in M P V Sundararamier (supra)?
d. What is the scope of Entry 49 of List II and whether it covers a tax which involves a measure based on the value of the produce of land? Would the constitutional position be any different qua 9 Civil Appeal No. 4056-4064 of 1999, Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India, Transcript of Hearing, 27 February 2024, 8-9.
1596 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports mining land on account of Entry 50 of List II read with Entry 54 of List I?
e. Whether Entry 50 of List II is a specific entry in relation to Entry 49 of List II, and would consequently subtract mining land from the scope of Entry 49 of List II?
6. The Union of India has filed an affidavit stating that the issues in this reference do not involve the interpretation of Entry 53 of List I of the Seventh Schedule which pertains to oilfields, mineral oil resources, petroleum and petroleum products. Counsel on both sides have not addressed submissions on any issues pertaining to the interpretation of Entry 53 of List I. We have accordingly neither discussed nor considered any issues pertaining to Entry 53 of List I. We have circumscribed the scope of the reference to the abovementioned issues referred to the nine-Judge Bench as reframed in the above terms.
C. Submissions i. Submissions of the petitioners
7. Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. Royalty is the consideration for parting with the right to work the mine and win minerals which are vested either in the Government or a private person. Section 9 of the MMDR Act statutorily determines the price to be compulsorily paid by the lessee to the lessor in lieu of the grant of rights under a mining lease. Royalty paid by the lessee under Section 9 does not meet either the criteria of a ‘tax’ or an ‘impost’ under Article 366(28) of the Constitution. Therefore, royalty is not a tax on either minerals or mineral rights;
b. Entry 49 of List II - “taxes on lands and buildings” - must be construed expansively because it is not subordinated to any other entry in the Seventh Schedule. The expression “lands” in Entry 49 has been interpreted to include all kinds of lands, including mineral-bearing land. Minerals continue to remain a part of the land until they are extracted. Therefore, the value of minerals can be used as a measure to tax mineral bearing land;
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1597Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
c. Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II are general entries relating to the subject matter of regulation of mines and mineral development. Entry 23 of List II has been expressly subordinated to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. Thus, the subject matter available to the State legislature under Entry 23 of List II is the residue of what is left after declaration by Parliament under Entry 54 of List I. Moreover, Entries 54 of List I and 23 of List II, being general entries, do not provide a source of imposing any kind of tax;
d. The legislative power of the State legislatures to levy tax on mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II has been made subject to “any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.” Parliament has no legislative competence to tax with respect to any subject matter enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule. Parliament cannot assume to itself the power to tax mineral rights, but can only impose limitations on the states when they exercise their powers in pursuance of Entry 50 of List II;
e. The limitations contemplated under Entry 50 of List II have to be express because they deprive the State legislatures of their plenary power to impose tax. The MMDR Act does not expressly limit the legislative competence of the State legislatures to tax mineral rights. Royalty is neither tax, nor an exaction in the nature of tax. It cannot serve as a limitation envisaged by Entry 50 of List II;
f. Under Entry 50 of List II, the limitations are required to be imposed “by law” made by Parliament. They cannot be imposed by a delegate acting under parliamentary legislation; and g. Entry 54 of List I read with Entry 50 of List II is not an exception to the principle laid down in M P V Sundararamier (supra). Entry 54 of List I is a regulatory entry, while Entry 50 of List II is a taxing entry. The power to impose “any limitations” under Entry 50 of List II cannot be interpreted so as to bestow upon Parliament legislative powers to tax mineral rights. There cannot be any overlap of the power of taxation because the legislative power of Union and States to tax is mutually exclusive and clearly demarcated under the Seventh Schedule.
1598 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
8. Mr S Niranjan Reddy, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. It is a settled law that the rights to sub-soil minerals vest in the title holder of the land. The ownership to sub-soil minerals generally follows the ownership of the land, unless the owner of the land is deprived of the same by some valid legal process; b. Ordinarily, the land owner, or the mining lessor, contractually requires the lessee to pay royalty as a compensation for the loss of the value of minerals from the land. Under Section 9 of the MMDR Act, Parliament has statutorily capped the amount of royalty that can be contractually collected by the lessor. Moreover, Section 9(3) of the MMDR Act (which limits the power of the Central Government to increase the rates of royalty) does not serve as a limitation on the taxing power of the State legislatures under Entry 50 of List II;
c. The Constitution is cognizant of the fact that the legislative power of the States to tax mineral rights may impede mineral development. Therefore, the Constitution has empowered Parliament to limit or restrict the taxing powers of the State legislatures under Entry 50 of List II by a law relating to mineral development; and d. The word “lands” under Entry 49 of List II includes lands of every character. The measure of a tax cannot determine the nature of tax. The productivity of land can be used as a measure for levy of taxes on lands. Resultantly, mineral produced from a land can always be used as a measure to tax lands.
9. Mr Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. The MMDR Act only deals with the regulation of mines and mineral development. Further, the legislation does not seek to legislate on the entire field of mines and minerals, but only to the extent provided. The levies such as royalty and dead rent payable under the MMDR Act are not in the nature of tax but only a payment for a right to enjoy the land and the usufruct of the land;
b. Entry 50 of List II, being a taxing entry, has to be construed with clarity and precision. The expression “law relating to [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1599Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
mineral development” occurring in Entry 50 of List II has to be construed in light of Section 18 of the MMDR Act which deals with mineral development. Section 18 does not impose any express limitation on the legislative power of the states to tax mineral rights; and c. Parliament does not have the legislative powers to tax minerals rights using its residuary powers because the subject matter has been expressly enumerated in the State List.
10. Ms Sansriti Pathak, learned counsel, made the following submissions: a. The State, being the proprietor of minerals, can receive royalty for parting with its mineral rights and can also levy tax on the same minerals in the capacity of the sovereign; and b. The expression “any limitations” appearing in Entry 50 of List II cannot be construed to mean prohibition. Parliament can only limit the exclusive legislative powers of the State legislature to tax minerals, but cannot prohibit them.
ii. Submissions of the respondents
11. Mr R Venkataramani, the learned Attorney General for India, made the following submissions:
a. The grant of permission to undertake any activity in relation to a mineral is based on certain terms and conditions prescribed under the MMDR Act. The consideration for the grant of such permission is royalty, which in essence is the demand for parting with the privilege of working the mineral;
b. It is immaterial whether royalty is designated as a tax. Any levy relating to mineral development, in so far as it is in relation to mineral rights, will serve as a limitation on the taxing powers of the State legislature under Entry 50 of List II;
c. Both Entry 54 of List I and Entry 50 of List II constitute a family of entries. Taxes on minerals rights must be understood as such levies, charges, impositions or demands that are related to mineral development. Entry 50 of List II cannot be a source of authority for imposing any levy, charge, impost, or demand which is either unconnected with mineral development or in relation to any other alien purpose, such as education cess; 1600 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports d. The MMDR Act contemplates all manner of levies, charges, imposts, or demands that can be legitimately provided for having a nexus with mineral rights. Therefore, the provisions of the MMDR Act will be treated as a limitation on the power of the States to demand or impose similar levies, imposts or demands of the same nature. Although Entry 50 of List II is a taxing entry, it will be limited by a law relating to mineral development enacted under a general entry, that is, Entry 54 of List I; and e. Entry 49 of List II cannot include any matter in relation to mineral rights activities. Any levy with reference to the value of mineral produced from a mineral bearing land will be treated as a levy in relation to mineral rights.
12. Mr Tushar Mehta, the learner Solicitor General of India, made the following submissions:
a. The only pertinent issue in this reference is whether the State Government can impose levies under Entry 50 of List II over and above the amount of royalty received by them under the MMDR Act. The State legislature’s competence to tax mineral rights under Entry 50 does not extend to taxing other aspects such as mining activities and minerals produced;
b. The Central Government fixes the rates of royalty to ensure harmonized development of minerals in India. The MMDR Act exhausts the field of statutory charges and levies on minerals and thereby denudes the power of the State legislature to impose any levy relating to mineral development. The MMDR Act occupies the entire field of legislation covered by both Entries 23 and 50 of List II;
c. In the context of mineral-bearing lands, the words “lands” used in Entry 49 of List II can only mean the surface of the land. It cannot be interpreted expansively to include sub-soil minerals because the subject matter of mines and minerals is covered by Entry 54 of List I and Entries 23 and 50 of List II. If mineral produce or mineral rights are used as a measure for taxation of lands under Entry 49 of List II, it will impact the Union’s powers to legislate under Entry 54 of List I to limit the taxes on mineral rights in the manner contemplated in Entry 50 of List II; and [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1601Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
d. Any levy imposed by the States with reference to the value of minerals produced is in pith and substance a tax on mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II. Since subject-matter of mineral rights covered by Entry 50 of List II is limited by a parliamentary law, giving an expansive reading to Entry 49 of List II by interpreting lands to include mineral deposits will lead to an overlap between the two entries.
13. Mr Harish Salve, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. Entry 50 of List II is sui generis because it is the only legislative entry which limits the taxing power of the State legislatures by reference to a general law;
b. The MMDR Act is a complete code on all aspects relating to regulation of mines and development of minerals. All mineral rights are granted according to the provisions of the central legislation regardless of whether that the minerals vest in the State Government;
c. The important issue in this reference pertains to the nature of “any limitations” mentioned under Entry 50 of List II. The State legislature’s power under Entry 50 of List II is excluded if taxes on mineral rights become incompatible with mineral development as contemplated by a regulatory law enacted under Entry 54 of List I. Any levy by State legislatures under Entry 50 of List II impinges upon mineral development;
d. Royalty belongs to the same genus as a tax on mineral rights in the sense that both are exactions by the sovereign in exercise of their statutory powers. The expression “taxes on mineral rights” has a very narrow focus and has to be interpreted accordingly. In a constitutional sense, the expression “tax on mineral rights” connotes that exaction which gives the States the share of the mineral produced. The royalty payable under Section 9 of the MMDR Act meets that definition;
e. The expression “mineral development” used in Entry 50 of List II has to be traced to the entire architecture of the MMDR Act. Therefore, the entirety of the MMDR Act serves as a limitation on the taxing powers of the State legislatures under Entry 50 of List II. Further, other provisions of the MMDR Act cover the 1602 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports taxing powers of the State legislature by satisfying the threshold of “any limitation” under Entry 50 of List II;
f. The tax on mineral rights can only be a tax on an owner (who is a private person) of minerals seeking to monetize the mineral resources. Resultantly, the State Government can exercise its legislative powers under Entry 50 of List II only in situations where the mineral rights vest in private persons; and g. The measure of tax must have a nexus with the nature of tax. In India, all minerals vest in the State. Ownership of land does not give the owner the right to the sub-soil minerals. Therefore, a tax on mineral bearing land cannot be imposed on the owner on the basis of the value of the sub-soil minerals.
14. Dr A M Singhvi, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. Royalty and dead rent are compulsory imposts under the MMDR Act, and not a result of negotiations leading to a contractual agreement. Royalty meets the criteria of tax under Article 366(28) of the Constitution;
b. The legislative declaration under Section 2 of the MMDR Act denudes the States of any power to tax mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II. Even if the legislative declaration does not ipso facto exclude the legislative competence of the State legislatures under Entry 50 of List II, the MMDR Act contains specific provisions such as Sections 9, 9A, and 9B imposing taxes on mining lessees which occupy the field of taxation of mineral rights;
c. The express language of Entry 50 of List II suggests that the taxing power of the State legislature is subordinated by a legislation made under Entry 54 of List I. This necessarily implies that Entry 54 of List I read with Entry 97 of List I empowers Parliament to tax mineral rights; and d. Entry 54 of List I read with Entry 97 of List I implies a sui generis and complete code on the legislative subject of regulation of mines and mineral development and taxation of minerals and mineral rights. Therefore, Entry 54 of List I and Entry 50 of List II constitute an exception to the principle laid down in M P V Sundararamier (supra).
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1603Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
15. Mr Darius Khambata, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. The limitations imposed by Parliament under Entry 50 of List II need not be express, they can also be implied. Therefore, once Parliament imposes charges or levies under a law relating to mineral development, it occupies the entire field pertaining to the subject-matter of Entry 50 of List II; and b. The MMDR Act is a complete code on the regulation of mineral development, including the field of taxation or exactions on minerals and mineral rights. The scheme of the MMDR Act is such that Parliament not only imposes a tax on mineral rights, but also curtails the powers of the State legislature under Entry 50 of List II.
16. Mr A K Ganguly, learned senior counsel, submitted that minerals cannot constitute as a measure for tax on land because they cease to be a part of land once extracted.
17. Mr S K Bagaria, learned senior counsel, submitted that the totality of levies pertaining to minerals and mineral rights are comprised in Sections 9, 9A, 9B, and 9C of the MMDR Act which leave nothing for the State legislature to tax under Entry 50 of List II. Moreover, the expression ‘tax on mineral rights’ under Entry 50 of List II will not empower State legislatures to levy tax on minerals.
18. Mr Arvind Datar, learned senior counsel, made the following submissions:
a. Since Entry 50 of List II is “subject to” any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development, the legislative power of the State legislature to tax mineral rights must yield to parliamentary legislation, that is, the MMDR Act. The taxing powers under Entry 50 of List II are made subject to a law made by Parliament to maintain uniformity and promote mineral development; and b. The scope of taxes on mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II is limited and only entails a taxation on the activity of excavation and mining. This has already been accounted for under the MMDR Act. The taxes on minerals produced is akin to an excise duty and can only be levied under Entry 84 of List I, and the taxes on sale of minerals can be levied under Entry 54 of List II. 1604 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
19. Mr Sujit Ghosh, learned senior counsel, submitted that the sovereign right of the State legislature can be curtailed by Parliament in the interests of mineral development. Counsel further contended that the ‘aspect’ of taxation of mineral rights has been taken over by Parliament by virtue of Section 9 of the MMDR Act.
20. Ms Aishwarya Bhati, the Additional Solicitor-General of India, submitted that the taxing powers of the State legislatures under Entry 50 of List II is not eclipsed by a taxing power of Parliament, but by a regulatory power. The learned ASG also emphasized that the concept of inter-generational equity has to be borne in mind by this Court to balance the legislative power of the State legislatures to tax mineral rights against the need for the development of minerals.
D. Distribution of legislative fields relating to mines and minerals
21. A mineral is an inorganic substance found either on or under the surface of the earth. 10 Minerals are natural and non-renewable resources. They serve as vital raw materials for the core sectors of the economy. India produces a diversity of minerals such as coal, iron-ore, bauxite, manganese and chromite. Many industries, especially those critical to the infrastructure sector such as power, steel, cement, and aluminum, are heavily dependent on minerals. For example, coal is an essential raw material for several key industries such as iron, steel, and cement, which in turn are basic ingredients for almost all manufacturing industries and physical infrastructure.
22. Most of the minerals are spatially located in a few mineral rich states, namely, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and West Bengal. 11 10 Ramanatha Aiyar Advanced Law Lexicon (Volume 3) 3543; In Banarsi Dass Chadha v. Lt Governor, Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 11 [4]. (Justice O Chinappa Reddy, on behalf of a three-Judge Bench observed: “The word “mineral” is not a term of Article. It is a word of common parlance, capable of a multiplicity of meanings depending upon the context. For example, the word is occasionally used in a very wide sense to denote any substance that is neither animal nor vegetation. Sometimes it is used in a narrow sense to mean no more than precious metals than gold and silver. Again, the word “minerals” is often used to indicate substances obtained from underneath the surface of the earth by digging or quarrying.”); V P Pithupitchai v. Special Secretary to the Government of TN (2003) 9 SCC 534 11 Ligia Norohna et al, ‘Resource Federalism in India: The Case of Minerals’ (2009) 44(8) Economic and Political Weekly 51, 52.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1605Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Since mineral resources are a shared inheritance of the people, it has always been the imperative of the Indian state to ensure equitable distribution of mineral wealth to sub-serve the common good. 12 Considering the socio-economic importance of mineral resources to economic development, the Constitution has emphasized that the state shall play an important role in facilitating and regulating mining activities.
23. The history of the distribution of legislative powers relating to the regulation of minerals and development of mineral rights could be traced to the Government of India Act 1915-19. 13 Section 45A of the GOI Act 1915 provided for the classification of subjects in relation to the functions of government as central and provincial subjects for the purpose of distinguishing the functions of the Governor-General in Council and the Indian Legislature from those of the local governments and local legislatures. Pursuant to Section 45A and Section 129A (which empowered the Governor-General to make further provisions for the regulation of certain matters by rules), the Governor-General prescribed the Devolution Rules. The Devolution Rules prescribed the distribution of the subject-matter of the regulation of mines and mineral resources in the following manner:
“Part I Central Subjects
25. Control of mineral development in so far as such control is reserved to the Governor General in Council under rule made or sanctioned by the Secretary of State, and regulation of mines.
Part II Provincial Subjects
24. Development of mineral resources which are Government property; - subject to rules made or sanctioned by the Secretary of State, but not including the regulation of mines.”
24. The primary aim behind the introduction of the Devolution Rules was to transfer certain responsibilities to provincial legislative assemblies.14 However, the colonial state reserved to itself almost the entirety of 12 Government of India, Ministry of Mines, ‘National Mineral Policy 2019’ 13 “GOI Act 1915”
14 See Debates in the House of Commons on the Government of India Act 1919 (3rd December 1919) 1606 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the subject matter relating to mineral development and regulation of mines. The provincial legislatures were given limited power to the extent of development of mineral resources which were Government property. The Government of India Act 193515 retained the distribution of legislative powers between the Centre and Provinces. Section 100 of the GOI Act 1935 demarcated the legislative powers of the Federal and Provincial Legislatures. 16 The relevant entries relating to mines and mineral development were as follows:
“List I. – Federal Legislative List
36. Regulation of mines and oilfields and mineral development to which such regulation and development under a Federal control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in the public interest.
List II. – Provincial Legislative List
23. Regulation of mines and oilfields and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under Federal control.
44. Taxes on mineral rights, subject to any limitations imposed by any Act of the Federal Legislature relating to mineral development.”
25. During the debates in the House of Commons on the above entries, the then Solicitor General stated that the provinces could enact their own regulations if there was any “inaction” by the Federal Legislature. 17 Thus, legislative power in relation to regulation of 15 “GOI Act 1935”
16 GOI Act 1935, Section 100. (It read:
Subject matter of Federal and Provincial Laws:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding subsections, the Federal Legislature has and a Provincial Legislature has not, power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule to this Act (hereinafter called the “Federal Legislative List”).
(2) Notwithstanding anything in the next succeeding sub-section, the Federal Legislature, and subject to the preceding sub-section, a Provincial Legislature also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the said Schedule (hereinafter called the “Concurrent Legislative List”).
(3) Subject to the two preceding sub-sections, the Provincial Legislature has, and the Federal Legislature has not, power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the said Schedule (hereinafter called the “Provincial Legislative List”).
(4) The Federal Legislature has power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislature List except for a Province of any part thereof.”) 17 Government of India Bill, Seventh Schedule (Legislative Lists) Hansard (Volume 301) (13 May 1935). [The Solicitor General said: “If there is inaction at the Centre the Provinces can go ahead with their [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1607Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
mines and mineral development was accorded to both the Federal and Provincial Legislatures. However, the subject matter in the Provincial Legislative List was made subject to the provisions of the Federal Legislative List. The Dominion Legislature enacted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1948 in pursuance of the subject contained in Entry 36 of the Federal Legislative List.
26. Entry 44 of the Provincial Legislative List enumerated the subject matter of taxes on mineral rights, but made the taxing power of the Provinces subject to any legislation relating to mineral development enacted by the Federal Legislature. This scheme of the distribution of legislative powers with respect to the subject-matter of mines and mineral development as well as the taxation of mineral rights is reflected in the Constitution.
27. The Seventh Schedule to the Constitution enumerates the following entries pertaining to regulation of mines and mineral development and the taxation of mineral rights:
“List I – Union List
54. Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.
List II – State List
23. Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.
50. Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitation imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.”
28. Although the above entries are substantially similar to the scheme under the GOI Act 1935, one of the differences lies in the removal of “oil fields” from Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II. The regulation and development of oil fields is now enumerated under own regulations and developments, but to the extent to which the Centre desires and declares by law that there shall be central regulations and control, then the subject comes out of the purely restricted Provincial field and becomes a subject of control at the Centre.”] 1608 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Entry 53 of List I.18 The other difference is that while the GOI Act 1935 required a declaration by Federal law, the Constitution now requires a declaration by Parliament. The entry pertaining to taxes on mineral rights is largely similar to Entry 44 of the Provincial Legislative List, except for the fact that Entry 44 provided for imposition of “any limitations” by “any Act” enacted by the Federal Legislature relating to mineral development, while Entry 50 of List II does not include the expression “any Act” enacted by Parliament. Before we delve into the intricacies of the interpretation of the legislative entries, we need to bear in mind the constitutional philosophy underlying the Indian federal setup.
E. Underlying constitutional philosophy i. Scheme of distribution of legislative powers and constitutional limitations
29. Part XI of the Constitution deals with the relations between the Union and the States. Article 245 provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State.19 The power to enact laws is inherently related to the sovereignty of the Union and State legislatures in their respective fields. 20 While the sovereign legislative powers of Parliament and the State legislatures are plenary, they are subject to well-defined constitutional limitations. The language of Article 245 makes the exercise of legislative powers expressly subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, laws made by a legislature may be void not only for the lack of legislative power in respect of the subject-matter, but also for transgressing constitutional limitations. 21 It is the duty of constitutional courts to resolve disputes regarding a breach of constitutional limits by the Union and State legislatures. 22 18 Entry 53 of List I, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India. [It reads: “53. Regulation and development of oil fields and mineral oil resources; petroleum and petroleum products; other liquids and substances declared by Parliament by law to be dangerously inflammable.”] 19 Article 245, Constitution of India 20 Jindal Stainless Steel v. State of Haryana (2017) 12 SCC 1 [617] 21 H M Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Volume 3 (4th edn.) [22.6] 2306; State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Company Ltd. (2012) 7 SCC 106, [41] 22 State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010) 3 SCC 571 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1609Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
30. The scheme of distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the State legislatures is embodied in Article 246. Article 246 is similar to Section 100 of the GOI Act 1935. Article 246 deals with the subject matter of laws made by Parliament and the Legislatures of States and is set below:
“246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States –
(1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to makes laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Union List”).
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have the power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”)
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the “State List”)
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.”
31. Article 246 confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I (the Union List) of the Seventh Schedule. The exclusive power of the State legislatures with respect to the matters enumerated in List II is subject to the exclusive legislative powers of Parliament. In Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v. State of Bihar, 23 this Court culled out the following principles underlying Article 246:
23 [1983] 3 SCR 130 : (1983) 4 SCC 45 1610 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports a. Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to the matters enumerated in List I;
b. The non-obstante clause in Article 246(1) provides for predominance or supremacy of the Union legislature;
c. The legislative powers of the Union legislature is not encumbered by anything contained in Articles 246(2) and 246(3) for these clauses are expressly limited and made subject to the nonobstante clause in Article 246(1);
d. The State legislature has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II;
e. The exclusive power of the State legislature to legislate with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II has to be exercised subject to Article 246(1), that is, the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate with respect to matters enumerated in List I;
f. Consequently, in case of any conflict between an entry in List I and an entry in List II which is not capable of reconciliation, the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter enumerated in List I must supersede pro tanto the exercise of power of the State legislature; and g. Both Parliament and State legislatures have concurrent powers of legislation with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III, the law enacted by Parliament prevailing in the event of any inconsistency or conflict.
32. Article 245 (read with Article 246) is the source of the legislative powers of Parliament and the State legislatures. The entries in the Seventh Schedule delineate the subject matter over which the appropriate legislature can enact laws. The entries are legislative heads and not the source of legislative powers. 24 A legislation could be composite in nature, drawing upon several entries in a particular list. 25 Such a legislation is referred to as a “ragbag” legislation.
24 Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd v. State of West Bengal [1962] Supp 3 SCR 1, [8] 25 Ujagar Prints (II) v. Union of India (1989) 3 SCC 488 [53]; State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010) 3 SCC 571 [27].
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1611Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
33. Article 254 clarifies that if the law made by a State legislature is repugnant to any provisions of a law made by Parliament with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III, the law made by Parliament would prevail and the law made by the State legislature would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. The issue of repugnancy arises only when both the legislatures are competent to legislate on the subject with respect to List III.26 The issue of repugnancy does not arise if the legislations enacted by Parliament and the State legislatures deal with separate and distinct legislative subject matters. By virtue of Article 248, Parliament has exclusive legislative powers to make laws with respect to any of the matters not enumerated in List II or List III.27 However, how should courts deal with a situation where two legislations, enacted by Parliament and State legislature in pursuance of their respective legislative powers, appear to conflict with each other? The answer lies in Article 246 itself.
34. Article 246 incorporates the principle of federal supremacy. 28 In Hoechst Pharmaceuticals (supra), this Court held that the words “notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (2) and (3)” in Article 246(1) and the words “subject to clauses (1) and (2)” in Article 246(3) embody that principle. The principle postulates that in case of an inevitable conflict between Union and State powers, the Union’s power of legislation over a subject enumerated in List I shall prevail over the State powers of legislation over a subject enumerated in List II and III. However, it is also settled that this principle cannot be resorted to unless there is an irreconcilable direct conflict between the entries in the Union and State Lists. 29 Such a conflict must be an actual one and not a mere seeming conflict between the two entries in two lists.30
35. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals (supra) laid down the following principles to resolve any direct conflict between the entries in List I and List II: (i) in case of seeming conflict, the two entries should be read together without giving a narrow and restricted reading to either 26 Ch Tika Ramji v. State of U P, 1956 SCC OnLine SC 9 [26]; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (2008)
27 Article 248, Constitution of India.
28 Kishori Shetty v. The King (1949-50) 11 FCR 650 29 State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd. (2012) 7 SCC 106 [39] 30 Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority (2011) 3 SCC 139 [99] 1612 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of them; (ii) an attempt should be made to see whether the two entries can be reconciled so as to avoid a conflict of jurisdiction; and
(iii) no question of conflict arises between two Lists if the impugned legislation in pith and substance appears to fall exclusively under one list and the encroachment upon the other list is incidental.
36. Articles 245 and 246 embody the essence of Indian federalism. The division of legislative powers between Union and States is an emanation of the federal project. 31 This division also serves as a constitutional limitation on legislative powers. Parliament cannot entrench upon the plenary power of the State legislatures in the ordinary course, except where the Constitution itself specifically allows it.32 The appropriate legislature must possess legislative competence to enact a law on the subject matter it seeks to legislate.
37. With respect to the powers of taxation, Article 265 provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. In Mafatlal Industries v. Union of India, a nine-Judge Bench of this Court held that the “law” mentioned under Article 265 refers to a valid law whose validity has to be determined with reference to other provisions in the Constitution. 33 Therefore, with respect to taxation laws particularly, there is a constitutional requirement that the law imposing tax must be in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Part III dealing with the fundamental rights. This is also a constitutional limitation because the appropriate legislature has to ensure that the law is in accord with the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Any legislation enacted by the legislature in excess of its constitutional powers is void. 34 31 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 11 (25 November 1949). [Dr. B R Ambedkar – “As to the relation between the Centre and the States, it is necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle on which it rests. The basic principle of Federalism is that the Legislative and Executive authority is partitioned between the Centre and the States not by any law to made by the Centre but by the Constitution itself. This is what the Constitution does. The States under our Constitution are in no way dependent upon the Centre for their legislative or executive authority. The Centre and the States are co-equal in this matter. It is difficult to see how such a Constitution can be called centralism. It may be that the Constitution assigns to the Centre too large field for the operation of its legislative and executive authority than it to be found in any other federal Constitution. It may be that the residuary powers are given to the Centre and not to the States. But these features do not form the essence of federalism. The chief mark of federalism as I said lies in the partition of the legislative and executive authority between the Centre and the Units by the Constitution. This is the principle embodied in our Constitution.”] 32 See Articles 249, 250, and 252, Constitution of India. 33 [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 585 : (1997) 5 SCC 536 [25] 34 R M D Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (1957) SCC OnLine SC 11 [12] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1613Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
ii. Interpretation of legislative entries
38. The structure of the legislative entries in the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule follows an express and deliberate pattern. The entries are classified into general and taxing entries. 35 In the Union List, entries 1 to 81 enumerate general subject matters, while entries 82 to 92-C pertain to the powers of taxation. Similarly, entries 1 to 45 in the State List enumerate the general entries and entries 46 to 63 provide for taxing entries. The legislature does not derive the power to tax from the general entries - taxation is considered to be a distinct matter for purposes of legislative competence. The distinction between the general and taxing entries was explained by this Court in M P V Sundararamier (supra) in the following manner:
“In List I, Entries 1 to 81 mention the several matters over which Parliament has authority to legislate. Entries 82 to 92 enumerate the taxes which could be imposed by a law by Parliament. An examination of these two groups of Entries shows that while the main subject of legislation figures in the first group, a tax in relation thereto is separately mentioned in the second. Thus, entry 22 in List I is “Railways”, and Entry 89 is “Terminal taxes on goods or passengers, carried by railway, sea, or air; taxes on railway fares and freights”. If Entry 22 is to be construed as involving taxes to be imposed, then Entry 89 would be superfluous. Entry 41 mentions “Trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export across customs frontiers”. If these expressions are to be interpreted as including duties to be levied in respect of that trade and commerce, then Entry 83 which is “Duties of customs including export duties” would be wholly redundant. Entries 43 and 44 relate to incorporation regulation and winding up of corporations. Entry 85 provides separately for Corporation tax. Turning to List II, Entries 1 to 44 form one group mentioning the subjects on which the States could legislate. Entries 45 to 63 in that List form another group, and they deal with taxes. Entry 18, for example, is “Land” and Entry 45 is “Land Revenue”. Entry 23 is “Regulation of mines” and Entry 50 35 R Abdul Quader & Co. v. STO [1964] 6 SCR 867, [8] 1614 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports is “taxes on mineral rights”. The above analysis – and it is not exhaustive of the Entries in the Lists – leads to the interference that taxation is not intended to be comprised in the main subject in which it might on an extended construction be regarded as included, but is treated as a distinct matter for purposes of legislative competence. And this distinction is also manifest in the language of Art. 248, Cls. (1) and (2), and of Entry 97 in List I of the Constitution. […] To sum up: […] (2) Under the scheme of the Entries in the Lists, taxation is regarded as a distinct matter and is separately set out.”
(emphasis added)
39. The above position of law has been expressly affirmed by the nine-Judge Bench of this Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd v. State of Haryana.36 Thus, it is an accepted principle that the subject matter of taxation is dealt with under distinct entries and, therefore, cannot be traced to a non-taxing entry. The taxing powers of Parliament and the State legislatures are mutually exclusive and clearly demarcated. There can be no overlap between the taxing powers of the Union and the States. Entries relating to taxing powers must be construed with clarity and precision to maintain exclusivity and a construction of a taxation entry which may lead to overlapping must be eschewed. 37 If a taxing power is enumerated within a particular legislative list, it is automatically excluded from the purview of subject-matters in other legislative lists. The residuary power of Parliament also includes the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either List II or List III.
40. The legislative fields or entries in the Seventh Schedule have used general words to define and delineate the legislative powers of Parliament and State legislatures. The rule that words should receive their ordinary, natural, and grammatical meaning applicable to statutes also applies to the entries contained in the Seventh Schedule. 38 It 36 Jindal Stainless Steel (supra) [120], [237.5], [639] 37 Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. State of UP (2005) 2 SCC 515 [46] 38 Navinchandra Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City (1954) 3 SCC 623 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1615Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
is also a well-accepted principle that the entries should not be read in a narrow or pedantic sense but must be given their broadest meaning and the widest amplitude because they are intrinsic to a machinery of government. 39 The ambit of the entries extends to all ancillary and subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in them. 40 Since the Seventh Schedule uses general terms, there is always a possibility of an overlap and conflict between two or more entries.
41. Many entries in the Seventh Schedule may appear to overlap because of the language used in the entries. The necessary corollary to the scheme of legislative distribution is that that any invasion by Parliament in the field assigned to the States and vice versa is a breach of the Constitution. 41 Even though the Constitution distributes legislative powers between the Union and the States, there have been situations where a legislation purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches on a subject in another list. To remedy such situation, the doctrine of pith and substance is used to examine whether the legislature has the competence to enact a law with regard to either of the three lists under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.42 There may arise situations where a legislature may frame a law that in substance and reality transgresses its legislative competence. Such a piece of legislation is called “colourable legislation” because the legislature veils its transgression by making it seem as if the legislation is within its legislative competence. 43 To examine whether the legislature has transgressed its legislative competence, the substance of the legislation is material. If the subject-matter is in substance beyond the legislative powers of the legislature, the form in which the law is clothed would not save it from the vice of unconstitutionality.44 39 Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail [1955] 1 SCR 1284; Elel Hotels & Investments Ltd v. Union of India (1989) 3 SCC 698; State of Rajasthan v. G Chawla, 1958 SCC OnLine SC 33 [8].
40 United Provinces v Atiqa Begum, (1940) 2 FCR 110; Express Hotels (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1989) 3 SCC 677; Sardar Baldev Singh v. CIT, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 147 [20] 41 Dr. B R Ambedkar, CAD Volume 7 (4 November 1948).
42 A L S P P L Subrahmanyan Chettiar v. Muthuswami Goundan (1940) 2 FCR 188; A S Krishna v. State of Madras [1957] SCR 399 [8];
43 K C Gajapathi Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa (1953) 2 SCC 178 [11] 44 K C Gajapathi Narayan Deo (supra) [12] 1616 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
42. The Constitution has used specific expressions to resolve potential overlaps or conflicts between and among the entries in the three Lists. The entries in the Seventh Schedule have used different phraseologies to either subject or restrict their scope and ambit. Some of the legislative entries in the State List have been made subject to broad or specific limitations or restrictions with respect to the entries in the Union List or Concurrent List. This would emerge from the tabulation set out below:
Phraseology used Entries in State List Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament Subject to the provisions of entries in List I 2, 17, 22, 24, 33 Subject to a particular field of legislation in List I Subject to the provisions of entries in List III 26, 27, 57 Subject to the provisions of List I and List III Subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law Other than 7, 12, 32, 63 Not including 1, 51, 54, 66
43. The above table is an indication of the extent to which the legislative powers of the States have been restricted, limited, or altogether precluded. The use of the expression “other than” or “not including” serves the purpose of redacting from the ambit of the legislative power of the States to the extent suggested. Where the Constitution intends to limit or preclude the legislative powers of the State to a particular extent, it has used specific terminologies such as “other than” and “not including”.
44. Where the entries have used the phrase “subject to”, the legislative power of the State is made subordinate to Parliament with respect to either the Union List or the Concurrent List. The expression “subject to” conveys the idea of a provision yielding place to another provision [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1617Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
or other provisions to which it is made subject. 45 Therefore, where the Constitution intends to displace or override46 the legislative powers of the States, it has used specific terminology – “subject to”. However, the Constitution has also indicated the extent to which a particular legislative entry under List II is subordinated. For instance, the subjection is either with respect to provisions of List I or List III, or it can also be to the extent of “any limitations” imposed by Parliament by law. Thus, it is imperative that the entries in List II must be read and interpreted in their proper context to understand the extent of their subordination to Union powers.
45. There are numerous entries in the State List where the Constitution has imposed no restrictions on the exercise of the legislative powers of the States. 47 With respect to such entries, the absence of any express limitations indicates that the Constitution did not intend to fetter the legislative powers of the States.
46. In addition to the above terminologies, the entries in the Seventh Schedule also indicate the manner in which a restriction or limitation can be imposed on the legislative powers of the State. This assumes clarity from the following tabulation:
Phraseology Used Entries Declared by or under law 23, 27, 67 of List I Declared by Parliament by law 24, 52, 53, 54, 56, 62, 63, 64 of List I Imposed by Parliament by law 50 of List II
47. The Constitution deploys three expressions to signify the manner in which the legislative power could be exercised by Parliament – “declared by or under law”, and “declared by Parliament by law”, and “imposed by Parliament by law” The difference in the character of these provisions can be gathered from the Constitution (Seventh 45 South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue [1964] 4 SCR 280 [19] 46 State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952) 1 SCC 528. [“18. […] It was said that the words “subject to the provisions of List III Entry 42” must be taken to mean that the law-making power under Entry 36 could only be exercised subject to the two conditions as to public purpose and payment of compensation, both of which are referred to in Entry 42. Those words, in my opinion, mean no more than that any law made under Entry 36 by a State Legislature can be displaced or overridden by the Union Legislature making a law under Entry 42 of List III.”] 47 See Entries 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, etc., List II, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India. 1618 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Amendment) Act 1956 which substituted the expression “declared by Parliament by law” with “declared by or under law made by Parliament” in Entry 6748 of the Union List. The object of the amendment was to enable the delegate under the statute to make the required declaration. 49 The expression “by law” means that the legislative power should be effectuated through the provisions of a statute. In comparison, “by or under law” means that the legislative intent could be effectuated either through the provisions of the statute or by any subordinate authority vested with powers in that behalf by the statute.50 It is important to note that Entry 50 of List II use the expression “by law relating to mineral development”. We will have to bear the meaning of the expression “by law” in mind to give an appropriate interpretation to the entry.
iii. Fiscal Federalism
48. Federalism is one of the basic features of the Indian Constitution.51 Federalism embodies a division of powers between the units of the federation, that is, the Union and the States. Indian federalism is defined as asymmetric because it tilts towards the Centre, producing a strong Central Government. Yet, it has not necessarily resulted in weak State governments. 52 The Indian States are sovereigns within the legislative competence assigned to them. The delicate 48 Entry 67, List I, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India. [It reads – “Ancient and historical monuments and records, and archaeological sites and remains, declared by or under law made by Parliament to be of national importance.”] 49 Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, State of Objects and Reasons – “Clause 24 – Entry 67 of the Union List refers to “ancient and historical monuments and records, and archaeological sites and remains, declared by Parliament by law to be of national importance. A large number of ancient monuments, archaeological sites, etc. have been declared to be of national importance by an Act of Parliament. It requires another Act of Parliament to make the slightest alteration in, or addition to, the lists in that Act, which seems to be and unduly cumbrous procedure. It is, therefore, proposed to amend the entry substituting for the words “declared by Parliament by law”, the words “declared by or under law made by Parliament”. The same amendment is also proposed to be made in connected provisions, entry 12 of the State List, entry 40 of the Concurrent List and article 49.” 50 In Dr Indramani Pyarelal Gupta v. W R Natu [1963] 1 SCR 721 a Constitution Bench of this Court explained the difference between “by law” and “under law” in the following terms: “15. […] The meaning of the word “under the Act” is well known. “By” an Act would mean by a provision directly enacted in the statute in question and which is gatherable from its express language or by necessary implication therefrom. The words “under the Act” would, in that context, signify what is not directly to be found in the statute itself but is conferred or imposed by virtue of powers enabling this to be done; in other words; bye-laws made by a subordinate law-making authority which is empowered to do so by the parent Act. The distinction is thus between what is directly done by the enactment and what is done indirectly by a subordinate law-making authority which is empowered to do so by the parent Act.” 51 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 [582] 52 Granville Austin, Cornerstone of a Nation (OUP, 1966) 187 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1619Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
balance of power is secured by constitutional courts by interpreting the scheme of distribution of powers. 53 In S R Bommai v. Union of India,54 Justice B P Jeevan Reddy observed that the courts should be circumspect in adopting an approach or interpretation which may have an effect of whittling down the powers reserved to the States: “276. The fact that under the scheme of our Constitution, greater power is conferred upon the Centre vis-à-vis the States does not mean that States are mere appendages on the Centre. Within the sphere allotted to them, States are supreme. The Centre cannot tamper with their powers. More particularly, the courts should not adopt an approach, an interpretation, which has the effect of or tends to have the effect of whittling down the powers reserved to the States. […]”
49. In a federal form of government, each federal unit should be able to perform its core constitutional functions with a certain degree of independence. The Constitution has to be interpreted in a manner which does not dilute the federal character of our constitutional scheme.55 The effort of the constitutional court should be to ensure that State legislatures are not subordinated to the Union in the areas exclusively reserved for them. 56
50. In Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Private Limited,57 this Court recognized fiscal federalism as an important attribute of Indian federalism. Fiscal federalism is concerned with the assignment of functions to different levels of government and devolution of appropriate fiscal instruments to carry out these functions. 58 In India, these fiscal instruments typically take the form of tax and debt instruments. Similar to the division of constitutional powers and responsibilities, the Constitution has also shared tax-raising responsibilities between the Union and the States.59 53 In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 1964 [1965] 1 SCR 413; Jindal Stainless Steel (supra) [612] 54 [1994] 2 SCR 644 : (1994) 3 SCC 1 55 Jindal Stainless Steel (supra) [85].
56 Jindal Stainless Steel (supra) [615].
57 [2022] 9 SCR 300 : (2022) 10 SCC 700 [56] 58 Wallace E Oates, ‘An Essay on Fiscal Federalism’ (1999) 37(3) Journal of Economic Literature 1120, 1121.
59 The legislative power of Parliament to tax is enumerated in entries 82 to 92B of List I. Similarly, the legislative power of state is enumerated is enumerated in entries 46 to 62 of List II. 1620 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
51. The Constitution is cognizant of the imbalance between resources at the disposal of states and the Union. The Constitution remedies the imbalance by way of intergovernmental distribution 60 and grants.61 One of basic features of fiscal federalism is that both the Union government and the State governments ought to have adequate fiscal resources to discharge their constitutional responsibilities. List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule contain various subject-matters under which Parliament and the State legislatures can respectively levy taxes. The purpose of such a distribution is to entrust adequate fiscal powers with the legislatures to raise revenues to meet the growing fiscal expenditures and rein in the fiscal deficit. The legislatures can formulate the principles underlying any taxing legislation, define the taxing event or the charge of tax as well the mode and manner of its implementation.
52. The subjects in respect of which the framers of the Constitution desired that there should be uniformity of law throughout the country have been enumerated under the Union List, while matters which may require laws to be made having regard to the particular needs and peculiar problems of each State have been placed under the State List. 62 For instance, the State legislatures can tax the consumption or sale of electricity. Although electricity is an important raw material for many industries, the States are allowed to determine the rates of the levy by taking into consideration the particular needs of the State. By laying down a heterogenous distribution of legislative powers, the Constitution underscores that the asymmetry of our federation is an integral aspect of our federal form of governance.
53. Dr B R Ambedkar in his treatise on the evolution of provincial finances in colonial India observed that the cornerstone of the financial relationship between the Federal and State governments was characterized by separation of sources and contributions from the yield. 63 Any dilution in the taxing powers of the State legislatures 60 Article 270(2), Constitution of India 61 Articles 273 and 275, Constitution of India 62 Khazan Chand v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1984) 2 SCC 456 [14] 63 Dr. B R Ambedkar, The Evolution of Provincial Finance in British India: A Study in the Provincial Decentralization of Imperial Finance’ (1923) 152-171.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1621Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
will necessarily impact their ability to raise revenues, which in turn will impede their ability to deliver welfare schemes and services to the people. The ability of the State Governments to invest in physical infrastructure, health, education, human capacity, and research and development is directly co-related to the raising of government revenues. 64 Constitutional courts have to be cognizant of this context while adjudicating on issues affecting the taxing powers of the State legislatures.
54. While speaking of fiscal federalism in the context of mineral resources, we have to be mindful of the fact that not all states are equally endowed with mineral resources. States such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Orissa have greater reserves of mineral resources. Resultantly, the contribution of the mining sector in the state domestic product is higher for these states.65 Despite the abundance of mineral wealth, many of these states lag economically and suffer from, what many economists refer to as, “resource curse”.66 For instance, mineral rich states such as Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa have lower per capita incomes than the national averages. 67 Taxation is among the important sources of revenue for these States, impacting on their ability to deliver welfare schemes and services to the people. Fiscal federalism entails that the power of the States to levy taxes within the legislative domain carved out to them and subject to the limitations laid down by the Constitution must be secured from unconstitutional interference by Parliament.
iv. Natural resources and the public trust doctrine
55. The public trust doctrine is founded on the principle that certain resources are nature’s bounty which ought to be reserved for the whole populace, for the present and for the future.68 Since these 64 ‘State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2023-2024, Revenue Dynamics and Fiscal Capacity of Indian States’ Reserve Bank of India (December 2023) 28.
65 Ligia Noronha, et al, ‘Resource Federalism in India: The Case of Minerals’ (2009) 44(8) Economic and Political Weekly 51, 53.
66 Economic Survey 2016-2017, Ministry of Finance, Government of India (January 2017) 292. (“Resource curse” refers to the phenomenon of economies with abundant natural resources having the tendency to grow less rapidly than resource-scarce economies.”)
67 Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, State-wise date on per capita income’ (24 July 2023) < https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1942055> 68 Joseph L Sax, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention’ (1970) Michigan Law Review 471, 484.
1622 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports resources are intrinsically important to every person in society, the State acts as a public trustee to safeguard them. In M C Mehta v. Kamal Nath, 69 Justice Kuldip Singh observed that the State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. The learned Judge further observed that the State has a legal duty to protect natural resources which cannot be converted into private ownership. 70 The environment and natural resources are national assets and subject to intergenerational equity. 71 The public trust doctrine looks beyond the needs of the present generation and obligates the State to protect natural resources for future generations as well. 72
56. While dealing with the allocation of spectrum in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 73 this Court held the State should distribute natural resources in consonance with the principles of equality and public trust to ensure against action detrimental to public interest. The public trust doctrine imposes restrictions and obligations on the government to protect long-established public rights over short-term private rights and private gain. 74 However, the obligation extends to every person who exercises rights over natural resources to use them without impairing or diminishing the rights of people and long term interests in that property or resource. 75 In Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. v. Reliance Industries,76 in the context of Article 297 77 of the Constitution, this Court held that the nature of the word “vest” must be seen in the context of the public trust doctrine. 78
57. The principle which emanates from the above discussion is that the State holds all natural resources, including minerals, as a trustee of 69 [1996] Supp. 10 SCR 12 : (1997) 1 SCC 388 [34] 70 ibid 71 M C Mehta v. Union of India (2009) 6 SCC 142 [45] 72 T N Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India (2006) 1 SCC 1 [89] 73 [2012] 3 SCR 147 : (2012) 3 SCC 1 74 Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd. v. Minguel Martins (2009) 3 SCC 571 [55] 75 Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd. (supra) [55] 76 [2010] 5 SCR 704 : (2010) 7 SCC 1 [114] 77 Article 297, Constitution of India.
78 Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. (supra) [122] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1623Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
the public and must deal with them in a manner consistent with the nature of such a trust.79
58. The Central Government or the State Government may not always be the “owner” of the underlying minerals. But the Constitution empowers both Parliament (under Entry 54 of List I) and the State legislatures (under Entry 23 of List II) to regulate mines and mineral development, the entrustment to the State being subject to the power of Parliament to regulate the domain. The Constitution has entrusted the Union and the States with the responsibility to regulate mines and mineral development in consonance with the principles of the public trust doctrine and sustainable development of mineral resources. Under the MMDR Act, the Central Government, acting as a public trustee of minerals, regulates prospecting and mining operations in public interest. 80 In the process, the legislation seeks to increase awareness of the compelling need to restore the serious ecological imbalance and protect against damage being caused to the nature.81 In Pradeep S Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka,82 one of us (Justice D Y Chandrachud) observed that the essence of the MMDR Act is to “protect humankind and every species whose existence depends on natural resources from the destruction which is caused by rapacious and unregulated mining.” The Court noted that the restrictions under Section 4 of the MMDR Act are intrinsically meant to protect the environment and communities who depend on the environment.
59. The principle that the Union and State Governments act as public trustees of mineral resources has been incorporated in the MMDR Act. Section 4-A empowers the Central Government to prematurely terminate a prospecting license, exploration license, or mining lease, after consultation with the State Government in the interests of
(i) the regulation of mines and mineral development; (ii) preservation of the natural environment; (iii) control of floods; (iv) prevention of pollution; (v) avoiding danger to public health or communications;
(vi) ensuring the safety of buildings, monuments or other structures;
(vii) conservation of mineral resources; and (viii) maintaining safety 79 Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1 [88] 80 State of Rajasthan v. Gotan Lime Stone Khanji Udyog (P) Ltd. (2016) 4 SCC 469 [29]; Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. v. Ministry of Environment & Forests (2013) 6 SCC 476 [58] 81 State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay (2014) 9 SCC 772 [32] 82 [2021] 11 SCR 985 : (2021) 19 SCC 62 [49.3] 1624 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports in the mines or for such other purposes. 83 Moreover, the MMDR Act now mandates grant of mining leases, 84 exploration licences, 85 and composite licences 86 in respect of notified minerals through the process of auction. The Central Government is empowered to prescribe the terms and conditions subject to which the auction shall be conducted.
60. The regulatory regime under the MMDR Act recognizes the important role of the state in regulating mines and mineral development. This emerges from the stand point of the following perspectives: (i) the State is a public trustee of natural resources, including minerals;
(ii) pursuant to its role as a public trustee, the State has been empowered to regulate prospecting and mining operations;
(iii) the provisions of the statute reflect the priority of the state to regulate mining and related activities to ensure sustainable mineral development; (iv) prospecting and mining operations may be carried out by both the government as well as private lessees bearing in mind the public interest; and (v) the Government has to ensure that mineral concessions are granted in a fair and transparent manner.
61. Having encapsulated the broad drift of the constitutional and statutory provisions, we now deal with the issues arising in this reference in the ensuing segments.
F. Whether royalty is tax i. Royalty under the MMDR Act
62. The MMDR Act was enacted by Parliament in exercise of its legislative power derived from Article 246 read with Entry 54 of List I. The Act seeks to provide for the regulation of mines and development of minerals under the control of the Union. Section 2 contains a declaration in terms of Entry 54 of List I, providing that “it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should 83 See State of Haryana v. Ram Kishan (1988) 3 SCC 416 [7]. [This Court observed that Section 4-A “was enacted with a view to improve the efficiency in this regard and with this view directs consultation between the Central Government and the State Government. The two governments have to consider whether premature termination of a particular mining lease shall advance the object or not, and must, therefore, take into account all considerations relevant to the issue, with reference to the lease in question.”] 84 Section 10B, MMDR Act 85 Section 10BA, MMDR Act 86 Section 11, MMDR Act [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1625Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided.” 87 The declaration indicates that Parliament intends to take the regulation of mines and development of mines under the control of the Union to the extent indicated in the statute.
63. Chapter II of the MMDR Act deals with general restrictions on undertaking prospecting and mining operations. Section 4 provides that no person shall undertake any reconnaissance, prospecting or mining operations in any area except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a reconnaissance permit; prospecting licence; exploration licence; or mining lease granted under the Act. It also provides that no mineral concession shall be granted otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the rules made under it.
64. Section 9 deals with royalties in respect of mining leases. Section 9(1) provides that the holder of a mining lease granted before the commencement of the Act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of lease or in any law in force at the commencement of the statute, pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the leased area after such commencement, at the rates of royalties prescribed under the Second Schedule. The non-obstante clause is only applicable to mining leases granted before the commencement of the MMDR Act.
65. Section 9(2) provides that the holder of a mining lease granted after the commencement of the MMDR Act is also liable to pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the leased area at the rate specified in the Second Schedule. Section 9(3) empowers the Central Government to amend the Second Schedule to enhance or reduce the rate at which royalty shall be payable in respect of minerals enumerated in the Second Schedule. However, it also provides that the enhancement in the rate of royalty in respect of any mineral shall not be done more than once during any period of three years. The then Minister of Mines and Oil (Mr K D Malviya) stated during the Lok Sabha debate preceding the passage of the Bill 87 Section 2, MMDR Act.
1626 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports that the purpose of capping further increases in the rates of royalty was to ensure financial security to the private sector.88
66. The rates of royalty payable in respect of minerals in the Second Schedule of the MMDR Act are computed either on an ad valorem basis at a specified percentage of the average sale price or at specific rates on per tonnage basis. While Section 9 authorizes the charging of royalty, the Second Schedule provides the method of computation. The rate of royalty and method of computation differ from mineral to mineral. This Court has held that the Second Schedule has to be read as a part and parcel of Section 9.89
67. The process of mining generally involves two stages: (i) extraction of the ores (also known as run-of-mine mineral) from the earth; and
(ii) mineral beneficiation which entails separating the mineral from their ores. Rule 64-B of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 provides for charging of royalty in case of minerals subjected to processing. It provides that if the processing of run-of-mine mineral is carried out within the leased area, royalty shall be chargeable on the processed mineral removed from the leased area. In case run-of-mine mineral is removed from the leased area to a processing plant located outside the leased area, the royalty shall be chargeable on the unprocessed run-of-mine mineral and not the processed product. Thus, royalty is payable on removal of the mineral from the boundaries of the leased area. 90 Rule 64D of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 deals with the manner of payment of royalty on minerals on ad valorem basis.
68. Section 9A deals with payment of dead rent by the lessee. It provides that the holder of a mining lease shall pay to the State Government dead rent at such rate as may be prescribed in the Third Schedule. However, where the holder of the mining lease also becomes liable to pay royalty under Section 9, such person shall be liable to pay 88 Mr K D Malviya, Lok Sabha Debates, Volume X (9th December to 21st December 1957) 7123. (The Minister stated: “We gave consideration to the question of what should be the minimum time which could give a sense of security to the private sector, so that they could invest their money and have a fairly reasonable view of their investment and production programmes. Suppose we took powers to reduce or increase the royalties every six months, it will make the position very insecure from their point of view. As long as we want a mixed pattern of economy to go on and the private sector to flourish, surely my hon friend does not expect me to put a sense of insecurity in the mind of the private sector, when every six months they will have to ask “look here. Are you going to increase the royalty or are you going to decrease it’ What are you going to do?”.)
89 National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. v. State of M.P. (2004) 6 SCC 281 [23] 90 Tata Steel Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 193 [71] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1627Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
either royalty or dead rent, whichever is higher. The dead rent is calculated on a rate per hectare basis as specified under the Third Schedule. Section 9A was inserted by an amendment in 1972 with a two-fold purpose, namely to: (i) provide a statutory basis for calculation of dead rent; and (ii) prohibit the Central Government from enhancing the rate of dead-rent more than once during any period of three years. 91
69. Section 9B provides for establishment of the District Mineral Foundation92 in any district to work for the interest and benefit of persons and areas affected by mining related operations. The purpose of Section 9-B and the object of the DMF is to further the cause of social justice for those affected by mining related operations, such as tribals who may be dislocated or displaced from their habitat. 93 Section 9B(5) provides that the holder of a mining lease shall pay, in addition to the royalty paid under Section 9, an amount which is equivalent to such percentage of the royalty as may be prescribed by the Central Government.
70. Section 9C provides for the establishment of a non-profit autonomous body called the National Mineral Exploration Trust 94 for the purposes of regional and detailed exploration in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government. Section 9C(4) mandates the holder of a mining lease to pay a sum equivalent of two percent of the royalty paid in terms of Section 9 to the Trust. The purpose of creating the NMET is to use the funds accrued from mining leaseholders for encouraging exploration.
71. Section 13 authorizes the Central Government to make rules regulating the grant of mineral concessions in respect of minerals and for purposes connected therewith. Section 13(2) lists various matters in respect of which the Central Government can make rules. A similar power is vested with the State Government under Section 15 to make rules with respect to minor minerals. Section 25 empowers the Government to recover rent, royalty, tax, fee or other sum due to the Government under the Act as arrears of land revenue. 91 D K Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat (1986) Supp. SCC 20 [45] 92 “DMF”
93 Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India (2017) 16 SCC 186 [43] 94 “NMET”
1628 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
72. The Central Government has framed the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 13. Rule 31 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 provides that the lease deed shall be executed between the lessor and lessee in terms of the Form K. According to the recitals of Form K, the State Government executes the lease deed in favor of the lessor “in consideration of the rents and royalties, covenants and agreement by and in these presents and the Schedule hereunder written reserved and contained and on the part of the lessee/lessees to be paid observed and performed.” Further, all the mine beds/veins/seams with respect to specified minerals lying and being in or under lands are demised by the State Government to the lessee together with the liberties, powers, and privileges to be exercised or enjoyed in connection with the demise. The recitals indicate that the lease deed serves as a statutory agreement between the State Government, being the lessor, and the lessee.
73. Part V of Form K deals with rents and royalties reserved by the lease and specifies the rate and mode of payment of dead rent, royalty, surface rent, and the water rate. This part mandates the lessee to pay royalty to the State Government at the rates prescribed by the Central Government in the Second Schedule to the Act.95 Part VI contains provisions relating to rents and royalties and provides for the mode of computing royalty:
“Mode of computation of royalty
2. For the purposes of computing the said royalties the lessee/lessees shall keep a correct account of the mineral/ minerals produced and dispatched. The accounts as well as the weight of the mineral/minerals in stock or in the process of export may be checked by an officer authorized by the Central or State Government.”
74. Part VII contains the covenants of the lessee/lessees. The lessee undertakes to pay the rent, water rate, and royalties specified 95 Mineral Concession Rules 1960, Form K, Part V. It reads: [“Rate and mode of payment of royalty
3. Subject to the provisions of clause 1 of this Part, the lessee/lessees shall during the subsistence of this lease pay to the State Government at such times and in such manner as the State Government may prescribe royalty in respect of any mineral/minerals removed by him/them from the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957”] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1629Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
under Parts V and VI in addition to the payment of taxes, rates, assessments and impositions being in the nature of public demands from time to time. Party VIII contains the covenants of the State Government. It provides that a lessee paying the rents, water rate, and royalties may quietly hold and enjoy the rights and premises during the term of the lease deed without unlawful interruption from the State Government.
ii. Purpose of Section 9 of the MMDR Act
75. The regime of mineral licensing prior to the enactment of the MMDR Act was governed by the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1948 96 read with the Mineral Concession Rules 1948. Under the previous regime, all grants and permissions (such as prospecting licences 97 and mining leases 98 ) were approved and issued by the State Government. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 proposed an active role for the State in setting up new industrial undertakings to achieve “planned and rapid development.” 99 Minerals such as coal, lignite, mineral oils, iron ore, copper, zinc, and atomic minerals were exclusively reserved for the State, while the private sector was allowed to participate along with the public sector in case of minor minerals. The MMDR Act was enacted in pursuance of the above goals stated in the Industrial Policy Resolution. Another important consideration behind the enactment of the MMDR Act was to revise old and outmoded mining lease agreements and allow the private sector reasonable encouragement to develop mines and minerals. 100 Through the MMDR Act, both the Central Government, and in case of minor minerals, the State Government, have been assigned a greater responsibility of development of minerals in India. This classification between major and minor minerals was primarily 96 “MMRD Act 1948”
97 Rule 13, Mineral Concession Rules 1948. [It read: “13. Restrictions on grant of prospecting licence –
(1) No prospecting license shall be granted to any person unless he holds a certificate of approval from the State Government concerned. […]”; Rule 17, Mineral Concession Rule 1948. It reads: “17. State Government may grant or refuse a license – (1) Subject to the provisions of rule 13, the State Government may grant or refuse the license.”] 98 Rule 26, Mineral Concession Rules 1948. [It read: “26. Restrictions on grant of mining leases – (1) No mining lease shall be granted to any person unless he holds a certificate of approval from the State Government concerned or is covered by Rule 12.”] 99 Cabinet Secretariat, Industrial Policy Resolution (30 April 1956) 100 Mr J R Mehta, Lok Sabha Debates, Volume X (9th December to 21st December 1957) 7111. 1630 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports done considering the export trade, the earning of foreign exchange, economic development, and industrial progress. 101
76. An important distinction between the MMRD Act 1948 and the MMDR Act which replaced it is that the former did not contain a provision similar to Section 9 of the subsequent legislation. Nevertheless, provisions pertaining to royalty were included in the Mineral Concession Rules 1948 as part of the essential conditions of a mining lease. 102 At the introduction of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Bill in Parliament the then Minister of Mines explained the legislative intent in the following terms: “The existing Act did give authority to the Government through rules to modify the rates and the quantum of royalty that was to be charged by the State Government. We have taken this opportunity to put a maximum limit also. With regard to the time also, at that time there was no limit and it could not be changed so long as the agreement lasted. But now considering all the conditions that prevail these days, we thought that the Government should have the right to examine the whole structure of the rates of royalty and see whether it was desirable to introduce a change in the royalty by way of either an increase or a decrease. If it was considered desirable to increase it, the Government would recommend an increase. If it was desirable to reduce it, a reduction might be made.” 103 (emphasis added)
77. The Minister further stated that allowing State Governments to fix the rates of royalty “will not be a healthy feature for trade in that particular commodity.”104 Section 9 sought to remedy the disparity of royalty rates across India. 105 101 Ibid, 7124 102 Rule 41, Mining Concession Rules 1948.
103 Lok Sabha Debates, Volume VIII (11th November to 22nd November, 1957, Third Session) 395. 104 Ibid, 462 105 K P Varghese v. ITO (1981) 4 SCC 173 [8]. It was observed that “[…] the speech made by the Mover of the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the Bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted.”
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1631Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
78. Rates of royalty were primarily governed by the terms of lease prior to the enactment of the MMDR Act. Once a mining lease was entered into between a lessor and lessee, the rates of royalty would remain static during the subsistence of the lease. Section 9 of the MMDR Act has enabled the Central Government to examine the rates of royalty in respect of all minerals and modulate them periodically after taking into consideration various factors, including the uniformity of mineral prices. The primary reason for empowering the Central Government to fix the rate of royalty could be traced to the Industrial Policy Resolution which underscored the active and predominant role of the State in organizing and utilizing mineral resources. The State Governments were not empowered to determine royalty in order to maintain a uniform regime of royalty across India. This was intended to promote domestic industry and maintain competitive commodity prices in the international market.106 iii. Contours of a mining lease a. Lease and license
79. Article 31A of the Constitution was inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 to deal with the saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates:
“31A. Saving of law providing for acquisition of estates, etc – Notwithstanding anything contained in article 13, no law providing for – […]
(e) the extinguishment or modification of any rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease or licence for the purpose of searching for or winning, any mineral or mineral oil, or the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19.”
(emphasis added)
106 Lok Sabha Debates, Volume VIII (11 th November to 22 nd November, 1957, Third Session) 463 1632 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
80. In Gujarat Pottery Works v. B P Sood, Controller of Mining Leases for India,107 a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the object of Article 31-A(1)(e) was to make laws providing for the extinguishment or modification of leases in connection with mineral rights immune from the provisions of Articles 14, 19, and 31.
81. The expressions ‘lease’ and ‘licence’ have been used in the context of mining operations in the Constitution and in the MMRD Act. Therefore, it is important to understand the meaning of these expressions in their general legal sense to appreciate their application to mineral operations.
82. A “lease” connotes a transfer of a right of enjoyment in immoveable property for a certain time in lieu of consideration. 108 Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 defines a lease of immoveable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms. 109 The provision defines ‘lessor’, ‘lessee’, ‘premium’, and ‘rent’. The “transferor is called the lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent.” This Court has interpreted the expression “rent” widely to mean any payment for the use or occupation of land or building including the payment by a lessee in respect of the use or occupation of any land or building. 110
83. According to Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act 1897, immoveable property is defined to include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. 111 Section 2(6) of the Registration Act defines immoveable property to include land, buildings, hereditary allowance, rights of way, lights, ferries, fisheries, or any other benefit to arise out of land, and things attached to earth, or permanently 107 [1967] 1 SCR 695 108 Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act 1882 (13th edn) 109 Section 105, Transfer of Property Act 1882 110 State of Punjab v. British India Corporation [1964] 2 SCR 114 [15] 111 Section 3(26), General Clauses Act 1897.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1633Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, except for standing timber, growing crops, and grass. 112 A mineral is also a benefit arising out of land. The right to carry out mining operations to extract minerals under a mining lease has been held by this Court to be a right to enjoy immoveable property within the meaning of Section 105.113
84. The expression “licence” is defined in the Indian Easements Act 1882 as follows:
“52. “License” defined. – Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do, or continue to do, in or upon the immoveable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence.” 114
85. In Associated Hotels of India Ltd v. R N Kapoor, 115 Justice K Subba Rao (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that a lease creates an interest in property, while a licence only permits another to make use of the property, whose legal possession continues to remain with the owner. A lease envisages and transfers an interest in the demised property creating a right in rem in favour of the lessee, while a licence only makes an action lawful which without it would be unlawful.116
86. Under the MMDR Act, a “prospecting licence” is granted for the purpose of undertaking prospecting operations. 117 Prospecting operations are defined to mean any operations undertaken for the 112 Section 2(6), Registration Act 1908 113 State of Karnataka v. Subhash Rukmayya Guttedar, (1993) Supp. 3 SCC 290 [6]; Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur jiu v. Dar Dass Dey (1979) 3 SCC 106 [37] 114 Section 52, Indian Easements Act 1882 115 [1960] 1 SCR 368, [28]. [“28. […] The following propositions may, therefore, be taken as well established:
(1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form; (2) the real test is the intention of the parties – whether they intended to create a lease or a licence; (3) if the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but, if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence; and (4) if under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, prima facie, he is considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease.”] 116 Mangal Amusement Park Private Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 11 SCC 713 [15] 117 Section 3(g), MMDR Act 1634 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports purpose of exploring, locating, or proving a mineral deposit. 118 Chapter III of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 deals with the grant of prospecting licences in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the government. Form F contained in the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 states that under a prospecting licence, the State Government grants to the licesee the sole rights to enter upon lands and to search, win, carry away or dispose of minerals won. Rule 14 read with Schedule III allows the prospecting licensee to win and carry away a limited quantity of minerals in lieu of the payment of specified royalty. Under a prospecting licence, the licensee does not get an interest in the land or in the minerals contained therein. The licensee is only allowed to carry away a limited quantity of minerals after payment of specified royalty.119 Even a prospecting licensee has to pay royalty to the State Government for carrying away the minerals won during prospecting operations.
87. A “mining lease” is defined under the MMDR Act to mean a lease granted for the purpose of undertaking mining operations and includes a sub-lease granted for such purpose. 120 The expression “mining operations” has been defined to mean any operations undertaken for the purpose of winning any mineral. The expression “winning” has been explained by this Court to mean getting or extracting minerals from the mines. 121 In Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v. Dar Dass Dey & Co, 122 Justice R S Sarkaria observed that the expression “mining operations” is expansive, so as to comprehend every activity by which the mineral is extracted or obtained from the earth irrespective of whether such activity is carried out on the surface or in the bowels of the earth. Section 3(fa) defines “production” or any derivative of the word “production” to mean the winning or raising 118 Section 3(h), MMDR Act 119 Mineral Concession Rules 1960, Schedule III 120 Section 3(c), MMDR Act 121 Gujarat Pottery Works v. B P Sood [1967] 1 SCR 695 [18]; Bhagwan Dass v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1976) 3 SCC 784 [13]. [Justice Y V Chandrachud (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed: “In any case, the definition of mining operations and minor minerals in Section 3(d) and (e) of the Act of 1957 and Rule 2(5) and (7) of the Rules of 1963 shows that minerals need not be subterranean and that mining operations cover every operation undertaken for the purpose of “winning” any minor mineral. “Winning” does not imply a hazardous or perilous activity. The word simply means “extracting a mineral” and is used generally to indicate any activity by which a mineral is secured. “Extracting”, in turn, means, drawing out or obtaining. A tooth is ‘extracted’ as much as is fruit juice and as much as a mineral. Only, that the effort varies from tooth to tooth, from fruit to fruit and from mineral to mineral.”] 122 (1979) 3 SCC 106 [15] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1635Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
of mineral within the leased area for the purpose of processing or dispatch. The expression “dispatch” has been defined to mean the removal of minerals or mineral products from the leased area and to include the consumption of minerals and mineral products within such area. 123 It is worth noting that royalty is payable under Section 9 on the removal or consumption of minerals by the lessee in the leased area. Thus, essentially royalty is payable on the dispatch of minerals from the leased area.
88. This segment indicates that under a lease deed for mining operations, the owner transfers the interest in the minerals to the lessee in lieu of the payment of rent, which usually takes the form of royalty. To answer whether this payment is akin to a tax, we must understand the nature of a mining lease under the MMDR Act.
b. The nature of a mining lease under the MMDR Act and the Mineral Concession Rules 1960
89. The MMDR Act and the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 detail the procedure for the grant of mining leases in three situations: first, where the minerals vest in the government;124 second, where the minerals vest in a person other than the government;125 and third, where the minerals vest partly in the government and partly in a private person. 126 Chapter IV of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 (containing Rules 22 to 40) deals with the grant of mining leases in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the government. Rule 22(1) provides that an application for the grant of a mining lease in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the government shall be made to the State Government. Rule 27 provides the conditions which are applicable to mining leases under Chapter IV. Rule 27(1)(c) provides that the lessee shall pay either dead rent or royalty (whichever is higher) to the State Government.127 Rule 27(1)(d) deals with payment of surface rents, water rents, etc. by the lessee to the State Government. 128 Rule 27(2) allows the State Government to 123 Section 3(aa), MMDR Act 124 Chapters II, III, IV, and IVA of Mineral Concession Rules 1960 125 Chapter V, Mineral Concession Rules 1960 126 Rule 53, Mineral Concession Rules 1960 127 Rule 27(c), Mineral Concession Rules 1960.
128 Rule 27(d), Mineral Concession Rules 1960 1636 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports include such other conditions as it may deem necessary in regard to matters enumerated therein. Rule 27(3) allows the State Government, either with the previous approval of the Central Government or at the instance of Central Government, to impose such further conditions as may be necessary in the interests of mineral development.
90. Chapter V (containing Rules 41 to 52) deals with the procedure for obtaining prospecting licences or mineral lease in respect of land in which the minerals vest in a person other than the Government. Unlike Rule 22(1), the provisions of Chapter V do not require the lessee to make an application to the State Government. Rule 45 pertains to the conditions of mining leases with respect to minerals vesting in private persons. The relevant part of Rule 45 is produced below: “45. Conditions of mining lease – Every mining lease shall be subject to the following conditions –
(i) the provisions of clauses (b) to (l) and (p) to (i) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 shall apply to such leases with the modification that in clauses (c) and (d) for the words “State Government” the word “lessor” shall be substituted; […]
(iii) the lease may contain such other conditions, not being inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and these rules, as may be agreed upon between the parties;
(iv) if the lessee makes any default in payment of royalty as required by Section 9 or commits a breach of any of the conditions of the lease, the lessor shall give notice to the lessee requiring him to pay the royalty or remedy the breach, as the case may be, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the notice and if the royalty is not paid or the breach is not remedied within such period, the lessor without prejudice to any proceeding that may be taken against the lessee determine the lease;
(v) the lessee may determine the lease at any time by giving not less that one year’s notice in writing to lessor.”
91. Rule 45(i) provides that certain specific conditions which apply under Rule 27 to mining leases in respect of minerals which vest in the Government are also applicable to leases of minerals vesting [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1637Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
in private persons. While under Chapter IV the State Government can stipulate additional conditions, Rule 45(iii) of Chapter V provides that the lease may contain such other conditions, not being inconsistent with the provisions of the MMDR Act and the Mineral Concession Rules, as may be agreed upon between the parties. If the lessee of a mining lease granted under Chapter IV, were to default in the payment of royalty or dead rent or commit a breach of any conditions of the lease the State Government is empowered to determine the lease. In case of a lease governed by Chapter V, the lessor is empowered to determine the mining lease if the lessee defaults in payment of royalty or commits a breach of any of the conditions of the lease. These differences indicates that in case of a mining lease under Chapter V of Mineral Concession Rules: (i) the State Government is not the lessor (that is the proprietor of the minerals who is a private person); and
(ii) royalty, dead rent, and other rents are to be payable to the lessor and not the State Government.
92. In State of Meghalaya v. All Dimasa Students Union, 129 this Court held that: (i) Chapter V of the Mineral Concession Rules has to be treated to be dealing with minerals owned by private persons;
(ii) a mining lease granted according to Chapter V of the Mining Concession Rules 1960 is a mining lease granted by the owner of the minerals and not the State Government; and (iii) no authority can grant a mining lease in respect of minerals which vest with private owners without the authority of such owners.
93. The right of proprietors to grant leases and receive royalty stems from the proprietary interest in the immovable property including the minerals. The MMDR Act regulates the exercise of the proprietary rights in the minerals in the larger public interest. 130 The statute specifies the terms of the lease, but the lease deed is ultimately entered between the State Government (or the private person, as the case may be) and the lessee. Similarly, the rates of royalty are fixed by the Central Government under Section 9, but royalty is received by the mining lessor, that is the State Government or a private person.
129 [2019] 8 SCR 297 : (2019) 8 SCC 177 [129]-[130] 130 Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd (supra) [138] 1638 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports iv. Meaning of “royalty”
94. At the outset we clarify that in this reference, we are dealing with ‘royalty’ in the context of the MMDR Act. Royalty is generally understood as compensation paid for rights and privileges enjoyed by the grantee. It has its genesis in the agreement entered into between the grantor and grantee. In Inderjeet Singh Sial v. Karam Chand Thapar,131 this Court observed that royalty is equivalent to the expression “jura regalia” or “jura regia”. Jura regalia is defined as royal prerogatives or rights. 132 For centuries, gold and silver mines (also called as royal metals) in the United Kingdom were treated as belonging to the Crown. Royal metals could be mined only after payments in the form of royalties were made to the Crown. The use of the word “royalty” underwent change in the United Kingdom with the decentralization of the sovereignty which was absorbed by the landowners. 133 Land ownership was concentrated in the hands of landowners, who conceded the right to work mines to lessees in return for consideration which took the form of dead-rent and royalties. 134
95. This Court has had occasion to analyze the meaning of the expression “royalty” in its decisions. In H R S Murthy v. Collector of Chittoor, 135 a Constitution Bench observed that royalty connotes a payment made for materials or minerals won from land. In D K Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, 136 the distinction between “royalty” and “dead rent” was explained thus:
“39. In a mining lease the consideration usually moving from the lessee to the lessor is the rent for the area leased (often called surface rent), dead rent and royalty. Since the mining lease confers upon the lessee the right not merely to enjoy the property as under an ordinary lease but also to extract minerals from the land and to appropriate them for his own use or benefit, in addition to the usual rent for the area 131 [1995] Supp. 4 SCR 53 : (1995) 6 SCC 166.
132 Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon (Volume 3) 2789. 133 J U Nef, The Rise of the British Coal Industry (Routledge, 1966) 134 Royal Commission on Mining Royalties, Final Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Subject of Mining Royalties (1893) 4.
135 [1964] 6 SCR 666 [6] 136 [1986] 1 SCR 479 : (1986) Supp. SCC 20 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1639Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
demised, the lessee is required to pay a certain amount in respect of the minerals extracted proportionate to the quantity so extracted. Such payment is called “royalty”. It may, however, be that the mine is not worked properly or as not to yield enough return to the lessor in the shape of royalty. In order to ensure for the lessor a regular income, whether the mine is worked or not, a fixed amount is provided to be paid to his by the lessee. This is called “dead rent”. “Dead rent” is calculated on the basis of the area leased while royalty is calculated on the quantity of minerals extracted or removed. Thus, while dead rent is a fixed return to the lessor, royalty is a return which varies with the quantity of minerals extracted or removed. […]”
(emphasis added)
96. Minerals are exhaustible and finite resources. Each quantity of mineral removed leads to the depletion of the mineral stock of the mine.137 Under a mining lease, a lessee acquires a right or interest in minerals. This right or interest allows the lessee to extract minerals and consume them. Royalty is a payment made by the lessee to the lessor or proprietor of the minerals for the removal of minerals. Royalty also serves to compensate the lessor for the degradation of the value of the mine because of the extraction of minerals. 138
97. In Bherulal v. State of Rajasthan,139 a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court explained the concept of royalty in the following terms: “8… In Wharton’s Law Lexicon, ‘royalty’ is defined as “payment to a patentee by agreement on every article made according to his patent, or to an author by a publisher on every copy of his book sold; or to the owner of minerals for the right of working the same on every on or other weight raised.” The present case is of the third kind, namely payment to the owner of minerals for the right of working the same. This payment is based on the 137 W R Sorley, ‘Mining Royalties and their Effect on the Iron and Coal Trades’ (1889) 52(1) Journal of Royal Statistical Society 60, 66 138 Ibid.
139 1956 SCC OnLine Raj 9 [8] 1640 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports produce, and the rate is fixed as so much per ton or other weight. It is clear that royalty has nothing to do with where the purchaser is taking the mineral, or to whom he is going to sell it, whether at the place where the mine is situated or at some place hundreds of miles away. […] It is clear, therefore, that royalty is a charge by the owner of minerals from those to whom he gives the concession to remove them, and the charge is on production, the rate being fixed according to weight.”
(emphasis added)
98. The essential characteristics of royalty are that (i) it is a consideration or payment made to the proprietor of minerals, either the government or a private person; (ii) it flows from a statutory agreement (a mining lease) between the lessor and the lessee; (iii) it represents a return for the grant of a privilege (to the lessee) of removing or consuming the minerals; and (iv) it is generally determined on the basis of the quantity of the minerals removed.
99. In comparison, dead rent acts as a deterrent against a leaseholder cornering a mining lease and keeping the mineral resources idle. 140 Similar to royalty, dead rent is also a statutory imposition and an integral part of the mining lease, but it generally does not serve as a consideration for the removal or consumption of minerals. The dead rent is determined on the basis of the area of land covered by the lease. Imposition of dead rent ensures that the proprietor obtains a fixed rent from the lessee even if the mine remains unworked. Therefore, dead rent is not in addition to royalty but an alternative.
100. If royalty is a consideration paid by the lessee to the lessor as part of the terms of a mining lease, can this payment be considered in the nature of tax? This is the next issue for our consideration. v. Characteristics of Tax
101. Taxation is a mode of raising revenue to fund public expenditure. The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty.141 In the decision of the US Supreme Court in McCulloch 140 Government of India, Ministry of Mines, ‘Mineral Royalties’ 27 (January 2011) 141 Thomas Cooley, The Law of Taxation (4th edn, 1924) 149 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1641Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
v. Maryland,142 Chief Justice John Marshall described the sovereign right of taxation thus:
“It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of Government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to which the Government may choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the Government itself. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.”
102. Taxes are monetary burdens or charges imposed by legislative power upon persons, or property to raise revenues.143 The government needs requisite funds to discharge its primary governmental functions. 144 No responsible government can function and achieve its welfare objectives without levying and collecting taxes. 145 The objects to be taxed can be taxed by the legislature according to the exigencies of its needs so long as they happen to be within the legislative competence of the legislature. 146 Although the power of taxation is pervasive and an incidence of sovereignty, it is subject to well-defined constitutional limitations.
103. In Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board,147 Latham CJ defined “tax” as a “compulsory exaction of money by a public authority for public purposes, enforceable by law, and … not a payment for services rendered.” In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowment, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirta Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 148 this Court relied on the above elucidation to enumerate the following essential characteristics of a tax:
“44. […] It is said that the essence of taxation is compulsion, that is to say, it is imposed under statutory power without 142 17 U.S. 316 (1819)
143 Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab (1992) 2 SCC 411 [10] 144 Dena Bank v. Bhikabhai Prabhudas Parekh & Co. (2000) 5 SCC 694 [8] 145 Jindal Stainless Steel [112.2] 146 Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar [1964] 1 SCR 897 [12]
147 60 CLR 263
148 [1954] 1 SCR 1005 : (1954) 1 SCC 412 1642 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the taxpayer’s consent and the payment is enforced by law. The second characteristic of tax is that it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. This is expressed by saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. As the object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual, there is, as it is said, no element of quid pro quo between the taxpayer and the public authority. Another feature of taxation is that as it is a part of the common burden, the quantum of imposition upon the taxpayer depends generally upon his capacity to pay.”
104. A tax has the following essential characteristics: (i) it is a compulsory exaction of money by a public authority; (ii) it is imposed under statutory power without the consent of the tax payer; (iii) the demand is enforceable by law; (iv) it is an imposition made for public purposes to meet the general expenses of the state without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax; and (v) it is part of the common burden.149
105. Article 366(28) defines “taxation” to include “the imposition of any tax or impost, whether general or local or special.” This Court has interpreted the word “tax” in its widest amplitude to include all money raised by taxation.150 In Jindal Stainless Steel (supra), one of us (Justice D Y Chandrachud) held that the expression “any tax” means “any levy which the State is constitutionally competent to legislate.”151
106. One of the issues debated in the reference pertains to the meaning of the word “impost.” Thomas Cooley in the Law of Taxation defines “imposts” to mean “any tax, tribute, or duty.”152 This Court has generally construed the expression “imposts” to include taxes 153 and fees 154 149 See Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa (1954) 1 SCC 455 [11] 150 D G Gose and Co. (Agents) (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1980) 2 SCC 410 [5] 151 Jindal Stainless Steel (supra) [730.1] 152 Thomas Cooley, The Law of Taxation (4th edn, 1924) 74 153 Sea Customs Act, S 20(2), In re, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 40 [37] (Held that customs duty or excise duty was an impost within the meaning of Article 366(28));
154 CCE v. Chhata Sugar Co. Ltd. (2004) 3 SCC 466 [36] (It was observed that an impost can be either a tax or fee.)
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1643Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
realizable by the authority of law.155 In CIT v. McDowell and Co. Ltd.,156 this Court held that the term “impost” means compulsory levy and that “tax” in its wider sense includes all imposts. 157 In McDowell (supra), the assesse sought to claim a deduction under Section 43- B(a) of the Income Tax Act 1961 on the payment of bottling fees made to the State Government under the Rajasthan Excise Act 1950. Section 43-B(a) allowed a deduction in respect of any sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or fee, by whatever name called, under any law for the time being in force. The issue before the two-Judge Bench was whether bottling fees chargeable from the assessee amounted to a tax, duty, cess, or fee. The two-Judge Bench formulated the characteristics of imposts thus:
“21. “Tax”, “duty”, “cess” or “fee” constituting a class denotes various kinds of imposts by State in its sovereign power of taxation to raise revenue for the State. Within the expression of each specie each expression denotes different kind of impost depending on the purpose for which they are levied. The power can be exercised in any of its manifestation only under any law authorising levy and collection of tax as envisaged under Article 265 which uses only the expression that no “tax” shall be levied and collected except authorized by law. In its elementary meaning conveys that to support a tax legislation action is essential, it cannot be levied and collected in the absence of any legislative sanction by exercise of executive power of State under Article 73 by the Union or Article 162 by the State.
22. Under Article 366(28) “Taxation” has been defined to include the imposition of any tax or impost whether general or local or special and tax shall be construed accordingly. “Impost” means compulsory levy. The wellknown and well-settled characteristic of “tax” in its wider sense includes all imposts. Imposts in the context have following characteristics:
155 Indian Banks’ Association v. Devkala Consultancy Service (2004) 11 SCC 1 [18] 156 [2009] 8 SCR 983 : (2009) 10 SCC 755 [22] 157 Reiterated in Jindal Stainless Steel (supra) [20], [395] 1644 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
(i) The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty.
(ii) “Law” in the context of Article 265 means an Act of legislature and cannot comprise an executive order or rule without express statutory authority.
(iii) The term “tax” under Article 265 read with Article 366(28) includes imposts of every kind viz. duty, cess or fees.
(iv) As an incident of sovereignty and in the nature of compulsory exaction, a liability founded on principle of contract cannot be a “tax” in its technical sense as an impost, general, local or special.”
107. The Court held in McDowell (supra) that bottling fees are a payment made by the assessee to the State Government “as consideration for acquiring the exclusive privilege” 158 The payment was held to be neither a fee nor a tax but consideration for the grant of approval by the government to contract on the exclusive right to deal in bottling liquor. Therefore, bottling fees were held not to fall within the purview of Section 43-B(a).
108. The expression “tax” under Article 265 includes every kind of impost in the form of a compulsory exaction. An impost is a compulsory exaction. The power to levy an impost is an incident of sovereignty. A liability arising out of contract cannot be termed as an impost or tax. A consideration paid under a contract to the State Government for acquiring exclusive privileges and rights with respect to a particular activity cannot be termed as an “impost” or “tax” under Article 366(28).
109. The government may demand payments in the nature of a price or consideration for parting with its exclusive privilege to carry on activities of a particular description. Well-known examples involving the parting of the exclusive privilege by the government include telecommunication activities and the manufacture and sale of intoxicants. The price paid for parting with an exclusive privilege vesting in government is neither a tax nor a fee.159 In State of Punjab v. 158 McDowell and Co. Ltd. (supra) [17] 159 Har Shankar v. Excise and Taxation Commissioner (1975) 1 SCC 737 [56]; State Bank of India v. Jage Ram (1980) 3 SCC 599 [20]; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Anabeshahi Wine and Distilleries Pvt Ltd. (1988) 2 SCC 25 [6] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1645Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Devans Modern Breweries,160 the issue before a Constitution Bench was whether the levy of an import fee by the state on potable liquor manufactured in other states was beyond the legislative competence of the state legislature. Justice R C Lahoti (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for the majority, observed that the State Government has unfettered power to regulate the import of intoxicants in exercise of its regulatory powers. The learned Judge held that the levy was neither a tax nor a fee, but “simply a levy for the act of granting permission or for the exercise of power to part with the privilege.” 161 The expression “impost” cannot hence be extrapolated to mean a price levied by the State for granting permission to part with its exclusive privilege. Imposts are such levies that are in the nature of tax.
110. The basic issue for determination is whether royalty payable under Section 9 of the MMDR Act is in the nature of a tax or impost. The need to decide the issue of “whether royalty is tax” arises in the backdrop of the divergence of opinion in the decisions in India Cement (supra) and Kesoram (supra).
vi. Royalty is not in the nature of tax a. Prelude to India Cement
111. Whether ‘royalty is a tax’ had been adjudicated upon by several High Courts before the issue reached this Court for decision in India Cement (supra). There was a divergence of view among the High Courts. A few High Courts had held that royalty is not a tax but a consideration for parting with the exclusive privilege over mineral rights. Others had held that royalty was a compulsory exaction, and hence a tax. In its decision in India Cement (supra) this Court referred to them, without actually analyzing their rationale.
112. In Laddu Mal v. State of Bihar,162 the petitioners challenged the notices issued to them by the Assistant Mining Officer, demanding payment of royalty for a period from 1958 to 1964 under the Bihar Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1964. The Division Bench of the Patna High Court held that royalty is a levy in the nature of 160 [2003] Supp. 5 SCR 930 : (2004) 11 SCC 26 161 Devans Modern Breweries (supra) [113] 162 1965 SCC OnLine Pat 30 1646 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports tax because of its compulsory nature. Royalty was held to be a compulsory exaction because it was imposed under a statute and because in the event of non-payment, it was recoverable as arrears of land revenue. However, it was held that the demand of royalty prior to 1964 when the Bihar Minor Mineral Rules came into effect was without the authority of law.
113. In Laxminarayana Mining Co. v. Taluk Development Board,163 licence fees levied on persons engaged in mining under the provisions of the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Board Act 1959 were challenged before the Mysore High Court. Justice E S Venkataramiah (as the learned Chief Justice then was) held that the State legislature had no legislative power to impose the levy since its subject matter was covered by the MMDR Act. The High Court also held that the levy was in substance a tax on mineral rights. 164 In the context of Entry 50 of List II, the High Court observed that: (i) tax on mineral rights includes royalty payable on extracted minerals; (ii) mineral rights and mining activities which are carried out in exercise of mineral rights are indistinguishable; (iii) Parliament has occupied the entire subject matter of the regulation of mines and mineral development as well as tax on mineral rights by virtue of the legislative declaration under the MMDR Act; and (iv) the provisions of the MMDR Act pertaining to the levy, fixation and collection of royalty (Section 9) as well as its recovery as arrears of land revenue (Section 25) suggest that the expression “royalty” under Section 9 connotes the levy of a tax. The essence of the High Court’s decision was that since royalty is in the nature of a tax on mineral rights and is covered by Parliamentary legislation, the legislative power of the State legislature to levy taxes on mineral rights stands excluded.
114. The contrary view of other High Courts (footnoted below) was that royalty is not a tax.165 We will not refer to all the decisions adopting 163 1972 SCC OnLine Kar 80 164 Laxminarayana Mining Co. (supra) [17] 165 Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1979 SCC OnLine Guj 23 (Gujarat High Court held that royalty payable under Section 9 was not a tax. Therefore, Parliament had legislative competence to prescribe royalty under the MMDR Act in pursuance of its regulatory powers under Entry 54 of List I); Laxmi Narayan Agarwalla v. State of Orissa, 1983 SCC OnLine Ori 16 (The Orissa High Court disagreed with the decisions in Laddu Mal (supra) and Laxminarayana Mining Co. (supra). It was held if royalty is held to be tax, Section 9 would have to be invalidated because Parliament has no legislative power to impose tax under Entry 54 of List I.) [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1647Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
that view, to avoid multiplicity, except for the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Dr. Shanti Swaroop Sharma v. State of Punjab.166 In that case, the petitioners challenged the demand of royalty by the State Government under the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1964. The petitioners contended that royalty, being a tax, cannot be levied under delegated legislation. The High Court rejected the contention holding that: (i) royalty is a share of produce or profit paid to the owner of land for granting the privilege of producing minerals; (ii) mere occupation of land containing minor minerals does not make the occupier liable to pay royalty; (iii) the liability to pay royalty arises only when a lessee extracts minerals in pursuance of a mining lease; (iv) royalty cannot be termed as a compulsory exaction because the compulsion to pay royalty arises out of the contractual conditions of the mining lease and not through the force of law; (v) the fact that the State Government can recover royalty as arrears of land revenue does not give it a character of tax because other dues such as moneys due under contract and fees can be recovered in the same manner. The High Court disagreed with the decision of the Patna High Court in Laddu Mal (supra). This judicial canvas was available before the seven-Judge Bench in India Cement (supra).
b. Divergence between India Cement and Kesoram
115. In India Cement (supra), the seven Judge Bench was called upon to determine the validity of the Madras Panchayat Act 1958. Section 115 of the Act levied a local cess on land revenue payable to government. An explanation to the provision stated that land revenue included royalty. Thus, the impugned provision considered royalty as part of land revenue. The issue was whether the State legislature could levy cess on royalty once Parliament had taken control of the regulation of mines and development of minerals under the MMDR Act.
116. The State’s justification proceeded on the following entries: (i) Entry 45 of List II - land revenue; (ii) Entry 49 of List II - taxes on lands and buildings; (iii) Entry 50 of List II - taxes on mineral rights; and
(iv) Entry 66 read with Entry 23 of List II - levy of fees. Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji (as the learned Chief Justice then was) writing for the majority, observed that the cess was levied essentially on 166 AIR 1969 Punj and Har 79 1648 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports royalty and not on land revenue, both of which are distinct concepts. The State’s recourse to Entry 45 of List II was negatived. With respect to Entry 49 of List II, Justice Mukharji observed that royalty is directly relatable to the minerals extracted and therefore would only be relatable to Entries 23 and 50 of List II, and not Entry 49 of List II. 167 Therefore, the statutory provision was in pith and substance held to be a tax on royalty and not on land. The decision in H R S Murthy (supra), according to which cess paid on royalty has a direct relationship with land and only a remote relationship with minerals, was overruled. A detailed analysis pertaining to Entry 49 of List II has been undertaken in a later segment of this judgment.
117. On Entries 23 and 66 of List II, Justice Mukharji observed that the legislative power of the State legislature to levy fees is denuded by the enactment of the MMDR Act by Parliament. Finally, on Entry 50 of List II, Justice Mukharji observed that the bar provided in Section 9(3) on the enhancement of royalty specified under the Second Schedule also applies to the state legislature. Imposition of cess on royalties was held to have the effect of amending the Second Schedule and was held ultra vires Section 9(3). Section 9 was regarded to be a limitation on the taxing power of the State legislature under Entry 50 of List II.168 Moreover, the Court held that the field is covered by the MMDR Act and hence the legislative power of the state stands denuded. 169 Paragraph 34 of the judgment sets out the conclusions: “34. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the State legislature because Section 9 of the Central Act covers the field and the State legislature is denuded of its competence under Entry 23 of List II. In any event, we are of the opinion that cess on royalty cannot be sustained under Entry 49 of List II as being a tax on land. Royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land.”
(emphasis added)
167 India Cement (supra) [33] 168 India Cement (supra) [32] 169 India Cement (supra) [33] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1649Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
118. In a concurring opinion, Justice G L Oza held that royalty is not a unit of charge merely on land, but on labour and capital as well. Resultantly, imposition of cess on royalty was held not to be a levy or tax on land in terms of Entry 49 of List II. Justice Oza suggested that the cess could have been saved, if it was levied on surface rent or dead rent. In his view, surface rent or dead rent is relatable to land, hence a cess on surface rent or dead rent would fall within the purview of Entry 49 of List II.
119. In Raojibhai Jivabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat,170 a three judge Bench of this Court referred to India Cement (supra) to reiterate that royalty levied on extracted mineral is in the nature of tax. In a series of subsequent decisions, particularly in Orissa Cement Ltd v. State of Orissa171 and Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Union of India,172 this Court followed India Cement (supra). In State of M P v. Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills Ltd,173 this Court rejected the submission that paragraph 34 of India Cement (supra) contained a “typographical error”. However, a divergence in opinion on whether royalty is in the nature of tax emerged.
120. In Quarry Owners Association v. State of Bihar, this Court held that royalty “does not constitute usual tax as commonly understood” but includes return for the consideration for parting with the property.174 In Kesoram (supra), a Constitution Bench had to decide on the validity of a cess levied by the State on coal-bearing land. The measure of the cess was relatable to the quantity of minerals produced from land. Whether royalty is a tax was not directly in issue. In fact, Justice Lahoti, speaking for the majority, held that India Cement (supra) was distinguishable because in that case cess was levied on royalty and not on mineral rights or lands. However, the learned Judge felt “constrained” and “duty-bound” to point out a typographical error in the majority opinion in India Cement (supra) to prevent any “adverse impact on subsequent judicial pronouncements”. Paragraph 34 of India Cement (supra) was held to contain a typographical error, which Justice Lahoti explained thus:
170 [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 406 : (1989) Supp. 2 SCC 744 171 [1991] 2 SCR 105 : (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 430 [36] 172 [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 44 : (2001) 1 SCC 91 173 [1995] 1 SCR 756 : (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 642 [12] 174 Quarry Owners Association v. State of Bihar (2000) 8 SCC 655 [34] 1650 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports “57. In the first sentence the word “royalty” occurring in the expression “royalty is a tax”, is clearly an error. What the majority wished to say, and has in fact said, is “cess on royalty is a tax”. The correct words to be printed in the judgment should have been “cess on royalty” in place of “royalty” only. The words “cess on” appear to have been inadvertently or erroneously omitted while typing the text of the judgment. This is clear from reading the judgment in its entirety. Vide paras 22 and 31, which precede para 34 abovesaid, Their Lordships have held that “royalty” is not a tax. Even the last line of para 34 records “royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land”. The very first sentence of the para records in quick succession “… as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the State Legislature….” What Their Lordships have intended to record is “… that cess on royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the State Legislature …”. That makes correct and sensible reading. A doubtful expression occurring in a judgment, apparently by mistake or inadvertence, ought to be read by assuming that the Court had intended to say only that which is correct according to the settled position of law, and the apparent error should be ignored, far from making any capital out of it, giving way to the correct expression which ought to be implied or necessarily read in the context, also having regard to what has been said a little before and a little after. No learned Judge would consciously author a judgment which is self-inconsistent or incorporates passages repugnant to each other. Vide para 22, Their Lordships have clearly held that there is no entry in List II which enables the State to impose a tax on royalty and, therefore, the State was incompetent to impose such a tax (cess). The cess which has an incidence of an additional charge on royalty and not a tax on land, cannot apparently be justified as falling under Entry 49 in List II.”
121. The decision in Kesoram (supra) analyzed the nature of royalty to hold that royalty is not a tax, but a payment made to the owner of [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1651Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
land who may be a person and may not necessarily be the state.175 It held that India Cement (supra) was caused by “an apparent typographical error or inadvertent error” and should not be understood as a correct declaration of law. Kesoram (supra) also expressed its disagreement with Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills (supra) to the extent it had held that there was no “typographical error” in India Cement (supra). Importantly, Kesoram (supra) concurred with India Cement (supra) on the aspect that cess on royalty is beyond the legislative competence of the state legislatures. 176
122. The divergence on the point of law between India Cement (supra) and Kesoram (supra) is apparent and pertains to whether or not royalty is a tax. For the reasons to follow, we are of the opinion that royalty does not meet the characteristic requirements of a tax. c. Royalty is not a tax
123. On first principles, royalty is a consideration paid by a mining lessee to the lessor for enjoyment of mineral rights and to compensate for the loss of value of minerals suffered by the owner of the minerals. The marginal note to Section 9 states that royalties are “in respect of mining leases.” The liability to pay royalty arises out of the contractual conditions of the mining lease.177 A failure of the lessee to pay royalty is considered to be a breach of the terms of the contract, allowing the lessor to determine the lease and initiate proceedings for recovery against the lessee.
124. Section 9 of the MMDR Act statutorily regulates the right of a lessor to receive consideration in the form of royalty from the lessee for removing or carrying away minerals from the leased area. Prior to the enactment of the MMDR Act, such a condition was treated as part of a mining lease. The object of empowering the Central Government to specify rates of royalty for major minerals was to ensure a certain level of uniformity in mineral prices in view of the domestic and international market.
125. The fact that the rates of royalty are prescribed under Section 9 of the MMDR Act does not make it a “compulsory exaction by public 175 Kesoram (supra) [71] 176 Kesoram (supra) [115] 177 See Rules 27 and 45, Mineral Concession Rules 1960 1652 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports authority for public purposes” because: (i) the compulsion stems from the contractual conditions of the mining lease agreed between the lessor and lessee; (ii) the demand is not made by a public authority, but the lessor (which can either be the State Government or a private party); and (iii) the payment is not for public purposes, but a consideration paid to the lessor for parting with their exclusive privileges in the minerals. Moreover, the fact that Section 25 allows recovery of royalty due to the Government under the MMDR Act or “under the terms of the contract” as arrears of land does not make royalty “an impost enforceable by law.” Section 25 is a standard recovery provision allowing the government to recover any dues payable to it, flowing from statute or the terms of a contract. Pertinently, contractual payments due to the government cannot be deemed to be a tax merely because the statute provides for their recovery as arrears.
126. There are major conceptual differences between royalty and a tax:
(i) the proprietor charges royalty as a consideration for parting with the right to win minerals, while a tax is an imposition of a sovereign;
(ii) royalty is paid in consideration of doing a particular action, that is, extracting minerals from the soil, while tax is generally levied with respect to a taxable event determined by law; 178 and (iii) royalty generally flows from the lease deed as compared to tax which is imposed by authority of law.
127. Under the MMDR Act, the Central Government fixes the rates of royalty, but it is still paid to the proprietor by virtue of a mining lease. In case the minerals vest in the government, the mining lease is signed between the State Government (as lessor) and the lessee in pursuance of Article 299 of the Constitution. Through the mining lease, the government parts with its exclusive privilege over mineral rights. A consideration paid under a contract to the State Government for acquiring exclusive privileges cannot be termed as an impost. Since royalty is a consideration paid by the lessee to the lessor under a mining lease, it cannot be termed as an impost.
128. This Court has held that royalty is not a tax, in several decisions. In State of H P v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd, 179 a three judge 178 Goodyear India Ltd v. State of Haryana (1990) 2 SCC 71 [27] 179 [2005] Supp. 1 SCR 684 : (2005) 6 SCC 499 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1653Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Bench of this Court held royalty not to be a tax. The subsequent decision in Indsil Hydro Power & Manganese Ltd. v. State of Kerala180 brought out the distinction between tax and royalty in the following terms:
“56. Thus, the expression “royalty” has consistently been construed to be compensation paid for rights and privileges enjoyed by the grantee and normally has its genesis in the agreement entered into between the grantor and the grantee. As against tax which is imposed under a statutory power without reference to any special benefit to the conferred on the payer of the tax, the royalty would be in terms of the agreement between the parties and normally has direct relationship with the benefit or privilege conferred upon the grantee.”
129. The principles applicable to royalty apply to dead rent because:
(i) dead rent is imposed in the exercise of the proprietary right (and not a sovereign right) by the lessor to ensure that the lessee works the mine, and does not keep it idle, and in a situation where the lessee keeps the mine idle, it ensures a constant flow of income to the proprietor; (ii) the liability to pay dead rent flows from the terms of the mining lease;181 (iii) dead rent is an alternate to royalty; if the rates of royalty are higher than dead rent, the lessee is required to pay the former and not the latter; and (iv) the Central Government prescribes the dead rent not in the exercise of its sovereign right, but as a regulatory measure to ensure uniformity of rates.
130. In view of the above discussion, we hold that both royalty and dead rent do not fulfil the characteristics of tax or impost. Accordingly, we conclude that the observation in India Cement (supra) to the effect that royalty is a tax is incorrect.
G. Inter-relationship between Entry 23 of List II and Entry 54 of List I
131. The subject of regulating mines and mineral development is enumerated in Entry 23 of List II. However, Parliament can under Entry 54 of List I bring the regulation of mines and mineral development 180 [2019] 10 SCR 647 : (2021) 10 SCC 165 [56] 181 Rules 27 and 45, Mineral Concession Rules 1960 1654 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports under its control to the extent that such control is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. Entry 54 of List I has three pre-requisites: (i) Parliament must make a law;
(ii) the law must contain a legislative declaration that it is in the public interest to bring the regulation of mines and mineral development under its control; and (iii) the law must lay down the extent to which Parliament desires to control the field relating to the regulation of mines and mineral development. Entry 54 of List I exclude the legislative power of the state legislature under Entry 23 of List II to the extent to which the Parliamentary law covers the field. The interrelationship between Entry 54 of Union List and Entry 23 of State List has been dealt with by this Court in numerous decisions, which will be discussed in the following segments.
i. Meaning of “regulation of mines” and “mineral development”
132. Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II are general or regulatory entries dealing with the same subject matter, namely of “regulation of mines and mineral development.” These entries deal with regulation of two aspects: (i) regulation of mines; and (ii) mineral development. By making Entry 23 of List II subordinate to Entry 54 of List I, the Constitution tilts the balance of legislative powers with respect to the regulation of mines and mineral development in favor of the Union.
133. Before delving further into the inter-relationship between the two entries, we deem it necessary to define the subject matter of the entries. The subject-matter of the entries has to be understood from both the text and the context in which the words have been used.
134. The expression “regulation” generally means to manage the governance of an enterprise by means of rules or laws. 182 In K Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu,183 this Court explained the meaning of the power to regulate in the following terms: “19. It has often been said that the power to regulate does not necessarily include the power to prohibit, and ordinarily the word “regulate” is not synonymous with the word “prohibit”. This is true in a general sense and in the sense that mere regulation is not the same as absolute 182 Ramanatha Aiyar Advanced Law Lexicon (Volume 3) 4778. 183 [1985] 2 SCR 1028 : (1985) 2 SCC 116 [19] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1655Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
prohibition. At the same time, the power to regulate carries with it full power over the thing subject to regulation and in absence of restrictive words, the power must be regarded as plenary over the entire subject. It implies the power to rule, direct and control, and involves the adoption of a rule or guiding principle to be followed, or the making of a rule with respect to the subject to be regulated. The power to regulate implies the power to check and may imply the power to prohibit under certain circumstances, as where the best or only efficacious regulation consists of suppression. It would therefore appear that the word “regulation” cannot have any inflexible meaning as to exclude “prohibition”. It has different shades of meaning and must take its colour from the context in which it is used having regard to the purpose and object of the legislation, and the Court must necessarily keep in view the mischief which the legislature seeks to remedy.”
135. The word “regulate” is of wide import and the breadth of its meaning depends on the context in which it is used. This Court has construed the power to regulate to include the power to: (i) grant or revoke a permission or licence including incidental or supplemental powers;184
(ii) prohibit depending upon the context and circumstance; 185
(iii) control or adjust by rule or to subject to governing principles;186 and
(iv) issue directions. 187 Thus, the expression “regulation” appearing in Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II must also receive a wide meaning, in keeping with the principle that the words used in the legislative entries must be interpreted broadly.
136. A “mine” is generally defined as an excavation in the earth for the purpose of obtaining minerals. 188 The expression was defined under the Mines Act 1952 to primarily mean any excavation for the 184 State of Tamil Nadu v. Hindu Stone (1981) 2 SCC 205 [10]; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh (1989) 2 SCC 505 [52] 185 Talcher Municipality v. Talcher Regulated Market Committee (2004) 6 SCC 178 [14]; Union of India v. Asian Food Industries Ltd (2006) 13 SCC 542 [43] 186 UP Coop. Cane Unions Federations v. West UP Sugar Mills Association (2004) 5 SCC 430 [20]; Balmer Lawrie & Company Limited v. Partha Sarathi Sen Roy (2013) 8 SCC 345 [24] 187 Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (2014) 5 SCC 75 [67] 188 Lord Provost and Magistrates of Glasgow v. Faire (1888) [L.R] 13 App. Cas. 657 1656 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports purposes of searching for or obtaining minerals 189 and to include the place where such excavation is carried on.190 The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code 2020 191 has adopted a similar definition of mine under Section 2(1)(zl). The Working Conditions Code also defines “minerals” to mean all substances which can be obtained from the earth by mining, digging, drilling, dredging, hydraulicing, quarrying or by any other operation and to include mineral oils.192 These definitions are indicative of the fact that: (i) the expression “mines” includes both the process by which minerals are extracted from the earth as well as the place where such extraction takes place; and (ii) minerals are obtained from the mine by the process of mining.
137. The expression “regulation of mines” can be understood in the backdrop of above discussion to mean the management of both the process of extracting minerals as well the place where such minerals will be extracted from sub-surface levels. The MMDR 189 Section 2(j) “mine” means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on and include –
(i) All borings, bore holes, oil wells and accessory crude conditions plants, including the pipe conveying mineral oil within the oil fields;
(ii) All shafts, in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine, whether in the course of being sunk or not;
(iii) All levels and inclined planes in the course of being driven;
(iv) All open cast workings;
(v) All conveyers or aerial rope-ways provided for bringing into or removal from a mine of minerals or other articles or for the removal of refuse therefrom;
(vi) All adits, levels, planes, machinery, works, railways, tramways and sidings in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine;
(vii) All protective works being carried out in or adjacent to a mine;
(viii) All workshops and stores situated within the precincts of a mine and under the same management and used primarily for the purposes connected with that mine or a number of mines under the same management;
(ix) All power stations, transformer sub-substations, convertor stations, rectifier stations and accumulator, storage stations for supplying electricity or mainly for the purpose of working the mine or a number of mines under the same management;
(x) Any premises for the time being used for depositing sand or other material for use in a mine or for depositing refuse from a mine or in which any operations in connection with such sand, refuse or other material is being carried on, being premises exclusively occupied by the owner of mine;
(xi) Any premises in or adjacent to and belonging to a mine on which any process ancillary to the getting dressing or preparation for the sale of minerals or of coke is being carried on. 190 Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act 2002. Section 4(k) defines “mine” to mean “any place in the offshore area wherein any exploration or production operation is carried on, together with any vessel, erection, appliance, artificial island or platform and premises in the offshore area used for the purposes of exploration, winning, treating or preparing minerals, obtaining or extracting any mineral or metal by any mode or method, and includes any area covered by a composite licence, or an exploration licence, or a production lease where exploration or production operation has been, or is being, or may be, carried on under the provisions of this Act. 191 “Working Conditions Code 2020”
192 Section 2(1)(zm), Working Conditions Code 2020.
[2024] 7 S.C.R. 1657Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Act gives shape and meaning to the expression “regulation of mines and mineral development” through its provisions and the subordinate rules. To that effect, we find provisions under the MMDR Act pertaining to prospecting or mining operations under lease or licence,193 restrictions on the grant of mineral concessions,194 periods for which prospecting licences 195 or mining leases 196 may be granted or renewed, and royalties in respect of mining leases. 197 Chapter III deals with the procedure for obtaining mineral concessions in respect of land in which the minerals vest in the government. Chapter IV empowers the government to frame rules for regulating the grant of mineral concessions. Chapter V deals with the special powers of Central Government to undertake prospecting or mining operations in respect of lands in which the minerals vest in the Government of a State or any other person. 198 Thus, Chapters II to V of the MMDR Act invariably deal with aspects regulating the place of extraction of minerals and the process by which mines are worked. These provisions govern aspects such as conceding land to a person for carrying out mining operations (mining concession) or granting licences for working mines and winning minerals, which are integral to the concept of “regulation of mines”. The fixation of rates of royalty under Section 9 read with the Second Schedule is also covered within the scope of “regulation of mines and mineral development.”
138. Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II do not use the expression “minerals” simpliciter. The entries use the term “mineral development”. In Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, a two judge Bench observed that the MMDR Act and the rules framed thereunder furnish the scope and purport of the word “mineral development.” 199 In that case, it was held that the scientific exploitation of minerals without waste is a part of “mineral development” as envisaged by the MMDR Act and the rules. In Quarry Owners Association (supra) 193 Section 4, MMDR Act 194 Section 5, MMDR Act 195 Section 7, MMDR Act 196 Section 8, MMDR Act 197 Section 9, MMDR Act 198 Section 17, MMDR Act 199 [1994] 1 SCR 579 : (1994) 2 SCC 691 [48] 1658 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports a two-Judge Bench defined the ambit of the expression “regulation of mines and mineral development”, observing:
“31. […] The word “regulation” may have a different meaning in different context but considering it in relation to the economic and social activities including the development and excavation of mines, ecological and environmental factors including States’ contribution in developing, manning and controlling such activities, including parting with its wealth, viz. the minerals, the fixation of the rate of royalties would also be included within its meaning.”
139. In Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India,200 it was held that the concept of “mineral development” can include captive mining, an assessment of its requirement by different industries and equitable distribution of mining leases. Tata Iron & Steel (supra) was decided in the context of the unamended Section 8(3) of the MMDR Act which allowed the Central Government to renew mining leases “in the interests of mineral development.”
140. As a concept, mineral development is a term of wide import. It encompasses exploitation of minerals, reduction of wastage in the beneficiation process, regulation of mining activities for ecological and environmental factors and equitable distribution of mineral resources and mining leases. Mineral development has been expressly recognized in Chapter VI of the MMDR Act. Section 18(1) mandates the Central Government to take all such steps as may be necessary by making rules for the conservation and systematic development of minerals in India and for the protection of the environment by preventing or controlling any pollution which may be caused by prospecting or mining operations. Section 18(2) indicates that the Central Government may make rules on matters pertaining inter alia to regulation of mining operations in any area; regulation of the excavation or collection of minerals from any mine; development of mineral resources in any area; regulation of arrangement of storage of minerals; and regulation of prospecting operations, disposal or discharge of waste slime or tailing arising from mining operations. In terms of Section 18, Parliament has framed the Mineral Conservation and Development Rules 2017 to provide a framework for conservation 200 [1996] Supp. 3 SCR 808 : (1996) 9 SCC 709 [64] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1659Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
of minerals, systematic and scientific mining, development of minerals and protection of the environment. 201
141. The expression “mineral development” has also been understood under the MMDR Act in a comprehensive manner, to include all activities and transactions relating to the working of mines, extracting of minerals, their storage and disposal, as well as the conservation of the environment. Having established the meaning and scope of the subject-matter in Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II, we now analyze the inter-relationship between the two entries in greater detail. ii. Analysis of Hingir-Rampur, M A Tulloch, and Baijnath Kedia
142. In Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, 202 writ petitions were filed before this Court challenging the Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act 1952 203 which levied cess on the petitioner’s colliery. The petitioner argued that the cess levied under the Orissa Act was beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature because it was in reality a levy of excise duty on the coal produced. In the alternative, it was argued that the cess was relatable to Entry 23 of List II which would be ultra vires having regard to the provisions of Entry 54 of List I read with the MMRD Act 1948, which was the applicable legislation at the time. The respondent state sought to repel the petitioner’s contention by arguing that the cess was a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 of List II whose validity is not affected by Entry 54 of List I read with the MMRD Act. Thus, this Court was called upon to decide two issues: (i) whether the impugned levy was in the nature of a fee relatable to Entries 23 and 66 of List II; and
(ii) the legislative competence of the State legislature to impose the levy in view of Entry 54 of List I read with the MMRD Act.
143. The Orissa Act provided that the rate of the levy shall not exceed five percent of the valuation of minerals at the pit’s mouth. The statute further provided that the proceeds of the cess recovered shall be utilized to meet the expenditure for providing amenities such as communications, water supply and electricity for the better development of the mining areas and improve the welfare of labour 201 Mineral Conservation and Development Rules 2017 202 [1961] 2 SCR 537 203 “Orissa Act”
1660 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports and persons residing or working in the mining areas. This Court analyzed the scheme of the Orissa Act to observe that it was enacted for the purpose of the development of mining areas in the State. It was held that the cess was in the nature of a fee because: (i) it had an element of quid pro quo; (ii) it was collected into a specific fund; (iii) its application was regulated by a statute and confined to its purposes; and (iv) there was a definite co-relationship between the impost and the purpose of the legislation which was to render service to the notified area. 204
144. Having established that the cess was in the nature of a fee, the next issue before this Court was whether the State legislature had the competence to impose the levy in view of Entry 54 of List I read with the MMRD Act 1948. Justice P B Gajendragadkar (as the learned Chief Justice then was) writing for the majority, explained the interrelationship between Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II in the following terms:
“24. […] The jurisdiction of the State Legislature under Entry 23 is subject to the limitation imposed by the latter part of the said Entry. If Parliament by its law has declared that regulation and development of mines should in public interest be under the control of the Union, to the extent of such declaration the jurisdiction of the State Legislature is excluded. In other words, if a Central Act has been passed which contains a declaration by Parliament as required by Entry 54, and if the said declaration covers the field occupied by the impugned Act the impugned Act would be ultra vires, not because of any repugnance between the two statutes but because the State Legislature had no jurisdiction to pass the law. The limitation imposed by the latter part of Entry 23 is a limitation on the legislative competence of the State Legislature itself. This position is not in dispute.”
145. This Court held that the test to determine the legislative competence of the state legislature in respect of a particular subject-matter relating to regulation of mines and mineral development is whether that matter is covered by the legislative declaration in the MMRD Act 1948. 204 Hingir-Rampur (supra) [19] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1661Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
This Court examined the provisions of the MMRD Act 1948 which contained a legislative declaration under Section 2. 205 Section 6 of the MMRD Act 1948 empowered the Central Government to make rules for the conservation and development of minerals. Section 6(2) empowered Parliament to make rules in respect of several subject matters, including the levy and collection of royalties, fees or taxes in respect of minerals mined, quarried, excavated or collected. In this respect, the observations made by Justice Gajendragadkar are relevant and extracted below:
“Section 6 of the Act, however, empowers the Central Government to make rules by notification in the Official Gazette for the conservation and development of minerals. Section 6(2) lays down several matters in respect of which rules can be framed by the Central Government. This power is, however, without prejudice to the generality of powers conferred on the Central Government by Section 6(1). Amongst the matters covered by Section 6(2) is the levy and collection of royalties, fees or taxes in respect of minerals mined, quarried, excavated or collected. It is true that no rules have in fact been framed by the Central Government in regard to the levy and collection of any fees; but, in our opinion, that would not make any difference. If it is held that this Act contains the declaration referred to in Entry 23 there would be no difficulty in holding that the declaration covers the field of conservation and development of minerals, and the said field is indistinguishable from the field covered by the impugned Act. What Entry 23 provides is that the legislative competence of the State Legislature is subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union, and Entry 54 in List I requires a declaration by Parliament by law that regulation and development of mines should be under the control of the Union in public interest. Therefore, if a Central Act has been passed for the purpose of 205 Section 2, MMRD Act 1948. [It read: “2. Declaration as to expediency of control by Central Government:- It is hereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Central Government should take under its control the regulation of mines and oilfields and the development of minerals to the extent hereinafter provided.”] 1662 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports providing for the conservation and development of minerals, and if it contains the requisite declaration, then it would not be competent to the State Legislature to pass an Act in respect of the subject-matter covered by the said declaration. In order that the declaration should be effective it is not necessary that rules should be made or enforced; all that this required is a declaration by Parliament that it is expedient in the public interest to take the regulation and development of mines under the control of the Union. In such a case the test must be whether the legislative declaration covers the field or not. Judged by this test there can be no doubt that the field covered by the impugned Act is covered by the Central Act 53 of 1948.”
(emphasis added)
146. The test laid down by this Court in Hingir-Rampur (supra) is whether the legislative declaration under a Parliamentary law enacted in pursuance of Entry 54 of List I covers the subject-matter. If the subject matter is covered by the legislative declaration, the legislative competence of the States with respect to that subject-matter is pro tanto denuded. Applying this test, it was held that the subject-matter of the levy of fees for conservation and development of minerals was covered by the MMRD Act 1948.
147. The next issue before this Court was whether the declaration contained in the MMRD Act was constitutionally valid in view of Entry 54 of List I. The MMRD Act 1948 was a pre-constitutional legislation enacted by the Dominion Legislature governed by the GOI Act 1935. It was held that even though the state legislation covered the same field as the MMRD Act, the legislative declaration made under the MMRD Act did not constitutionally amount to the requisite declaration by Parliament in terms of Entry 54 of List I.206 Therefore, this Court concluded that the limitation imposed by Entry 54 of List I did not impair the legislative competence of the State to enact the legislation under Entry 23 read with Entry 66 of List II. In view of the conclusion 206 Hingir-Rampur (supra) [35] [“35. […] We reach this position that the field covered by Act 53 of 1948 is substantially the same as the field covered by the impugned Act but the declaration made by Section 2 of the said Act does not constitutionally amount to the requisite declaration by Parliament, and so the limitation imposed by Entry 54 does not come into operation in the present case.”] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1663Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
reached, the majority opined that it was unnecessary to consider the validity of the Orissa Act in terms of Entry 50 of List II.207
148. Justice Wanchoo recorded his dissent from the opinion of the majority by holding that the cess in question was a duty of excise falling squarely within Entry 84 of List I, 208 and consequently, beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature. The learned Judge held that the cess was levied at a rate not exceeding five percent of the value of the minerals at the pit’s mouth on all extracted minerals. Since all the extracted minerals were goods produced, a cess on the value of such extracted minerals was held to constitute excise duty. 209 Unlike the majority opinion, Justice Wanchoo dealt with the issue of the legislative competence of the State legislature to impose the cess in view of Entry 50 of List II. The learned Judge held that the cess was not a tax on mineral rights, but rather a tax on minerals actually produced, and therefore not covered by Entry 50 of List II.
149. In State of Orissa v. M A Tulloch, 210 a Constitution Bench was concerned with the validity of the same Orissa Act which was under consideration in Hingir-Rampur (supra). The respondents challenged the demand for the payment of fees made by the State Government for the period from July 1957 to March 1958 under the Orissa Act for being ultra vires. It must be noted that the MMDR Act was brought into force as and from 1 June 1958. The Constitution Bench analyzed the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, and precedent to reiterate the following principles of law:
(i) The power of the State to enact legislation on the subject matter of “mines and mineral development” under Entry 23 of List II is plenary and subject to the provisions of Entry 54 of List I;
(ii) Section 2 of the MMDR Act contains the requisite legislative declaration in terms of Entry 54 of List I. To the extent to which the Union Government has taken the regulation of mines 207 Hingir-Rampur (supra) [37] 208 Entry 84, before the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act 2016, read as follows: “84. Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except –
(a) Alcoholic liquors for human consumption;
(b) Opium, Indian hemp and other narcotic drugs and narcotics, but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry.” 209 Hingir-Rampur (supra) [47] 210 [1964] 4 SCR 461 1664 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports and development of minerals under its control, so much was withdrawn from the ambit of the power of the State legislature under Entry 23 of List II. The legislation of the State enacted under Entry 23 of List II would, to the extent of that “control”, be superseded or be rendered ineffective;211
(iii) The legislative power of the state remains intact beyond the “extent” of the MMDR Act. Therefore, the crucial enquiry has to be directed to ascertain the “extent” of the Parliamentary legislation;
(iv) Where a competent legislature with superior legislative powers expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before or after would be superseded on the ground of repugnance.212 Section 18(1) evinces the Parliamentary intention to cover the entire field relating to conservation and development of minerals. Therefore, the fact that the Central Government has not framed any regulation along the lines of the Orissa Act was not relevant; and
(v) The declaration under Section 2 of MMDR Act has taken over the entire field of conservation and development of minerals. Resultantly, the particular subject matter would be subtracted from the scope and ambit of Entry 23 of List II and the State legislature would also lose the legislative competence to levy a fee under Entry 66 of List II.213
150. In M A Tulloch (supra), the Constitution Bench held that the legislative competence of the States to levy fees under Entry 66 of List II is also affected to the extent to which the subject-matter of regulation of mines and mineral development is taken over by the Parliamentary declaration under Entry 54 of List I.
151. The third major decision dealing with the inter-relationship between Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II is Baijnath Kedia v. State of Bihar.214 In that case, an amendment to the Bihar Land Reforms 211 M A Tulloch (supra) [5] 212 M A Tulloch (supra) [14] 213 M A Tulloch (supra) [15] 214 [1970] 2 SCR 100 : (1969) 3 SCC 838 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1665Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Act 1950 and the rules pertaining to the modification of the terms and conditions of leases of minor minerals were challenged. Having held that it was bound by Hingir-Rampur (supra) and M A Tulloch (supra), the issue before this Court was the extent to which the declaration by Parliament left any scope for the state legislature. The Court observed that by the legislative declaration under Section 2 read with Section 15, the whole of the field relating to minor minerals came within the jurisdiction of Parliament and no scope was left for the State legislature. Although Section 15 allowed the State legislature to make rules, it did not create a scope for legislation at the state level. 215 Consequently, it was held that the amendment to the Bihar Act was without jurisdiction. In Hingir-Rampur (supra) and M A Tulloch (supra), it was held that the whole field of conservation and development of minerals was covered by the MMDR Act. In Baijnath Kedia (supra), it was held that the field of minor minerals was covered by the central legislation, thereby depriving the state legislation of its plenary legislative power under Entry 23 of List II to that extent.
152. The Solicitor General has relied on the above decisions to submit that the consequence of the whole of the legislative field being occupied by Parliament under the MMDR Act is that the state legislatures possess only such powers as are expressly conferred on them by Parliament. The propositions put forth by the Solicitor General can be encapsulated as follows:
a. Hingir-Rampur (supra) shows that the subject-matter of statutory levies pertaining to minerals is covered by the legislative declaration. Although the MMDR Act does not contain a provision similar to Section 6 of the MMRD Act 1948, it provides for statutory levies such as royalty and dead-rent. Thus, Parliament has covered the subject-matter of statutory levies relating to mineral rights and the state legislature has no power to impose a levy in the form of taxes on mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II;
b. M A Tulloch (supra) held that a Parliamentary legislation enacted under Entry 54 of List I also impacts the independent legislative powers of States with respect to Entry 66 of List II. 215 Baijnath Kedia (supra) [21] 1666 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports This reasoning will be applicable to Entry 50 of List II with greater force, more so, because this entry is expressly subject to any law made by Parliament relating to mineral development; and c. In Baijnath Kedia (supra) there were no express provisions under the MMDR Act limiting the state legislature from enacting legislation relating to leases of minor minerals, but this Court held that such a limitation was implied. Similarly, the Parliamentary law, the MMDR Act, impliedly excludes the legislative competence of the state with respect to Entry 50 of List II.
153. The above arguments will be dealt with in the ensuing segment relating to the interpretation of Entry 50 of List II.
iii. Examination of the “extent” of the MMDR Act
154. The respondents submit that the MMDR Act is a complete code and occupies the entire field relating to regulation of mines and mineral development, leaving nothing for the state legislature under Entry 23 of List II. It was also submitted that the scope of the MMDR Act and the rules made under it has to be given an exhaustive interpretation because they were enacted in the “public interest.” The Solicitor General recounted the following public interest considerations underpinning the MMDR Act: (i) provision of national legal landscape for protection, exploration, and extraction of minerals; (ii) ushering a uniform structure of regulation and development of minerals; and
(iii) ensuring sustained development of the mineral sector at the national level to ensure availability of domestic minerals to industries.
155. The MMDR Act and the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 comprise of a complete code, containing exhaustive provisions in respect of the grant and renewal of prospecting licenses and mining leases in lands belonging to government as well as lands belonging to private persons.216 Section 2 of the MMDR Act declares that the Union is acting in public interest to take under its control the regulation of mines and development of minerals to the extent provided. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Hindu Stone,217 the Court observed that “[t]he public interest which induced Parliament to make the declaration 216 State of Assam v. Om Prakash Mehta (1973) 1 SCC 584 [12]; 217 [1981] 2 SCR 742 : (1981) 2 SCC 205 [6] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1667Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
contained in Section 2 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, has naturally to be the paramount consideration in all matters concerning the regulation of mines and the development of minerals.”
156. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 218 the issue before a two judge Bench was whether the State Government had legal authority to execute leases in favor of the respondents for collection of slurry on payment of royalty. This Court held that the state legislature lacked authority in law to regulate the disposal of slurry. Section 18 of the MMDR Act was held to cover the field of the disposal of waste of a mine (including coal slurry), thereby denuding the legislative power of the state legislature with respect to that subject matter. It was further held that once the state legislature’s power under Entry 23 of List II is denuded, the State Government ceases to have any executive authority in the matter relating to the regulation of mines and mineral development in view of Article 162 of the Constitution. 219 Thus, both the legislative and the executive powers of the State were held to be taken away to the extent to which the MMDR Act covered the subject matter dealing with regulation of mines and mineral development.220
157. This Court has to give credence to the public interest considerations underpinning the MMDR Act while interpreting its scope and ambit. The expression “public interest” occurring in both Entry 54 of List I and Section 2 of the MMDR Act indicates that the provisions of the legislation do not merely cover the interests of private individuals (such as owners of private property or holders of mining leases) relating to the regulation of mines and mineral development. The public interest underpinning the MMDR Act synonymizes with the collective welfare of the people and is informed by the dictates of 218 [1990] 3 SCR 744 : (1990) 4 SCC 557 219 Article 162, Constitution of India. [It reads:
162. Extent of executive power of State – Subject to the provision of this Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws:
Provided that in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power expressly conferred by this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof.”] 220 Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd v. State of Karnataka (2010) 13 SCC 1 [39] 1668 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the public trust doctrine. 221 At the same time, the underlying public interest has to be construed in view of the entire legislative scheme, purpose, and object of the enactment. 222
158. The latter part of Entry 23 of List II makes the entry “subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.” Entry 54 of List I provide that Parliament can regulate mines and mineral development “to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.” The text of Entry 54 of List I indicates that besides declaring that it is taking under its control any subject relating to the regulation of mines and mineral development, Parliament has to specify the extent to which the Parliamentary regulation is deemed expedient in the public interest. The legislative domain of the States under Entry 23 of List II is excluded only to the extent of the field covered by the provisions of the MMDR Act. The expression “to the extent provided” refers to the subject matter or fields covered by the Parliamentary legislation.
159. During the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly pertaining to present Entry 23 of List II, Mr Brajeshwar Prasad moved a motion to move the entire field of “regulation of mines and mineral development” under the Union List. He reasoned that mines constitute a vital subject and should remain a subject under the Union List.223 Consequently, a motion was moved to transfer Entry 23 of List II (which was draft Entry 28 of List II then) to the Union List. However, the amendment was negatived by the Assembly.224 This indicates that the Constituent Assembly deemed it necessary that state legislatures must also have necessary legislative powers with respect to the regulation of mines and mineral development. The legislative field of the states would stand abstracted once Parliament makes a declaration evincing an intent to takeover the regulation and development of mines and 221 Sayyed Ratanbhai Sayeed v. Shirdi Nagar Panchayat (2016) 4 SCC 631 222 Meerut Development Authority v. Association of Management Studies (2009) 6 SCC 171 [67] 223 Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume IX, 898 (31st August 1949). [Mr. Brajeshwar Prasad explained his aim in introducing the motion in the following words: “My whole aim in moving this amendment is to make redundant entry 28, of List II. I am clear in my own mind that Mines constitute a vital subject as important as Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. I am of opinion that if the system of defence is going to be organized on sound line then Mines must remain a Central subject. I do not want to give the Provinces the power even to “regulate mines and oil fields and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I” as has been provided for in entry 28 of List II.”] 224 Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume IX, 898 (2nd September 1949) [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1669Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
specifies the extent to which control of the field by the Union is deemed to be in the public interest.
160. The requirement of a legal declaration under Entry 54 of List I serves twofold purposes: first, it enables a clear demarcation of the subject matter under the control of Parliament and determines the extent of such control; and second, it enshrines the precept of the rule of law where the basis for trenching upon the legislative powers of the State has to be found in a law made by Parliament. The Parliamentary enactment through which legislative control is being assumed by the Union, to the exclusion of state legislatures, cannot be abstract, vague, and general. While Parliament has the power to denude the field given to the states under Entry 23 of List II by making a declaration in the law which it enacts pursuant to the field reserved by Entry 54 of List I, the law enacted by Parliament must specify the field of regulation and development which it has taken over, and the extent to which the control of the Union is deemed to be in the public interest.
161. The use of the expression “to the extent” under Entry 54 of List I carries the consequence that the Parliamentary legislation has to specify the subject matter or field over which it seeks to legislate. In M A Tulloch (supra), this Court held that the intention of the legislation to occupy a particular subject matter has to be gathered from the words of the provisions. 225 As a consequence, the coverage of the fields by Parliament has to be express. The ambit of the MMDR Act has to be determined from the express words used in the provisions and not by mere implications or inference. This legal principle has already been accepted by this Court. 226
162. In Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 227 a Constitution Bench was called upon to interpret the ambit of Entry 52 of List I and Entry 24 of List II. The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 228 was enacted by Parliament to assume 225 M A Tulloch (supra) [14]. [It reads: “14. […] In the present case, having regard to the terms of Section 18(1) it appears clear to us that the intention of Parliament was to cover the entire field and thus to leave no scope for the argument that until the rules were framed, there was no inconsistency and no supersession, of the State Act.”] 226 Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1980) 4 SCC 136; Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Association v. State of Rajasthan (1994) Supp. 1 SCC 413 [14] 227 [1980] 3 SCR 331 : (1980) 4 SCC 136 228 “IDR Act”
1670 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports control over specified industries in pursuance of Entry 52 of List I. Section 2 of the IDR Act contained the legislative declaration to the effect that the Union shall take under its control the industries specified in Schedule I. The majority, speaking through Justice D A Desai, observed that the legislative declaration under the IDR Act has the effect of denying the legislative powers to the state legislature under Entry 24 of List II.229 Therefore, it was held that the legislative declaration contained under Section 2 of the IDR Act has to be construed strictly. The Court held that the legislative competence of state legislature would be eroded only to the extent to which control was assumed by the Union in terms of the legislative declaration under the IDR Act. A legislative declaration which has the impact of denuding or depriving the legislative power of the state legislature has to be construed strictly.
163. The inter-relationship between Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II can be formulated as follows:
(i) The state legislatures possess plenary legislative power in respect of regulation of mines and mineral development under Entry 23 of List II;
(ii) Entry 23 of List II is, however, subject to the operation of Entry 54 of List I;
(ii) The field under Entry 23 of List II is subordinated to the extent to which Parliament has brought under its control the regulation of mines and development of minerals under the MMDR Act;
(iii) The expression of the legislative intention to cover a particular field relating to mines and mineral development excludes or denudes the legislative powers of the State with respect to that particular field; and
(iv) Parliamentary intention to cover a particular field relating to the regulation of mines and mineral development and the extent to which control of the Union is regarded to be in the public interest has to be ascertained from the language of the statute. Keeping these principles in mind, we now move on to analyzing the inter-relationship between Entry 54 of List I and Entry 50 of List II. 229 Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills (supra) [11] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1671Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
H. Inter-relationship between Entry 50 of List II and Entry 54 of List I
164. The respondents contend that the legislative declaration contained under Section 2 along with the other provisions of the MMDR Act serves as a “limitation” on the legislative powers of state legislatures to tax minerals under Entry 50 of List II. The main thrust of the argument of the respondents is that anything encompassed in a “law relating to mineral development” serves as a limitation on the field of taxation under Entry 50 of List II. Moreover, it was submitted that the MMDR Act leaves no legislative room for the state legislature in respect of the subject matter of mines and mineral development, including taxes on mineral rights. On the contrary, the petitioners submit that the MMDR Act can only have the effect of abstracting the State’s legislative field with respect to Entry 23 of List II. It was further contended that the MMDR Act does not contain any provision limiting the field of the states with respect to the taxation of mineral rights.
165. To recap, Entry 50 of List II reads thus:
“Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.”
Entry 50 of List II has two elements: (i) the legislative field governing taxes on mineral rights is given exclusively to the states; (ii) the field given to the states is subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development. Entry 50 of List II is a taxing entry. The limitations on the field created by Entry 50 of List II is however, contemplated to be created by a law which relates to mineral development. The legislative competence of Parliament to enact a “law relating to mineral development” can be traced to Entry 54 of List I, which is a general entry. Therefore, the taxing powers of the state with respect to mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II can be restricted by Parliament by its regulatory power under Entry 54 of List I.
166. To delve into the inter-relationship between Entry 54 of List I and Entry 50 of List II, we have to primarily address the following questions:
(i) what is a tax on mineral rights; (ii) whether Entry 50 of List II is an exception to the general rule laid down in M P V Sundararamier (supra); (iii) what is the nature of the limitations envisaged by the 1672 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Constitution on the taxing powers of the state; and (iv) whether the MMDR Act imposes limitations on the taxing powers of the state. i. Taxes on mineral rights a. Mineral rights duty
167. The expression “taxes on mineral rights” was originally used in the GOI Act 1935. The Constitution uses a similar expression. Therefore, it is important to understand the context in which the term “taxes on mineral rights” (in its myriad forms) came to occupy the discourse.
168. Under the law in England, landlords would receive royalties for exercising their mineral rights or assigning them to other persons or lessees.230 However, in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, it was recognized that landlords received the benefits of royalty often at the cost of the welfare of the miners. The Royal Commission on Mining Royalties narrated in its report of 1893 that:
“[W]itnesses examined on behalf of the working miners expressed the opinion that royalties and wayleaves, where fixed in amount, are often so high that in depressed times, when coal falls greatly in price, the royalty owner continues to receive his full royalty, whilst the miner suffers from a reduction in wages, or a closing of mines; their efforts to avert any reduction sometimes taking the form of a strike.”231 To counter the appropriation of royalties by landowners, the lawmakers decided to levy tax on royalties received by them 232 with a view to increase revenue generation and enhance the welfare measures for miners. 233
169. The Parliament in England imposed a mineral rights duty by Finance Act 1910. Section 20 imposed a duty “on the rental value of all rights to work minerals and of all mineral way leaves” at the rate of “one 230 Lloyd George, ‘The Budget, The Land and The People: The New Land Value Taxes Explained and Illustrated’ (2 nd edn, 1909) 48.
231 Royal Commission on Mining Royalties, Final Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the subject of mining royalties (1893) 14.
232 Lloyd George (n 230) 51 233 Mr. Lloyd George (Hansard, Volume 11) 28 September 1909 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1673Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
shilling for every twenty shillings of that rental value.” The rental value was calculated in the following manner: (i) where the right to work the minerals was the subject of a mining lease, the amount of rent paid in the last working year; (ii) where minerals were being worked by the proprietor, an amount fixed by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue as equivalent to rent; and (iii) in case of mineral wayleave, the amount of rent paid by the working lessee in the last working year. Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, stated while introducing the legislative proposal that the duty on mineral rights imposed “tax upon royalties and way-leaves actually received by the owners of those rights.” 234 The Chancellor further clarified that the mineral rights duty was introduced as part of taxes on land. 235 It was in this context that the concept of taxes on mineral rights was introduced in England and was later entrenched in the colonial regime by the GOI Act 1935.
b. Meaning of the expression “mineral rights”
170. The Constitution does not define “mineral rights”. The expression has not been defined in the MMDR Act or the rules framed under it. Though the expression “mineral rights” is used in Entry 50 of List II, it does not find mention in any of the other related legislative entries – Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II. The expression has to be given its ordinary and natural meaning by adopting an interpretative approach which eschews rigidity. Mineral rights are inextricably connected to property. Any understanding of “mineral rights” must be prefaced on an understanding of the basics of property law.
171. In a regime of private property, the rules governing access to and control of resources are organized around the idea that resources are on the whole separate objects belonging to particular individuals.236 These resources can comprise of immovable and movable property, both corporeal and incorporeal. In a social order based on private property, an owner’s decision of the manner in which they put the resource to use is generally upheld by society as final. 237 A person who owns a resource has the right to determine its use. The ownership of 234 Hansard, Volume 11, 22 September 1909 235 Hansard, Volume 35, 5 March 1912 236 Jeremy Waldron, ‘What is Private Property?’ (1985) 5(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 313, 327. 237 Ibid, 327.
1674 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports a resource also precludes the claims of other persons or individuals with respect to that particular resource. 238
172. In the context of land, it is well-established that the ownership of land includes the ownership of underlying minerals, unless the right to minerals has been expressly reserved by law. 239 Therefore, an owner of land has rights to the surface of the land and to sub-soil resources. 240 Surface rights are rights to the surface of the land and include the right to use land, construct buildings, install machinery and equipment, and plant trees or dig wells. Surface rights can also be sold or transferred to another person. The right to minerals entails the right to monetize mineral resources by either consuming them or selling them to third parties. The right to minerals emanates from the concept of the ownership of property.
173. Counsel have drawn attention to dictionary meanings attributed to “mineral rights”. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “mineral right” as “an interest in minerals in land, with or without ownership of the surface of the land; a right to take minerals or a right to receive royalty.”241
174. Corpus Juris Secundum defines the term “mineral right” as follows: “It is the right or title to all, or to certain specified, minerals in a given tract. It is a broader term and is more inclusive than the term “oil and gas”, and it has been held that, in the light of the surrounding facts and circumstances under which it is used, it may not be necessarily include the right to oil and gas.”242
175. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 243 the US Supreme Court observed that the right to coal consists of the right to mine it. Entry 50 of List II uses the expression “mineral rights” in the plural. It hence envisages a bundle of rights associated with the ownership of minerals. The owner of minerals may transfer the rights to the minerals to another person. Once transferred, the lessee stands in the 238 James Y Stern, ‘The Essential Structure of Property Law’ (2017) 115(7) Michigan Law Review 1167, 1176.
239 Thressiamma Jacob v. Geologist, Department of Mining & Geology (2013) 9 SCC 725 240 State of West Bengal v. Union of India [1964] 1 SCR 371 [18] 241 Black’s Law Dictionary (6 th edn,1990) 995 242 Corpus Juris Secundum (Volume 58) 15 243 260 US 393 (1922)
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shoes of the owner/ lessor by acquiring his interest in the minerals, according to the terms and conditions of the agreement. Usually, the right to mine includes two related activities: (i) excavation of minerals; and (ii) removal or consumption of the extracted minerals. The process of excavating minerals generally entails the right to enter upon and occupy the land for the purpose of working the mines to extract minerals. The removal or consumption of minerals allows the lessee to monetize the extracted minerals.
176. The meaning of the expression “mineral rights” has been discussed in a few judicial decisions in India. In a decision of the Calcutta High Court rendered in 1905, it was held that grant of mineral rights “must be taken to carry as incident to it the power not only to go upon the land and work the minerals known to be underground but to go to the land and conduct the ordinary preliminary operations by boring or otherwise to ascertain (when it is not known) if there are minerals underground.” 244 In Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Gujarat,245 the Gujarat Mineral Rights Tax Act 1985 imposed a tax on the mineral rights of holders of mining leases in respect of minerals specified in the Schedule.246 A Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court, speaking through Justice A M Ahmadi (as the learned Chief Justice then was) repelled the challenge to the validity of the legislation. The Court drew a distinction between mining rights and mineral rights thus: “51. [a] mining right is a right to enter upon and occupy land for the purpose of working it with a view to obtaining the minerals deposited therein whereas a mineral right is a right or title to all or to certain specified minerals in a given tract. It is, therefore, clear that a person having a mining right is entitled to work the mine with a view to winning the minerals deposited therein but unless he is given a right to remove or consume the mineral, he cannot do so. It is the latter right which is known as the mineral right which the impugned legislation seeks to tax.”
244 Kumar Ramessur Malia v. Ram Nath Bhattacharjee, 1905 SCC OnLine Cal 55 245 1988 SCC OnLine Guj 13 246 Section 3, Gujarat Mineral Rights Tax Act 1985. Section 3 reads: “On and from the commencement of this Act, there shall be levied and collected a tax on mineral rights at such rates not exceeding the maximum specified in Column 2 of the Schedule against minerals specified in column 1 of that Schedule as the State Government may, from time to time by notification in the Official gazette, fix.” 1676 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports The Gujarat High Court held that a mining right is a right to enter upon and occupy land for the purpose of working. A mineral right is a right or title to certain specified minerals in a given tract. Therefore, the High Court followed the principle that a lessee acquires mineral rights if the lessor grants them the permission to remove minerals from the leased area.
177. In his dissenting opinion in Kesoram (supra), Justice S B Sinha sought to draw a distinction between “minerals” and “mineral rights” by observing that mineral rights “cannot be construed as mineral already extracted as contradistinguished from being capable of extraction or otherwise in a state or form when embedded in the earth.” 247 The learned Judge observed that when a mineral is extracted, it may be a culmination of the right to deal in the mineral but the mineral rights would not include a right to dispatch extracted minerals. Justice Sinha observed that the right to receive royalty is also a mineral right. According to him mineral rights extend till the extraction of minerals from the earth and do not include the right to dispatch the extracted minerals. There is a fallacy in Justice Sinha’s observations. Statutorily, royalty is a consideration by the lessee to the lessor for winning the minerals and removing them from the leased area. Section 9 of MMDR Act imposes royalty on removal or consumption of minerals by lessee. Royalty, is paid on dispatch of minerals. Thus, mineral rights do not culminate with the extraction of minerals, but include the right to dispatch the extracted minerals as well.
178. The Constitution is a living organic document and must be interpreted in that spirit.248 Enumerated legislative powers ought to be interpreted with a wide and liberal spirit to ensure that the legislatures have the requisite authority to legislate and to allow the executive to govern. The expression “mineral rights” must be construed in this spirit to ensure that the taxing powers of the State under Entry 50 of List II are not unnecessarily curtailed. The natural meaning of the expression “mineral rights” will include the entire bundle of rights that follow ownership of minerals, including rights which can be transferred to a lessee through a mining lease. These rights will 247 Kesoram (supra) [400] 248 Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146 [71]; Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1 [95].
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include the right to extract minerals by working the mines, winning the minerals, and monetizing the minerals obtained by removing or consuming them.
179. The breadth and scope of mineral rights has also been recognized under the MMDR Act. In a situation where the minerals vest with the State by operation of law, the right to those minerals also vests with the State. However, the State can assign or transfer its mineral rights by way of a mining lease to a lessee. This has been contemplated by the Mineral Concession Rules read with Form K. In Part I of Form K, the Government grants its mineral rights to the lessee, including liberties, powers, and privileges. However, it is important to note that the lessee is only granted rights in the minerals specified in Part I of Form K. The Government can reserve to itself the right to work the other minerals found in the same demised land or to grant a lease to a separate person to work and remove these other minerals. 249 Part II of Form K of the Mineral Concession Rules 1960 enumerates the liberties, powers, and privileges of the lessee. It provides that the lessee has the liberty and power at all times during the term of demise to enter upon the land demised and search, mine, bore, dig, drill, win, work, dress, process, convert, carry away, and dispose of the minerals. Part II of Form K further provides that a lessee has liberty and power to use the demised land to sink pits,250 use machinery equipment 251 construct buildings, roadways, and railways, 252 to beneficiate any ore produced from the lands and carry away such beneficiated ore,253 and clear undergrowth and brushwood and utilize any trees or timber standing or found on the demised lands. 249 Part IV, Form K, Mineral Concession Rules 1960. [“1. Liberty and power for the State Government, or to any lessee or persons authorized by it in that behalf to enter into and upon the said lands and to search for, win, work, dig, get, raise, dress, process, convert and carry away minerals other than the said minerals and any other substances and for those purposes to sink, drive, make, erect, construct, maintain and use such pits, shafts, inclines, drifts, levels and other lines, waterways, airways, water courses, drains, reservoirs, engines, machinery, plant, buildings, canals, tramways, railways, roadways, and other works and conveniences as may be deemed necessary or convenient. Provided that in the exercise of such liberty and power no substantial hindrance or interference shall be caused to or with the liberties, powers and privileges of the lessee/lessees under these presents and that fair compensation (as may be mutually agreed upon or in the event of disagreement as may be decided by the State Government) shall be made to the lessee/ lessees for all loss or damage sustained by the lessee/ lessees by reason or in consequence of the exercise of such liberty and power.”] 250 Form K, Part II, Rule 2, Mineral Concession Rules 1960 251 Rule 3, Mineral Concession Rules 1960 252 Rule 4, Mineral Concession Rules 1960 253 Rule 8(a), Mineral Concession Rules 1960 1678 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
180. Having explained the scope of the expression “mineral rights”, the next issue pertains to the scope and ambit of “taxes on mineral rights.” c. Taxes on mineral rights
181. The respondents have contended that the meaning of the term “taxes on mineral rights” must be derived from the related entries in List II, namely Entries 45 and 49. It was contended that since the incidence of the tax imposed in light of Entries 45 and 49 is on the owner of land, the incidence of tax on mineral rights is also on the owner of land, that is the private lessor. On the contrary, the petitioners have refuted the respondent’s submission on the ground that the tax under Entry 50 of List II can also be applied with respect to lessees who hold the land or building on lease from the Government.
182. Conceptually, a tax has four elements – (i) the nature of the tax which prescribes the taxable event attracting the levy; (ii) the person who is liable to pay tax; (iii) the rate at which the tax is paid; and (iv) the measure or value to which the rate will be applied for computing the liability.254
183. The subject matter of taxation has been exhaustively enunciated in the Union and State Lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 255 The occurrence of the taxable event creates or attracts the liability to tax. 256 For example, In re Sea Customs Act, S.20(2), 257 this Court held that in the case of excise duties, the taxable event is the manufacture of goods and the duty is not directly on the goods but the manufacture thereof. Thus, the activity of the manufacture of goods attracts the liability for the levy of excise duties.
184. The incidence of taxation pertains to the manner in which the burden of tax would fall on a person. 258 The incidence of tax was exemplified by the decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Drive-In Enterprise. 259 While dealing with the validity of an entertainment 254 Govind Saran Ganga Saran v. CST (1985) Supp. SCC 205 [6]; Mathuram Agrawal v. State of M P (1999) 8 SCC 667 [12]; Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (P) Ltd. (2022) 10 SCC 700 [97] 255 Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co. v. Union of India [1962] Supp 2 SCR 1 [68] 256 Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana (1990) 2 SCC 71 257 [1964] 3 SCR 787 [23] 258 Godfrey Phillips India Ltd v. State of UP (2005) 2 SCC 515 [47] 259 [2001] 2 SCR 378 : (2001) 4 SCC 60 [13] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1679Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
tax imposed by the State of Karnataka, it was held that since an entertainment necessarily requires a person who is entertained, the incidence of the tax is on the persons entertained. The incidence of tax is relatable to the person who bears the ultimate burden of the tax.
185. The subject matter of Entry 50 of List II is “taxes on mineral rights.” As discussed in the above segment, ‘mineral rights’ is a comprehensive term to mean the bundle of rights with respect to minerals. The taxable event under Entry 50 of List II would relate to the exercise of mineral rights.
186. In his dissenting opinion in Hingir-Rampur (supra), Justice Wanchoo observed that taxes on mineral rights would mean taxes on the right to extract minerals and not taxes on the minerals actually extracted. He opined that a tax on mineral rights would be confined, for example, to taxes on leases of mineral rights and on premium or royalty for that. In the process, Justice Wanchoo differentiated between taxes on minerals produced and taxes on mineral rights. According to this view, the process of working mines to extract minerals has to necessarily precede the production of minerals. The process of working mines, according to the learned Judge, attracts liability under “taxes on mineral rights”, while taxes on minerals extracted form part of taxes on goods produced, in the nature of duties of excise.
187. The working of a mine can be undertaken either by the owner or by another to whom the right to work the mine has been granted by a mining lease. In the latter case, the lessee has to pay royalty to the lessor as a consideration for removing or consuming the minerals from the leased area. The right to receive royalty is an integral part of the mineral rights of the lessor. However, as discussed in the segments above, royalty is not a tax. Therefore, royalty would not be comprehended within the meaning of the expression “taxes on mineral rights.” The scope of taxes on mineral rights includes taxes on the right to extract minerals. Taxes on mineral rights also take within their fold other aspects relating to the exercise of mineral rights such as working the mines and dispatching minerals from the leased area. However, the legislature has to ensure that the exercise of the taxing powers relatable to the field under Entry 50 of List II does not foray into a duty of excise or a tax on the sale of minerals.
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188. The taxable event with respect to taxes on mineral rights will be the exercise of mineral rights. The incidence of the tax on mineral rights depends upon who is exercising the right. We do not agree with the respondents that the incidence of a tax on mineral rights would necessarily have to be on the owner of the land. A tax under Entry 49 of List II is not only levied on the owner of the land, but also an occupier.260 Similarly, a tax on mineral rights could be levied on any person who has an interest in the minerals.
189. The measure of tax is a matter of legislative policy. The legislature can select any measure of tax to compute liability, as long as it has a reasonable nexus with the nature of the tax. Hence, it is for the legislature to devise an appropriate measure of tax to compute the tax liability, provided the measure has a nexus with the nature of levy, that is a tax on mineral rights.
ii. The limitations on the taxing power of the State under Entry 50 of List II
190. Entry 50 of List II is unique because though it is a taxing entry, it is made subject to “any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.” Thus, the taxing power of the state is capable of being controlled by a non-fiscal enactment by Parliament relating to the development of minerals. This seems to recognize that a fiscal imposition in the nature of a tax on mineral rights by a state may impact on the development of minerals. That is why the former has been made subject to a law relatable to mineral development enacted by Parliament.
191. The common thread between Entry 54 of List I and Entries 23 and 50 of List II is the use of the phrase “mineral development”. Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II deal with the same subject matter namely, of the regulation of mines and mineral development, where the latter is subordinated to the former to the extent to which Parliament brings the field under its control. In the above segments, we have analyzed the decisions of this Court in Hingir-Rampur (supra), MA Tulloch (supra), and Baijnath Kedia (supra) where it was held that Entry 23 of List II is pro tanto excluded to the extent to which the Parliamentary legislation enacted in terms of Entry 54 of List I covers the field.
260 See Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1975) 2 SCC 175 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1681Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
a. Entry 50 of List II does not constitute an exception to the Sundararamier principle
192. The position which was enunciated in M P V Sundararamier (supra) and accepted in Jindal Stainless Ltd (supra) is that the field of taxation is distinct from the general subjects of legislation in the Union and State lists of the Seventh Schedule. The issue which needs to be addressed is whether Entry 50 of List II is an exception to the position which has been laid down in M P V Sundararamier (supra) in view of the fact that the ambit of a taxing entry is sought to be restricted by a regulatory entry. A related issue is whether Parliament has the legislative competence to tax mineral rights under its residuary powers.
193. The decision in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals (supra) interpreted the relationship between Entry 54 of List II and Entry 92A of List I. Entry 54 of List II, before amendment, was subject to the provisions of Entry 92A of List I.261 The entry was substituted by the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act 2016. The Bihar Finance Act 1981 levied a surcharge on dealers. The law was made pursuant to the field of legislation in Entry 54 of List II. The Act prohibited dealers from collecting surcharge. It was contended that the prohibition on dealers recovering the surcharge was inconsistent with the Drug (Price Control) Order 1979 issued under the Essential Commodities Act, which allowed the manufacturer or producer of drugs to pass on the liability to pay sales tax. The Essential Commodities Act was enacted for the regulation, production, supply, distribution and pricing of essential commodities and is relatable to Entry 33 of List III.262 One of the issues before this Court was whether the State power to tax the sale of goods under Entry 54 of List II could be encroached upon by a law made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated in List III.
194. This Court referred to M P V Sundararamier (supra) to reiterate that: (i) taxation is considered to be a distinct matter for purposes 261 Entry 54 of List II, before substitution by the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act 2016 read: “54. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92A of List I)
262 Entry 33, List III, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of India. (It reads: [“33. Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of –
(a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products; […]”] 1682 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports of legislative competence; (ii) the power to tax cannot be deduced from a general legislative entry; (iii) the taxing powers of the Union and the States are mutually exclusive without any overlap; and
(iv) this is also evident from the fact that there is no taxing entry in List III. The Court held that a law made by Parliament under a general entry, that is, Entry 33 of List III, cannot intrude into the plenary power of the state legislature to levy taxes on the sale or purchase of goods under Entry 54 of List II. Further, it was held that the 1981 Act and the Control Order operated in separate and distinct fields without inconsistency or overlap.
195. The decision in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals (supra) is an authority for the following legal propositions: (i) the principle of federal supremacy will not apply where there is no direct conflict between the legislative powers of Union and States; (ii) Parliament cannot acquire legislative competence with respect to subject matters of taxation enumerated under List II under the guise of regulatory entries; and (iii) since taxing entries are mutually exclusive, the principle of federal supremacy is not generally applicable with respect to taxing entries under Lists I and II.
196. Entry 54 of List I is a regulatory entry dealing with the regulation of mines and mineral development. The regulatory entries in Lists I and II of the Seventh Schedule are distinct from taxing entries. Though the power to levy taxes is an incident of sovereignty, it is subject to constitutional limitations. Giving an extended interpretation to general entries to include the power of taxation will grant arbitrary and unconstitutional authority to the Union and States. Since Entry 54 of List I is a general entry, it will not include the power of taxation.
197. The subject of Entry 54 of List I is “regulation of mines and mineral development”. In contrast, the subject of Entry 50 of List II is “taxes on mineral rights”. Each of these terms has a specific connotation. Whereas Entry 54 of List I encompass a broad subject matter covering the regulation of mines and mineral development, the taxing entry in Entry 50 of List II is confined to mineral rights. Entry 23 of List II also encompasses the “regulation of mines and mineral development” as a legislative field for the states. Since Entry 54 of List I also deals with the “regulation of mines and mineral development”, the states’ domain under Entry 23 of List II is subject to the limitations created by Entry 54 of List I. Despite the positioning of Entry 23 in List II, the Constitution has specifically enumerated the taxing field with [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1683Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
respect to mineral rights in Entry 50 of List II. Taxation of mineral rights is hence, traceable to Entry 50 of List II. If the framers had intended that the field of taxing mineral rights would be subsumed in the general entry covering the regulation of mines and mineral development, namely, Entry 23 of List II, there would have been no reason to provide for a specific taxing entry on mineral rights in Entry 50 of List II. Therefore, just as the field of taxing mineral rights does not fall under Entry 23 of List II, it does not fall under Entry 54 of List I which uses similar language and is not a taxing entry. While the imposition of taxes on mineral rights is a field entrusted to the State legislatures in List II, it is subject to a law enacted by Parliament on mineral development. While the imposition of taxes on mineral rights is a field exclusively entrusted to the State legislatures (and not to Parliament) in the State List, Parliament can while making provisions in a law relating to mineral development make provisions which ensure that the exercise of the taxing power by the states does not adversely affect the development of minerals. This power of Parliament to impose limitations or conditions which ensure that that the exercise of the taxing power of the states does not impede mineral development distinct from the power to tax mineral rights which is entrusted to the state legislatures.
198. If Parliament has no legislative competence to tax mineral rights under Entry 54 of List I, can it make use of its residuary powers to gain legislative competence? The answer has to be in in the negative. Article 246 exclusively empowers the state legislatures to make laws with respect to entries in List II, which includes taxes on mineral rights. Article 248 provides that the residuary powers of Parliament shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax not mentioned in either the State List or Concurrent List. Under Entry 97 of List I Parliament can make a law with respect to any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists.
199. During the debates in the Constituent Assembly, Dr. B R Ambedkar explained that the purpose of Entry 97 of List I is to include “anything not included in List II or List III.” 263 In International Tourist 263 Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 9 (1 September 1949) 1684 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports Corporation v. State of Haryana,264 this Court held that it is necessary to establish the legislative incompetence of the State legislature before Parliament can claim exclusive legislative competence by resorting to the residuary power. A matter can be brought under Entry 97 only if it is not enumerated in List II or List III and in the case of a tax if it is not mentioned in List II. Importantly, it was also observed that the residuary powers of the Union cannot be interpreted so expansively as to whittle down the power of the State legislatures. A subject can be brought under Entry 97 of List I only if it is not enumerated in either List II or List III.265
200. In Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna,266 Chief Justice Maurice Gwyer speaking for the Federal Court observed that “[i]t is natural enough, when considering the ambit of an express power in relation to an unspecified residuary power, to give a broad interpretation to the former at the expense of the latter.” The enumeration of taxes on mineral rights in List II is a constitutional entrustment to the states. This Court is bound to abide by the constitutional distribution of legislative powers. The distribution also subserves the principles of fiscal federalism.
201. In Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills (supra), 267 the constitutional validity of Section 9(3) of the MMDR Act and a notification fixing new rates of royalty was in question. The Central Government sought to increase the rate of royalty to compensate the state, which had suffered financial losses as a result of the invalidation of the cess imposed by it by the decision in India Cement (supra). The notification was challenged before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for excessively increasing the rates of royalty by 400 per cent to 2000 per cent as compared to the royalty fixed in 1981 on various varieties of coal. The High Court held that the notification was outside the purview of Section 9(3) of the MMDR Act. Against the decision of the High Court, appeals were filed before this Court. The main contention of the petitioners was that since royalty is a tax, as held in India Cement (supra), Entry 54 of List I is a general entry and did not empower Parliament to impose the tax.
264 [1981] 2 SCR 364 : (1981) 2 SCC 318 [6-A] 265 See All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v. Union of India (2007) 7 SCC 527 [46]
266 (1942) 4 FCR 90
267 (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 642 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1685Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
202. This Court held that once Parliament enacts a law under Entry 54 of List I and occupies the field in connection with the regulation of mines and mineral development, the state legislature will lose legislative competence with respect to both Entries 23 and 50 of List II. Further, it was observed that since royalty is a tax, the legislative competence of Parliament to enact Section 9 of the MMDR Act could be traced to both Entries 54 and 97 of List I.268
203. The decision in Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills (supra) was followed by a two judge Bench in Saurashtra Cement (supra).269 In State of Orissa v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.,270 a three judge Bench held that the MMDR Act has made exhaustive provisions for “all kinds of taxation on minerals and mineral rights – tax, royalty – fee – dead rent, etc.” which denudes the state legislature of the power to enact any law or to impose any tax or other levy with reference to Entry 23 or Entry 50 of List II.
204. As discussed in the above segments, the field of tax on mineral rights vests with the state legislature. Parliament cannot impose a tax on mineral rights under Entry 54 of List I. Parliament cannot resort to its residuary powers to tax mineral rights when the subject matter is specifically enumerated in Entry 50 of the State List. The fixation of the rates of royalty under Section 9 can be validly traced to Entry 54 of List I because royalty is not a tax. The fixation of the rates of royalty falls with the regulatory powers of Parliament under Entry 54 of List I. The decisions in Mahalaxmi Fabric Mills (supra), Saurashtra Cement (supra), and Mahanadi Coalfields (supra) do not reflect the correct position of law.
205. Entry 50 of List II is not an exception to the Sundararamier principle which is that taxing entries are enumerated separately from the general entries in Lists I and II of the Seventh Schedule. The field of taxation cannot be derived from regulatory legislative entries and has to be derived from a specified taxing entry. This principle has now been well-entrenched in our constitutional jurisprudence. 271 268 Mahalaxmi Fabric (supra) [14] 269 [2000] Supp. 4 SCR 44 : (2001) 1 SCC 91 [11] 270 (1995) Supp. 2 SCC 686 271 Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India (1989) 3 SCC 634 [74]; State of Karnataka v. State of Meghalaya (2023) 4 SCC 416 [66] 1686 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports A legislature has incidental and subsidiary powers with respect to a legislative entry. However, the power to tax is neither incidental nor subsidiary to the power to legislate on a particular matter in the nature of a regulatory entry. 272
206. Entry 50 of List II is subordinated only to the extent of any limitations that may be imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development. Unless Parliament imposes a limitation, the plenary power of the state legislature to levy taxes on mineral rights is unaffected.
207. The question of an overlap between the taxing entry and general entry does not arise because Parliament cannot impose taxes on minerals under Entry 54 of List I. There is no direct conflict between the taxing powers of the States under Entry 50 of List II and the regulatory powers of the Union. Resultantly, the principle of federal supremacy has no application in the instant case. Hence, while Entry 50 of List II is sui generis, it does not constitute an exception to the position of law laid down in M P V Sundararamier (supra). b. Nature of “any limitation”
208. Having established that the state legislature has exclusive power to enact laws relating to taxes on mineral rights under Entry 50 of List II the next issue is to determine the nature of the limitations that Parliament can constitutionally impose on the exercise of the taxing powers of the states. To recap, the latter part of Entry 50 of List II has three elements: (i) any limitations; (ii) imposed by Parliament by law; and (iii) relating to mineral development. As held in above segments, the element of “law relating to mineral development” can be traced to Entry 54 of List I. Parliament has enacted the MMDR Act in pursuance of Article 246 read with Entry 54 of List I.
209. In respect to the first element, the petitioners have argued that Parliament has not expressly imposed any limitation under the MMDR Act on the taxing powers of the state under Entry 50 of List II. On the contrary, the respondents argue that the overall scheme of the MMDR Act in itself constitutes a limitation on the taxing powers of the state under Entry 50 of List II.
272 State of Mysore v. D Cawasji and Co (1970) 3 SCC 710 [8] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1687Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
210. There is a significant distinction as regard the nature of the restraints imposable by Parliament on the legislative field of the states to regulate mines and the development of minerals, as contrasted with the Parliamentary restraints contemplated on the taxing power of the states over mineral rights. In relation to the former, this distinction emerges from the language of Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of List II. As regards the latter, the language of Entry 50 of List II needs analysis for this purpose. We will take up the regulatory power of the states over mines and mineral development under Entry 23 of List II. Entry 23 of List II is expressly subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. The expression “subject to” indicates that the Constitution subordinates Entry 23 of List II to the entries in List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union. In other words, where there is an entry in List I relating to regulation and development under the control of the Union, Entry 23 of the State list has to yield to it. Entry 54 of List I is one such entry, which envisages the regulation of mines and mineral development. Entry 54 of List I is conditioned by three requirements – (i) a declaration by Parliament by law; (ii) envisaging that control of the Union is expedient in the public interest; and (iii) an indication by Parliament in the law of the extent of the control by the Union. Once these three conditions are fulfilled, the field for the states is abstracted away to the extent that is envisaged in the Parliamentary law. The relationship between Entry 23 of List II and Entry 54 of List I is that the latter results in a denudation of the legislative field of the states to the extent envisaged by Parliament by law. The expression ‘extent’ leaves it entirely to Parliament to determine whether the extent of the control by the Union is to be total or partial. The denudation of the legislative field of the states follows such a declaration by Parliament and the extent would be determined by the provisions of the law (the MMDR Act) enacted by Parliament.
211. We may now contrast this with Entry 50 of List II. Entry 50 of List II gives the legislative field of taxing mineral rights to the states. But while doing so, it makes it subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development. The words “subject to” appear in both Entry 23 and in Entry 50 of List II. They are words which indicate primacy of Parliament. But in Entry 50 of 1688 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports List II, the Constitution envisages that the field of taxing mineral rights which is given to the states will be subject to (i) limitations;
(ii) imposed by a law of Parliament relating to mineral development. The expression “regulation of mines” does not find place in Entry 50 of List II (as it does in Entry 23 of List II). Moreover, the law by Parliament relating to mineral development may impose limitations. Entry 50 of List II does not result in the field of taxing mineral rights being conferred on Parliament. This is clear also because there is no specific entry in List I giving the field of taxing mineral rights to the Union. The field of taxing mineral rights is exclusive to the states and continues to remain with them but the field is subject to the limitations imposed by Parliamentary law relating to mineral development. Parliament can determine whether, and if so, how the taxing power of the states over mineral rights should be limited in order to ensure that it does not impede or retard mineral development. If Parliament does so and indicates the nature of the limitations, the states are bound to abide by them while exercising the taxing power over mineral rights. The authority to impose a tax on mineral rights remains with the states but is subject to the limitations envisaged by a law enacted by Parliament in relation to the development of minerals. Under Entry 23, the regulatory power of the State is denuded by Parliament, while in case of Entry 50 the legislative field assigned to the states to tax mineral rights is only limited.
212. The supremacy of Parliament is one of the fundamental features of the English legal system. Our constitutional democracy envisages the supremacy of the Constitution. The subjection of all constitutional authorities to the mandate of a written Constitution is the fundamental feature of our Constitution. 273 This Court in In re Powers, Privileges and Immunities of State legislature, Special Reference No. 1 of 1964274 observed that the supremacy of the Constitution is fundamental to the existence of the federal unit and of the member States as a protection against destruction or impairment of the delicate balance of power. The Constitution is the source of the legislative powers of both Union and the states. 273 Kalpana Mehta v. Union of India (2018) 7 SCC 1 [218] 274 [1965] 1 SCR 413 [39] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1689Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
Any limitation on the exercise of plenary powers has to be situated within the Constitution and not beyond.
213. In Umeg Singh v. State of Bombay, 275 a Constitution Bench held that any limitation on the legislative power of the state legislature must be express:
“13. […] The legislative competence of the State can only be circumscribed by express prohibition contained in the Constitution itself and unless and until there is any provision in the Constitution expressly prohibiting legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally, there is no fetter or limitation on the plenary powers which the State Legislature enjoys to legislate on the topics enumerated in the Lists 2 and 3 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. […]” “14. The fetter or limitation upon the legislative power of the State Legislature which had plenary powers of legislation within the ambit of the legislative heads specified in the Lists 2 and 3 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution could only be imposed by the Constitution itself and not by any obligation which had been undertaken by either the Dominion Government or the Province of Bombay or even the State of Bombay. Under Article 246 the State Legislature was invested with the power to legislate on the topics enumerated in Lists 2 and 3 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and this power was by virtue of Article 245(1) subject to the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution itself laid down the fetters or limitations on this power e.g. in Article 303 or Article 286(2). But unless and until the court came to the conclusion that the Constitution itself had expressly prohibited legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally the power of the State Legislature to enact legislation within its legislative competence was plenary. Once the topic of legislation was comprised within any of the entries in the Lists 2 and 3 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution the fetter or limitation on such legislative power had to be found within 275 [1955] 2 SCR 164 1690 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports the Constitution itself and if there was no such fetter or limitation to be found there the State Legislature had full competence to enact the impugned Act no matter whether such enactment was contrary to the guarantee given, or the obligation undertaken by the Dominion Government or the Province of Bombay or even the State of Bombay.”
214. In Firm Bansidhar Premsukhdas v. State of Rajasthan, 276 this Court reiterated Umeg Singh (supra) by observing that the legislative competence of Parliament or of the State legislature can only be circumscribed by express prohibition contained in the Constitution. It was further observed that unless there is a provision in the Constitution expressly prohibiting legislation on the subject either absolutely or conditionally, there is no fetter or limitation on the plenary powers which the legislature is endowed with for legislating on the topics enumerated in the relevant Lists.
215. Any limitation on the plenary legislative powers of either the Union or the States with respect to a subject in the relevant Lists must be express and specified by the Constitution.
c. Scheme of the MMDR Act does not serve as “any limitation”
216. The Union has argued that (i) the MMDR Act occupies the entirety of the subject matter pertaining to mineral development, leaving no scope for the State legislatures to legislate under Entry 50 of List II; (ii) the MMDR Act abstracts the legislative powers of the States under Entry 50 of List II; (iii) the MMDR is a complete code with respect to the regulation of mines and mineral development and no part of the field is left for the States to legislate including on taxation of mineral rights.
217. The respondents have drawn our attention to the following architecture of the MMDR Act to press the point that the states have been deprived of legislative control in respect of mineral development: a. Although the State Government is the owner of minerals, the MMDR Act defines the rights which can be created in those minerals. Section 4 provides that no person can undertake prospecting or mining operations except in accordance with 276 [1966] Supp SCR 81 [7] [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1691Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
the terms and conditions of the license or lease, as the case may be. The form of license and lease agreements is stipulated under the Mineral Concession Rules. The grant of mineral rights is governed by the terms and conditions laid down under Form K of the rules. The State Government cannot change or modify the terms of the prospecting license or mining lease. The proviso to Section 5(1) states that the State Government shall not grant any mineral concession except with the previous approval of the Central Government. Any mineral concession granted in contravention of the provisions of the MMDR Act is void. 277 Moreover, Section 21 entails penal sanctions for contravention of Section 4;
b. The Central Government prescribes the fiscal exactions (such as royalty, dead rent, and surface rent) for the grant or creation of mineral rights. Section 9 empowers the Central Government to fix the rate of royalties. Section 25 deals with the recovery of unpaid rent, royalty and tax as arrears of land revenue; and c. The MMDR Act governs all aspects relating to both major minerals and minor minerals. Under Section 13, the Central Government is empowered to make rules on all or any matter relating to the grant of mineral concessions. Although Sections 14 and 15 allow the State Government to make rules in respect of minor minerals, the field of minor minerals is covered by the MMDR Act leaving no scope for the state legislature to legislate. In case the Central Government undertakes prospecting or mining operations, Section 17(3) specifies the levies it is bound to pay. Further, the State Government cannot reserve any area under Section 17A without the approval of the Central Government. The Central Government is also empowered to issue directions to the State Government for the conservation of mineral resources or on any policy matter in the national interest. Section 18 empowers only the Central Government to take any measure necessary for mineral development.
218. Two issues have to be addressed: (i) whether the MMDR Act fulfils the requirement of “any limitation” under Entry 50 of List II; and 277 Section 19, MMDR Act 1692 [2024] 7 S.C.R.Digital Supreme Court Reports
(ii) whether the MMDR Act contains any provision limiting the taxing powers of the states under Entry 50 of List II.
219. The MMDR Act lays down the means and processes by which the rights to mines and minerals may be exercised or granted by the owner of mineral rights. It is true that the MMDR Act largely denudes the states of their legislative powers with respect to regulation of mines and mineral development under Entry 23 of List II. However, the expression in Entry 50 of List II demonstrates that: (i) Parliament can limit the legislative power of the States to tax minerals; and (ii) the limitation has to be imposed “by law” relating to mineral development.
220. The MMDR Act has a centralizing tendency because the Central Government is tasked with important responsibilities such as setting out the terms and conditions of mining leases, fixing the rates of royalty and issuing guidelines to State Governments in respect of conservation of minerals. This drift towards the Central Government stems from the fact that the principal aim of the MMDR Act is development and conservation of minerals. 278 Minerals being a natural and scarce resource, their exploitation has to be scientific and judicious. The MMDR Act enumerates rules and regulations to ensure that the exploration, extraction, and exploitation of minerals follow standards of conservation and sustainability. The Indian State is the trustee of all natural resources, including minerals. 279 Therefore, it is a constitutional duty of the State to protect minerals and ensure their exploitation in public interest.
221. By authorizing the Central Government to lay down the terms of mining leases and grant approval to concessions, the MMDR Act seeks to ensure that there is uniformity in the terms for working of mines and extraction of minerals. Uniformity in the terms and conditions of mining leases, rates of royalty, and in the policy approach towards conservation of minerals reduces indiscriminate exploitation of mineral resources and promotes mineral development. The fact that the State Government cannot alter the clauses in the mining lease cannot be understood to mean that all the powers of the State with respect to regulation of mines and mineral development as well as the power to tax mineral rights have been extinguished.
278 Hindu Stone (supra) [10] 279 See M C Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 1693Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. v. M/s Steel Authority of India & Anr. Etc.
222. Entry 50 of List II provides that the legislative power of States to tax mineral rights is subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development. A plain reading of the phrase makes it clear that the taxing power is subject to “any limitations” and not a “law relating to mineral development.” If the Constitution intended to restrict the taxing powers under Entry 50 of List II with respect to a parliamentary law, it would not have used the expression “any limitations.” It could have used phraseology such as for example, “Taxes on mineral rights subject to any law relating to mineral development made by Parliament.” Parliament has to ‘impose’ the limitations. That is, Parliament has to expressly specify the limitations by the authority of law. Thus, under Entry 50 of List II the taxing power of the State is subject to the extent that Parliament imposes any limitations “by law” relating to mineral development.
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